

1  
2 (9.30 am)  
3 (Delay in proceedings)  
4 (9.42 am)  
5 DR DAVID WEBB (continued)  
6 Questions from MS ANYADIKE-DANES (continued)  
7 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Good morning, Dr Webb.  
8 I want to pull up something that you had talked  
9 about in relation to status epilepticus. There's  
10 a protocol that was developed for status epilepticus  
11 in the Children's Hospital, the reference for which is  
12 311-023-010, I think; were you familiar with that?  
13 A. This is the protocol that's used for convulsive status.  
14 Q. Yes. And what would be the difference in treatment  
15 between that and non-convulsive status so far as you're  
16 concerned?  
17 A. Well, this is a protocol that -- do we have the date of  
18 when it was first ...  
19 Q. Yes, we do: July 1994. This is the third edition and,  
20 I believe, the edition that was in force at the time of  
21 Claire's admission.  
22 A. It's similar to a protocol that would be used today with  
23 some variation, so we wouldn't go to diazepam --  
24 Q. All I'm asking you for is, in 1996, if you say this was  
25 the protocol that was developed for convulsive

1 A. But as I said, I wouldn't have gone to phenobarbitone  
2 in the situation that I found myself.  
3 Q. What's the difference between the general situation and  
4 the situation you found yourself in with Claire?  
5 A. Because I think with phenobarbitone Claire would have  
6 had to go to intensive care.  
7 Q. But isn't that the point? It might be thought at that  
8 stage, when you're having to use phenobarbitone, that  
9 intensive care might be an appropriate place to be  
10 treating a child like that.  
11 A. I think if you had used phenobarbitone, that would be  
12 correct.  
13 Q. Yes. Is one way of interpreting that at that stage,  
14 where you feel it's necessary to move on to a different  
15 therapy, that might be indicating something sufficiently  
16 serious, which suggests that the child should be treated  
17 in intensive care?  
18 A. And I think that the rationale for that is largely to do  
19 with the convulsive nature of the problem. So with  
20 convulsive status, the risk is much higher for it to  
21 cause additional damage to the brain.  
22 Q. And why is that?  
23 A. Because there's a huge metabolic requirement that occurs  
24 during convulsive status. You're much more likely to  
25 get hypoxic damage to the brain in that context. So

1 status epilepticus, what was the difference in 1996  
2 between the treatment of convulsive status epilepticus  
3 and non-convulsive status epilepticus?  
4 A. I think this protocol was a useful guideline, but you  
5 had to design your treatment for the situation you were  
6 in. So it would be one that -- I wouldn't have used  
7 phenobarbitone for Claire because, in that context, she  
8 would have had to have ventilation. So that was the  
9 reason that I went to midazolam after phenytoin because  
10 I felt that that was a safer option for her.  
11 Q. Safer?  
12 A. Yes.  
13 Q. I'm still not entirely clear on what you say the  
14 difference in principle is between treating convulsive  
15 status epilepticus and non-convulsive status epilepticus  
16 or isn't there one?  
17 A. There isn't one.  
18 Q. Right. I understand you to say that, in all treatments,  
19 you tailor them to what you understand to be the needs  
20 and requirements of the child, I understand that, but in  
21 this general protocol, why is it that it goes, after  
22 diazepam, to phenobarbitone?  
23 A. Because I think that was the protocol that was  
24 recommended at the time.  
25 Q. At the time.

1 it's the fact that the child is convulsing, which places  
2 a huge metabolic demand on the brain. That's less of  
3 an issue with non-convulsive status.  
4 Q. What about the demand on the brain if non-convulsive  
5 status is continuing for some considerable period of  
6 time?  
7 A. Non-convulsive status can go on for days and cause no  
8 additional damage to the brain. In that sense, it  
9 doesn't always cause the concern that you see with  
10 convulsive status.  
11 Q. Well, we may have to revisit that as to how serious  
12 a condition non-convulsive status is. Can I just hear  
13 from you --  
14 THE CHAIRMAN: Sorry, I don't think the doctor's saying it's  
15 not serious.  
16 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: No, no, that's how I'm going to frame  
17 it --  
18 A. What I am saying is that it can go on for days and the  
19 child can make a full recovery from it.  
20 Q. I understand you to be saying that.  
21 A. It can also cause problems, but the situation is  
22 completely different for convulsive status where there's  
23 a very high risk after 30 minutes.  
24 Q. If we stay with the non-convulsive status epilepticus,  
25 is it also possible, even without it being prolonged for

1 days, for that too to be serious and to have the  
2 potential to cause damage?  
3 A. Yes, and that's why I was treating it, but I think that  
4 potential is much less.  
5 Q. Thank you. And under there where it says "maintain  
6 homoeostasis", what does that mean?  
7 A. Homoeostasis is maintaining the child's oxygen levels,  
8 their blood pressure.  
9 Q. Might that include also maintaining their serum sodium  
10 levels within range?  
11 A. I think in a general sense, if you're in intensive care,  
12 yes, that would be part of the care.  
13 Q. I don't mean in intensive care; I mean maintaining  
14 homoeostasis. Can that terminology also include  
15 maintaining their electrolyte levels within normal  
16 range?  
17 A. I think that's a much bigger issue if you're in  
18 convulsive status.  
19 Q. I'm trying to find out about the meaning of maintaining  
20 homoeostasis --  
21 A. I understand that.  
22 Q. I don't mean how difficult it might be to do --  
23 A. I understand that.  
24 Q. -- or how serious it is if you don't do it; all I want  
25 to find out at the moment from you is whether you

5

1 understand that terminology to also embrace maintaining  
2 electrolyte levels within normal range.  
3 A. I think I would, yes [OVERSPEAKING].  
4 Q. And how would you do that other than testing?  
5 A. As I said, this is in the context of convulsive status  
6 you're talking about.  
7 Q. I understand that.  
8 A. I think it is a little less of an issue in  
9 non-convulsive status.  
10 Q. I understand that. But in any event, if you are going  
11 to maintain homoeostasis, which does include maintaining  
12 your electrolyte levels within normal range, you have to  
13 test.  
14 A. That's correct.  
15 Q. Otherwise how will you know. Why do you need to do  
16 that?  
17 A. Because of the risks of hypoglycaemia and hyponatraemia.  
18 Q. And hyponatraemia? And hyponatraemia, is that not also  
19 a risk for non-fitting or non-convulsive  
20 status epilepticus?  
21 A. It's very much less of an issue for it.  
22 Q. But it is a risk?  
23 A. It's a potential small risk, yes.  
24 Q. Yes. A risk. And therefore something one has to have  
25 in mind?

6

1 A. Yes.  
2 Q. And if it's something you have to have in mind -- on  
3 Friday, I was asking you about the need for a paediatric  
4 neurologist who might be involved to not be prescribing  
5 the fluid therapy, but offering some guidance on it. If  
6 it's something that you ought to have in mind, is it not  
7 something that you should therefore have been drawing to  
8 the attention of the junior paediatric team?  
9 A. And as I said to you on Friday, I discussed that with  
10 Dr Sands the very first time we talked about Claire, so  
11 I had raised the issue of what her sodium was and we  
12 both agreed it wouldn't have explained her presentation  
13 at that time.  
14 Q. That's a different point. That's a diagnostic point.  
15 The point I'm asking you is in terms of managing her  
16 care. When you come at 2 o'clock, it is because you've  
17 been asked to offer some sort of an opinion as to her  
18 and to help provide some assistance as to what an  
19 appropriate treatment plan might be in terms of her  
20 neurological presentation. At that stage when you are  
21 doing that, the point I'm asking you is: would that not  
22 have been appropriate to offer some guidance as to the  
23 fluid therapy?  
24 A. I don't think I would have distinguished my discussion  
25 about the sodium from it being a diagnostic issue from

7

1 being a therapeutic issue. So I would have raised it as  
2 an issue and my understanding was that the fluid  
3 management was being managed by the paediatric team.  
4 Q. Later on, when you see her at 2 o'clock, is it not  
5 something that you should be considering then also?  
6 A. We had just discussed it. It was minutes previously.  
7 Q. No, you had discussed it with Dr Sands. Dr Sands is not  
8 there at 2 o'clock. You have the junior team and, for  
9 all you know, Dr Sands may not be returning for some  
10 time. You are there offering guidance and an opinion on  
11 her state. So it's a very simple question: is it not  
12 something that you could have just drawn to the  
13 attention of the junior SHO who was with you, just so  
14 that he is alive to, perhaps, the importance of keeping  
15 an eye on her serum sodium level?  
16 A. My expectation wouldn't have been that Dr Sands wouldn't  
17 have been around. My expectation was that Dr Sands  
18 would have been around. He was providing care for that  
19 ward. So as I said, I had raised that issue, we  
20 discussed it, the level, as I understood it, was from  
21 that morning and was not one that would have caused me  
22 concern.  
23 Q. Then maybe I can ask you in this way: when you raised it  
24 and discussed it with Dr Sands, how did you discuss it  
25 with him in terms of the diagnostics and the risks?

8

1 A. The very fact that we discussed it would have raised it  
2 as an issue.  
3 Q. That's what I'm asking you. What did you say? I'm not  
4 asking you literally what you said because it's  
5 impossible to recall, but in general terms what would  
6 you have been saying about it from a diagnostic point of  
7 view and from a risk point of view?  
8 A. I would have asked him what the level was, he told me  
9 what the level was, and we agreed it wasn't an  
10 explanation for her presentation at that time.  
11 Q. Yes? And?  
12 A. I can't recall any further discussion about it at that  
13 time.  
14 Q. That's why I'm asking you about the risk. That is only  
15 saying that doesn't help us to diagnose her presentation  
16 as at when you saw her at the ward round at 11 o'clock.  
17 It doesn't say: this is a child who's presenting with  
18 some neurological concerns, one needs to bear in mind  
19 fluids and electrolyte levels.  
20 A. I accept I wasn't prescriptive in that way.  
21 Q. Do you think that would have been helpful to have done  
22 that?  
23 A. In retrospect, it might have been. I think it was  
24 reasonable for me to expect that the paediatric team  
25 would manage the fluids.

1 that hadn't happened.  
2 A. No, and I didn't imply that he did.  
3 Q. No, you didn't say that; I'm saying that he couldn't  
4 have.  
5 A. Yes.  
6 Q. There's a flowchart, just while you're there on the  
7 interrelationship of matters, that we prepared with the  
8 assistance of one of the inquiry's experts to see if you  
9 can help with this. It's 310-014-001. This is trying  
10 to capture the interrelationship of these conditions.  
11 You see there that you've got a feed in to the cerebral  
12 oedema from those three potential conditions, the  
13 encephalitis, status epilepticus, and the  
14 encephalopathy. But the status epilepticus  
15 non-convulsive, non-fitting, is seen, so far as the  
16 inquiry's experts are seeing it, as a potential  
17 independent cause of cerebral oedema. Do you accept  
18 that that's possible?  
19 A. My experience certainly has been that it is a rare cause  
20 of cerebral oedema. So it wouldn't be something that  
21 I would be expecting, no.  
22 Q. Can I ask you, as at 1996 when you were treating Claire,  
23 what was the extent of your experience of non-fitting or  
24 non-convulsive status epilepticus?  
25 A. I can't recall exactly, but I probably would have seen

1 Q. I think you've said that before. I was simply looking  
2 for your position on guidance. Even with retrospect, do  
3 you think that guidance on it might have been helpful?  
4 A. I think if her sodium had been below 130 then I would  
5 almost certainly have said something in relation to  
6 fluid management specifically. But with a figure of 132  
7 in a child who had been vomiting, I wouldn't have made  
8 any comment.  
9 Q. I suppose one of the reasons I am pressing you -- and to  
10 some extent, I'm being asked to press you a little  
11 bit -- is because an awful lot turns, as it turns out,  
12 on your belief that the 132 was from that morning. And  
13 given that it does, would it not have been incumbent to  
14 be absolutely sure about when that test was taken, even  
15 to ask exactly when were those bloods taken; not is it  
16 this morning or whenever -- this morning could have been  
17 after the ward round whenever. When exactly were those  
18 bloods taken? Would that not have been an appropriate  
19 question? Then you're pinpointing to a particular time  
20 what her serum sodium was.  
21 A. In retrospect perhaps, yes.  
22 Q. Yes. From Dr Sands' evidence -- as I understand it and  
23 I'll stand corrected -- he couldn't have intentionally  
24 been conveying to you that that blood result came from  
25 a test result that was done that morning because he knew

1 maybe 7 or 8 children with non-convulsive status.  
2 Q. As at that stage?  
3 A. Yes.  
4 Q. And can you recall -- you may not be able to, I'm just  
5 seeing if you can help us -- over what period of time  
6 we're talking about. Does that include prior to you  
7 being a consultant?  
8 A. Yes.  
9 Q. When you were a registrar and so on?  
10 A. Yes.  
11 Q. If you can do it, do you know, before Claire, roughly  
12 the last time you saw a child with the condition you  
13 thought she had, which is non-convulsive  
14 status epilepticus?  
15 A. It would have been in Vancouver.  
16 Q. In Vancouver?  
17 A. Yes.  
18 Q. So it's not a common occurrence for you?  
19 A. No, it's not.  
20 Q. And it in and of itself is not a common occurrence,  
21 therefore the potential odd features of it or rare  
22 features of it will be even less likely to have been  
23 familiar to you?  
24 A. That's correct.  
25 Q. As you probably have appreciated from some of the

1 questions that you were being asked on Friday, there is  
2 an issue, perhaps, between you and Dr Sands as to how  
3 many times you spoke to him before you actually came to  
4 the ward and saw Claire. I think up until Friday your  
5 evidence -- and correct me if I'm wrong -- was that you  
6 had actually spoken to Dr Sands once, which was that  
7 period in the corridor. And at that time, apart from  
8 all the other things that you say you talked to him  
9 about, there were two issues that Dr Sands was  
10 particularly concerned about. Obviously he was  
11 concerned about her neurological presentation. But  
12 he was particularly concerned about whether he ought to  
13 be starting her on diazepam and whether he ought to be  
14 requesting a CT scan. We'll come to the CT scan later.  
15 But in terms of the diazepam, your view that that --  
16 there was one conversation and the conversation happened  
17 whenever you met up in the corridor after your talk and  
18 then went into the room. That doesn't seem to be able  
19 to work, given that he took his lead from you that  
20 rectal diazepam was appropriate and rectal diazepam is  
21 recorded as having been administered at 12.15. I think  
22 your view was you might have spoken to him on the phone  
23 about that.  
24 A. That's possible, yes.  
25 Q. When did you first think you might have had some other

13

1 Q. -- because meeting him in the corridor is too late.  
2 A. Yes.  
3 Q. Was there any discussion about diazepam when you met him  
4 at lunchtime?  
5 A. I can't recall. No, I don't think there was. I can't  
6 recall.  
7 Q. So does that mean that you didn't actually appreciate  
8 that rectal diazepam had been administered until you  
9 came on to the ward and would have seen his note?  
10 A. Until I came on the ward and discussed it with the  
11 nurse.  
12 THE CHAIRMAN: No, sorry. There's a difference between what  
13 the doctor remembers 16 years later and what he would  
14 have known on the Tuesday morning. If he had spoken to  
15 Dr Sands earlier in the morning and given the go-ahead  
16 for diazepam, then he would not have been surprised  
17 later on that Tuesday to find that, when he came to the  
18 ward, that the diazepam had been administered.  
19 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Yes.  
20 THE CHAIRMAN: I'm not sure how much it's going to be  
21 helpful to get bogged down in exactly how many times he  
22 spoke. The question is: what happened between them and  
23 what did Dr Webb do when he arrived to see Claire?  
24 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: I think from Dr Sands' point of view, he  
25 probably does regard it as important that he is raising

15

1 conversation with him apart from the time when you  
2 actually met him?  
3 A. I can't recall any other communication before me seeing  
4 Claire.  
5 Q. No, sorry. When was the first time it occurred to you  
6 you might have actually had two communications with  
7 Dr Sands as opposed to the one which has featured  
8 previously in your statements?  
9 A. I think when I read his transcripts.  
10 Q. Why did you think you might have had two?  
11 A. Because he talked about me recommending the diazepam,  
12 which I hadn't recalled myself before.  
13 THE CHAIRMAN: So having seen him say that, you think that  
14 might be right --  
15 A. Yes.  
16 THE CHAIRMAN: -- but you can't remember?  
17 A. I can't remember.  
18 THE CHAIRMAN: Okay.  
19 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: You hadn't recalled before that he  
20 wanted advice and guidance on the rectal diazepam or  
21 diazepam at all?  
22 A. That I had agreed or recommended it, if you like.  
23 Q. And so if you did that, then that must mean that you had  
24 some other conversation --  
25 A. Yes, it made sense.

14

1 issues just as soon as he can with Dr Webb because he  
2 regarded Claire's situation as being very serious.  
3 THE CHAIRMAN: I've understood that. I get that entirely  
4 from Dr Sands, that he wouldn't have gone to see Dr Webb  
5 if he didn't think Claire's condition was very worrying  
6 indeed.  
7 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: I think his point is that he didn't  
8 leave it to a phone call just to ask him, "Can I confirm  
9 whether it is all right to give diazepam?"; he actually  
10 had a fuller conversation with him earlier, as I  
11 understand his evidence to be, but I'll be corrected if  
12 that's incorrect.  
13 But in terms of you appreciating what Dr Sands'  
14 position was, if I can put it that way, in relation to  
15 the diazepam, in his inquest statement Dr Sands says  
16 that -- the reference is 091-009-056, which we don't  
17 need to pull up -- the diazepam was after speaking to  
18 you. So if you had read the papers for the inquest --  
19 I don't know, did you read the statements for the  
20 inquest?  
21 A. I can't recall reading Dr Sands' statement.  
22 Q. If I could just pick up some points with you in relation  
23 to the 2 pm attendance. If we pull up 090-022-054.  
24 I had asked you about -- if you see under "Impressions",  
25 "Yesterday's episodes".

16

1 A. Mm-hm.  
2 Q. And I think the answer you got was that it was possible  
3 that she was -- or it is possible to have quite subtle  
4 non-convulsive seizure activity.  
5 A. That's correct.  
6 Q. But in relation to the "yesterday's episodes" point,  
7 I had asked you where you obtained that information from  
8 and I had taken you to -- just bear with me -- Dr Sands'  
9 ward note, which is just above there, when it says, "No  
10 seizure activity observed". And I think it was in  
11 response to that that you then said these things can be  
12 really quite subtle. Would that be a fair way of  
13 characterising it?  
14 A. That's correct.  
15 Q. And then when I asked you where would you get the  
16 information there and there was an issue as to how you  
17 might have done that, you provided a statement for  
18 the coroner at 139-098-018. If you look down at the  
19 bottom:  
20 "I was uncertain after speaking to her  
21 grandmother ..."  
22 And if we can pull up the next page as well, I think  
23 it goes on. Let's stay with the bottom bit:  
24 "I was uncertain after speaking to her grandmother  
25 whether there had been definite seizure activity

17

1 A. Yes.  
2 Q. When do you think you were told about the 3.25 seizure?  
3 A. Because in relation to the contact that I had prior to  
4 starting the midazolam --  
5 Q. Yes, but the midazolam is started at 3.25.  
6 A. And I --  
7 Q. And you have already described the process that you went  
8 through --  
9 A. It's recorded as being started at 3.25 --  
10 Q. It is recorded that it was started at 3.25 -- well, it's  
11 recorded in two places and we'll come to that in  
12 a minute. But you already went through, on Friday, the  
13 process by which you would have provided that  
14 prescription or dosage and it involved you hearing  
15 something from the ward, going to your office, checking  
16 through your papers, checking what the appropriate  
17 dosage was, phoning back to the ward to say what the  
18 dosage should be, that dosage then to be prepared,  
19 written up and administered. And I think you accepted  
20 from me that it's pretty difficult or might be quite  
21 difficult for all that to happen within the span of time  
22 of the seizure being recorded at 3.25 and the  
23 administration being recorded at 3.25.  
24 A. That's correct, but my understanding is that Claire's  
25 mother witnessed the seizure at 3.25, so I don't think

19

1 witnessed on the day of admission [so that's the  
2 previously day, Monday 21st]. However, when I spoke to  
3 Claire's mother later on that afternoon, I obtained  
4 a history of a definite seizure affecting Claire's right  
5 side the previous day [that's the 21st] and I was in no  
6 doubt that she had indeed had a convulsive seizure on  
7 Monday, the day of admission."  
8 The history that you are talking about, that's the  
9 where you come on to the ward at about 5 o'clock;  
10 is that right?  
11 A. That's correct.  
12 Q. And what you're saying is that when you were talking to  
13 the mother at that stage, she described a seizure to  
14 you.  
15 A. That's correct.  
16 Q. The mother had witnessed a seizure. In the record of  
17 attacks observed, she witnessed a seizure at 3.25. Is  
18 it at all possible that she was telling you about the  
19 seizure that might well have been uppermost in her mind,  
20 which is that one?  
21 A. I have considered that since. I think it's unlikely  
22 because I think I would have been alerted to that  
23 because I'm almost certain I was told about the seizure  
24 at 3.25 earlier.  
25 Q. Earlier?

18

1 that the medication could have been given at 3.25.  
2 Q. Well, let's just have a look at the nursing note. The  
3 nursing note at 090-040-141. This is by either Staff  
4 Nurse Ellison or Staff Nurse Field. You can see:  
5 "Stat dose IV phenytoin."  
6 That's recorded:  
7 "Seen by Dr Webb. Still in status epilepticus.  
8 Given stat IV Hypnovel [which is the midazolam] at  
9 3.25."  
10 A. And my understanding is that --  
11 MR SEPHTON: I wonder if my learned friend could also put up  
12 at the same time the record of attacks observed, which  
13 is at page 144 in this bundle.  
14 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: The record of attacks observed is  
15 090-042-144.  
16 MR SEPHTON: I don't know what my learned friend is putting,  
17 but the time there is recorded as "3.10 pm" and then  
18 there's -- Mrs Roberts has also written "3.25".  
19 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: I think that may have been one of the  
20 occasions when you may not have been here for the  
21 evidence. The attack observed is at 3.25, it was  
22 observed by Claire's mother and she signed it and  
23 entered it. The attack is not observed and recorded at  
24 3.10. It was thought that 3.10 might have been, for  
25 some reason, when the sheet was started for whatever

20

1 reason. We can't explain it.  
2 THE CHAIRMAN: There's a question about that. It's  
3 a curious combination of entries about why she would be  
4 started at 3.10 before any attacks are observed, but  
5 Mrs Roberts was strong in her recollection that  
6 despite -- it goes slightly against the ordinary reading  
7 of the page, but she was quite strong in her  
8 recollection that the seizure she noted was actually at  
9 3.25.

10 MR SEPHTON: The only point I make is when the nurse put  
11 "3.10" there, she made a mistake, and the same point  
12 needs to be made about the point at which the midazolam  
13 was administered.

14 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

15 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Let's go to the drug sheet, which is  
16 090-026-075. At the bottom, under the "Drugs once only"  
17 prescriptions, third line:

18 "Midazolam. 3.25."

19 So both the nurse and the doctor completing that  
20 drugs sheet have 3.25. But in any event, however that  
21 record of attacks is completed, as the chairman has  
22 said, Mrs Roberts was very clear about when it was  
23 happened. She was the only person there, she made  
24 a note of the time, she witnessed it, it was something  
25 she had never seen before, it left quite a powerful

21

1 look and see what's said at the top of that 019:  
2 "I believe my impression was that this girl, who had  
3 an undoubted epileptic tendency and had had a witnessed  
4 seizure on the day prior to admission."

5 That's a Sunday. What is the seizure that she's  
6 having on the Sunday?

7 A. That's a mistake. It should be "the day of admission".

8 Q. That's a mistake?

9 A. Yes. It was prior to me seeing her, the day of  
10 admission.

11 Q. But in any event, you have characterised these as  
12 a seizure, and the source of it is from Claire's mother;  
13 is that right?

14 A. That's correct.

15 Q. Yes. So in other words, if it's a seizure that Claire's  
16 mother could recognise as such and describe to you as  
17 a seizure, how does that fit with you saying, "Well, it  
18 might be something subtle"?

19 A. I don't think that Claire's mother may not have  
20 recognised it as a seizure, it may have been that we  
21 discussed -- I would have asked her questions that would  
22 have elicited a history that suggested to me that it was  
23 a seizure. But she may not herself have been aware that  
24 it was a potential seizure.

25 Q. But if that's the case then, wouldn't she have been

23

1 impression on her and I believe she got the nurse  
2 herself and the nurse is the person who asked her to  
3 record, in the record of attacks, her observation. And  
4 her evidence is there on the transcript to see how she  
5 put the time and why she put that time there and why she  
6 is certain of it.

7 So where this all started was to suggest to you that  
8 perhaps there has been some confusion and that what  
9 you're referring to in this witness statement and since  
10 about the seizure activity is actually not something  
11 that happened the previous day, but is something that  
12 happened that day when Mrs Roberts was describing to you  
13 what she had just seen, close to just seen, and had made  
14 an impression on her, and that's what I was putting to  
15 you. Is that possible, that there could have been some  
16 confusion?

17 A. I think it's most unlikely.

18 Q. Most unlikely. Then if we pull up, again, the  
19 139-098-018 and 019. As I understand Mrs Roberts'  
20 evidence, just so that it's clear, she is going to say  
21 that she only told you about the seizure at 3.25 that  
22 she witnessed, and her evidence so far has been, as  
23 intimated to the inquiry by her senior counsel Mr Quinn,  
24 that she definitely didn't describe any seizures  
25 happening on the day of Claire's admission. But if you

22

1 saying that sort of thing to Dr O'Hare, who took quite  
2 a detailed note of Claire's presentation when she  
3 examined her? Her note starts at 090-022-50; it's  
4 recorded at 8 o'clock. She took quite a detailed  
5 history from the parents. But there is no reference in  
6 there, as you go on then -- if one pulls up alongside  
7 that 051 -- there is absolutely no reference to  
8 a seizure there.

9 A. I think it's quite likely that Dr O'Hare would have  
10 asked the question, "Did Claire have any seizures?", but  
11 that's not the question I would have asked.

12 Q. Why do you think that Dr O'Hare would ask, "Did Claire  
13 have any seizures?"

14 A. Because that's what she's written.

15 Q. Is that not equally interpreted as her conclusion in the  
16 same way as you concluded from what Claire's mother,  
17 Mrs Roberts, told you, that she had had one? Is it not  
18 equally possible that Dr O'Hare concluded what Claire's  
19 mother told her, that she hadn't had one?

20 A. It is possible, yes, but I think it's more likely that  
21 she would have said to the mother, "Did Claire have any  
22 seizures yesterday?"

23 THE CHAIRMAN: In other words, if the admitting doctor goes  
24 through a history with a parent of a child's seizures,  
25 then it would be strange if the doctor did not ask when

24

1 the recent most seizure was, or if there had been  
2 a recent seizure?  
3 A. Yes.  
4 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: On the other hand, if what you're trying  
5 to find out is what's the cause of the child's  
6 presentation and how long she might have been like that,  
7 then you're putting a burden on the parent to interpret  
8 matters accurately for you. Are you not better off  
9 simply asking the parent to describe how the child has  
10 been and that allows you to use your clinical judgment  
11 as you say that you did on Tuesday to have reached  
12 a view?  
13 A. I'm not suggesting that Dr O'Hare didn't do that; I'm  
14 just saying, in relation to convulsive seizures, she may  
15 have asked the question, "Did you see any seizures?",  
16 which would have been --  
17 Q. Then I suspect we'll hear from the parents as to what  
18 they told Dr O'Hare. I'm not sure Dr O'Hare's evidence  
19 suggests any of that, but we'll obviously go through and  
20 see what she says.  
21 In any event, you're saying that your description of  
22 seizure in the witness statement that you prepared for  
23 the coroner is to embrace your reference to "subtle,  
24 non-convulsive seizure activity"?  
25 A. No, my understanding from my clinical note would be that

25

1 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: We actually can see what Dr O'Hare did  
2 say. It occurs in two places. Her witness statement  
3 135/1 at page 6. Let's go to that first. At (d):  
4 "Explain if there were any alternative diagnoses  
5 and, if so, identify each of them and explain why they  
6 were not noted on the A&E notes.  
7 "My working diagnosis was a viral illness. I appear  
8 to have written 'encephalitis' and then deleted it. My  
9 reason for deleting this as a differential diagnosis was  
10 the absence of fever. I believe I also considered  
11 a subclinical seizure as I have written to give diazepam  
12 if there were any seizures observed. However, the GP,  
13 the SHO and I, who took the initial history, appear not  
14 to have elicited the history of focal signs with  
15 right-sided stiffening on the day of admission. This is  
16 first recorded the following day by Dr Webb."  
17 So she hasn't said that she asked her about  
18 seizures, she's trying to elicit a history which will  
19 allow her to reach certain conclusions. If we perhaps  
20 pull up alongside that a further reference, 135/1 at  
21 page 20. The very top:  
22 "I believe Claire was unwell, but was difficult to  
23 assess in view of her past medical history. The absence  
24 of a fever made infectious encephalitis less likely. In  
25 view of her history of epilepsy the possibility of

27

1 the story that I obtained from Claire's mum would have  
2 been a description of a convulsive seizure.  
3 Q. A convulsive seizure?  
4 A. Yes.  
5 Q. Well, if she had convulsive seizures, why did you think  
6 she was now having non-convulsive seizures?  
7 A. Because it's not unusual for the two to occur together.  
8 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, but if the two are occurring together,  
9 if that was your understanding, then having convulsive  
10 seizures is more serious on the evidence that you were  
11 giving earlier.  
12 A. If they are longer, yes.  
13 THE CHAIRMAN: Because that carries with it a greater risk  
14 of brain damage --  
15 A. If you're having a 30-minute convulsive seizure, that's  
16 a major concern.  
17 THE CHAIRMAN: Sorry, when you gave your evidence earlier  
18 this morning, I understood that you were drawing  
19 a difference between convulsive seizures, which carry  
20 with them a greater risk of brain damage, and  
21 non-convulsive seizures, which still carry a risk, but  
22 a lesser risk?  
23 A. In the context of status epilepticus --  
24 THE CHAIRMAN: Right.  
25 A. -- which is a greater than 30-minute seizure.

26

1 non-convulsive states was a possibility, but there were  
2 no visible seizures on admission and EEG out of hours  
3 was not routinely available. On her admission, I felt  
4 an initial period of observation [and so forth] was  
5 warranted."  
6 So from whatever was the history that she took, the  
7 clear view that she got was that there were no visible  
8 seizures if you look at those two things. I'm sure  
9 Mrs Roberts will give her evidence. So that just leaves  
10 the position as to why it was in the face of that  
11 you were able to nonetheless discern that Claire had  
12 suffered a convulsive seizure, which would have been  
13 obvious in a way that could be described so that  
14 somebody could have recognised it as such, on the  
15 Monday. Were you told when that convulsive seizure had  
16 happened?  
17 A. I can't recall that.  
18 Q. But that would have been an important thing to know.  
19 A. Um ... Well, I may have been told, but I didn't record  
20 it.  
21 Q. Were you told how long it had lasted for?  
22 A. I didn't record that either.  
23 Q. That would have been an important thing to record,  
24 wouldn't it?  
25 A. Well, it was almost certainly a brief seizure if it

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1 had --  
2 Q. Sorry?  
3 A. It was almost certain a brief event. If it had been  
4 lengthy, I certainly would have recorded it.  
5 Q. Your evidence is you believed you were being brought in  
6 to offer specific guidance and opinion, so your evidence  
7 is you're not having the normal care of this or the  
8 general care of this child, you're coming in to do very  
9 specific things. Your note therefore has to be  
10 something that people who are having the general care of  
11 the child can readily interpret, understand and see the  
12 significance of.  
13 A. Mm-hm.  
14 Q. So if you're going to put that she had episodes, which  
15 in your note you don't actually describe as seizures --  
16 as I understand it, you call them "yesterday's  
17 episodes".  
18 A. That's correct.  
19 Q. Why didn't you put it was a seizure?  
20 A. Because at that time I wasn't clear in my own mind that  
21 it was.  
22 Q. Did you revisit that at 5 o'clock and say, "Now that  
23 I've taken a fuller history from the mother, I can see  
24 that she had actually suffered a seizure on the  
25 Monday" --

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1 admitting notes. And it's something which, for  
2 instance, Dr Sands appears to have been unaware of, even  
3 having spoken to Mr and Mrs Roberts on that morning.  
4 And the question is then, in the same way as your note  
5 for the coroner or your preparatory note for the coroner  
6 describes Claire having had a seizure on the Sunday,  
7 could you be mistaken in recording that Mrs Roberts had  
8 told you she had a seizure on the Monday when in fact  
9 she was referring, if anything, to the Tuesday afternoon  
10 event?  
11 A. I accept that's possible.  
12 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Thank you. I just want to move on and  
13 ask you a brief question about her notes. When you came  
14 to see her at 2 o'clock, you said -- and that's how this  
15 line of questioning started -- that you didn't have  
16 a very clear picture. And in fact, if you had looked  
17 at the note previous from Dr Sands, he also wanted to  
18 have a discussion with Dr Gaston. And I asked you  
19 a little bit about that on Friday. But what I'm  
20 interested to know is what is it you wanted to know.  
21 You've clearly recorded that I'm not really too sure  
22 about this child's background, effectively, so what is  
23 it that you wanted to know?  
24 A. In relation to the prodrome, it was particularly whether  
25 if there were other symptoms that would suggest that

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1 A. That's correct.  
2 Q. -- did you put that in your note at 5 pm?  
3 A. I recorded in my history that that included an event --  
4 Q. She had some focal signs on Monday and right sided  
5 stiffening.  
6 A. That's correct.  
7 Q. And that's a seizure?  
8 A. Yes.  
9 MR SEPHTON: The wording is "some focal seizure".  
10 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: "Some focal seizure". I beg your  
11 pardon. That's why you go back and record that. If you  
12 were going to record that, would it not have been  
13 helpful to record how long you think that happened?  
14 A. Well, not really because, as I said, if it's a brief  
15 event, the fact that it occurred is the most important  
16 thing.  
17 THE CHAIRMAN: If it's brief?  
18 A. Yes.  
19 THE CHAIRMAN: That's the point really.  
20 A. If it was a lengthy event, I certainly would have  
21 recorded it, but I clearly didn't get that history.  
22 THE CHAIRMAN: I think in short, doctor, the concern is that  
23 you've recorded Mrs Roberts as telling you something on  
24 Tuesday at about 5 o'clock, which is inconsistent with  
25 her recollection and is also inconsistent with the

30

1 this was a viral gastro-enteritis.  
2 Q. Did you want to know anything about her previous medical  
3 history at all?  
4 A. I had obtained a previous medical history; it was  
5 in relation to her examination. It would have been  
6 helpful to know if there was a formal neurological  
7 examination done recently.  
8 Q. And if you wanted to know that, did you ever find out?  
9 A. I understand subsequently that Dr Gaston's report came  
10 back to the ward.  
11 Q. No, I actually meant did you find out during the time  
12 when you were treating Claire whether such a thing had  
13 happened?  
14 A. No.  
15 Q. But if you wanted to know that, did you try and chase  
16 that up?  
17 A. I don't recall.  
18 Q. When you note that you don't have that clear picture  
19 with the clear impression that you would like to have  
20 it, if it was available, by the time you get back at  
21 5 o'clock, do you not make any enquiries as to: do we  
22 now know the answer to that question?  
23 A. I was particularly interested in the lead into this  
24 illness.  
25 Q. I understand that. That's why I'm asking you. Did you

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1 ask when you got back to the ward at 5 o'clock, "Do we  
2 now have whether she had such an examination?"?  
3 A. No, I don't think I did.  
4 Q. Why wouldn't you have done that?  
5 A. I can't recall. I suppose my expectation that we would  
6 have had contact with Dr Gaston in that time frame would  
7 have been that we wouldn't have and it wasn't brought to  
8 my attention that there was a phone call through to the  
9 ward.  
10 Q. Let me put it another way: when did you want to find out  
11 the information that you were seeking or would have  
12 liked to have?  
13 A. Well, if it became available, as soon as possible.  
14 Q. As soon as possible, exactly. So that's what I am  
15 asking you, leaving aside the nature of your contact  
16 between the 2 o'clock note and examination and the  
17 5 o'clock one, leaving aside that, you certainly are on  
18 the ward at 5 o'clock because you have written that note  
19 or there or thereabouts. So that's why I'm asking  
20 you: why didn't you ask whether we've got the answer to  
21 the question as to whether she'd had that kind of  
22 examination previously?  
23 A. Because I think my expectation would have been that  
24 we wouldn't have got it actually.  
25 Q. They wouldn't have got it?

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1 Q. I had asked you the question about rectal diazepam and  
2 you had said that you thought -- and in fairness to you,  
3 it's something that is throughout your statements --  
4 that you were told by a member of the nursing team or  
5 the medical team that she had improved after the rectal  
6 diazepam. And I had asked you whether that is recorded  
7 anywhere. I went through the notes that the nurses made  
8 for Claire. I can't see that there is a reference to  
9 her showing any improvement after having received the  
10 rectal diazepam. Did you see anything in her notes?  
11 A. No, but it's recorded in my note.  
12 Q. Sorry?  
13 A. It's recorded in my note.  
14 Q. I appreciate that. It is recorded in your note, but in  
15 your note, you are reporting what you say somebody has  
16 told you.  
17 A. That's correct.  
18 Q. Obviously you're not there at the time to see any such  
19 improvement, and I think your evidence on Friday was  
20 that if you were going to have an improvement with  
21 diazepam, it's fairly speedy if it shows and it can be  
22 as short as 15 minutes.  
23 A. That's correct.  
24 Q. So one would expect to see that sort of thing recorded  
25 in the notes, particularly if the nurses were then going

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1 A. Yes. And I would have expected, if they had got it,  
2 they would have brought it to my attention.  
3 Q. Did you think that you might just short circuit things  
4 and phone Dr Gaston?  
5 A. No.  
6 Q. But might that have been a faster way of getting  
7 something rather than he have to pull out whatever it is  
8 that he's going to have to pull out and fax to you or  
9 send to you? You could just have spoken to him on the  
10 phone.  
11 A. The likelihood that I would have made contact with him  
12 directly would have been small and I think he would have  
13 had to go and obtain the chart. But in any event, my  
14 understanding was that that's what Dr Steen's team were  
15 going to do.  
16 Q. You wanted to know the information because it was going  
17 to be relevant to how you were advising on her  
18 neurological preparation.  
19 A. And the plan to do that was already in place, if you  
20 like.  
21 Q. I understand that, but when it hasn't emerged by  
22 5 o'clock, did it not occur to you that a way to short  
23 circuit all of this and see whether you can get the  
24 information quickly is just to phone Dr Gaston?  
25 A. It didn't occur to me, no.

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1 to tell you that there had been an improvement. Would  
2 you expect to see that?  
3 THE CHAIRMAN: Perhaps. I'm not sure that the nursing notes  
4 are consistently that good.  
5 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: No, no, no, I understand that,  
6 Mr Chairman; I'm asking what his expectations might be.  
7 Would your expectation be that the nurse would  
8 record it if she was going to tell you at 2 o'clock that  
9 there had been an improvement?  
10 A. She may not have done if she relayed it to me that there  
11 was an improvement. She may not have recorded it in her  
12 note as well.  
13 Q. If we look at the note, 090-040-141. We don't know  
14 exactly when the note was made in fairness. Right  
15 at the top you can see:  
16 "Rectal diazepam, 5 milligrams, given rectally."  
17 And then it says:  
18 "Commenced on CNS observations hourly."  
19 There is no reference to there being an improvement  
20 as a result of the administration of the diazepam.  
21 Unfortunately, the observations don't start until  
22 1 o'clock. I think that's right. One sees them at  
23 1 o'clock at 090-039-137. The total there is 9.  
24 I think you had your own total for 2 o'clock; certainly,  
25 the nurse doesn't record the 2 o'clock one. But without

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1 knowing what it was prior to 9, that doesn't help with  
2 recording any improvement, but certainly I think you've  
3 confirmed there isn't any in any of the notes and  
4 records, other than your won note that you were told  
5 that.  
6 A. That's correct. 2 o'clock is a turnover time and it's  
7 also possible that it perhaps wasn't recorded.  
8 Q. Sorry?  
9 A. 2 pm is, I think, the turnover time for the nursing  
10 staff.  
11 Q. Yes, but I think there's --  
12 THE CHAIRMAN: Sorry, let's not get bogged down in this.  
13 Dr Webb made a note on 22 October, before things had  
14 gone catastrophically wrong with Claire, noting that she  
15 appeared to have improved following rectal diazepam.  
16 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Yes, and Dr Webb, so far I think you've  
17 identified two things of quite great significance. One  
18 is the 130 serum sodium level, which you thought was  
19 actually a test from the morning. That's significant --  
20 THE CHAIRMAN: It's 132.  
21 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: I'm so sorry, 132. That's significant  
22 for you because that allows you to discount anything  
23 that might be to do with her serum sodium levels because  
24 they're only mildly out of range.  
25 A. That's correct.

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1 Q. Was it significant to you that Dr O'Hare at midnight and  
2 a nurse having thought Claire was brighter, then she  
3 wasn't, that her parents thought she definitely wasn't  
4 brighter when they came and saw her at 9.30 and then  
5 Dr Sands was called and he shared their concern. How  
6 significant is that?  
7 A. The significance is, if you have raised intracranial  
8 pressure, then the worst time for you is first thing in  
9 the morning. So for me, that was significant.  
10 Q. Could she not have been developing raised intracranial  
11 pressure over the course of the day?  
12 A. She could have been, but at presentation she had  
13 a neurological problem and that clearly wasn't explained  
14 by her sodium. So something else had to be explaining  
15 it and I think this was the most likely explanation  
16 actually.  
17 Q. Yes, but that's why I'm putting it to you, that  
18 a combination of when you thought the 132 referred to  
19 and what you understood was the response to the diazepam  
20 allowed you to form the view that what you were dealing  
21 with here was non-convulsive status epilepticus.  
22 A. They were two pieces of the jigsaw, yes.  
23 Q. Two important pieces of --  
24 A. Yes.  
25 Q. And in fact you carried on with that view for some

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1 Q. Yes. And the second important thing is that so far as  
2 you are concerned, there had been an improvement  
3 following the administration of the diazepam, and that's  
4 important to you because you interpreted that as being  
5 on the right lines, if I can put it that way, in terms  
6 of your differential diagnosis of status epilepticus of  
7 the non-convulsive type.  
8 A. Correct.  
9 Q. You diagnosed it as that and a particular treatment had  
10 been administered, which, if you were right about that,  
11 you would have expected an improvement and, so far as  
12 you're concerned, that's what you got. So that was  
13 diagnostically significant for you.  
14 A. It was important, yes.  
15 Q. And in fact, as a result of that, in many respects you  
16 continued on through the afternoon with a view that that  
17 was at the heart or the seat of her problem?  
18 A. Well I think there was a lot more to it than that. This  
19 was a child who was at great risk of seizures. She had  
20 a fluctuating course, she was brighter at 7 o'clock than  
21 she had been at other times, which would be very against  
22 raised intracranial pressure as a cause, and she had  
23 responded to diazepam. So yes, there were several  
24 features that gave that picture, it wasn't just the  
25 diazepam.

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1 considerable time.  
2 A. Well, over the three hours that I saw her, yes.  
3 Q. Even though -- and we'll come to it in detail, but just  
4 while we're here generally -- she didn't appear to  
5 respond to any further medication that you administered?  
6 A. That's correct.  
7 Q. If we then go to what happened at 2 o'clock proper in  
8 terms of your diagnosis. I had asked you some questions  
9 about this, Dr Webb, on Friday and I had told you that  
10 I would revisit it in terms of what some of the experts  
11 have said so you have an opportunity to comment on their  
12 view. Professor Neville has commented on it, both in  
13 his expert reports for the inquiry and also in his  
14 evidence when he gave oral evidence.  
15 In his expert report, if we start with that, he says  
16 at 232-002-008 essentially that your assessment on the  
17 afternoon of the 22nd was:  
18 "... a competent examination, but the interpretation  
19 failed to include the possibility of rising intracranial  
20 pressure to explain her reduced conscious level and  
21 motor signs."  
22 So he is putting that you should have been thinking  
23 about that at 2 o'clock, irrespective of what you  
24 concluded about that being the position at 7 o'clock  
25 in the morning, if I can put it that way. Can you

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1 comment on that?

2 A. Well, all I can say is that my clinical assessment was  
3 that raised intracranial pressure was unlikely at that  
4 time. There were no other features to suggest raised  
5 intracranial pressure, such as hypertension or  
6 bradycardia. There was no papilloedema. And I felt  
7 that the other diagnosis was much more likely.

8 Q. Her Glasgow Coma Scale -- you would have only seen one  
9 at that stage, to be fair. At 006, in relation to the  
10 view that you formed that it was non-convulsive  
11 status epilepticus, he says:

12 "I would not agree that non-convulsive  
13 status epilepticus was the likely diagnosis because  
14 it is not common and epilepsy was not prominent in this  
15 girl's recent history. In my opinion, non-convulsive  
16 status epilepticus needed to be proved by an urgent EEG  
17 and another more likely cause of reduced conscious level  
18 and poorly reacting pupils would be cerebral oedema,  
19 related to ..."

20 I beg your pardon, I think it should be page 5. I'm  
21 sorry. Then he says:

22 "The reduced conscious level and poorly reacting  
23 pupils would be cerebral oedema related to hyponatraemia  
24 and that should have been considered as a matter of  
25 urgency because, in its early stages, it is reversible

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1 that Claire was likely to have had when she was a baby  
2 and, therefore, the likelihood of the recurrence that  
3 you've just described?

4 A. Well, in fact, the seizures that she had -- as an  
5 infant, she had multiple different seizure types and she  
6 didn't have typical infantile spasms because her EEG  
7 didn't follow the pattern that was typical for that. So  
8 I'm not sure that he's correct when he refers to  
9 infantile spasms. It's certainly not a case of  
10 infantile spasms. I'm not sure whether he is basing this  
11 opinion on his lifetime of experience of epilepsy, but  
12 certainly my understanding, at the time in 1996, from my  
13 reading, would have been, in the situation, Claire had  
14 a very high risk of recurrence.

15 Q. Did you appreciate at the time the likelihood of  
16 a recurrence in the way that you've described it might  
17 actually have some relationship to the type of epilepsy  
18 that she had had when she was a baby?

19 A. To some extent that's correct, but it's actually just  
20 having epilepsy in infancy is a major risk factor for  
21 recurrence.

22 Q. Then you disagree, do you, with Professor Neville when  
23 he says that it is significant, the type of epilepsy  
24 that you have when you're a baby or at least that Claire  
25 would have had, because if she had had a particular

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1 by treatment."

2 Can you comment on his first part, which is that  
3 non-convulsive status epilepticus is not common and then  
4 going on to his next bit, which is epilepsy was not  
5 prominent in Claire's recent history?

6 A. Yes. I think we differ on this point. I think a child  
7 who's had epilepsy in early infancy, as I mentioned on  
8 Friday, is at very high risk of recurrence of seizures  
9 in childhood. So we disagree on that point, I have to  
10 say.

11 Q. That is a good place to depart because he then deals  
12 with that in his transcript and one finds that in the  
13 transcript for 1 November 2012 at page 112. At the  
14 bottom:

15 "Her epilepsy had ceased, she was at significantly  
16 higher risk of developing epilepsy again, but the form  
17 of epilepsy that she had before, which was as  
18 I understand it, likely to be infantile spasms, is one  
19 which tends to have an end point to it, around 2, 3,  
20 4-ish, and then to either go away or persist almost  
21 continuously with a different sort of epilepsy. So  
22 I think that the chances of it just starting in the  
23 middle of something which would be 3 or 4 years away is  
24 unlikely."

25 Can you comment on his view of the kind of epilepsy

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1 sort, then the reoccurrence would have either worked its  
2 way out before now, effectively, or actually developed  
3 into full-blown continuous epilepsy. Do you see that?

4 A. In relation to the epilepsy syndrome that he's  
5 describing, I'm sure his experience is correct.

6 Q. Then can I ask you this -- sorry, I cut you off before  
7 you'd finished.

8 A. I've lost it, sorry.

9 Q. You said in relation to the type of epilepsy that he was  
10 describing that his experience was likely to be correct.  
11 Then I think you might have been going to say "but" and  
12 then distinguish it from something else.

13 A. But in the context of an infant who's had multiple  
14 seizure types, I don't think you can make that  
15 conclusion as clearly. That's what I'm saying.

16 Q. Can I ask you: when you were examining Claire on the  
17 ward at 2 o'clock, what knowledge did you have of the  
18 type of epilepsy she'd had when she was a baby?

19 A. Well, I had history from Dr Sands that she'd had  
20 seizures as an infant and had been under Dr Hicks.  
21 I think I also knew that she had had, as part of that,  
22 spasms.

23 Q. Can you say how you knew that?

24 A. From the history.

25 Q. Does that mean you read the history.

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1 A. No, I'm saying he told me that she'd had seizures as an  
2 infant, that she had been in under Dr Hicks, but I can't  
3 recall any more detail than that.  
4 THE CHAIRMAN: What was it that you learned which made you  
5 think that that these were not just -- if "just" is the  
6 right word -- infantile spasms?  
7 A. I wouldn't have known the EEG results at that stage.  
8 THE CHAIRMAN: But I thought, when you were distinguishing  
9 your view from Professor Neville's, you were  
10 saying: well, although he says they were likely to be  
11 infantile spasms, she had multiple seizure types.  
12 A. That's correct.  
13 THE CHAIRMAN: Where was that information coming from?  
14 A. That would have been from Dr Sands.  
15 THE CHAIRMAN: Right.  
16 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: You mean from Dr Sands in that  
17 conversation that you had in the room off the corridor?  
18 A. Yes.  
19 Q. And for Dr Sands to have known that, is it evident where  
20 he would have got that level of detail of information?  
21 A. Well, he may have got it from Claire's parents, I don't  
22 know. That's the most likely explanation.  
23 Q. Can you help us? In --  
24 THE CHAIRMAN: Sorry, with all due respect to Mr and  
25 Mrs Roberts, how likely do you think it is that they

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1 that between him having carried out the ward round and  
2 coming to see you in order for you to have that  
3 information --  
4 A. That's correct.  
5 Q. -- because you didn't independently get it from her  
6 medical notes and records.  
7 A. That's correct.  
8 Q. I think Dr Sands' evidence was that he may not actually  
9 have read all her notes, even from her admission, and  
10 was rather relying on his SHO as he conducted the ward  
11 round to be telling him the salient points out of her  
12 admission notes. I don't think his evidence was that he  
13 went back and looked at the charts that she had when she  
14 was admitted when she was a few months old.  
15 A. Okay.  
16 Q. So if that's correct, the only source is from the  
17 parents.  
18 A. That's correct.  
19 Q. So then if we look at what Professor Neville said in his  
20 transcript of 1 November 2012 at page 119. I think his  
21 conclusion really was that you had gone too quickly and  
22 too strongly in favour of one diagnosis and missed what  
23 was a more likely diagnosis. I think that's the upshot  
24 of what he was saying. Do you see just under "The  
25 chairman" at line 7? In fact, I think it's really an

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1 were going to be describing multiple seizure types,  
2 using language or descriptions which would convey to  
3 Dr Sands that it wasn't just infantile spasms, but  
4 a variety of seizure types?  
5 A. Well, it would depend on what description they gave of  
6 the events.  
7 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.  
8 A. But it certainly would be possible to conclude that she  
9 had convulsive seizures or that she had events which  
10 would involve sudden jerking. It didn't require that  
11 they would describe them in medical terms.  
12 THE CHAIRMAN: Sorry, I understand the point. Thank you.  
13 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: If you didn't get it from them, then he  
14 would have been getting it from somewhere in the medical  
15 notes and records?  
16 A. Yes.  
17 Q. Can you see where there is information that will enable  
18 you to conclude that from her medical notes and records?  
19 A. Yes.  
20 Q. Where is that?  
21 A. In her chart, the records of her original admission are  
22 there.  
23 Q. He would have had to go back and look at that --  
24 A. That's correct.  
25 Q. Yes. And he would have had to have gone and looked at

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1 agreement with the way that the chairman has put it to  
2 Professor Neville:  
3 "Question: This is your concern, that he went too  
4 quickly and too strongly in favour of one diagnosis?  
5 "Answer: Yes, indeed.  
6 "Question: And missed what you think was a more  
7 likely diagnosis?  
8 "Answer: Sure, I don't deny that he worked hard at  
9 it and came back to see the child and did that sort of  
10 thing, but it was in the wrong direction."  
11 And I think his view was that you should have kept  
12 broader range, if I can put it that way, of differential  
13 diagnoses before channelling so narrowly down the route  
14 of non-convulsive status epilepticus.  
15 A. Well, Professor Neville seemed to imply that his  
16 interpretation of the situation was that the sodium of  
17 132 explained Claire's presentation when she came into  
18 hospital, which I have difficulty with understanding.  
19 Q. Well, I don't think --  
20 THE CHAIRMAN: Sorry, I have to say I don't get that out of  
21 Professor Neville's evidence. I don't think that he,  
22 subject to correction, ever expressed the view that her  
23 sodium level of 132 did explain her presentation on  
24 admission to hospital. In fact, what he seemed to be  
25 saying was that 132 was a consequence of things like

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1 vomiting during Monday afternoon into Monday evening,  
2 which prompted her to be brought to the hospital.  
3 A. Okay.  
4 THE CHAIRMAN: In fact, he said it wouldn't be unusual for  
5 children to be slightly below the range.  
6 A. My understanding of his transcript was that he was  
7 implying that cerebral oedema may have played a role  
8 early in her admission.  
9 THE CHAIRMAN: Okay. Well, I'm --  
10 A. And I have difficulty with understanding that. I accept  
11 that she clearly did develop cerebral oedema, but  
12 I think there was another explanation for her  
13 presentation initially, and that was that she was having  
14 seizure activity.  
15 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Then if I can ask you to comment on  
16 Dr MacFaul's evidence. That can be found in the  
17 transcript on 13 November. If you go to page 75 and  
18 perhaps start at line 19. So I'm putting to him that  
19 your view was that the 132 serum sodium level was  
20 obtained from a sample taken that morning. We leave  
21 aside whether he thinks that's likely or not. I've  
22 asked him to assume for the moment that that's right  
23 and, as Tuesday moves on, it's understood somehow -- can  
24 we pull up 76 alongside that, please? It's understood  
25 somehow that the reading of 132 comes from that morning:

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1 a sodium of 132, I don't think that you would  
2 immediately think of cerebral oedema. If her sodium had  
3 been 129, that would be quite different.  
4 Q. But when you were giving evidence on Friday, you hadn't  
5 ruled out the fact that there was an encephalitis, which  
6 is actually something that you had discussed earlier  
7 with Dr Sands.  
8 A. That's correct.  
9 Q. So that was still there. In fact, you couldn't rule it  
10 out because there had been no test that would have ruled  
11 it out at that stage. So you had that as a possibility.  
12 A. I'm talking about bacterial meningitis, which is  
13 a different entity.  
14 Q. I understand that, but an encephalitis is still, is it  
15 not, an infection of the meninges?  
16 A. Of the brain.  
17 Q. Of the brain, sorry. So that's serious --  
18 A. It is serious.  
19 Q. -- if you think you've got an infection in the brain?  
20 A. But again, as a risk factor for cerebral oedema, it's  
21 not as great as you would have with somebody with  
22 bacterial meningitis or a head injury.  
23 Q. And it's quite possible that that encephalitis was the  
24 underlying cause of the status epilepticus.  
25 A. It's one possible explanation, but it doesn't require

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1 "It's low-ish, but it's not necessarily, on its own,  
2 particularly concerning."  
3 Then I've asked him to express a view. He says:  
4 "The view that I've expressed is that, for a general  
5 paediatrician, in a child without encephalopathy, it's  
6 not particularly significant, but I've also taken the  
7 view that for a paediatric neurologist where there is  
8 acute encephalopathy, even a measurement of 132 should  
9 have been a red flag that this common and very serious  
10 complication of hyponatraemia was evolving because it is  
11 well recognised over that time -- and I've given the  
12 sources from the textbooks -- that this was a problem  
13 that was well recognised. So I believe his action  
14 should have been, when he saw Claire, to have taken the  
15 steps to deal with it already, even on a figure of 132."  
16 Can you comment on that?  
17 A. I think Dr MacFaul's evidence -- I would argue with on  
18 the basis that he seems to imply that all children with  
19 encephalopathy have the same risk of cerebral oedema and  
20 that really is not the case. Children with head injury  
21 and bacterial meningitis are at particular risk of  
22 cerebral oedema from SIADH, and in that context, I would  
23 absolutely agree with him. In the context of a child  
24 who doesn't have that history, who has a previous  
25 history of seizures and epilepsy and presents with

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1 that.  
2 Q. But it's possible?  
3 A. Yes.  
4 Q. If you have all these things as possibilities and none  
5 of them are really being ruled out, why aren't you also  
6 bearing in mind that the 132, even if it came from  
7 a sample taken that morning, is a factor that might be  
8 relevant and let's get an up-to-date one?  
9 A. Because I didn't think a figure of 132 was going to be  
10 relevant in the context of her having vomiting.  
11 Q. So a slightly below --  
12 A. If it had been --  
13 Q. -- range serum sodium level, even with all these  
14 neurological presentations, is not relevant?  
15 A. A figure of 132 for me at the time would not have caused  
16 concern to me.  
17 Q. What do you think caused it?  
18 A. Caused it?  
19 Q. Why did you think it was 132?  
20 A. Because she had been vomiting.  
21 Q. Sorry?  
22 A. Because she had been vomiting.  
23 Q. But she's been receiving maintenance fluids.  
24 A. She had.  
25 Q. Yes, so why did you think she was 132?

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1 A. Because that's what I was told, that she had a sodium of  
2 132.  
3 Q. I know. Sorry, at a very literal level you thought it  
4 was 132 because somebody told you she was 132. What did  
5 you think was the cause of her being 132?  
6 A. She had a history of vomiting and loose bowel motions  
7 and that would certainly explain it.  
8 Q. Which bowel movements?  
9 A. I obtained a history from her mum that she had loose  
10 bowel motions --  
11 Q. Three days ago.  
12 A. That's correct.  
13 Q. Yes. Well, how is that affecting how she currently is  
14 on the afternoon of the 22nd?  
15 A. It's not, but it's related to her gastro-enteritis,  
16 which --  
17 Q. It may or may not be. Three days ago might be  
18 completely irrelevant. Sometimes children do --  
19 A. It's unlikely to have been completely irrelevant.  
20 Q. But it could have been?  
21 A. Unlikely.  
22 Q. Her mother described it as "a smelly poo three days  
23 ago".  
24 A. Yes, but in the context of a child who is vomiting  
25 subsequently --

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1 different, but because you thought this was a Tuesday  
2 morning reading of 132, you didn't go down lines that  
3 you would otherwise have gone down?  
4 A. That's correct.  
5 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: What did you think had triggered her  
6 non-convulsive status epilepticus?  
7 A. A viral infection.  
8 Q. And I think I had asked you before why you didn't treat  
9 that at the same time as at 2 o'clock, and I think you  
10 fairly said with hindsight maybe you could have.  
11 A. Yes.  
12 Q. So if I just pull up Dr MacFaul on 14 November, page 63.  
13 I am moving on to a different point here, which is the  
14 testing. There has been some criticism, I think, from  
15 Professor Neville and from Dr MacFaul as to the lack of  
16 testing, that you could have asked for a full blood  
17 workup, for example.  
18 If I start with an earlier reference, that might be  
19 more helpful. Can we go to 30 November -- sorry, it  
20 just starts there:  
21 "I have another rider to that."  
22 Can you see that there at line 17?  
23 "... Dr Webb saw Claire, the range of ..."  
24 When you did:  
25 "... the range of blood investigations carried out

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1 Q. But she was only vomiting on the Monday.  
2 THE CHAIRMAN: No, she vomited on Monday night, through  
3 Monday night, didn't she?  
4 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Exactly. What I'm putting to him is  
5 there appears to be a conflation of the loose motions  
6 and the vomiting, but in fact the loose motion occurs  
7 three days ago and the vomiting happens on the Monday  
8 afternoon and into the Monday evening.  
9 A. I think it's much more likely that those two are  
10 connected than that they're not connected.  
11 THE CHAIRMAN: But for you, doctor, if I understand it,  
12 a critical point in your analysis of Claire on the  
13 Tuesday afternoon at about 1.30 or 2 was that her recent  
14 sodium level was 132.  
15 A. Yes.  
16 THE CHAIRMAN: And your misunderstanding that that was  
17 a recent reading, in effect, set you in the wrong  
18 direction. If you'd known that was the reading from  
19 Monday night --  
20 A. I think we would have considered cerebral oedema  
21 earlier, yes.  
22 THE CHAIRMAN: Or, at the very least, you would have  
23 directed fresh blood tests.  
24 A. Yes.  
25 THE CHAIRMAN: Had that been done, everything might be

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1 was limited."  
2 Then he refers to the guidance in 1984, third  
3 edition, and the fourth edition, of Forfar & Arneil and  
4 the guidance in the Nelson textbooks and the paediatric  
5 neurology textbooks:  
6 "All -- certainly, the Forfar & Arneil include  
7 a range of investigations."  
8 And in his view, they were not done. He goes on, if  
9 we can pull up 77 in substitution for the 63:  
10 "The next step for Dr Webb to have done at the  
11 2 o'clock consultation in my view -- and supported by  
12 the guidance of the time -- is further blood tests then.  
13 So that even if the sodium was thought to have been done  
14 in the morning, another blood test should have been done  
15 for liver function tests, for blood ammonia, and  
16 possibly toxins. And had that been done as  
17 a consequence of this convulsion, the blood sodium,  
18 which on balance of probability would have been much  
19 lower, would have been available and knowledge would  
20 have been there towards the end of the afternoon on the  
21 22nd."  
22 So his point is obviously that even though you  
23 didn't have a further blood test for the serum sodium  
24 because you thought you had a result from not so far  
25 away, if I can put it that way, you should, according to

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1 the appropriate practice of the time, have been asking  
2 for fuller blood tests. And if you had had those  
3 further blood tests, that would have given you the serum  
4 sodium level anyway, even if you weren't setting out to  
5 get that specifically. Do you accept that you should  
6 have asked for more blood tests?  
7 A. No, I don't.  
8 Q. Why is that?  
9 A. Because you are talking about the accepted practice  
10 at the time. The textbook essentially comments that  
11 these are tests that may be helpful. They're not  
12 prescriptive tests and I had no evidence that Claire had  
13 evidence of liver damage, she had a normal glucose and  
14 I had no reason to think that she had ingested toxins.  
15 Q. But you didn't know.  
16 A. I think it's most unlikely that she would have, given  
17 the supervision that she had.  
18 Q. But --  
19 A. And --  
20 Q. Why not simply do -- since you're really at a stage of  
21 trying to find out what's wrong with her, instead of  
22 forming an earlier conclusion, why not just do a broad  
23 range of blood tests and see what they disclose to you  
24 to see if that helps you in refining or confirming your  
25 differential diagnoses?

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1 presentation, really.  
2 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Then if we go to -- I think that it's  
3 Professor Neville who expresses a similar view. I'm  
4 hoping to find that at 232-002-008. Perhaps if we can  
5 pull up, alongside that, 009. Sorry, I think I have got  
6 the wrong test for that.  
7 THE CHAIRMAN: I think it's (b) at the bottom of page 008,  
8 is it not, repeating electrolytes and so on?  
9 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Thank you, Mr Chairman:  
10 "I have stated that, six hours after the first blood  
11 test, the electrolytes should have been repeated."  
12 That actually, if you had thought that the blood had  
13 been taken at 8 o'clock in the morning, which I think  
14 was your evidence on Friday, and that therefore there  
15 were test results available for the ward round, if  
16 that's the case then carrying out a test six hours after  
17 the blood test would have taken you roughly to the time  
18 of this examination at 2 o'clock. So that's  
19 Professor Neville's view, that leaving aside, if I can  
20 put it that way, when you thought it had happened, and  
21 assuming that you did think it had happened at  
22 8 o'clock, then on that basis, it would have been  
23 appropriate to have asked for further tests at round  
24 about 2 o'clock; do you accept that?  
25 A. That would not have been my practice to do a sodium that

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1 A. Well, it may be an issue of approach. I think some  
2 people take a broad sweep and do lots of blood tests and  
3 others target their investigations to what they think is  
4 the most likely diagnosis.  
5 Q. But it's just information, isn't it? It's a bit of  
6 a detective work when you have a child who presents like  
7 Claire.  
8 A. Sometimes it is, that's correct.  
9 Q. And this is just further information that allows you to  
10 see what is happening. So why not do it?  
11 A. Well, I think you have to think about what you're  
12 looking for when you do your investigations. So in some  
13 people with a viral infection it's quite likely that the  
14 liver enzymes will be slightly elevated, but it doesn't  
15 help you any further really.  
16 THE CHAIRMAN: Does this indicate your degree of confidence  
17 in believing that Claire had non-convulsive  
18 status epilepticus? If you hadn't been that confident  
19 then you would have --  
20 A. To some extent I think that's true, but I think my sense  
21 is that the important investigations that were relevant  
22 had been done and doing a test for liver function, which  
23 may not have come back for several hours or perhaps even  
24 the following day, wouldn't have been terribly helpful.  
25 Toxins were very unlikely to be relevant to her

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1 quickly after the original one.  
2 Q. No, I don't mean what your practice would be --  
3 A. But I accept that he may have that view.  
4 Q. In a case such as Claire's, which is a little bit  
5 complicated because there are so many things that could  
6 actually be either the underlying problem or maybe the  
7 presenting problem is the problem, there are a number of  
8 interlinked conditions that could be the explanation for  
9 her presentation and then, once you've worked that out,  
10 then you know how you're going to treat it, if I can put  
11 it that way. Bearing that in mind, is this not a time  
12 to be a little bit broader, not just in the tests that  
13 you do but also maybe to think of doing things perhaps  
14 more frequently than you would normally do?  
15 A. I think, in retrospect, you could argue that.  
16 Q. That would have been a reasonable thing to do, to have  
17 asked to have a repeat blood test at 2 pm?  
18 A. It wouldn't have been what I -- at the time, what  
19 I would have done, but I can see why he could make that  
20 statement.  
21 Q. And do you accept that?  
22 A. Yes.  
23 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Mr Chairman ...  
24 THE CHAIRMAN: Okay, we'll take a 15-minute break and resume  
25 at 11.25 until lunchtime.

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1 (11.10 am)  
2 (A short break)  
3 (11.31 am)  
4 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: You, I think, when I asked you as to  
5 what you thought your diagnosis was, you said you  
6 thought that she was experiencing non-convulsive  
7 status epilepticus; is that right? If we pull up the  
8 two parts of your note from 2 o'clock, 090-022-053 and,  
9 alongside that, 054. Do you actually state that in your  
10 note?  
11 A. No, I didn't. But it's implicit in the pictures of  
12 acute encephalopathy, most probably postictal in nature.  
13 Q. Well, would it not have been helpful to have actually  
14 spelt it out, what you thought it was?  
15 A. Well, I had discussed it with Dr Sands and he was the  
16 person who was senior person on the team, so --  
17 Q. But it may not only be -- forgive me -- Dr Sands who has  
18 to look at these notes and records. Dr Sands isn't  
19 actually there when you examine Claire at 2 o'clock.  
20 I don't believe he's there when you examine her at  
21 5 o'clock. Who you do see are relatively junior members  
22 of the team, an SHO, I think who is three months into  
23 his paediatric rotation. Those people also have to look  
24 at the notes that you write and rely on them for  
25 guidance. Should Dr Steen have been asked, "What's been

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1 who had a risk of further seizures.  
2 Q. Did you know that she had been off her medication for  
3 that length of time at this stage or is that something  
4 that Dr Sands told you?  
5 A. Dr Sands told me.  
6 Q. So when you say she had been off her medication, that  
7 put her at risk. Then she'd had contact with somebody  
8 who you formed the impression had had some sort of tummy  
9 bug and that was a viral infection, you thought. How  
10 does that give rise to the picture of acute  
11 encephalopathy? How do she develop, out of all of that,  
12 an acute encephalopathy?  
13 A. Well, encephalopathy just implies that there's an  
14 alteration of consciousness, with or without seizures.  
15 Q. And what does acute mean?  
16 A. Acute means recent.  
17 Q. Right, so a recent change in consciousness?  
18 A. Yes.  
19 Q. "Most probably postictal in nature"; what does that  
20 mean?  
21 A. That's relating it to her seizures. "Ictal" is  
22 seizures.  
23 Q. Yes. How long do you think that presentation carries on  
24 after she's had a seizure?  
25 A. I'm using it here in the context of her having

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1 written in the notes?", if she contacted the ward, then  
2 she would be relying on somebody perhaps to read out  
3 what you have written so that she knows what the picture  
4 is. Would it not have been helpful to have spelt out  
5 what you think you have here is a confirmation of what  
6 Dr Sands' impression of non-fitting status; would that  
7 not have been helpful?  
8 A. I think it perhaps would have been helpful, but I would  
9 have conveyed my feelings to the nursing staff and to  
10 Dr Stevenson after seeing the child.  
11 Q. So you think you would have explained this to  
12 Dr Stevenson?  
13 A. Yes, to the medical and nursing staff at the time.  
14 Q. And then the question that -- and you might have  
15 answered this and forgive me if you did and I didn't  
16 appreciate it: the underlying cause of all this was what  
17 you believed to be a viral infection of some sort.  
18 A. I think the fact that Claire had come off her  
19 medication, had been off it for a period of time, put  
20 her at risk and the trigger was almost certainly her  
21 viral infection.  
22 Q. So the fact that she had been off her medication for  
23 about 18 months or so, I think it was, you thought that  
24 in and of itself put her at risk?  
25 A. Yes, because she was a child, as far as I was concerned,

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1 non-convulsive activity. I wasn't aware at this stage  
2 whether she had or hadn't definitely had seizures the  
3 previous day, but I was suspicious, so it was really in  
4 the context of it being epileptic, if you like.  
5 Q. How do you tell the difference between the seizure  
6 itself when she's non-convulsive and the aftermath of  
7 the seizure, which is the post-ictal? How do you  
8 tell --  
9 A. It's very difficult. In somebody who's had a convulsive  
10 seizure, they're always encephalopathic afterwards for  
11 a period.  
12 Q. But when somebody hasn't, which is what you thought you  
13 were dealing with with Claire, how would you know  
14 whether what you were looking at was her at that moment  
15 in a non-convulsive fitting state or her in the  
16 aftermath of having had a series of non-convulsive fits?  
17 MR SEPHTON: I'm sorry, can my learned friend please be  
18 a bit more clear because I for one don't understand how  
19 you can have a non-convulsive fit. It's either a fit or  
20 it's not.  
21 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: A non-convulsive state?  
22 Well, if it's non-convulsive what exactly is  
23 happening in the brain?  
24 A. The brain is producing electrical activity that should  
25 not be there and it is either continuous or

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1 semi-continuous. It can be difficult to know whether it  
2 is continuous or semi-continuous.  
3 Q. And the difference is that, apart from the degree of  
4 activity in the brain, if you've got a convulsion, you  
5 can actually see that, and if you have got  
6 a non-convulsive state, you can't see the physical  
7 manifestations of that?  
8 A. The outward manifestation is more obvious in somebody  
9 who's having a convulsive seizure whereas --  
10 Q. That's what I meant --  
11 (Intervention from the stenographer)  
12 A. I'm sorry. The outward manifestation is more obvious in  
13 somebody who is having a convulsive seizure. In a child  
14 who is having non-convulsive seizure activity, it may  
15 just be that they have a change in behaviour.  
16 Q. Would a better term have been "subclinical seizure"?  
17 A. Some people use that term.  
18 Q. So there is electrical activity going on, it is just  
19 a matter of whether you can see, in a more direct way,  
20 the product of that?  
21 A. Yes.  
22 Q. Then the question I was asking you is: how can you tell  
23 the difference, if you formed the view that what the  
24 child has is the non-convulsive condition, if I can put  
25 it that way, so where you're not going to see readily

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1 a convulsion that morning, which she clearly hadn't had.  
2 Q. If somebody was reading that out to Dr Steen, for  
3 example, who might have been trying to update herself on  
4 what the position was, would she readily appreciate what  
5 you meant if somebody read that out?  
6 A. I think she would have in the context of the overall  
7 history, yes.  
8 Q. And does that mean from the way you've put it that the  
9 acute encephalopathy is produced by the postictal state  
10 or as a result of the postictal state?  
11 A. It's produced by the non-convulsive status.  
12 Q. So the viral infection causes the non-convulsive status  
13 and that produces the acute encephalopathy?  
14 A. Correct.  
15 Q. That's the sequence for you?  
16 A. Yes.  
17 Q. If we just pull up what you said in your evidence about  
18 it, 138/3, page 4. You say:  
19 "I must have felt ..."  
20 THE CHAIRMAN: Whereabouts on the page?  
21 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: It's in relation to 2 o'clock, at (b):  
22 "I must have felt, when I saw Claire first at 2 pm  
23 on October 22nd, that I had sufficient evidence to treat  
24 Claire for non-convulsive status epilepticus."  
25 And do I understand you, so that Professor Neville

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1 the physical appearance of it? How can you tell whether  
2 that's what is going on at the time or what has happened  
3 is that the postictal phase of one of the seizures, the  
4 actual convulsions that you thought she had had the  
5 previous day?  
6 A. Well, I don't think that she was postictal from the  
7 previous day because it wouldn't last that long. The  
8 postictal effect of a convulsive seizure lasts for a  
9 period of about an hour or two.  
10 Q. Can you have a postictal effect from the electrical  
11 activity associated with a subclinical seizure?  
12 A. Not usually.  
13 Q. So you're either having the subclinical seizure or  
14 you're not?  
15 A. Yes.  
16 Q. So if you translate that back into Claire's case, and  
17 when you're looking at her too:  
18 "The picture is of acute encephalopathy, most  
19 probably postictal in nature."  
20 What does that mean then?  
21 A. It's implying that it's relating to seizure activity,  
22 but I'm not certain how much of this was previous  
23 convulsive activity or non-convulsive status. I didn't  
24 have the history from the previous day, but I can see  
25 how it's confusing because it might imply that she had

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1 can comment on it, that that evidence that allows you to  
2 consider was sufficient was her history of risk, the  
3 description of her presentation -- what was the  
4 subsequent behaviour?  
5 A. The fact that she continues to have vacant staring and  
6 poor responsiveness.  
7 Q. And the improvement that there was to the initial  
8 administration of diazepam. All those things allowed  
9 you to feel that you had sufficient evidence to start  
10 treating Claire for non-convulsive status epilepticus?  
11 A. That's correct.  
12 Q. If you'd wanted to confirm that, what would you have  
13 done?  
14 A. The only way of being certain was to have done an EEG.  
15 Q. That's what would have confirmed it?  
16 A. Yes.  
17 Q. And do you accept, as Professor Neville considers it,  
18 that in not seeking to see whether anything else was  
19 going on, for example the development of her cerebral  
20 oedema from some other cause, and therefore being able  
21 to address that through, for example, restricting her  
22 fluids or taking some steps of that nature, meant that  
23 there was a risk that you were not treating something  
24 that could actually have been getting worse all the time  
25 you were focusing on the non-convulsive

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1 status epilepticus?  
2 A. I think I did focus on the non-convulsive status and  
3 I didn't feel at this time that Claire had clinical  
4 evidence of cerebral oedema or that that was likely in  
5 the presentation.  
6 Q. But if you were incorrect about that, then what you were  
7 doing wouldn't actually have been addressing that  
8 mechanism for the development of cerebral oedema and  
9 deterioration as a result of cerebral oedema?  
10 A. I think that's correct.  
11 Q. So the anticonvulsant therapy that you prescribed for  
12 her would not have affected that?  
13 A. No. No, that's correct.  
14 THE CHAIRMAN: In a sense, doctor, that's right about any  
15 diagnosis, isn't it? If you identify her illness going  
16 in one direction, if you treat that and if that  
17 assessment is wrong, then there's always the danger that  
18 another problem which you have missed or you haven't  
19 missed but you thought was a much lower risk could be  
20 getting worse at the same time?  
21 A. That's correct, yes.  
22 THE CHAIRMAN: What that leads on to then is how confident  
23 you are about your diagnosis and what the extent of the  
24 recent testing is. You're relying on test results; as  
25 you now know, it turns out that the test result was from

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1 Hospital at that point without a specific direction to  
2 do so that they would have taken a further blood test  
3 for serum sodium levels in the afternoon?  
4 A. I think that was a reasonable expectation and it would  
5 usually be done before 5 o'clock, so it was done within  
6 hours, if you like.  
7 Q. I'm just trying to confirm: are you saying in 1996,  
8 in the Children's Hospital, that was a practice that if  
9 children were on IV fluids, that they would have their  
10 bloods done again in the afternoon?  
11 A. I don't know that I knew that for certain. And  
12 I understand that there was a practice at the time that  
13 bloods were done once a day, which I subsequently  
14 learned. But my expectation at the time would have been  
15 that they would have been repeated, but I accept that  
16 I wasn't, if you like -- I was on a ward that I wasn't  
17 unfamiliar with perhaps.  
18 Q. Well, you have just said fairly enough that the practice  
19 would have been once a day, I think as you understood  
20 it.  
21 A. I didn't understand at the time, but I subsequently  
22 learned.  
23 Q. You subsequently know now?  
24 A. Yes.  
25 Q. What did you think the practice was in 1996? You had

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1 Monday night, not from Tuesday morning.  
2 A. Mm.  
3 THE CHAIRMAN: So it was already, by the time you saw her,  
4 some time about 1.30, 2, Claire had not been tested for  
5 this at all since Monday night. And that therefore  
6 increases the consequence of your diagnosis being  
7 incorrect, doesn't it?  
8 A. I think that's correct. I think in clinical practice  
9 you're all the time trying to measure what's the most  
10 likely explanation for this presentation.  
11 THE CHAIRMAN: Exactly. I don't have any trouble at all  
12 understanding that. On a general level, once you go  
13 down one route with a patient because you have a degree  
14 of confidence in it, the alternative routes -- you close  
15 them off, but you don't forget them, I assume, do you?  
16 A. No. No. And I would have had an expectation that  
17 a sodium would have been repeated that afternoon at some  
18 point because she was a child on fluids. So that would  
19 have been my expectation.  
20 THE CHAIRMAN: At some point on Tuesday afternoon?  
21 A. Yes.  
22 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.  
23 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Apart if the fact that that might be  
24 a good idea because she's on fluids, was there any  
25 particular reason why you expected in the Children's

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1 your own patients, you conducted your ward rounds and so  
2 forth: what was the practice about taking bloods and  
3 measuring electrolytes?  
4 A. My own practice was that if a child went on to treatment  
5 with fluids on an evening, that the bloods would be done  
6 the following morning, and if there was anything that  
7 was unusual about the result, it would be repeated the  
8 same day.  
9 Q. Yes, but routinely what was the practice? Were bloods  
10 routinely done in the morning for the ward round, twice  
11 a day? What was the practice?  
12 A. I've just told you. I think if they were required, they  
13 were done first thing in the morning and, if necessary,  
14 they were done later in the evening before 5 o'clock.  
15 Q. And who is the person who exercises the judgment that  
16 it's necessary to do it later on in the afternoon?  
17 A. It's usually the registrar.  
18 THE CHAIRMAN: When you came back at 5 o'clock, whether you  
19 were physically there at 3 or 3.30, does that mean that  
20 you were expecting to see --  
21 A. I wouldn't have expected to see a result at that time,  
22 but I would have expected that a test would have been  
23 sent.  
24 THE CHAIRMAN: And would you have expected a record that the  
25 sample had been taken?

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1 A. I can't recall.  
2 THE CHAIRMAN: You know, as it turns out, that didn't  
3 happen.  
4 A. That's right. I don't think that all blood tests would  
5 have been necessarily written into the notes.  
6 I wouldn't have expected that written into the notes.  
7 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Sorry, if bloods have been taken and  
8 sent off for testing, you wouldn't expect that to be  
9 written in the notes?  
10 A. The result would be written in, but we wouldn't expect  
11 the request necessarily to be written in.  
12 Q. If you were expecting that to be done, which is  
13 something that would be useful for you to know, did you  
14 ask whether anybody had done that?  
15 A. No, I didn't because I wasn't at the time ... As  
16 I said, managing the fluids, I felt that was being dealt  
17 with.  
18 Q. But you knew what fluids she was on.  
19 A. I wouldn't have known the exact fluid. It would have  
20 been a maintenance fluid, which would be routinely fifth  
21 normal --  
22 Q. Solution No. 18, wouldn't it?  
23 A. Yes.  
24 Q. So unless something rather different had been  
25 prescribed, you knew she was on IV fluids and she had

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1 MR FORTUNE: Sir, bearing in mind the answers Dr Webb has  
2 just given, that he had the expectation that blood would  
3 be taken again at about 5 o'clock and that that was  
4 effectively the responsibility of the registrar, on  
5 behalf of Dr Steen, can we find out whether in fact  
6 Dr Webb is saying there was a protocol in existence?  
7 After all, Dr Webb had been a consultant at the hospital  
8 for a year and would have known what the protocols were,  
9 if any such protocols existed.  
10 THE CHAIRMAN: I think he said there wasn't a protocol.  
11 A. I don't think there was a protocol specifically.  
12 THE CHAIRMAN: In essence then the question is: if there  
13 wasn't a protocol, what was the basis for your  
14 expectation that there would be bloods taken at about  
15 5-ish?  
16 A. If there was anything that -- if the sodium result was  
17 a little bit low, I think that's something that you  
18 would expect would be repeated.  
19 THE CHAIRMAN: Right.  
20 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Well, at that time was Claire  
21 essentially in a coma?  
22 A. Claire was still responding.  
23 THE CHAIRMAN: Sorry, let's just clarify. Are we on to  
24 5 o'clock now?  
25 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: No, at 2 o'clock.

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1 been on IV fluids since the previous evening.  
2 A. That's correct.  
3 Q. Yes. So unless something odd is there, you would expect  
4 that she had been on IV Solution No. 18 pretty much  
5 since she was admitted?  
6 A. That's correct.  
7 Q. Professor Neville says in his evidence on  
8 1 November 2012 -- we don't have to pull it up -- that  
9 you should have been aware of the potential problem of  
10 low solute fluids in this situation. Were you aware?  
11 A. I wasn't aware that there was a specific concern about  
12 fifth-normal saline.  
13 Q. No. Were you aware that when you have neurological  
14 problems that low-sodium fluids can in themselves be  
15 a problem?  
16 A. I was aware that they could be a problem in the context  
17 of SIADH or renal impairment.  
18 Q. But is that something that you thought or should have  
19 thought --  
20 A. It wouldn't have been a concern for me in somebody who  
21 did have SIADH, who had an encephalopathy with seizures,  
22 for example.  
23 Q. That wouldn't have been a concern?  
24 A. No, it's specifically in the context of SIADH that it's  
25 a concern.

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1 A. At 2 o'clock, I don't think she was in a coma. She sat  
2 up and she was interacting with me.  
3 Q. Then if I put it to you again what Professor Neville  
4 said a little bit later on in that evidence, which is at  
5 161, that you had the responsibility to provide  
6 a cautionary note, essentially, because this is  
7 a particular feature of neurological -- let's pull it up  
8 so that we can see it. It's the transcript of  
9 1 November, page 163, starting at line 6.  
10 The question was:  
11 "Question: Do you think that it was part of  
12 Dr Webb's role and responsibility to provide that  
13 cautionary note or warning, even though his view is that  
14 he was simply being brought in to give some discrete  
15 neurological opinion?  
16 "Answer: Yes, I do think he has that responsibility  
17 because this is a particular feature of neurological  
18 conditions, and therefore if you don't know about it,  
19 then you can't be sure that anybody else will."  
20 What he's talking about is the importance of  
21 managing the fluids, and it goes back to the point  
22 in the textbook that I put to you earlier, which is the  
23 homeostasis, which you said could include maintaining  
24 the electrolyte levels within the range.  
25 A. I don't know what neurological conditions he's referring

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1 to there.

2 Q. I think he's referring to the --

3 THE CHAIRMAN: Let's go back to page 162 if we can.

4 Thank you. I think if you look at line 14 in the middle

5 of 162:

6 "He should have alerted people to the need not to

7 give anticonvulsants, which is what were planned, unless

8 he had satisfied himself as to where he was and it

9 should be within his field to at least know about the

10 dangers of low sodium levels and to have some method of

11 managing them."

12 A. It doesn't really help me in terms of what he was

13 referring to in terms of "neurological conditions". Was

14 he implying it was because of Claire's epilepsy and

15 learning disability or ...?

16 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: I think he might be referring to an

17 extract out of Nelson in terms of the conditions. I'm

18 not saying he specifically was citing Nelson, but this

19 is the sort of area he's into. We can pull that up.

20 011-018-007. Under 56.6, "Electrolyte disturbances

21 associated with central nervous system disorders", where

22 it says:

23 "Diseases of the central nervous system are

24 frequently associated with disturbances in sodium

25 concentration. Patients with ..."

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1 come and give his evidence thereafter, so I'm wondering

2 if you want to respond to what he says.

3 A. Well, that list does not include status epilepticus or

4 non-convulsive status, and as I said, I think the risk

5 is significant in traumatic brain injury and in

6 bacterial meningitis. I thought, at 2 o'clock, that

7 encephalitis was unlikely in Claire because she had no

8 fever, so it wouldn't have been high on my differential

9 at that stage.

10 Q. I understand that you say that, but she hadn't had

11 a fever when you discussed encephalitis with Dr Sands,

12 whenever it was earlier, because she'd never had

13 a fever.

14 A. That's correct and I think we discussed that

15 encephalitis might be a differential, but it wasn't high

16 on our differential.

17 Q. It was sufficiently high for him to go and add it to the

18 note that Dr Stevenson had taken. So why did you think

19 that that was a potential differential even though there

20 was no fever and now, at 2 o'clock, when she still

21 doesn't have a fever, you don't think so?

22 A. I'm not saying I didn't consider it; I'm just saying

23 I didn't think it was likely that she had encephalitis.

24 Q. But what had changed for you to have thought it was

25 likely when you were speaking to him not so long ago --

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1 It goes on and you see in there "encephalitis",

2 which is one of the things you had discussed with

3 Dr Sands, and if you carry on through that list:

4 "... may present with hyponatraemia. Most

5 hyponatraemia in this setting is associated with normal

6 total body sodium with minimal or negative sodium

7 balance. A decrease in serum sodium is also entirely

8 the result of retention of water."

9 And then it goes on to say how you have to manage

10 that.

11 So I think that's the sort of thing that he is

12 warning against, that there is an interrelationship

13 between the development of these conditions, the

14 application of low-sodium fluids, and even the

15 relationship between the encephalitis and the

16 development of the SIADH and so on.

17 So that's, as I understand it, what he's saying,

18 that is within the provenance, if I can put it that way,

19 of a paediatric neurologist, not necessarily within the

20 knowledge, experience and expertise of a three-month

21 paediatric SHO. So his statement is: you know that or

22 should know that far better than they, and you should be

23 guiding them. I'm putting his words to you because

24 although I had asked you about that earlier, I hadn't

25 put to you his own view about that, and he's going to

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1 MR SEPHTON: Sorry, my learned friend is misquoting the

2 witness. He has never said it was likely; he said it

3 was a possible differential diagnosis. It's unfair to

4 put to him that he thought earlier that it was likely

5 and now he didn't.

6 THE CHAIRMAN: He consistently thought it was a possibility

7 but not a significant possibility; is that a fair

8 summary?

9 A. Yes.

10 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: But I think that you'd just said that

11 you had moved it lower down the register, if I can put

12 it that way, at 2 o'clock.

13 A. I didn't mean to imply that. I still felt it was less

14 likely, really.

15 THE CHAIRMAN: Okay.

16 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Had its likelihood changed since you

17 spoke to Dr Sands and when you saw Claire at 2 o'clock?

18 A. I don't think so. I can't remember, but I don't think

19 so.

20 Q. Because I think that's what you said in your evidence on

21 Friday, but we can pick it up if it is relevant.

22 MR GREEN: If I may assist because it may be that my learned

23 friend, Mr Sephton's, criticism of Ms Anyadike-Danes was

24 unfair. If we could pull up witness statement 138,

25 page 20, please? 138/1, page 20.

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1 This is Dr Webb's first statement and, if we go  
2 to (e), he's asked about his examination of Claire on  
3 the 22nd at 2 o'clock. If we go down to the bottom  
4 three lines:  
5 "I also considered meningoencephalitis as a likely  
6 underlying diagnosis."  
7 THE CHAIRMAN: Doesn't he start (e) by saying -- before he  
8 goes into 1, 2, and 3, he says under the general heading  
9 of (e):  
10 "I had a picture of non-convulsive  
11 status epilepticus possibly associated with viral  
12 infection and possibly encephalopathy."  
13 MR GREEN: Absolutely.  
14 THE CHAIRMAN: And then he's asked to expand on the  
15 encephalitis at (iii), and he says:  
16 "Claire had a history to suggest ..."  
17 MR GREEN: That's right. I simply raise it because perhaps  
18 Mr Sephton's interruption was misdirected.  
19 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Can you also clarify this point? Did  
20 you think that there was a real risk of SIADH as  
21 a result of whatever were your differential diagnoses  
22 that you were formulating at 2 o'clock?  
23 A. No, I didn't.  
24 Q. You didn't?  
25 A. No.

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1 it goes much further and causes real damage? The bit  
2 about papilloedema being very late in the process --  
3 it's not my wording, it's Professor Neville's evidence  
4 on 5 November at page 14. And there he says:  
5 "Papilloedema is very late in this process, so you  
6 would expect to be spotting this ['this' being the signs  
7 of raised intracranial pressure] before papilloedema had  
8 appeared and if you had papilloedema, you'd know you'd  
9 probably had it, you'd know you were beyond the point of  
10 no return."  
11 So what you're trying to do is to make sure that  
12 you've spotted the signs of developing intracranial  
13 pressure before you get to that stage so that you can  
14 actually treat it and avoid it.  
15 A. I don't accept that papilloedema is always very late in  
16 this process. Unfortunately, detecting raised  
17 intracranial pressure can be difficult clinically.  
18 Q. But is that something that you think you should have  
19 been seeking to detect at that time or seeking to ask  
20 yourself the question, might I be seeing a child who is  
21 developing raised intracranial pressure and should  
22 I therefore be trying to address that?  
23 A. I would have been alerted to -- aware of that and  
24 I would have been conscious of blood pressure and heart  
25 rate and her optic discs.

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1 Q. Can I ask you about the issue of raised intracranial  
2 pressure? In your witness statement, 138/1, at page 64,  
3 you said that:  
4 "[You] didn't consider raised intracranial pressure  
5 as a cause of Claire's presentation because that would  
6 not usually be a feature of non-convulsive status and  
7 I did not think she had a neurosurgical emergency or  
8 bacterial meningitis, which might account for cerebral  
9 oedema and raised ICP."  
10 And then I think you go on to say that you did not  
11 note that she -- I think you went on to test and found  
12 that she didn't have papilloedema. And I think that  
13 that comes from your statement to the coroner at  
14 090-053-173. We don't have to pull it up, but you say:  
15 "I would specifically have checked her for evidence  
16 of raised intracranial pressure by examining the back of  
17 her eye with an ophthalmoscope for papilloedema and  
18 I documented that this was not present."  
19 But if she had had papilloedema at that stage, that  
20 occurs rather late in the process of raised intracranial  
21 pressure; isn't that right?  
22 A. It can do, but if she had papilloedema, it would have  
23 been a very different situation.  
24 Q. Of course. But the issue is: is she developing a raised  
25 intracranial pressure that can be addressed there before

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1 Q. How else would you have detected its possibility?  
2 A. Well, early on, headache is a predominant symptom.  
3 Subsequently, vomiting.  
4 Q. If you had carried out a CT scan, for example, would  
5 you have been able to see that, whether there was  
6 evidence of something that could be causing raised  
7 intracranial pressure?  
8 A. Not necessarily.  
9 Q. But could you have?  
10 A. Yes, you could have, but not necessarily. In the early  
11 stages of cerebral oedema, the CT is often normal.  
12 Q. Then if we move to the attendance with Claire at around  
13 3 o'clock. You know from Friday that there is an issue  
14 between you and Dr Stevenson as to in what circumstances  
15 the prescription or the suggestion for midazolam was  
16 communicated to the ward. Your view is that you  
17 telephoned that through.  
18 A. I can't recall the details of this consultation, but  
19 I certainly had contact from the ward and --  
20 Q. I think you have fairly said you can't recall the  
21 details, but is it also fair to say that you could have  
22 attended the ward?  
23 A. It's possible that I did, but I think it's unlikely.  
24 Q. The reason I say that is because there are any number of  
25 statements that you've made or places in your statements

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1 where that would suggest that you had indeed done that.  
2 A. And those statements are in response to questions from  
3 the inquiry, which seemed to place me on the ward at  
4 that time. So I was ...  
5 THE CHAIRMAN: Which at least, to some extent, are prompted  
6 by the medical record, which says, "Seen by".  
7 A. Yes, that's correct.  
8 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Can I just put one to you? Well, in  
9 fairness, because I've been asked to, let me put them to  
10 you. There's a witness statement at 138/1, page 3. And  
11 in that, you say -- and this is the point that the  
12 chairman has just put to you:  
13 "From the clinical notes, it appears that I met with  
14 Claire and/or members of her family at 2 pm, some time  
15 around 3.25, and at 5 pm on October 22."  
16 A. That's correct.  
17 Q. So that's where you got that from?  
18 A. Yes.  
19 Q. And then you go on at page 12:  
20 "I saw Claire on two further occasions following my  
21 initial consultation at 2 pm."  
22 And then at page 28 you say -- and we don't need to  
23 go to that either. You say:  
24 "I assessed Claire's clinical state three times on  
25 the afternoon of 22 October."

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1 to the inquiry's witness statements and you seem to  
2 associate them -- sorry, I beg your pardon, we might  
3 want the first page. Although you say that there to the  
4 coroner, on the first page of your coroner's witness  
5 statement, you refer to seeing Claire twice. So the  
6 picture does appear a little confused, but I'm trying to  
7 be fair to you because it hasn't necessarily all been  
8 one way, if I can put it that way, and the reference to  
9 seeing her twice is at 090-053-161.  
10 But this is the one that I would like to come to,  
11 which is your reference in your first witness statement  
12 for the inquiry, which is at 138/1, page 31. It starts  
13 "I believe":  
14 "State what information [it's in answer to (xiii)]  
15 you communicated to Claire's parents and family and when  
16 and where you told them this information, and where the  
17 information you communicated was recorded or noted."  
18 You say:  
19 "I believe this was recorded at 3.25 pm."  
20 And there's a reference there to the notes:  
21 "I believe this was for a short period and I did not  
22 write a clinical note at this point. I cannot recall  
23 who was present or whether members of Claire's family  
24 with present. I don't believe I undertook a formal  
25 examination at this time. I would have reviewed

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1 And that's how matters lie, really, until we get to  
2 your third witness statement, where you say at page 2,  
3 138/3, page 2:  
4 "I believe my communication with the medical staff  
5 in relation to [and it's the midazolam we're talking  
6 about] was most likely to have been by phone as I did  
7 not attend the ward until some time later and did not  
8 write the dose myself in Claire's note."  
9 But then you go on at page 4 of that witness  
10 statement to say:  
11 "On my second visit to the ward at 3 pm, the  
12 description of Claire's definite seizure since I had  
13 last seen her in many ways reinforced my belief that  
14 seizures were central to Claire's presentation and  
15 needed to be treated."  
16 So although you've got the point at 2 that you'd  
17 been there only twice, that's not sustained, if I can  
18 put it that way, through that statement.  
19 And then you say -- I think this is to the  
20 coroner -- at 090-053-165. In fairness, you say:  
21 "It would appear from the notes that I reviewed  
22 Claire during the afternoon because of concerns about  
23 ongoing seizure activity and recommended the use of  
24 midazolam."  
25 So this is closer in time, if I can put it that way,

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1 Claire's GCS score and nursing observations, which did  
2 not show evidence for hypertension or bradycardia that  
3 might be seen in raised intracranial pressure."  
4 It goes on:  
5 "I was of the ongoing impression that Claire was in  
6 non-convulsive status and did not give consideration to  
7 SIADH as I understood her sodium level to have been  
8 satisfactory earlier that morning."  
9 And then it goes on about not discussing matters  
10 with members of the PICU staff. That seems to be  
11 actually quite a detailed account of what you think you  
12 were doing at 3.25.  
13 A. I was trying to answer the inquiry's queries and, as  
14 I said, essentially the notes on two occasions seem to  
15 place me on the ward, but I've no recollection of going  
16 back to the ward at that time.  
17 THE CHAIRMAN: And Dr Stevenson doesn't remember that day at  
18 all, so really it's an open question as to whether you  
19 were there or not.  
20 A. Yes, I can't recall.  
21 THE CHAIRMAN: If that's the position, doctor, why then did  
22 you say in your third witness statement that you think  
23 your contact was probably by phone?  
24 A. Because I must have had contact --  
25 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, you did have contact. There's no doubt

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1 you did have contact. But until that third statement,  
2 which is the recent one, you seemed to have been working  
3 without any clear recollection, but on the basis that  
4 you were probably there on the ward yourself at some  
5 time soon after 3, and then that changes in the third  
6 witness statement to "I probably wasn't there at some  
7 time after 3, this contact was probably by phone".  
8 A. And I've always had a recollection that I had some  
9 conversation with a member of the medical staff by phone  
10 about Claire, and I -- so that's been part of my memory  
11 from the time.  
12 THE CHAIRMAN: Just to spell it out because I don't want you  
13 to be in any doubt about this and I want you to  
14 understand the position fairly: the concern is when the  
15 overprescription of drugs arose, that you have somehow  
16 tried to distance yourself from that by suggesting that  
17 you might not have been physically on the scene but that  
18 you had done this by phone and that really, well, if  
19 Dr Stevenson made a mistake in writing it down, that's  
20 very regrettable but that's not what I told him.  
21 A. That hasn't been my intention and I think I said it on  
22 Friday that if there was a miscommunication, I was  
23 partly responsible for that.  
24 THE CHAIRMAN: Okay.  
25 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Thank you. I think that I did ask you

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1 things to think about, I suppose. One is: do I think  
2 that she warrants it absolutely now? Do I think she  
3 might warrant it, but by the time that presentation  
4 occurs, that might be out of hours and it might be an  
5 awful lot more complicated and difficult to actually get  
6 it done? And then if that doesn't happen, we're in the  
7 absence of that information through the whole of the  
8 night until the next day. So as you go further on down  
9 in the afternoon, do you not have to factor that timing  
10 point into your decision as to whether I should really  
11 be trying to arrange an EEG for this child?  
12 A. Well, I think as I said on Friday, I would also be  
13 thinking if this occurred at 10 o'clock at night-time,  
14 I would have to deal with it myself irrespective --  
15 Q. If you can avoid that, it's probably better, isn't it?  
16 A. In an ideal world, perhaps, but I think we have to  
17 realise that 16 years later, we still do not have EEG  
18 technicians on 24/7, so there is not a consensus that  
19 EEG is absolutely crucial in this situation. We have  
20 radiographers on call because we know that CT scans are  
21 crucial and we have to have somebody to do them. But we  
22 do not, 16 years later, have EEG technicians on call  
23 regularly.  
24 Q. Does that not mean that you give some thought as to  
25 whether you can be doing that within the normal working

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1 about the EEG, and I think ultimately your evidence on  
2 Friday -- somebody will correct me if I've misstated  
3 it -- was that if you had contacted the technician, you  
4 think they probably would have, because you were asking  
5 her, acceded to that, and that that would have really  
6 meant that she was working overtime effectively because  
7 that would be added to her normal list and that you  
8 didn't think that it was so -- correct me if I'm  
9 incorrect -- urgent that you would put her to that extra  
10 burden; is that the size of it?  
11 A. I think at 2 o'clock I felt that I had significant  
12 information or adequate information to act the way  
13 I did. So I think that was why I didn't request an EEG  
14 at that time. In a sense, if you pose the question,  
15 could you give rectal diazepam in that situation, and  
16 most people would say yes, then that was a reasonable  
17 thing to do. And if you like, I was taking the next  
18 step after that, and I felt that was reasonable in the  
19 context of the presentation. As the afternoon wore on,  
20 it became more and more difficult for me to contemplate  
21 EEG because it almost inevitably meant it was going to  
22 be after 5.  
23 Q. Yes. And that was one of the points that I wanted to  
24 pick up with you. In fact I think I started it by  
25 saying, if you're sort of looking down, you have two

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1 day?  
2 A. Oh yes, absolutely, yes.  
3 Q. Yes. And without wishing to burden her, could you not  
4 have had a conversation to see what her list looked  
5 like? She might have had a cancellation.  
6 A. I could have, but I think ... As I said, at 2 o'clock,  
7 my thinking was that this was something I could go ahead  
8 and treat and perhaps I missed the boat then, yes.  
9 Q. That's what I meant on Friday. It becomes a difficult  
10 point because you have to figure out whether you are  
11 likely to miss the boat.  
12 A. Yes.  
13 Q. And just so that you have it because, in fairness to you  
14 I said I would put what Professor Neville had said about  
15 it, he says -- and some of this may encompass not just  
16 your thinking at 2 o'clock but for the afternoon in the  
17 way that you've just mentioned now. In his evidence on  
18 1 November, he says at page 121 -- and we don't need to  
19 pull it up -- at line 17 in relation to EEG:  
20 "It is certainly crucial if you're treating it as  
21 non-convulsive status epilepticus."  
22 And the reason he says that's crucial is because as  
23 you, I think earlier said, it's the one way of  
24 confirming whether that is an accurate diagnosis.  
25 A. Yes, but again I would dispute with him that it's

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1 crucial because, as I said, if that was the case,  
2 we would have 24/7 EEG cover now.  
3 Q. That might be a resource issue as opposed to a clinical  
4 issue.  
5 A. I don't think so.  
6 THE CHAIRMAN: But your point is you can treat without  
7 having an EEG --  
8 A. Yes.  
9 THE CHAIRMAN: -- and you do treat without having an EEG.  
10 A. Yes.  
11 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Just so that we're clear about it,  
12 because I'm sure both he and Dr MacFaul will want to  
13 comment on it, you are saying it is not necessary  
14 therefore to have EEG services that can provide a quick  
15 response to children?  
16 A. Well, as I said, we don't have 24-hour cover.  
17 THE CHAIRMAN: I think the doctor said there's still no  
18 consensus on whether that's required and that's why you  
19 think it is not required because there is no consensus  
20 on it.  
21 A. There isn't a consensus.  
22 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: In some respects, I'm actually asking  
23 you for your view.  
24 A. Well, what's happened in the interval, of course, is  
25 that we have more technicians, so I think -- I don't

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1 single technician who was there. You were a fairly new  
2 consultant, it was important to form good relations and  
3 you didn't want to put her into the difficult position  
4 of deciding whether she was going to have to bump --  
5 I think that was the expression -- one of the scheduled  
6 cases. And what Dr Neville is saying is that  
7 essentially it's your decision. If you consider that  
8 the child requires it, then it's not -- the burden is  
9 not on the technician, it's a matter for you to say that  
10 this child has this kind of priority. And I think  
11 Dr MacFaul said something similar when he was giving his  
12 evidence. So just so that we're clear then: you at  
13 2 o'clock in the afternoon did not think that Claire's  
14 condition warranted that kind of urgent response with an  
15 EEG.  
16 A. I felt I had sufficient information to proceed with  
17 treatment, yes.  
18 Q. Thank you.  
19 Then so that you have the thing in its entirety,  
20 Professor Neville comments on the absence of an EEG in  
21 his report. He does that at 232-002-006 and on to 007,  
22 where he characterises the lack of an urgent EEG as  
23 a major omission, which should have been arranged at the  
24 latest by the morning of 22 October and which should  
25 have been carried out before the administration of any

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1 know how many there are in the Royal at the moment, but  
2 there are six in Dublin. I think now you would be more  
3 inclined to push them to do a test out of hours because  
4 you know that they can take the time off.  
5 Q. What's the benefit in being able to have a response like  
6 that, the benefit in terms of care for the child?  
7 A. You're -- it increases your certainty about the  
8 diagnosis.  
9 Q. Is that valuable?  
10 A. Yes, yes.  
11 Q. So if it was a clinical issue, if I can put it that way,  
12 from your point of view, would you have liked to have  
13 access to a service like that?  
14 A. In an ideal world, yes. Yes.  
15 Q. And then Professor Neville says on 1 November at  
16 page 127:  
17 "It seems to me that if you are managing this child  
18 in a way that requires repeated doses of  
19 anticonvulsants, you should be able to make out a strong  
20 case as to why this child should be treated and another  
21 deferred."  
22 That was in response to the suggestion that I think  
23 you had in your third witness statement, which is  
24 essentially the point that you expanded upon on Friday,  
25 which was that you didn't really want to burden the

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1 anticonvulsant medication other than the rectal  
2 diazepam.  
3 THE CHAIRMAN: Do you think that's harsh, doctor?  
4 A. I think if you agree in principle that you can use  
5 rectal diazepam in this situation, then I don't think  
6 you can then make a case that it's completely  
7 unreasonable to treat it otherwise, with other  
8 medication.  
9 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.  
10 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Well, do you think that the Children's  
11 Hospital -- it wasn't just the Children's Hospital, the  
12 Royal, as it were -- which was providing a regional  
13 service for neurology to the entirety of  
14 Northern Ireland, should have had that kind of service?  
15 A. I think this was in a sense quite a young specialty, so  
16 it was very early in the specialty and perhaps having  
17 had more than one technician would have been obviously  
18 a benefit, but at the time there was only one  
19 technician, the other person was on maternity leave.  
20 Q. Presumably because one was on maternity leave, there was  
21 supposed to be two?  
22 A. 1.5 -- I think the other person was working part time.  
23 Q. Sorry?  
24 A. The other lady was working part-time, I think.  
25 Q. So one full-time and one part-time --

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1 A. Yes.  
2 Q. -- was the full complement of --  
3 A. Of the department, yes.  
4 Q. And in your view as a consultant paediatric neurologist,  
5 was that adequate?  
6 A. They were very overworked, so it wasn't ideal. But as  
7 I said, there wasn't a consensus at the time that it was  
8 required that they would work out of hours and it  
9 certainly hasn't happened since.  
10 Q. Is that something that was discussed and raised?  
11 A. I can't recall that. I'm sure we did discuss it, but  
12 I can't recall the outcome of that.  
13 THE CHAIRMAN: Doctor, when you say you don't know what the  
14 position is in the Royal now? Are there six of these  
15 technicians in Dublin?  
16 A. Yes.  
17 THE CHAIRMAN: So you are less reluctant to call them out at  
18 night because they can then take time off during the day  
19 or take time in lieu?  
20 A. Yes, it still doesn't happen -- I can't remember the  
21 last time that I've had a technician in after hours, but  
22 they would stay late perhaps.  
23 THE CHAIRMAN: You say there are six. How many does it take  
24 to operate the machine?  
25 A. Some infants -- young children require two technicians

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1 remind him or it might not.  
2 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: I'm pulling up the particular page that  
3 deals with the EEG. 314-015-003. If we perhaps blow  
4 that up. You see that the survey didn't actually -- it  
5 excluded Northern Ireland from there. Nonetheless, they  
6 were looking at EEG services and if you look on the  
7 page 3, you see the ideal requirements for the provision  
8 of neurophysiological services for children. It says:  
9 "The working party, having considered all this  
10 information, has suggested the following statements  
11 identify the ideal requirements for the provision of  
12 neurophysiological services for children in Britain."  
13 (1) is EEG, and then you see, at (d), apart from the  
14 ambulatory 24-hour EEG recordings:  
15 "EEG and 24-hour EEG recording should be available  
16 for neonatal intensive care units and this service  
17 should be linked to a neurophysiological department with  
18 neurophysiological technician who has special  
19 responsibility for this service."  
20 I take it we didn't have that here.  
21 A. No.  
22 Q. Then at (e):  
23 "EEG video recordings, probably in a few specialised  
24 units with a special interest in epilepsy."  
25 Was there a special interest in epilepsy in the

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1 to obtain the study.  
2 THE CHAIRMAN: Do they work as six individuals?  
3 A. They do.  
4 THE CHAIRMAN: So how many machines do you have which can do  
5 the EEG tests?  
6 A. There would be three.  
7 THE CHAIRMAN: Okay. And are there three on at any one time  
8 or more than that?  
9 A. They do other investigations apart from EEGs, so there  
10 would be nerve conduction studies and visual studies and  
11 continuous monitoring during surgery.  
12 THE CHAIRMAN: And the hospital which you're in in Dublin,  
13 is that a -- obviously Dublin is much bigger than  
14 Belfast -- a regional centre as well as being a Dublin  
15 hospital?  
16 A. It is.  
17 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.  
18 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: I think there's a study that was done by  
19 the British Paediatric Association in January 1989 into  
20 neurophysiological services for children in the UK.  
21 Were you aware of a study like that?  
22 A. In 1989?  
23 Q. 1989.  
24 A. I don't think I would have been in 1989.  
25 THE CHAIRMAN: Let's show the doctor the study. It might

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1 Children's Hospital in 1996 so far as you're aware?  
2 A. Epilepsy would have been one of the most common things  
3 we would have dealt with, so yes.  
4 Q. And I take it we wouldn't have complied with that?  
5 A. No.  
6 THE CHAIRMAN: Sorry, hold on. Complying with something --  
7 this is an identification of what the ideal requirements  
8 are: isn't that right?  
9 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: It's not a criticism, but we wouldn't  
10 have met that ideal.  
11 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, but even (e) does not [sic] talk about  
12 "EEG video recordings probably in a few specialised  
13 units"; is that a few specialised units across Britain  
14 as opposed to in each hospital?  
15 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Well, sorry, I had probably phrased the  
16 question badly to Dr Webb. I was trying to identify  
17 from him whether he thought that the Children's Hospital  
18 or the Royal itself formed a specialist unit for  
19 epilepsy and I thought he had said that it did.  
20 A. Yes, but I think what they're referring to here is  
21 another step up again. What they're recommending, or at  
22 least identifying is there are sub-specialised units  
23 that deal with a child who can't be dealt with in  
24 the tertiary centre.  
25 Q. I understand.

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1 And the ambulatory 24-hour EEG recording, is that  
2 something where you can bring the EEG to the bed, if I  
3 can put it that way?  
4 A. No, that refers to a cassette that you wear, which is  
5 linked to the leads in your --  
6 Q. So the child can move around?  
7 A. Yes.  
8 Q. Are you able to help us with to what extent the Royal in  
9 1996 could offer this kind of service?  
10 A. I think it stops at 1(a).  
11 Q. Thank you. Then perhaps if we can deal with the CT scan  
12 now. A CT scan was something, I think, in your  
13 evidence, you said that Dr Sands had asked you about.  
14 A. That's correct.  
15 Q. In fact, we don't need to pull it up, but you said it at  
16 witness statement 138/1, page 5. I believe he also  
17 asked if he should request a CT scan. So he had that in  
18 mind.  
19 A. Yes.  
20 Q. Did he tell you why he was asking about that?  
21 A. I don't think so.  
22 THE CHAIRMAN: What do you read into him raising the  
23 question with you?  
24 A. I don't know whether he was requesting it because of any  
25 specific diagnosis. I think that's unlikely. I think

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1 latest, by the morning of the 22nd."  
2 And so on. Then if one goes down:  
3 "Whether it was reasonable for Dr Webb not to have  
4 seen Claire until 2 o'clock."  
5 His view is under (d):  
6 "If you were the gatekeeper for CT scans, then he  
7 should have been asked earlier, but otherwise that sort  
8 of delay can occur."  
9 You were asked earlier, you were asked earlier by  
10 Dr Sands, except you wanted to examine the child first  
11 before you formed that view. Can you deal with why  
12 Professor Neville is saying that you should have had  
13 a CT scan because it would have excluded  
14 "a space-occupying lesion, particularly a haemorrhage",  
15 and it would have confirmed cerebral oedema in his view?  
16 A. Professor Neville didn't see the child, but this  
17 presentation was not one of a space-occupying lesion or  
18 a haemorrhage. A haemorrhage occurring in this context  
19 would be a stroke, essentially, and --  
20 Q. And what would be the difference in her presentation if  
21 she'd had that?  
22 A. A stroke occurs very acutely, so you have a very sudden  
23 onset of symptoms over a period of seconds or a minute  
24 or two. A space-occupying lesion presenting like this  
25 would be extremely rare and unusual; it's a presentation

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1 he was doing it as a sort of scan to rule out things.  
2 THE CHAIRMAN: Right.  
3 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: And what sort of things would it have  
4 ruled out?  
5 A. I think particularly a brain haemorrhage, hydrocephalus,  
6 a tumour.  
7 Q. And what did you tell him?  
8 A. I felt that I would go and see the child first before  
9 we would do that and I thought, having seen Claire, that  
10 those diagnoses were very unlikely.  
11 Q. I think Professor Neville's view is that:  
12 "An early CT was indicated to provide evidence of  
13 intracranial pathology that would account for the  
14 deteriorating neurological state and help to decide if  
15 there was any suitable treatment. In this case,  
16 cerebral oedema could have been identified earlier and  
17 treated [as he has already identified]. Other  
18 conditions that might have been identified are  
19 inflammatory diseases, for example encephalitis."  
20 And I think one finds that in his reports at  
21 232-002-004, 006 and 007, particularly those two pages.  
22 So if we see what he says about it, he says:  
23 "The CT was to exclude a space-occupying lesion,  
24 particularly haemorrhage, and to confirm cerebral  
25 oedema. The CT scan should have been arranged, at the

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1 over a period of weeks usually.  
2 Q. If you said the stroke would have happened very quickly  
3 if she'd had something, by that do I understand, if for  
4 example she'd fallen, bumped her head and had some sort  
5 of bleed, if that had happened, and --  
6 A. A traumatic bleed?  
7 Q. Yes.  
8 A. Okay.  
9 Q. Is that what you describe as a stroke?  
10 A. No, no, a stroke would be a blood vessel that bursts.  
11 Q. What if that had happened? What if she had fallen,  
12 bumped her head and had a bit of a bleed?  
13 A. It presents like a stroke. It's a very acute onset  
14 and --  
15 Q. And how would she appear?  
16 A. In discomfort and usually have a weakness down one side.  
17 Q. Did she not have a weakness down one side?  
18 A. She had a history of a weakness down one side, or at  
19 least a history of favouring one side which was  
20 longstanding.  
21 Q. Was it possible to tell just from her presentation  
22 whether that had developed, if I can put it that way, or  
23 was any worse?  
24 A. She didn't have an obvious weakness down one side. She  
25 was moving all four limbs.

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1 THE CHAIRMAN: Whether it would exclude a space-occupying  
2 lesion, do you agree that a CT scan would confirm  
3 cerebral oedema?  
4 A. Not in the early stages, no.  
5 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: If I just have an early part of  
6 Professor Neville's report, which is 004, at the top, he  
7 says:  
8 "An MRI or CT could have been an urgent requirement  
9 and EEG ordered if no diagnosis emerged ... Blood tests  
10 to assist with the possibility of encephalitis or  
11 non-convulsive status epilepticus. A CT scan ought to  
12 have been carried out on the evening of 21 October. If  
13 the emergency CT scanner was in the adult hospital, then  
14 that is where the child should have gone for the test.  
15 It was likely there was only one CT scanner. Nowadays,  
16 a CT scan can be called up on a computer."  
17 But leaving that aside, he goes on to say:  
18 "I think that the CT scan was required urgently on  
19 the basis of the child having unexplained reduced  
20 consciousness. I would expect a paediatric registrar to  
21 discuss this patient with the consultant paediatrician  
22 and whatever the rules about who has to agree a scan, it  
23 should have been performed that night."  
24 That's his view about the night. I suppose one can  
25 say that he certainly thought by the 22nd that she

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1 following morning.  
2 Q. That goes back to the question the chairman put to you  
3 earlier that, if you're waiting, you must have formed  
4 the view that the risk of being incorrect and what might  
5 be wrong with her being something that was therefore  
6 not being treated and causing her harm must be quite  
7 low, otherwise you would keep all Claire's options open?  
8 A. I thought that risk was low, yes.  
9 Q. You did think that?  
10 THE CHAIRMAN: Sorry, doctor, just one of your entries  
11 concerns me a little. It's at the point where you say:  
12 "CT scan if she doesn't wake up tomorrow."  
13 Let me find exactly where that is.  
14 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: It's 090-022-054. The third part of the  
15 suggestion.  
16 THE CHAIRMAN: Surely if she doesn't wake up by that stage,  
17 she's in a terrible condition?  
18 A. She could still be in non-convulsive status. Actually,  
19 it can go on for days. My thinking then was: if we're  
20 going to do a lumbar puncture tomorrow morning, she's  
21 going to have to have a CT scan before that.  
22 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: That's a slightly different point. In  
23 terms of the chairman's point, if you're contemplating  
24 a CT scan tomorrow if she doesn't wake up, there must be  
25 a possibility that if that's happened, actually it might

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1 should have been having a CT scan. Can you comment on  
2 his rationale?  
3 A. I think it's very difficult for the experts to consider  
4 these cases when they know the outcome. It's very  
5 different when you don't know the outcome. I think to  
6 have expected someone to have sent Claire for a CT on  
7 the evening of her admission, I think that's a little  
8 harsh, really, I don't think that's what most  
9 paediatricians would do.  
10 Q. If you leave that aside and come to the 22nd, if he  
11 thought that it was warranted on the 21st, he certainly  
12 thought it was warranted on the 22nd. So can you help  
13 with his rationale for that?  
14 A. Well, as I said, I think it depends on your approach.  
15 Do you screen everybody or do you focus on the children  
16 that you think need the scan most? And my assessment  
17 was that this was very unlikely to be a neurosurgical  
18 emergency, it was very unlikely -- there was no history  
19 of trauma and the yield in the context of non-convulsive  
20 status in somebody who has previously epilepsy would be  
21 extremely low and the yield in an early  
22 meningoencephalitis would be extremely low. So I felt  
23 that given of the circumstances it was reasonable to  
24 wait to see how the situation developed and that if  
25 we were going to do scanning, we would do it the

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1 not be status epilepticus, it might have been something  
2 else, whatever that thing is, it has been developing and  
3 she has been deteriorating through the evening, through  
4 the night and into the morning of the next day.  
5 A. And that's why I started her on treatment at 5 o'clock  
6 with acyclovir for encephalitis.  
7 Q. Then if one looks at what Dr MacFaul said when he was  
8 giving evidence, he said that on 14 November, at  
9 page 65, he starts at line 4 with reciting what  
10 Professor Neville said, that he regards the lack of  
11 a CT scan as a major omission, and so on. In fact,  
12 I think that's me putting the points from  
13 Professor Neville to Dr MacFaul.  
14 Then he says in answer:  
15 "Well, I think that a scan was indicated, but  
16 exactly when, I would defer to Professor Neville,  
17 I think, on that point."  
18 And then if one pulls up page 66 as well, he goes  
19 over the page to say why he thinks it was important.  
20 Line 251:  
21 "As far as should it have been done, the answer is  
22 yes. And the reason why is that you could not, at that  
23 stage, know why Claire had a brain disease. And amongst  
24 the conditions that could have been present would have  
25 been a brain tumour of long-standing, which had just

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1 become increased in size. There could have been even  
2 a small bleed because she might have had a head injury  
3 that somebody hadn't noticed, if she'd tripped over.  
4 There could even have been even a brain abscess,  
5 exceedingly rare, but it does happen without there being  
6 a fever. In other words, there could have been  
7 a structural lesion within the brain responsible for her  
8 brain illness and she did have focal neurological signs.  
9 In other words, a difference between the sides, which  
10 was reported on admission. And all of these features  
11 would indicate that a scan was necessary to either  
12 include or exclude those conditions because one of  
13 them -- for example, an abscess -- or a tumour, an  
14 another, would require a neurosurgical intervention.\*  
15 So you have these things in the way that you were  
16 explaining them as rather low down on the register of  
17 possibilities.  
18 A. I've just missed them essentially, because I think --  
19 I don't agree any of those diagnoses were likely,  
20 really, and I don't accept she had new neurological  
21 signs. I think she had a history of favouring one side  
22 of the body. So that --  
23 THE CHAIRMAN: Do you say then that that rationale, which is  
24 put forward by Dr MacFaul, is really something that  
25 doesn't go against you because Claire didn't have

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1 In the same way as you put "CT tomorrow if she doesn't  
2 wake up", would you not have directed that if she  
3 doesn't wake up, one of the things we should be carrying  
4 out is a lumbar puncture?  
5 A. That's correct.  
6 Q. Because that would have been part of your plan in those  
7 circumstances.  
8 A. Are you asking me should I have written that in the  
9 notes?  
10 Q. Yes.  
11 A. Again, I think it's implicit almost in the statement  
12 that I made.  
13 Q. Sorry, in this entry in the notes?  
14 A. Yes.  
15 Q. Why is that? Because you might have been doing the  
16 CT scan to look at the sorts of things that  
17 Professor Neville and Dr MacFaul have talked about  
18 independent of an issue which would be assisted by  
19 a lumbar puncture.  
20 A. That's correct, but I think given that we had discussed  
21 the possibility of encephalitis and meningoenephalitis,  
22 that it would be sufficiently widely known that you did  
23 a CT scan in this context before doing a lumbar puncture  
24 and that Dr Sands would have known that.  
25 MR GREEN: Sir, before we move on and away from this entry,

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1 a tumour or an abscess or any of these other conditions?  
2 A. I'm saying that --  
3 THE CHAIRMAN: Even in retrospect, you're --  
4 A. In retrospect it's easy to say, but even at the time  
5 I did not feel that Claire had a tumour. I think that  
6 was extremely unlikely given her presentation. I didn't  
7 think that she had a brain haemorrhage or trauma to the  
8 brain because there was no history of that. An abscess  
9 in this context would be -- without fever would be  
10 unheard of, almost.  
11 MR FORTUNE: Sir, forgive me for interrupting. It may be my  
12 fault. Have we heard mention previously of a possible  
13 plan for a lumbar puncture to be carried out the  
14 following day? And if so, who was going to carry it  
15 out? A paediatrician or a neurosurgeon or somebody  
16 else?  
17 A. Lumbar punctures were usually carried out by the  
18 paediatric team, so the registrar usually.  
19 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Sorry, I misheard that.  
20 A. Lumbar punctures in children were usually carried out by  
21 the paediatric team, so it would be either the registrar  
22 or the SHO, depending --  
23 Q. Yes. When you were answering the chairman earlier about  
24 the CT scan, you said if you were going to do a lumbar  
25 puncture, then you would do a CT scan; is that correct?

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1 "CT tomorrow if she doesn't wake up", could we clarify  
2 what Dr Webb means by if she doesn't wake up? If memory  
3 serves me right, at page 73 of the [draft] transcript  
4 his evidence a few minutes ago was that at 2 o'clock she  
5 sat up and was interacting. And I just want to see if  
6 I've missed something about the way that note should be  
7 read because, on the face of it, it seems starkly  
8 inconsistent about what is being said on oath today.  
9 MR SEPHTON: The witness said, as I understand it, that that  
10 was his position at 2 o'clock and we're now reading  
11 a note at 5 o'clock.  
12 THE CHAIRMAN: No, this note is at 2 o'clock.  
13 MR GREEN: Absolutely.  
14 THE CHAIRMAN: But it's projecting a possible course of  
15 action. This is a suggestion by Dr Webb that if Claire  
16 doesn't wake up -- well, do we interpret that, doctor,  
17 to mean if she doesn't wake up tomorrow? Because at  
18 this stage if she's sitting up, she is at least to some  
19 extent awake at 1.30, 2 o'clock.  
20 A. Yes. What I'm suggesting is that if she doesn't  
21 improve, if she doesn't come back to herself --  
22 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: What you said on Friday was if she  
23 didn't come back to how she normally was, if I can put  
24 it that way --  
25 MR GREEN: At page 73 of today's [draft] transcript, the

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1 contemporaneous note that the stenographer is doing, it  
2 is that she sat up and was interacting.  
3 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, sorry, but Mr Green, I understand that  
4 Dr Webb found Claire to be doing that, but she was still  
5 clearly unwell. The extent to which she was unwell is  
6 a matter of some debate, but she was able to do that at  
7 1.30, 2 o'clock on the Tuesday lunchtime. Is your point  
8 that she was still at that reduced level of activity and  
9 consciousness the following morning, that the CT scan  
10 should be done?  
11 A. Yes.  
12 THE CHAIRMAN: It's not if she was completely unconscious?  
13 A. No, no.  
14 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Maybe you have just answered the  
15 chairman. How recovered would she have to be for you to  
16 no longer think that a CT scan was warranted on the  
17 Glasgow Coma Scale?  
18 A. I think if she had come back to normal, then it wouldn't  
19 have been because I think that's ...  
20 Q. If we just pull up this record of the Glasgow Coma  
21 Scale, 310-011-001. So that is all her records there,  
22 broken down in that way. And I think that that red one  
23 at 2 pm is one that you entered. But in any event, she  
24 never recovers back to where you have her when you're  
25 examining her at 2 o'clock. In fact, irrespective of

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1 was Mr Fortune actually -- about the lumbar puncture,  
2 that appears at witness statement 138/1, and I think at  
3 pages 84 and 85. I think it starts at (e):  
4 "State whether you took any steps to test your  
5 diagnosis of meningitis. If so, explain the action you  
6 took. I recommended viral cultures of stool, urine and  
7 blood and a throat swab to look for possible viral  
8 agents that might be causing meningoencephalitis. I did  
9 not request a lumbar puncture, but would have planned  
10 this for the following day if Claire had not improved,  
11 and after a CT scan, and if there were still concerns  
12 about her level of awareness."  
13 So I think that is your reference to lumbar  
14 puncture.  
15 MR FORTUNE: My concern was that the entry in the note is  
16 silent as to any lumbar puncture. So how was anyone  
17 else, in particular a paediatrician, to know what was in  
18 Dr Webb's mind?  
19 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Possibly where that's going is the next  
20 day would be a new team, so if it's the new paediatric  
21 team who are going to carry that out, then they would  
22 need to know that that's what's being indicated on the  
23 plan that you're formulating.  
24 A. I don't think there would have been a new team.  
25 THE CHAIRMAN: A new consultant maybe, but not a new team.

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1 the points that are made as to how precise these are,  
2 the trends are pretty low and never getting back to  
3 where you had her at 2 o'clock, if I can put it that  
4 way, apart from 8 o'clock.  
5 Then from 9 pm, it's fairly consistently at that  
6 level of 6 or 7, as the case may be. So if that's the  
7 case then, so if you had thought that a CT scan tomorrow  
8 if she doesn't wake up, or at least show some signs of  
9 coming back to herself, if I can put it that way, we're  
10 coming to that perhaps when we go to 5 o'clock. But if  
11 you see that's a bit of a trend, notwithstanding the  
12 anticonvulsant therapy that you have prescribed for her,  
13 there is absolutely no sign -- and she has had quite  
14 a bit of anticonvulsant they were -- of her getting  
15 anywhere nearby the time you see her at 5 o'clock where  
16 she was at 1 o'clock when the first readings were taken.  
17 So is that the sort of thing which would have caused  
18 you to revisit your initial view as to whether a CT scan  
19 would have been appropriate?  
20 A. At the time, no. And I think my view over the three  
21 hours that I saw Claire didn't change very much, really.  
22 In the interval, she had had a seizure, which in a sense  
23 was supporting my suggestion that that was the basis of  
24 her problem.  
25 Q. I understand. Just in case of Mr Green -- I think it

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1 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: New consultant, sorry.  
2 A. I think my understanding would have been that Claire  
3 would have remained under Dr Steen's care and therefore  
4 Dr Sands and Dr Stevenson would still be involved.  
5 Q. Yes, but it wouldn't be Dr Steen as the consultant for  
6 the next day.  
7 THE CHAIRMAN: She's still the named consultant.  
8 A. It would be -- the on-call piece is just to cover the  
9 evening.  
10 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Oh sorry. Actually, maybe you can help  
11 us with that. If the named consultant doesn't have  
12 a rota for that day, how do you manage with consultant  
13 cover?  
14 A. If the named consultant doesn't ...?  
15 THE CHAIRMAN: In other words, Dr Steen, as we understand  
16 it, was not scheduled to be in the Children's Hospital  
17 on the Wednesday, probably because she was outside doing  
18 community work. In her absence on Wednesday, does she  
19 still retain responsibility as the consultant in charge  
20 of Claire despite the fact that she's not supposed to be  
21 in the hospital at all that day?  
22 A. That's my understanding, unless she deputises it -- ask  
23 someone to deputise.  
24 THE CHAIRMAN: Dr Steen's arrangement was that she did two  
25 sessions in the Children's Hospital -- I think Tuesday

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1 morning and perhaps Friday, maybe Thursday. It's not  
2 clear. But those were the only two sessions in which  
3 she's there. So if a child came in under her care on,  
4 say, Monday night/Tuesday morning, as Claire did, then  
5 she remains under Claire for the rest of the week --  
6 A. That's my understanding.  
7 THE CHAIRMAN: -- even though Dr Steen isn't expected to be  
8 there for more than a half day.  
9 A. That's my understanding.  
10 THE CHAIRMAN: How is that actually managed in practice?  
11 A. Presumably it's managed through her contact with the  
12 registrar. I can't speak for Dr Steen. I think you'd  
13 have to ask her yourself.  
14 THE CHAIRMAN: Okay, we can pick that up. We have more --  
15 MR FORTUNE: [Inaudible: no microphone] sir, more important  
16 for a note to be made of an intended plan.  
17 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, it does.  
18 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: You might be able to help us with this  
19 point, though, Dr Webb.  
20 When Dr Steen was giving evidence she described the  
21 paediatric service as a "consultant-led service", and  
22 the way in which she described it -- somebody correct me  
23 if I'm wrong me here -- meant that consultants weren't  
24 sort of on the ward in that way and that they liaised  
25 with the ward, liaised with their registrars and so

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1 So somebody's got to be able to read to them what's  
2 happening from the notes so they can understand and make  
3 decisions about the patient's care.  
4 A. Yes, I think that's fair.  
5 Q. So the notes become, in that circumstance, really quite  
6 important?  
7 A. I think most of the time the consultant would contact  
8 the registrar and have a consultation with the  
9 registrar, particularly about cases that were difficult  
10 or required more thought.  
11 Q. Thank you. That actually goes a little bit into  
12 consultant responsibility, which was an issue that I had  
13 passed over, you may recall, on Friday, because that  
14 would have assisted. You, I think, said in your witness  
15 statement at 138/1, page 4:  
16 "I was consulted to provide [and I am paraphrasing a  
17 little bit here] neurological advice on the management  
18 of Claire. My role was to assess Claire with history  
19 and clinical examination, provide probable diagnoses and  
20 offer a management strategy to her paediatric team."  
21 And you then you go on at page 6 to say this:  
22 "Dr Sands asked me to provide a specialist opinion  
23 on Claire. He didn't ask me or my team to take over  
24 Claire's care, management and treatment."  
25 Firstly, can I ask what it means to offer

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1 forth. Did that extend to the neurological unit as  
2 well? Was that a consultant-led service?  
3 A. Yes.  
4 Q. So if you've got a consultant-led service, which means  
5 that the consultants aren't based in the ward, if I can  
6 put it that way, then does that not mean that your forms  
7 of communication, whether they be by telephoning each  
8 other if you are treating each other's patients, if I  
9 can put it that way, or by entry in the notes, take on  
10 quite a bit of importance because, in some respects,  
11 that might be a substitute for the consultant actually  
12 looking at the child as they might do if they were based  
13 on the ward?  
14 A. I think the most important contact was with the  
15 registrar.  
16 Q. Yes.  
17 A. So that --  
18 Q. But do the notes not become particularly important?  
19 A. The notes are important, yes.  
20 Q. I appreciate notes are always important, but do they not  
21 become particularly important when the consultants might  
22 be phoning in and might be wanting to have notes read to  
23 them because they're not there present on the ward all  
24 the time, and it may not be the registrar that they were  
25 able to contact, who might be off doing other things?

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1 a management strategy? What does that mean exactly?  
2 A. To provide advice on what's the most appropriate  
3 treatment.  
4 Q. Is it prescriptive? Is it that you're saying this is  
5 actually what I think you should be doing?  
6 A. Sometimes it is.  
7 Q. And was it in Claire's case?  
8 A. I think I gave fairly prescriptive advice --  
9 Q. Is it just --  
10 A. -- on both occasions.  
11 Q. -- when you refer to it then as suggestions and so  
12 forth, that's just a way of phrasing? What you really  
13 mean is: this is what I think you should be doing?  
14 A. Yes.  
15 Q. Okay. Did you ever consider at any point in the  
16 afternoon that maybe, actually, it would be a good idea  
17 and certainly more efficient if you did take over her  
18 care?  
19 A. No, I didn't, because I ... My understanding was that  
20 I was to give advice and usually you would be asked to  
21 take over care rather than assuming it.  
22 Q. No, but --  
23 A. I suppose the other issue is that I'm not sure whether  
24 my registrar was there at the time, so we may have been  
25 down in our own team.

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1 Q. So it might not have been a straightforward thing for  
2 you to do from your own resource point of view?  
3 A. If we didn't have the registrar, it would have been  
4 a foolish thing to do, actually.  
5 Q. Dr Sands thought she had a serious neurological problem.  
6 All the time that you were offering advice on her, you  
7 only seem -- well, you're the neurologist so you would  
8 think only of the neurology problems. But any of the  
9 things you identified all seemed to point towards some  
10 sort of neurological condition or outcome, even the  
11 tummy bug that might have started it all. By the time  
12 you're there offering advice in Claire, from your point  
13 of view, we've gone way past her just having a tummy  
14 bug. That has had a knock-on effect and we're into  
15 neurological territory. And you had never seen anything  
16 in relation to Claire's presentation that wasn't  
17 something to do with her neurological state; isn't that  
18 right?  
19 A. Um ... I think her issues were --  
20 Q. Yes.  
21 A. -- neurological, yes.  
22 Q. Leaving aside your resource point -- and we need to  
23 check whether your registrar was there -- would it not  
24 have made more sense to have actually brought Claire on  
25 to the neurological ward?

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1 terms the issues that we were dealing with here were  
2 ones that any general paediatric nursing person could  
3 deal with, really.  
4 Q. We'll see it as we go further on down the afternoon, but  
5 the inquiry's nursing expert, Ms Ramsay, certainly from  
6 the nurses' point of view, formed the view that the  
7 extent to which the therapy being administered to  
8 Claire -- she, in that position, would have been asking  
9 the question as to whether this child shouldn't be in  
10 paediatric intensive care and not on a general ward.  
11 This is one step away from that; this is putting her in  
12 a setting where the people are likely to be more  
13 experienced about her presentation and the medication  
14 that's being provided and so on.  
15 A. I think if the nursing staff had come to me and said  
16 they had an issue with her being on the ward,  
17 I certainly would have considered that, but that  
18 representation was never made to me.  
19 Q. Is that realistic though, that a nurse would --  
20 A. Absolutely.  
21 MR FORTUNE: There seems to be some confusion in my learned  
22 friend's mind as to whether there is a significant  
23 difference between the general ward where Claire was and  
24 neurological ward where she might have been and,  
25 certainly, PICU, where arguably she should have been at

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1 A. That afternoon, probably not, because she was known to  
2 the staff and the nursing staff on the ward that she was  
3 on. I think the following day, if there were still  
4 issues and we were having difficulty controlling  
5 seizures or there were some other issues, then perhaps  
6 we would have. But on that afternoon, she'd been  
7 admitted on that ward, the nursing staff knew her, the  
8 medical team knew her. I would not have seen an  
9 indication to transfer her.  
10 Q. If she had moved on to a neurological ward, is that  
11 St Paul's ward?  
12 A. Mm.  
13 Q. Yes. If she had moved on to that ward, then would the  
14 nurses treating her have had any better -- I'm just  
15 trying to see whether you have specialist nurses with  
16 any better experience or expertise in neurological  
17 issues or are they general nurses that have a rotation  
18 throughout the Children's Hospital?  
19 A. We had one specialist nurse who worked very much as  
20 a liaison person, largely with families with epilepsy.  
21 My understanding was that the nursing staff on the ward  
22 were generally general paediatric nurses, but certainly  
23 the more senior members of the staff probably had  
24 experience from Paul Ward over a period of time so they  
25 would have acquired that experience. But in general

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1 some time. Perhaps Dr Webb ought to explain what the  
2 differences are, if any, between a paediatric ward and  
3 a neurological ward. We're all aware of --  
4 THE CHAIRMAN: I'm not sure Ms Anyadike-Danes was confused  
5 about the difference between a neurological ward and  
6 a PICU ward. I'm not sure that that suggestion was  
7 warranted. Let me ask it in this way: what would it  
8 take for you to suggest that a child who is on  
9 Allen Ward should be moved on to the neurological ward?  
10 A. If we were asked to take over the care.  
11 THE CHAIRMAN: Right. So if you had been, and this comes  
12 back to your point that you don't assume care, the  
13 normal practice is that if the consultant paediatrician  
14 suggests that this is a child who might be more  
15 appropriately or better dealt with on a neurological  
16 ward --  
17 A. Absolutely.  
18 THE CHAIRMAN: -- you will consider that request and  
19 probably accede to it, if you can --  
20 A. If there is a bed available, yes.  
21 THE CHAIRMAN: Okay. And in the neurological ward then,  
22 because you had begun to take the lead in Claire's care  
23 without formally taking it over, you were prescribing  
24 the drugs and your return visits or visit during the  
25 afternoon showed your level of commitment to Claire.

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1 That would be one reason perhaps for moving her on to  
2 the neurological ward, but your point is you weren't  
3 asked to so you don't assume something you're not asked  
4 to do.  
5 A. No, I wouldn't have, no.  
6 THE CHAIRMAN: Then the next step, whether she stays on  
7 Allen Ward or goes to the neurological ward, there's  
8 a difference between either of those two on the one hand  
9 and PICU on the other?  
10 A. Yes.  
11 THE CHAIRMAN: And a move to PICU depends on a view being  
12 taken about the seriousness of her condition, does it?  
13 A. It does, but at that time almost all of the children who  
14 would have gone to PICU would have required ventilation.  
15 THE CHAIRMAN: Right. The other possibility or option which  
16 was discussed was that there might have been some  
17 engagement with the consultants in PICU at some point  
18 during Tuesday afternoon to alert them to the fact that  
19 this was a girl for whom significant drugs were being  
20 prescribed, which is in itself an indication of her  
21 condition, and to at least sound ideas off them?  
22 A. I think that's correct, and I did acknowledge in one of  
23 my statements that I felt that I should have made  
24 contact with the intensive care staff at 5 o'clock.  
25 THE CHAIRMAN: Okay.

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1 Q. Did you actually know where she was in the afternoon?  
2 A. I don't think I did.  
3 Q. No. But you see no evidence of her, and I think you  
4 said at some point on Friday you got the impression that  
5 she wasn't about in the morning because Dr Sands had  
6 said he had carried out the ward round. So for all you  
7 knew, that might be one of the times when she's not  
8 scheduled or rostered to be in the hospital.  
9 A. Possibly.  
10 Q. That afternoon, I mean.  
11 A. Mm-hm. The afternoon, yes.  
12 Q. Did it occur to you that, given the amount of  
13 involvement you were having in Claire's care, you'd met  
14 two parts of her family -- by 5 o'clock, you'd seen the  
15 mother, but at 2 o'clock you'd certainly seen the  
16 grandparents -- that you might try to see where Dr Steen  
17 is, have a discussion about Claire, as to whether, apart  
18 from any other thing, you might bring her on to the  
19 neurological ward?  
20 A. No, I didn't make contact with Dr Steen. I think --  
21 Q. No, sorry, Dr Webb, I know you didn't; I'm just  
22 wondering if it occurred to you that you might do that.  
23 A. No, I don't think it did.  
24 Q. It didn't occur to you?  
25 A. No. The following day, as I said, if we were in the

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1 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Apart from the convenience, whether you  
2 actually came to the ward twice or three times, you  
3 certainly seem to have made contact with it at least  
4 three times, and given that you're also managing your  
5 own patients, that's quite a level of care and  
6 commitment that you're providing to a patient that's not  
7 yours. The chairman's point is that if things had  
8 worked that way, it might have been easier to have  
9 provided her with that level of oversight, since it's  
10 your therapy, your plan, that people are implementing,  
11 if she was on your ward, if I can put it that way.  
12 I think your answer was ultimately that's not  
13 a suggestion that would be initiated by you and, if  
14 Dr Steen had asked you that, you might have thought  
15 about that.  
16 A. Yes, if I had been requested, certainly.  
17 Q. Have you ever, in whatever the circumstances might be,  
18 suggested that maybe a child's needs could be better  
19 addressed on the neurological ward? Have you ever  
20 volunteered that suggestion?  
21 A. Yes, I'm sure there have been times when I've discussed  
22 it with the consultant and come to that decision.  
23 Q. The slight difficulty about it is that you don't  
24 actually have any contact with Dr Steen at all.  
25 A. No.

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1 situation, I think I would have almost certainly pursued  
2 that.  
3 Q. How well did you know Dr Steen at that stage?  
4 A. Well, we had been colleagues for a year.  
5 Q. So might it not just have been a normal thing to say,  
6 "Look, I've actually had quite a bit of involvement with  
7 your patient this afternoon. I'm not sure how much you  
8 know about what's happening, but this is how I see it"?  
9 Would that not have been a normal thing to do?  
10 A. No, it wasn't routinely, actually. Most of the contact  
11 and communication was done through the team, and  
12 I suppose the advantage of that is that the registrar  
13 then knew what both consultants were thinking.  
14 THE CHAIRMAN: Sorry, I can understand that generally,  
15 doctor. You said to me a few moments ago, as you said  
16 in one of your statements, that you regret now that you  
17 didn't make contact with PICU staff at 5 pm, and that  
18 reflects the extent to which Claire was unwell. But if  
19 it would have been better for you to contact PICU staff,  
20 then surely that in itself is a strong indication that  
21 Dr Steen is somebody you should have spoken to. If  
22 you're going to go to contact a consultant in PICU, you  
23 would at least want some discussion with Dr Steen about  
24 what's going on and why you're going to PICU, wouldn't  
25 you?

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1 A. I probably would have recommended it to Dr Sands that  
2 a contact be made with PICU. I could have made the  
3 contact myself, but I probably would have recommended it  
4 to him so at least he was in the system.  
5 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: The difficulty is you don't actually see  
6 Dr Sands again, if I'm correct. He wasn't there when  
7 you came at 2 because, by that time, it would appear he  
8 has gone to do a clinic with Dr Hill. It's not clear  
9 that he is there at 5 pm when you come again, although  
10 he come a little bit after that, I think, because he's  
11 recorded as having administered medication at 5.15,  
12 I think. But there's no record of him --  
13 A. I think we did have contact at 5 o'clock.  
14 Q. We'll check that. We'll come to that when we come to  
15 5 o'clock. It's probably easier to keep it in that way.  
16 Is there any possibility that by you coming to see  
17 and treat Claire in the way that you did led to any kind  
18 of confusion as to who actually was the lead in Claire's  
19 case? I know that you say that it could not be you  
20 because, if you were the lead in her case, then you  
21 would have taken over the management of her care and  
22 that's something that was a definite step and it would  
23 be recorded somewhere. But from the point of view of  
24 the others seeing your presence with no obvious presence  
25 from Dr Steen, was it at all possible that people looked

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1 way, or the nurses, for that matter, should be directing  
2 their queries to or communicating with. In terms of  
3 Claire's condition, though, if she had deteriorated or  
4 had had some sort of adverse reaction to any of the  
5 medication that you had suggested was administered,  
6 you'd have expected them to contact you; is that right?  
7 A. Yes.  
8 THE CHAIRMAN: Sorry, would you have expected them to  
9 contact you directly? We're talking about the nurses.  
10 If the nurses had spotted something, would you have  
11 still expected them to speak to Dr Sands or Dr Stewart  
12 and Dr Stevenson and for them to contact you?  
13 A. Yes, it would normally be that the nurses would go to  
14 the doctors first.  
15 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Do you ever expect a nurse to contact  
16 you directly?  
17 A. I wouldn't have that expectation, but it occasionally  
18 happens.  
19 Q. So primarily, if something had not gone in the way that  
20 it was envisaged it might go, you'd have expected to  
21 hear that from some member of the team, typically the  
22 junior paediatricians or --  
23 A. Yes.  
24 Q. -- in some odd circumstances perhaps the nurse?  
25 A. Yes.

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1 to you as providing the lead in her care?  
2 A. I don't think that's actually likely. It was a short  
3 period of time. I don't believe the nursing staff  
4 thought that I had taken over care and I don't believe  
5 the medical staff had either, actually, because I would  
6 have indicated to them that I was taking over care.  
7 Q. Well, I don't mean so much in a formal way taking over  
8 her care, but providing the lead in the direction of her  
9 care so that, if you like, they were now going to be  
10 looking to you as to the plan, how it should be  
11 modified, how it should be implemented and all that sort  
12 of thing, so you were now performing that role.  
13 A. No, I don't accept that. It was clear to them that  
14 I was providing advice and that the person in charge was  
15 the general paediatrician.  
16 THE CHAIRMAN: Okay. We'll take a break there, doctor, and  
17 start again at 2 o'clock. Thank you.  
18 (1.12 pm)  
19 (The Short Adjournment)  
20 (2.00 pm)  
21 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: I was asking you about the consultant  
22 responsibility and your view was that you didn't think  
23 that your attendance and the level of involvement in  
24 Claire could have generated any confusion about who the  
25 more junior members of the team, if I can put it that

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1 Q. And that would be to you and not to Dr Steen, so you  
2 wouldn't expect them to be telling Dr Steen and then  
3 Dr Steen to be contacting you?  
4 A. It could happen that way, but I would expect that it  
5 could happen directly to me too through the team.  
6 Q. What would be your greater expectation, directly to you?  
7 A. Yes, possibly.  
8 THE CHAIRMAN: Sorry, that depends on whether Dr Steen is  
9 available or not. If she's not available, then you will  
10 expect one of the junior doctors to come to you.  
11 A. This is on Tuesday evening, Tuesday afternoon?  
12 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.  
13 A. Yes.  
14 THE CHAIRMAN: If she is available, you would expect them to  
15 go to Dr Steen and somebody from the paediatric team to  
16 contact you?  
17 A. I think if it was Tuesday afternoon and it was directly  
18 related to the medication that I'd started, I think they  
19 may have come directly to me at that point.  
20 THE CHAIRMAN: That's also the point at which Dr Steen seems  
21 to have been elsewhere, doing other duties. You  
22 wouldn't expect them to go in a very circuitous route if  
23 it's going to end up with you anyway?  
24 A. That's reasonable, yes.  
25 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: So that we're clear: you were providing

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1 expert guidance on her neurological presentation and how  
2 that might best be addressed. And I think earlier,  
3 before lunch, you were saying that actually in terms of  
4 all that you saw, it all ended up as something  
5 neurological, really.  
6 A. Yes, there was a paediatric piece to it in that she had  
7 a gastrointestinal illness and she required fluids --  
8 Q. But by the time you got there at 2 o'clock and for the  
9 rest of that afternoon, essentially what was happening  
10 was all neurological so far as you're concerned.  
11 A. So far as I was concerned, but there was another piece  
12 to it, I suppose.  
13 Q. So that we're clear, the other piece was what?  
14 A. She had presented with vomiting and a viral illness and  
15 she required fluids because she wasn't drinking or  
16 eating.  
17 Q. And apart from the fluid aspect of it, the rest of it  
18 was neurological? Is that right, is that fair?  
19 A. I think that's fair, yes.  
20 Q. So even if Dr Steen had been about -- not ward based,  
21 but about -- if something arose out of either the  
22 medication or her neurological presentation and so on,  
23 would you expect to be contacted first or would you  
24 expect Dr Steen to be contacted?  
25 A. I can't recall my expectation at the time, but I think

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1 Q. -- would that be fair? Having had your discussion with  
2 Dr Sands in the morning then, did you feel that it would  
3 be appropriate for you to have a direct discussion with  
4 Dr Sands to update him on what you had found at  
5 2 o'clock and just generally how you saw things?  
6 A. Yes. I would have had an expectation that there would  
7 have been contact between the SHOs and Dr Sands in his  
8 absence. And I'm fairly confident that I did have  
9 another discussion with Dr Sands at some point in the  
10 afternoon. I think it was at 5 o'clock.  
11 Q. But before you get to 5 o'clock, and I see what you say,  
12 that you would expect that the SHOs who had attended  
13 you, say at 2 o'clock, to relay to Dr Sands, but then it  
14 all gets a bit sort of one remove, if you like, and  
15 that's why I asked you whether you thought it would be  
16 preferable to have a direct discussion with the  
17 registrar, Dr Sands, rather than to have your views  
18 filtered through the understanding of the SHO.  
19 A. Well, I may have had an expectation that I would meet  
20 him again later in the afternoon.  
21 Q. Yes. Did you have any expectation of how soon you would  
22 want to do that really? In the absence of the  
23 consultant, he's managing the general paediatric side of  
24 things, if I can put it that way --  
25 A. Mm-hm.

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1 it's likely that I would have been contacted first and  
2 I think I was for the seizure, for example.  
3 Q. In the way that you have explained matters -- maybe this  
4 is unfair, but this was my understanding of it -- you  
5 have put rather a lot of responsibility on the registrar  
6 because in the system where the consultants aren't  
7 ward-based, then it's the registrar, if you like, who's  
8 making certain decisions, seeing whether things have  
9 become sufficiently serious or significant that more  
10 senior people have to be approached; is that what you  
11 intended to convey?  
12 A. Sorry, could you repeat that last bit?  
13 Q. I said quite a bit of emphasis seems to be put on the  
14 position of the registrar, who is ward-based -- if the  
15 consultant isn't, the registrar is -- and I think in the  
16 way you were describing it before lunch, that's the  
17 person really who is there to take an experienced eye  
18 and decide whether things are sufficiently serious or  
19 changing in certain directions that assistance, more  
20 senior assistance, is required?  
21 A. Yes.  
22 Q. So it's quite important that the registrar understands  
23 what's going on, particularly if what's going on is  
24 being directed by a specialist --  
25 A. Yes.

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1 Q. -- and that team has the overall care of Claire, as I  
2 understand your characterisation of it.  
3 A. Yes.  
4 Q. So it's quite important that he understands how what  
5 you're saying fits into the general paediatrician's  
6 role. So how quickly after you'd seen Claire at 2 pm  
7 would you have liked to be having a conversation with  
8 Dr Sands?  
9 A. I think I was getting adequate feedback from the other  
10 members of the team, through my contact with them, and  
11 while I didn't have direct contact with Dr Sands  
12 immediately after I'd started treatment, I think I did  
13 have contact with him later in the afternoon, and  
14 I certainly would have expected to have contact with  
15 him. Clearly at the time I felt that was adequate.  
16 Q. You have put that at 5 o'clock or thereabouts when you  
17 think he might have been there, so that's three hours'  
18 time. But of course, you don't know it's going to be  
19 5 o'clock when you have finished your consultation with  
20 Claire. That's why I'm asking you when, in the general  
21 scheme of things, would you liked to have been  
22 discussing matters with him?  
23 A. I think it's hard to predict that in advance.  
24 Q. No, I don't mean that you should have predicted it; when  
25 you would have liked to for the good order of Claire's

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1 management? When would you have liked to?  
2 THE CHAIRMAN: After you saw Claire at about 1.30 or 2 pm  
3 and you prescribed the drugs, you didn't then speak to  
4 Dr Sands?  
5 A. Not immediately, I don't think, no.  
6 THE CHAIRMAN: Do you think it was important or relevant to  
7 speak to him at that point?  
8 A. I think there were sufficient other members of the team  
9 present to feed back to me if there were issues.  
10 I would have had an expectation that I would have  
11 discussed with Dr Sands later in the afternoon.  
12 THE CHAIRMAN: Then you were involved again at some point  
13 after 3 o'clock and, whether you saw Claire at that  
14 point or not, you were engaged in a fairly significant  
15 fresh prescription. Would that have increased your  
16 desire to speak to Dr Sands?  
17 A. It may have done. I can't recall whether I was told  
18 at the time that he may not have been available or --  
19 I don't know.  
20 THE CHAIRMAN: We're coming towards 5 o'clock and I think  
21 you did speak to him around 5.  
22 A. I'm pretty certain we had a second conversation and it's  
23 most likely to have been around 5 o'clock.  
24 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.  
25 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Thank you. Just before the chairman

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1 treatment.  
2 A. Would I have liked?  
3 Q. Yes.  
4 A. I can't answer that because I don't know what I was  
5 thinking at the time. But I felt I had a consultation  
6 with a good registrar, who I expected was in contact  
7 with his consultant. So I felt that there were lines of  
8 communication open.  
9 Q. Would it have been helpful to you to have had an  
10 experienced consultant paediatrician, if you like, be  
11 able, not exactly debate, but at least discuss with you  
12 and perhaps raise other possibilities, maybe even  
13 challenge the basis of some of your assumptions? Would  
14 that have been helpful in the interests of Claire's  
15 management?  
16 A. It might have been, yes.  
17 Q. It might have been?  
18 A. Yes.  
19 Q. I want to ask you something a little more about the drug  
20 administration itself. Firstly, the question of  
21 double-checking. We don't need to pull it up, but in  
22 your first witness statement at 138/1 at page 97, you  
23 said you thought it was normal practice for the dose to  
24 be checked with two people at the time of administration  
25 and this was usually with the attending nurse. That was

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1 started asking you some questions, you said you felt you  
2 were having -- I don't know whether you said fairly good  
3 feedback, but in any event you certainly referred to you  
4 felt you were having feedback from the junior  
5 paediatricians.  
6 A. I certainly was aware that they were there and if there  
7 were issues that I would get feedback.  
8 Q. That's slightly different. What I'm wanting to know is  
9 what do you mean by you were getting feedback from them?  
10 A. I'm pretty confident that I was told about the seizure  
11 and we had discussions about the medication.  
12 Q. Yes. Does that all happen on one occasion?  
13 A. I can't recall.  
14 Q. Okay.  
15 THE CHAIRMAN: Let's move on.  
16 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: In the same way as I've asked you  
17 whether you would have liked to have had a discussion  
18 with the registrar and explained your position since he  
19 had initially brought you in, if I can put it that way,  
20 because he wanted your assistance or your assistance for  
21 Claire, leaving aside who is the person who should have  
22 contacted, would you have liked to have had a discussion  
23 with the consultant paediatrician about Claire? So  
24 a consultant-to-consultant discussion about the most  
25 likely differential diagnoses and the appropriate

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1 how you thought about it.  
2 Then you go on to say that you personally wouldn't  
3 get yourself involved in checking calculations, but you  
4 thought anyway that the practice was that you would have  
5 two people carrying out that checking.  
6 In 1994, the Children's Hospital published the third  
7 edition of the paediatric prescriber that I showed  
8 earlier, and they talk about what has to happen in some  
9 respects, for example if there's a cancellation of  
10 a prescription and so on. But it doesn't seem to refer  
11 anywhere to two people being required to check at the  
12 time of administration. Can you help with where you got  
13 that from as a normal practice or how you came to have  
14 that understanding?  
15 A. That was my experience in working in other hospitals.  
16 Q. In the Royal?  
17 A. No, no, in other hospitals in Ireland and the UK and  
18 Canada. It was pretty standard practice that if you  
19 were giving an intravenous administration, that you  
20 would check the dose and the drug with somebody else.  
21 Q. By the time Claire's admitted and you are treating her,  
22 you have been a consultant at the Royal for about  
23 14 months; I think you accepted that on Friday. During  
24 that time, had you observed that as a practice in the  
25 Children's Hospital?

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1 A. I can't recall that because I wouldn't regularly be  
2 around when intravenous administrations were being  
3 given, but that was my understanding that there would  
4 be --  
5 Q. Had anybody discussed it with you or drawn to your  
6 attention that this is what happens?  
7 A. No. It was so much part of normal practice that  
8 I wouldn't have gone enquiring even.  
9 THE CHAIRMAN: Sorry, we've heard before about  
10 double-checking in slightly different circumstances,  
11 whether it was two nurses administering the drug or  
12 whether it was a doctor. When you say it was your  
13 experience in other hospitals that there would be  
14 double-checking with another person, is that doctor and  
15 doctor or is that nurse and nurse?  
16 A. It would usually be nurse and nurse or doctor and nurse.  
17 THE CHAIRMAN: If your experience previously was that even  
18 if a doctor was administering the intravenous drug,  
19 there would be a check --  
20 A. Yes. Certainly, as a junior doctor myself, that would  
21 have been my practice.  
22 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: And if that's checked is there a place  
23 where that gets signed off, that that has been checked?  
24 A. Again, I think it was so much part of routine practice  
25 that you wouldn't sign the drug being given unless you'd

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1 children who don't respond to the medications. So what  
2 you do is you move on to the next line of treatment.  
3 Q. Is it possible that she didn't show any improvement  
4 because she didn't actually have non-convulsive  
5 status epilepticus?  
6 A. I think that's unlikely, actually. I think there was  
7 clearly something causing her problem when she came into  
8 hospital. She seemed to respond to diazepam and, for  
9 a period on Tuesday evening, she appeared to respond to  
10 midazolam. So in retrospect, I think that there is  
11 evidence that she did have some response to medication,  
12 but not as much as I would have liked.  
13 Q. I think you've said before that you're not in a position  
14 to directly evaluate the quality of her response to the  
15 diazepam. It's not recorded anywhere and it's down to  
16 what the nurses told you, which --  
17 A. I did review her at 5 o'clock.  
18 Q. We're going to come to what you saw when you reviewed  
19 her at 5 o'clock. In any event it's unlikely, but it's  
20 possible, that her failure to respond to the phenytoin  
21 was because the original diagnosis as to what is the  
22 cause of her presentation was not non-convulsive  
23 status epilepticus?  
24 A. It's possible.  
25 Q. Yes. But in your view, it was more likely that it's

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1 done that.  
2 Q. And this is something, in the way that you're describing  
3 it now, would be part of the basic training that the  
4 SHOs and, for that matter even, registrars coming up  
5 would understand, that that is what had to happen?  
6 A. That was the training that I got, yes.  
7 Q. Then if I can just go directly to the prescriptions.  
8 The phenytoin, for example. You prescribed that and you  
9 say in your witness statement, 138/1 at page 24, that if  
10 it was effective, it might be associated with an  
11 improvement in her conscious level. I think you said on  
12 Friday that might have happened rather quickly if that  
13 was going to happen.  
14 A. 15 minutes, perhaps.  
15 Q. Professor Neville's view -- the reference is  
16 232-002-009 -- he says that wasn't appropriate without  
17 proof of EEG and that the proof from the EEG that  
18 non-convulsive status epilepticus was present. Was  
19 there any evidence that you could see that the phenytoin  
20 had been effective?  
21 A. No.  
22 Q. And if it's not effective, how does that factor into  
23 your consideration as to what's happening with her?  
24 A. For children who are in non-convulsive status -- and  
25 indeed convulsive status -- there are a percentage of

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1 just she's in that category of patient that doesn't  
2 respond in that way.  
3 A. Doesn't respond.  
4 Q. Is that quite a small proportion of patients that don't  
5 respond in that way?  
6 A. There are about 20 per cent who don't respond to the  
7 medication.  
8 Q. And the condition itself is not terribly common?  
9 A. That's correct, yes.  
10 Q. I think you've also said that it was routine practice to  
11 have a cardiac monitor in situ; is that right? I think  
12 you said that in 138/1, page 23.  
13 A. When you're administering phenytoin, that's correct.  
14 Q. Did you prescribe that or direct that it should be in  
15 place?  
16 A. I can't recall that, but it would have been standard  
17 practice and phenytoin is a drug that's been around for  
18 a long time.  
19 Q. It's referred to later on when they give her  
20 the subsequent dose of it --  
21 A. Evening dose, yes.  
22 Q. There's a note from the nurse that that's in place. But  
23 it's not referred to in relation to this administration  
24 of it. You say that you wouldn't need to direct that  
25 because they should just know that.

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1 A. Well, I would expect that because it's a very well-known  
2 drug. And I think it's likely that it would have been  
3 if it was -- if she was monitored later in the evening,  
4 it's most likely she was monitored with the infusion.  
5 Q. Is it possible it didn't happen because the SHO is  
6 really quite junior, who would have been responsible at  
7 that stage for administering the medication, and didn't  
8 appreciate that that's what was required? Is that  
9 possible?  
10 A. It's possible, but I think the nursing staff were quite  
11 experienced and I would have expected that they would  
12 have monitored, and if the SHO didn't know, it certainly  
13 was available to him.  
14 Q. Were you aware of how experienced or inexperienced  
15 Dr Stevenson was?  
16 A. No.  
17 Q. And when you say that the nursing staff were quite  
18 experienced, is there anything in particular that you  
19 base that on?  
20 A. Just my observation of the nursing staff and --  
21 Q. It seems the ward sister wasn't there that day, so they  
22 were missing -- who would normally be a very experienced  
23 person and that, for whatever reason, actually quite  
24 a junior -- in terms of her qualifications -- nurse  
25 accompanied Dr Sands on the ward round at 11 o'clock.

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1 the third drug and you are prescribing that -- and  
2 I think on Friday you'd said it was quite a powerful  
3 drug -- still without having got any confirmation that  
4 this is in fact the condition that she has. Can you  
5 comment?  
6 A. We've discussed the issues around the EEG and I think --  
7 Q. Sorry, no. I framed that question badly for you,  
8 I apologise. What I mean to say is you're now on to  
9 your third level of anticonvulsant therapy and your  
10 original answer, I think to the EEG, to the chairman,  
11 was that not seeking an EEG at that stage reflected in  
12 a way your confidence or your belief that you had  
13 accurately identified the source of her problem, if I  
14 can put it that way.  
15 A. Okay.  
16 Q. And now you're on to the third round. Are you still  
17 that confident that you've accurately identified the  
18 source of her problem?  
19 A. Well, you'll recall that she had a seizure in between.  
20 Q. Yes.  
21 A. And that will have, in many ways, supported my  
22 suggestion that this was related to seizure activity,  
23 that that was the underlying issue for her.  
24 Q. At that stage, therefore, are you now thinking that  
25 she's got both convulsive status epilepticus as well as

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1 But did you know these nurses in particular to be able  
2 to talk about their expertise?  
3 A. I didn't know them individually, no.  
4 Q. You sort of assumed that nurses there are likely to know  
5 these sorts of things?  
6 A. Well, this was a general paediatric ward in a tertiary  
7 hospital with a good reputation and I think I would have  
8 expected that there would be some knowledge of using  
9 a drug like phenytoin in that context.  
10 Q. Then if we go to the midazolam, we have heard when that  
11 was actually administered, but if I can ask you a little  
12 bit about it. Professor Neville says that the giving of  
13 midazolam was inappropriate because -- this is  
14 a continuing concern of his in terms of no further  
15 confirmation having been obtained of your differential  
16 diagnosis of non-convulsive status epilepticus. He said  
17 that the giving of midazolam was inappropriate because:  
18 "There was no confirmation by EEG of the diagnosis,  
19 and [he believes] that midazolam has a sedative effect  
20 and could have caused or contributed to a fall in  
21 Claire's GCS with the effect of the drug lasting at  
22 least one or two hours."  
23 That's his view -- and we don't need to pull it  
24 up -- at 232-002-016.  
25 If I ask you just about the fact that this is now

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1 non-convulsive --  
2 A. No, I didn't think she had convulsive status, but she'd  
3 had a convulsion. Convulsive status involves convulsing  
4 for 30 minutes. So I thought she'd had a convulsion and  
5 that would not be uncommon in the context of her having  
6 non-convulsive status.  
7 Q. So you can have a convulsion even though your condition  
8 is non-convulsive?  
9 A. You can have convulsions during your non-convulsive  
10 status, if you like.  
11 Q. What causes that?  
12 A. I don't think we know.  
13 Q. Does it mean that your condition is a little bit more  
14 serious because -- I think you had described actual  
15 convulsions -- convulsions that you could see -- as  
16 indicating something about the electric activity in the  
17 brain, and if they had now reached a level which  
18 produced a physical manifestation, how are you to  
19 interpret that in terms of her condition?  
20 A. I wouldn't interpret that things were getting worse, but  
21 I would interpret it as this is a situation where it may  
22 get worse and I think further treatment is required.  
23 Q. Could it be evidence that things are getting worse?  
24 A. No, not necessarily. Could it be? Yes, it could,  
25 of course.

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1 Q. Thank you. Could it also, if one had all the options  
2 ranged out, mean that there was actually something else  
3 that was causing this and it actually wasn't  
4 non-convulsive status epilepticus, but something else,  
5 and this seizure could be indicative of that?  
6 A. I don't think you had to infer that at all, no.  
7 Q. I meant "could it".  
8 A. Is it possible?  
9 Q. Yes.  
10 A. Yes.  
11 Q. Then there has been quite a bit of evidence about -- at  
12 least you have been asked a number of questions about  
13 the actual dosage of the midazolam, both in requests for  
14 witness statements and to some extent in your evidence  
15 on Friday. Your evidence was that you --  
16 THE CHAIRMAN: We don't need to go back over that again. Is  
17 there any additional point that wasn't raised on Friday?  
18 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: There is.  
19 THE CHAIRMAN: Let's get to the point.  
20 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: The evidence that you gave was that the  
21 loading dose of 0.15 was something that you got from  
22 a particular paper which you provided to the inquiry.  
23 A. That's correct. That paper is the one paper that seems  
24 to inform the dosing, but --  
25 Q. Yes. Had you actually used that dosage yourself or come

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1 "Hypnovel should not be administered by a rapid or  
2 single bolus IV administration."  
3 Is that actually what was administered to her,  
4 a bolus of midazolam?  
5 A. That's the way it was recommended.  
6 Q. Where did you see that the single bolus is what's  
7 recommended as opposed to the IV administration?  
8 A. That's the way it's recommended in the papers that  
9 I quoted or the paper I quoted, and it's the way it was  
10 used in my experience: it was given intravenously as  
11 a bolus then followed by an infusion.  
12 Q. Were you aware that this is what the product literature  
13 said about it?  
14 A. I can't recall whether I was aware at the time.  
15 Q. Then it goes on to talk about only being used:  
16 "In settings with equipment and skilled personnel  
17 for continuous monitoring of cardiorespiratory function  
18 [and so forth]."  
19 Were you aware of that?  
20 A. I was aware that it was important to monitor respiratory  
21 rate and cardiac function.  
22 Q. And were you aware that a possible disadvantage of it is  
23 that it can bring about respiratory arrest?  
24 A. It can do, as can diazepam. And we did start Claire on  
25 a continuous oxygen saturation monitor which monitored

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1 across it being used while you were in Canada?  
2 A. Yes.  
3 Q. You had used it personally?  
4 A. I hadn't prescribed it, but I was involved in the care  
5 of children who had had it.  
6 Q. Sorry, what does that mean?  
7 A. I hadn't prescribed it myself.  
8 THE CHAIRMAN: Somebody senior to you prescribed it?  
9 A. There were other people who were using it and I had been  
10 involved.  
11 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Okay. Then a point that I had put to  
12 Professor Aronson and Professor Neville in relation to  
13 the seriousness of that drug. You'd, I think, conceded  
14 that it was, and I had put to you that in the product  
15 literature it talks about the sorts of effects that can  
16 be produced, paradoxical effects, and therefore things  
17 that one has to be aware of. I had put some of those to  
18 the experts and I think to some extent they thought some  
19 of it was a counsel of perfection, but nonetheless there  
20 were things that perhaps one ought to bear in mind.  
21 Maybe I can pull up 311-034-004.  
22 It's really under the precautions. The second  
23 sentence. This is from Roche, the manufacturers of  
24 Hypnovel, which is a particular type of midazolam that  
25 was administered to Claire:

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1 her oxygen second by second and her heart rate second by  
2 second.  
3 Q. When was that started for Claire?  
4 A. After the midazolam.  
5 Q. After the midazolam?  
6 A. Well, at the time of the midazolam.  
7 Q. Given that the nurses and the junior doctors wouldn't  
8 necessarily be aware of the effects of this, did you  
9 talk that through with Dr Stevenson, who was going to be  
10 the person who was making up and administering the drug?  
11 A. Midazolam is a member of a group of drugs called the  
12 benzodiazepines, which are very well-known to junior  
13 doctors and to nursing staff, and the effects are very  
14 well-known.  
15 Q. Would he have known that, that midazolam is part of that  
16 group?  
17 A. Yes.  
18 Q. How would he have known that?  
19 A. Because most of the drugs that finish with the term "am"  
20 are in that group.  
21 Q. And therefore, does that mean that you assumed that he  
22 would know about the possibilities, however rare they  
23 might be, that he would understand about these possible  
24 side effects?  
25 A. I would have had an expectation that he'd be certainly

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1 familiar with that group of drugs.  
2 Q. Would it not simply have been worth pointing that out to  
3 him? This is a junior doctor that you're talking to.  
4 These things are powerful medications. If there is  
5 a side effect, that could be quite serious. Is there  
6 any reason why you simply wouldn't ensure that he did  
7 know?  
8 A. I may well have. I just can't recall whether I did or  
9 not, but I may well have.  
10 Q. How quickly does midazolam have an effect?  
11 A. It's usually within minutes.  
12 Q. So if you were going to get an improvement from  
13 midazolam, you'd expect to see that fairly quickly?  
14 A. Yes.  
15 Q. Did you see any record of that having been noted, that  
16 she had an improvement with midazolam within that kind  
17 of time frame?  
18 A. No.  
19 Q. No?  
20 A. No.  
21 Q. So there hadn't been that for phenytoin, which may be  
22 slightly longer, but still a relatively short period of  
23 time -- 15 minutes I think you said. There hadn't been  
24 that for midazolam. What was your thinking as to why  
25 that wasn't happening?

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1 current status.  
2 Q. Well, could you not have simply left instructions?  
3 A. No.  
4 Q. Did you think she was sufficiently ill that actually it  
5 warranted you keeping a fairly close eye on her by  
6 coming again?  
7 A. Yes.  
8 Q. Some of the clinicians have described Claire as the  
9 sickest child on the ward. It's not your ward, but that  
10 seemed to connote that they had the impression that she  
11 really was quite ill. Are you able to express a view as  
12 to how ill you thought she was when you came at  
13 5 o'clock?  
14 A. I was concerned about Claire, but I didn't expect her to  
15 deteriorate, and I had an expectation that she would  
16 improve over time or at least remain stable. I wasn't  
17 expecting a deterioration.  
18 Q. That's the answer to a slightly different question.  
19 THE CHAIRMAN: If you had been apprehensive that she was  
20 likely to deteriorate, would you have left her after  
21 your 5 o'clock examination --  
22 A. No.  
23 THE CHAIRMAN: -- without speaking to the PICU consultants?  
24 A. No.  
25 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

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1 A. Well, I would have been --  
2 THE CHAIRMAN: Sorry, let's take this in sequence because  
3 the midazolam is given some point after 3.30, isn't it?  
4 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: 15.25.  
5 THE CHAIRMAN: If you're going to ask the doctor what his  
6 thinking was when that improvement didn't materialise,  
7 that brings us into the 5 o'clock examination. Let's go  
8 to 5 o'clock.  
9 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Yes. Then if we come to 5 o'clock, it's  
10 not entirely clear when you do attend, but in any event  
11 your note is timed 5 o'clock. Mrs Roberts is there, is  
12 she?  
13 A. I believe so, yes.  
14 Q. Why did you come at 5 o'clock?  
15 A. I can't recall.  
16 Q. Well, after you had prescribed or suggested the  
17 midazolam, had you indicated that you would come again  
18 to see Claire?  
19 A. I can't recall.  
20 Q. Would you want to have come again to see her?  
21 A. Yes, absolutely. But I don't know what I was doing.  
22 I may well have been with other patients and I just  
23 can't recall.  
24 Q. I understand. Why would you want to come again?  
25 A. To follow up on her response to treatment and her

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1 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: The question that I wanted to know from  
2 you is how ill you thought she was. Because I presume  
3 it is possible for a child to be really quite ill, but  
4 you to have the view that that quite ill child will  
5 nonetheless respond to treatment. So I'm trying to find  
6 out how ill you thought she was at 5 o'clock.  
7 A. It's difficult to measure that. I think ... As I said,  
8 I was concerned about her. I felt she needed ongoing  
9 treatment and close observation, but I had an  
10 expectation that actually, with this condition, she  
11 would improve.  
12 Q. Do you think you conveyed to the nursing staff and/or  
13 the junior paediatricians who might be there that you  
14 were concerned about her?  
15 A. By virtue of my attending to her, certainly.  
16 Q. And by virtue of whatever you found when you examined  
17 her at 5 o'clock?  
18 A. My notes, yes. I can't recall the conversations that we  
19 had, but --  
20 Q. No, but if your view was that you were concerned about  
21 her, and presumably even though it's difficult to  
22 measure it on a register how ill you thought she was,  
23 you did think that she was ill. Dr Sands had described  
24 her as "neurologically very unwell". Would that capture  
25 it for you?

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1 A. I don't know that he used that term for me, but ... As  
2 I said, I thought she was ill, I had concerns about her,  
3 but I can't take it further than that.  
4 Q. If you thought she was ill and you had concerns about  
5 her, then the question I was asking you is: do you think  
6 that you had communicated to the junior paediatricians  
7 there and the nursing staff that that was your view?  
8 A. I think the staff were aware, yes.  
9 Q. That that was your view? So if anybody had phoned up to  
10 the ward to find out how is she, they should have  
11 received that sort of message?  
12 A. Yes, I think so.  
13 Q. Yes.  
14 THE CHAIRMAN: Sorry, I think specifically what you're being  
15 asked is: if Dr Steen had phoned the ward, is that the  
16 sort of message she would have got?  
17 A. I would not have expected anybody to tell her that  
18 Claire was well. I think my expectation would be that  
19 they would convey to Dr Steen that Claire wasn't  
20 responding to treatment ...  
21 THE CHAIRMAN: And that you had had to see her two or three  
22 times --  
23 A. Yes.  
24 THE CHAIRMAN: -- that day?  
25 A. Yes.

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1 A. That I was concerned about Claire, but that I had an  
2 expectation that things may improve, but that she hadn't  
3 responded to treatment so far.  
4 Q. And would you have thought it appropriate for her to  
5 come and see Claire?  
6 A. I think that would have been helpful, but I may be  
7 thinking that in retrospect, I don't know.  
8 Q. I understand, that's fair. Would you have thought it  
9 appropriate or helpful for her -- leaving aside whether  
10 she came to see Claire -- to come and have a discussion  
11 with you about Claire?  
12 A. Yes, it may have been, yes.  
13 Q. Thank you. Then Mrs Roberts is there and you take  
14 a history --  
15 MR FORTUNE: Forgive me. What difference would it have made  
16 if the discussion was over the telephone as opposed to  
17 face-to-face?  
18 A. I don't think it would have been made any difference,  
19 probably. It's always helpful to have another pair of  
20 eyes.  
21 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: When examining the child?  
22 A. Yes.  
23 THE CHAIRMAN: So presumably if someone is there  
24 face-to-face, that other consultant gets a chance to  
25 read through the medical records, which are pretty

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1 THE CHAIRMAN: And you were prescribing drugs for her, which  
2 were significant drugs?  
3 A. Yes.  
4 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: I don't know if you're aware of her  
5 evidence, but Dr Steen's evidence was that when she was  
6 at the clinic -- which is where she was on the Tuesday  
7 afternoon, her routine clinic, I should say -- it was  
8 nonetheless possible -- and she did do it from time to  
9 time -- for her to come back after that clinic, pass  
10 through the ward, and see a child that people may have  
11 had concerns over, and she would phone the ward just to  
12 see how matters lay with her patients. Her evidence  
13 would seem to be that she did contact the ward and  
14 whoever told it to her or exactly what words were used,  
15 nonetheless she had the impression that Claire wasn't  
16 sufficiently ill as to warrant her passing through and  
17 having a look at Claire.  
18 Admittedly Claire is not your patient, Claire was  
19 Dr Steen's patient, but if she had contacted you  
20 directly, would you have expressed a view as to maybe  
21 whether she could come and have a look at the child and  
22 maybe you and she could have a chat about her?  
23 A. I could have done, yes.  
24 Q. And if you had expressed a view, what view would  
25 you have expressed to her?

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1 difficult to read through in detail over the phone?  
2 A. Yes.  
3 THE CHAIRMAN: But it comes back to a question -- and  
4 Mr Roberts raised this specifically in his evidence --  
5 about whether the extent to which Claire was unwell was  
6 actually recognised as Tuesday continued through the  
7 afternoon into the evening.  
8 A. I think there's no issue that I didn't diagnose her  
9 raised intracranial pressure. The issue for me is when  
10 did that start to problem a problem for her.  
11 THE CHAIRMAN: You said a few moments ago that you expected  
12 Claire to improve. She didn't unfortunately improve.  
13 If you were expecting her to improve that indicates  
14 there might have been, unfortunately, an underestimation  
15 on your part about how unwell she was or what the reason  
16 was for it.  
17 A. I think that's reasonable. The issue really is how  
18 difficult it can be sometimes to diagnose intracranial  
19 pressure.  
20 THE CHAIRMAN: I understand. It also means that if there  
21 was some contact with Dr Steen, that Dr Steen might have  
22 got an equivalent message that she was unwell, but not  
23 significantly unwell.  
24 A. It's possible, yes.  
25 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Just to assist, can we pull up the note

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1 that you entered at 1700 hours? If we pull up  
2 090-022-055. You've been involved with her from the  
3 afternoon on at least two occasions, leaving aside the  
4 advice you give to Dr Sands in the late morning. By the  
5 time you come at 5 o'clock, she's had rectal diazepam at  
6 12.15, she's had 635 milligrams of phenytoin at 14.45,  
7 which turned out to be significantly more than you  
8 intended that she should have, but in any event --  
9 I think you intended she should have 432. Then she's  
10 also had 12 milligrams of midazolam at 15.25, which also  
11 turned out to be significantly more than you intended  
12 her to have; you intended her to have 3.6. And she's  
13 started on an IV infusion of midazolam at 4.30, at 2 ml  
14 per hour, so she's had about half an hour of that,  
15 roughly, by the time you arrive.

16 Also, in terms of her Glasgow Coma Scale, which  
17 started off, as you know, at 9 at 1 o'clock, at this  
18 time it is 6 or 7, depending on how you measure that.  
19 And she'd had a strong seizure, as it was described by  
20 her mother at 15.25, and she's had an episode of teeth  
21 tightening slightly. So quite apart from anything else  
22 that's been written up about her, those are the events,  
23 would you agree, that have happened --

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. -- by the time you come at 5 o'clock? So presumably

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1 events that have happened. What are you looking at in  
2 her notes?

3 A. I'm particularly interested in the vital signs and in  
4 her pupil responses and, for me, her eye movements,  
5 which I would have checked myself. So the Glasgow Coma  
6 Scale is important, but it's only part of a bigger  
7 picture, if you like.

8 Q. Yes.

9 A. And my recollection was that Claire hadn't been vomiting  
10 over the day, that her blood pressure and heart rate had  
11 stayed stable and that her pupil responses were equal  
12 and reactive and there'd been no change in that.

13 Q. Did you talk to the nurses or look at any of their  
14 descriptions of how she was presenting over and above  
15 the Glasgow Coma Scale?

16 A. Well, I certainly would have spoken to the nurses.

17 Q. If one looks at their notes at 090-040-141, admittedly  
18 these notes seem to be written all together, so it is  
19 not always easy to tease out exactly what the timing of  
20 any of these things are, apart from when they  
21 specifically put a time. But if you see where it says  
22 "5.15"; do you see that?

23 "Given stat dose Epilim at 5.15."

24 And then immediately after that:

25 "Very unresponsive. Only to pain."

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1 that is all part of what you try and put together and do  
2 a bit of a stocktake of: where are we now and what does  
3 this mean? How significant an examination did you think  
4 5 o'clock would be, bearing in mind when the change of  
5 shifts are?

6 A. I don't think I can recall how I would have felt at the  
7 time, but I ... It was clearly a point where I was  
8 going to be handing over care on the wards to the staff  
9 that evening, so it was significant.

10 Q. Leaving aside everything else, the actual timing of it  
11 is quite significant.

12 A. That's correct.

13 Q. At that stage, would I be right in saying it's probably  
14 your last chance to try and readily have things like  
15 CT scans and EEGs carried out?

16 A. I think organising an EEG would have been very  
17 difficult.

18 Q. It might not be so straightforward to organise a CT scan  
19 at that hour either, but it could be done, couldn't it?

20 A. It could be done.

21 Q. When you arrive at 5 o'clock, or whenever it was that  
22 you come, and you're doing the sort of stocktaking to  
23 get a sense of where she is with your mind now on the  
24 management plan that you're going to have going into the  
25 evening, what do you look at? I've given you some

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1 Admittedly that's 15 minutes after you're writing  
2 your note, but if one looks at the Glasgow Coma Scale at  
3 5 o'clock up until 6 o'clock, it starts at 6 or 7,  
4 depending on how you interpret it, and at 6 pm it's 7 or  
5 8. But that description, "very unresponsive", does that  
6 fit with what the nurses were telling you or what you  
7 were observing, actually?

8 A. It fits with her Glasgow Coma Scale.

9 Q. Does it fit with what you were observing? Did she seem  
10 to you very unresponsive?

11 A. She was responding to pain.

12 Q. Yes. Is that not quite a serious state to have reached?

13 THE CHAIRMAN: It fits with your note, doctor, doesn't it:  
14 "She continues to be largely unresponsive."

15 A. That's correct.

16 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: If that's the case, how different was  
17 she from when you saw her at 2 o'clock and you referred  
18 to her opening her eyes and so forth and interacting.  
19 I think you used the expression "interacting with you".

20 A. Mm-hm. She clearly hadn't improved and she was less  
21 responsive than she had been.

22 Q. She was less responsive?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. The reason I ask you that is because I got the  
25 impression that your evidence was that you didn't think

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1 much had really changed.  
2 A. I think in terms of the bigger picture in terms of her  
3 vital signs and observations of her pupil responses and  
4 eye movements, there had been no change, but her  
5 responsiveness had changed, and part of the explanation  
6 for that may have been that she received midazolam.  
7 THE CHAIRMAN: But she wasn't sitting up?  
8 A. No.  
9 THE CHAIRMAN: Were her eyes open?  
10 A. No, I don't think so.  
11 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: So you're saying some of that may  
12 actually have been the effect of the medication --  
13 A. Yes.  
14 Q. -- and not accurately mirroring, if I can put it that  
15 way, her condition?  
16 A. Underlying condition, yes.  
17 Q. Is that what you thought at the time?  
18 A. Yes, I think that's what I would have expected at the  
19 time.  
20 Q. But it might not have been; it might have been a real  
21 deterioration.  
22 A. It might have been, but the fact that she improved later  
23 in the evening would be against that, really.  
24 Q. Now that you mention it, the improvement later in the  
25 evening, you take that in relation to ... If we just

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1 "Between about 6.30 and 8.30, Claire opened her eyes  
2 from time to time. Mr and Mrs Roberts encouraged her  
3 and reassured her."  
4 So Dr Webb is quite right, there is some evidence of  
5 a degree of responsiveness. And that is a greater  
6 degree of responsiveness than you found at about  
7 5 o'clock.  
8 A. Yes.  
9 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: So if that was happening at about  
10 8 o'clock ...  
11 THE CHAIRMAN: On my note, that was between about 6.30 and  
12 8.30.  
13 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: What in particular would you attribute  
14 that to, finally responding to a combination of the  
15 medication or --  
16 A. She may have been responding to the midazolam infusion  
17 or perhaps to the Epilim, but it does significantly  
18 change that GCS score.  
19 Q. And then it goes down?  
20 A. That's correct.  
21 Q. And then what is the significance of that?  
22 A. Well, as I said, I think that at some point cerebral  
23 oedema starts to play a part in her presentation. I'm  
24 just not certain when it occurred.  
25 Q. I understand. In any event, as you're there at

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1 pull this up, 310-011-001. If we have the original  
2 sheet, just in case we've missed something in our  
3 sheets. It's 090-039-137. If we have that alongside.  
4 If you see along that scale total, there's an "8",  
5 which corresponds to the 8 pm on the schedule. Can you  
6 see that on the CNS chart?  
7 A. Yes.  
8 Q. There's an "8" there, and if you look along "scale  
9 total, 3 to 14", you can see an "8", which is  
10 corresponding to 8 o'clock. Apart from that, is there  
11 any other evidence of her improving?  
12 A. My understanding from the transcripts is that Claire's  
13 parents felt that she was opening her eyes and looking  
14 at them and at her brothers during that period.  
15 Q. But apart from that, is there any evidence -- I'm asking  
16 you for what's actually recorded in her medical notes  
17 and records.  
18 A. Well, it's very significant evidence. It's not on the  
19 chart, clearly, but it's very significant evidence if  
20 she was opening her eyes at that stage because it  
21 suggests that her eye opening GCS was probably 3.  
22 Q. Was that something that you found recorded in her notes?  
23 A. No, it's from the transcripts.  
24 Q. We'll check the transcripts.  
25 THE CHAIRMAN: My note is that Mr and Mrs Roberts said that:

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1 5 o'clock, if we focus on that and look at the evidence  
2 that you had before you, did you form the view that she  
3 had deteriorated a little bit?  
4 A. Well, she was less responsive, certainly.  
5 Q. And why in your view do you think she was not responding  
6 to the therapy that you were providing her with,  
7 particularly as, in retrospect now, you realise that she  
8 got quite a lot of that medication? What's the effect  
9 of that in terms of --  
10 A. Well, the fact that she got more than she should have  
11 would actually make her GCS lower.  
12 Q. Leaving aside her GCS, but in terms of addressing her  
13 underlying problem.  
14 A. It won't have helped. I think the fact that she  
15 improved subsequently suggests it didn't have any  
16 lasting effect.  
17 Q. If you think that a step from 7 to 8 is significant,  
18 presumably a step down from 8 to 6 is significant?  
19 A. Well, it may actually more than one a step from 7 to 8,  
20 it may be a step from 7 to 10 if she was opening her  
21 eyes, and certainly then a change from that would be  
22 significant.  
23 Q. Are you saying therefore that the nurses have failed to  
24 record the appropriate level of her improvement?  
25 A. No, I'm saying that there were observations that

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1 suggested that at some time during that period she was  
2 opening her eyes.  
3 Q. Well ...  
4 THE CHAIRMAN: In which case the "1" under "eyes open"  
5 should be?  
6 A. 3.  
7 THE CHAIRMAN: Should be 3, okay.  
8 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: So then we go back to your note.  
9 MR SEPHTON: Sorry, if I can help my learned friend when she  
10 goes to the note of the evidence on 31 October,  
11 page 115, where Mr Roberts says:  
12 "I recall at least around that time, if I'm back  
13 shortly before 6.30, certainly around 7, 8 o'clock, I do  
14 recall Claire opening her eyes and looking at us and us  
15 reassuring her and talking to her and explaining that  
16 the doctor had seen her."  
17 So it's not merely opening her eyes, it's a question  
18 of responsiveness as well.  
19 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Thank you. So if she was opening her  
20 eyes shortly after 6.30 and also at 7 and 8 o'clock --  
21 sorry, that's when he says he's back. If she's opening  
22 her eyes at around that time of 6.30, so far as you can  
23 tell, what is to be made of the teeth tightening that  
24 she experiences at 16.30? What did you make of it when  
25 you came to examine her at 5 o'clock?

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1 continuous EEG.  
2 Q. No, but you have, from the description, considered that  
3 it was possibly a seizure. What is actually said in the  
4 record of attacks observed at 090-042-144, at 4.30, is  
5 "teeth tightened slightly".  
6 A. If I was putting any significance to it, I would have  
7 thought it was a seizure, but it may just have been  
8 agitation.  
9 Q. But is it possible for it to indicate something else  
10 that was happening to her, which is not consistent with  
11 your view of non-convulsive status epilepticus or some  
12 sort of seizure breaking through?  
13 A. I wouldn't have felt that at the time, no.  
14 Q. No. Is it possible?  
15 A. Um ...  
16 THE CHAIRMAN: I'm not sure how much the "Is it possible?"  
17 questions really help. As I understand it, it's really  
18 very hard to rule out many, many things, so saying  
19 something is possible doesn't really advance the  
20 evidence.  
21 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: If he thought it was not possible and  
22 the experts thought it was, I suppose that would be  
23 a point of difference between them that they could  
24 address.  
25 A. I didn't think it was not possible.

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1 A. I would have thought it was most likely to be a minor  
2 seizure, a brief seizure.  
3 Q. Professor Neville has characterised that as a completely  
4 different thing to a seizure and, to some extent,  
5 Dr Aronson did as well. Those sorts of movements,  
6 I think they both said, are the sort of things that are  
7 not seizures, but could be associated with raised  
8 intracranial pressure; is that correct?  
9 A. Well, my experience has been that with that sort of  
10 movement, you get an extension of the body; you don't  
11 just get teeth clenching. So I think it would be very  
12 difficult to discern whether this was a movement related  
13 to high pressure or a seizure. And if you're looking  
14 for probabilities, it's much, much more likely to be  
15 a seizure than it is to be teeth clenching on its own to  
16 reflect some movement relating to high pressure.  
17 Q. If it was a seizure, would you have expected the nurses  
18 to have recorded it as that?  
19 A. My understanding was that it was quite brief.  
20 Q. Yes, but you have characterised it as a seizure and, in  
21 these sorts of presentations when you were before  
22 distinguishing things, whether things are seizures or  
23 not are likely to be important diagnostically for you.  
24 A. It can be, and it can be very difficult actually to be  
25 certain of the nature of events without a 24-hour

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1 Q. You didn't think it was not possible.  
2 So then if we go to your diagnosis, you have  
3 a number of different views as to what you thought was  
4 happening at 5 pm. The first is to be found at 138/1 --  
5 one is to be found at 138/1, page 43:  
6 "I believe that Claire had epilepsy and that she was  
7 experiencing a recurrence of her epilepsy, triggered  
8 either by an intercurrent viral infection or by  
9 meningoencephalitis."  
10 Is that what you thought?  
11 A. This is at 5 o'clock?  
12 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.  
13 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Yes.  
14 A. I think, at 5 o'clock, I did raise the issue of whether  
15 this was because of her poor responsiveness, whether  
16 there may have been direct infection in her brain, and  
17 "meningoencephalitis" would cover that rubric of  
18 encephalitis or meningitis.  
19 Q. If you thought that, would that be moving away from the  
20 non-convulsive status epilepticus?  
21 A. She could have had both.  
22 Q. Okay. Then at 138/1, page 17, you say:  
23 "My diagnosis was predominantly of an epileptic  
24 encephalopathy, but I also considered  
25 meningoencephalitis and encephalomyelitis, which is why

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1 I recommended antibacterial and antiviral therapy."  
2 You don't mention the non-convulsive  
3 status epilepticus there.  
4 A. The non-convulsive status is, in a sense, almost  
5 a symptom of her epilepsy and possibly a symptom of  
6 meningoencephalitis.  
7 Q. You mean it's not an independent condition?  
8 A. It's a sign that the brain is upset and it can be upset  
9 because you have epilepsy or it can be upset because  
10 you have something irritating it.  
11 Q. Well, when I had asked you before what did you think was  
12 causing it, you had said -- this is earlier at  
13 2 o'clock. I don't think you were of the view that it  
14 was encephalitis so much that was causing her  
15 non-convulsive status epilepticus.  
16 A. Mm-hm.  
17 Q. So just so that we're clear, what did you think was  
18 causing it at 2 o'clock?  
19 A. I thought it was her epilepsy at 2 o'clock. I think at  
20 5 o'clock she had had some medication and hadn't  
21 responded and I was concerned that the possibility of  
22 meningoencephalitis should be raised higher and  
23 I started her then on treatment for that.  
24 Q. Did that mean at 5 o'clock you thought there might be  
25 a different cause for her non-convulsive

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1 A. That's correct.  
2 Q. -- her --  
3 A. Underlying potential --  
4 Q. -- potential for epilepsy and that had led to her  
5 non-convulsive status epilepticus?  
6 A. That's correct.  
7 Q. By 5 o'clock you're thinking maybe it's not that, maybe  
8 it's some sort of encephalitis, some sort of problem  
9 with an infection in her brain that's doing that?  
10 A. Or both. Or both.  
11 Q. And at 5 o'clock, what did you think was the most likely  
12 cause of her presentation?  
13 A. I can't recall what I felt at the time, but I think ...  
14 I would have still thought that her underlying epilepsy  
15 was the major issue. But I felt it was important that  
16 we cover with treatment for the potential for her to  
17 have meningoencephalitis. I didn't think it was --  
18 I think I actually wrote in my note that I didn't think  
19 meningoencephalitis was very likely, but I felt it was  
20 important to treat it.  
21 Q. That's why I'm asking you. I'm asking you these  
22 questions because it doesn't always seem that what is  
23 in the note fits with some of what is in your witness  
24 statement. Because, unless I've completely  
25 misunderstood it, you are right that in your clinical

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1 status epilepticus?  
2 A. I thought the possibility of the infection that she had  
3 causing irritation to her brain directly needed to be  
4 considered.  
5 Q. That's what I'm trying to clarify with you. If she has  
6 non-convulsive status epilepticus, does that not mean  
7 that she is suffering some disturbance of the brain?  
8 A. That's correct.  
9 Q. And the task, apart from treating that disturbance, is  
10 to identify what is causing that disturbance; is that  
11 right?  
12 A. Mm-hm.  
13 Q. I think that at an earlier point you thought that might  
14 all be to do with a tummy bug, some sort of viral  
15 problem?  
16 A. A viral illness doesn't usually cause non-convulsive  
17 status in a child. This child had a learning disability  
18 and had a previous history of epilepsy. That what's  
19 what made her different. In that context, I felt -- the  
20 first time I saw her -- that that was the most likely  
21 trigger for her non-convulsive status, but the  
22 non-convulsive status was on the basis of her underlying  
23 potential to produce epileptic activity.  
24 Q. So you thought she might have spontaneously had or the  
25 virus itself had triggered --

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1 note at 090-022-055 you say:  
2 "I don't think meningoencephalitis is very likely."  
3 Then in your witness statement at 138/3 at page 4,  
4 you say:  
5 "At 5 pm I believed I was beginning to feel that  
6 encephalitis was higher on the differential than  
7 a recurrence of Claire's underlying epilepsy and hence  
8 the decision to start acyclovir and cefotaxime."  
9 A. I think that's what I have been saying.  
10 Q. I didn't think that's what you just said.  
11 I thought what you had just said --  
12 THE CHAIRMAN: Surely, doctor, what you said a few moments  
13 ago was that the major issue was her underlying  
14 epilepsy, whereas in this statement, on the right-hand  
15 side of the screen, you seem to be saying that although  
16 everything isn't entirely clear, encephalitis is now  
17 higher on the differential than a recurrence of the  
18 underlying epilepsy. If that's the way your view  
19 changed, that's fine, because that's part of your reason  
20 for going backwards and forwards to see Claire a number  
21 of times, which nobody will ever fault you for. But  
22 that's not quite what you have been describing this  
23 afternoon, is it?  
24 A. What I'm trying to say is that at 5 o'clock I felt that  
25 the possibility of meningoencephalitis needed to be

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1 considered, so it was now higher on the differential  
2 than it had been at 2 o'clock.  
3 THE CHAIRMAN: But that's not what that says. That says:  
4 "[It's] higher on the differential than a recurrence  
5 of underlying epilepsy."  
6 If you had just said that encephalitis was higher on  
7 the differential than it had been before, then that's  
8 one thing. That's not what your statement says; it  
9 says:  
10 "... higher on the differential than a recurrence of  
11 the epilepsy."  
12 A. I can't remember at the time exactly what I felt, but  
13 I guess ...  
14 THE CHAIRMAN: And the reason you were taken to that is  
15 because, as Ms Anyadike-Danes put to you a moment ago,  
16 on the left-hand side of the screen, which is  
17 highlighted in yellow:  
18 "I don't think that meningoencephalitis is very  
19 likely."  
20 But you're saying on the statement -- that's your  
21 contemporaneous note made before things went terribly  
22 wrong.  
23 A. Correct.  
24 THE CHAIRMAN: The statement that you've made reasonably  
25 recently to the inquiry says that it's higher on the

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1 your writing -- I don't think you make any reference to  
2 her non-convulsive status epilepticus, which is where  
3 the others in the team have thought she was. Dr Sands  
4 thought she was there when he wrote her -- well, when  
5 the note of the ward round is made by Dr Stevenson, in  
6 fact, but that was him directing it. And then just  
7 above, there is a reference to "still in status", and  
8 the midazolam calculation there.  
9 But when you are now having your plan, there's no  
10 reference in there as to whether you think she still has  
11 non-convulsive status epilepticus.  
12 A. That's correct.  
13 Q. Is there a reason why you don't put that in?  
14 A. No, I think it's already been written in her notes that  
15 that is what we thought, Dr Sands thought, and I'm  
16 continuing on that vein of treatment for that condition.  
17 Q. Yes, but if you don't include that in there, whomsoever  
18 is coming after you to read these, perhaps with a new  
19 registrar -- it won't be Dr Sands in the evening --  
20 should anything happen, they've not got a complete note  
21 of what you think might be the position.  
22 A. I think that's fair criticism.  
23 THE CHAIRMAN: Okay.  
24 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Then I think you have at some point said  
25 that you did not look at that midazolam calculation and

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1 differential than underlying epilepsy.  
2 A. I think what I was trying to get across is it was higher  
3 on the differential than it had been.  
4 THE CHAIRMAN: Let me see if you agree with this: do you  
5 mean that that sentence on the right-hand side of the  
6 screen should read:  
7 "I believed I was beginning to feel that  
8 encephalitis was higher on the differential than it had  
9 been, but was still less likely than a recurrence of  
10 underlying epilepsy"?  
11 A. Yes, that's correct.  
12 THE CHAIRMAN: Do you see why --  
13 A. Yes.  
14 THE CHAIRMAN: That's significantly different from what is  
15 written.  
16 A. I can see that, yes.  
17 THE CHAIRMAN: So you're telling us that in fact what you  
18 wrote at the time was the view you still adhered to,  
19 that you didn't think that encephalitis was very likely,  
20 it was a bit more likely than it had been when you saw  
21 her at about 1.30 or 2 pm, but still your primary  
22 diagnosis was a recurrence of underlying epilepsy?  
23 A. That's correct.  
24 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.  
25 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: You also, unless it's my misreading of

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1 see that it was the wrong dose that was applied, and the  
2 wrong dose is the 0.5. You didn't notice that.  
3 A. That's correct.  
4 Q. But in fact, even if you weren't looking at that and  
5 just looking at the amount, does that 12 not jump out to  
6 you? You'd wanted her to get 3.6.  
7 A. If I noticed it, I would have brought it to attention,  
8 but I didn't.  
9 Q. Maybe this is now a question of whether you should have.  
10 When you're coming back at 5 o'clock, you're doing a --  
11 I called it "a stock take", that's probably not a very  
12 happy use of words -- a review of what's happened so you  
13 can see where matters stand now. You're looking into  
14 the evening, you want to formulate some plan for Claire  
15 and also leave things in a way that those coming after  
16 in the new shift will be able to understand what you  
17 think is the position with Claire and how her care ought  
18 to be managed. Should you therefore not actually have  
19 reviewed exactly what she was being given particularly  
20 as you're trying to look at what her response is?  
21 Should you not have done that?  
22 A. It would not have been routine to go back and look  
23 at the individual drug dosages.  
24 Q. Claire is not a terribly routine case at the moment.  
25 A. I understand that, but that would not have been what

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1 I would normally have done.

2 Q. But would it not have been a prudent thing? You have  
3 advised that, by this stage, she have three different  
4 sorts of anticonvulsants, so presumably you're trying to  
5 work out what effect all that is having on her and why  
6 aren't you seeing the returns for that drug therapy that  
7 you would have wanted to see? So would it not have been  
8 a prudent thing to say, "Let me check exactly what they  
9 gave her and when they gave it to her"?

10 A. Firstly, there would have been a low expectation that  
11 people would have got it wrong. Secondly, it depends on  
12 what time you have available to you to do that kind of  
13 thing.

14 Q. Yes, but you don't have to go very far to see it because  
15 it's a few lines above your own note.

16 A. As I say, I accept that I missed it.

17 Q. It isn't actually you missing it that I'm asking you  
18 about because you have said that very fairly. What I'm  
19 trying to get at is whether that should not have been  
20 part of your review, a conscious decision to now have  
21 a look at exactly what she was given and when.

22 If I give you an example of that. For example, you  
23 would have wanted the phenytoin to have been given as  
24 a stat dose, which is pretty much immediately. Given  
25 that people get busy and things have to be prepared and

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1 give her a trial of intravenous valproate.

2 Q. But did you not want to at least allow some of what she  
3 had in her system to have worked its way through before  
4 you start adding more anticonvulsant since she hadn't  
5 yet had a terribly positive response to the  
6 anticonvulsant you had --

7 A. No, the schedule usually involves going one drug after  
8 the other and you don't wait a period of time to see  
9 whether the drug -- more than the sort of ... 15 or 30  
10 minutes after you give the drug, you move on to the next  
11 medication.

12 Q. What were your expectations in terms of the sodium  
13 valproate?

14 A. That she would begin to improve.

15 Q. How quickly would you have expected her to respond to  
16 the sodium valproate?

17 A. The effect wouldn't be as quick as for the other  
18 medications, but you would expect a response within half  
19 an hour, usually.

20 Q. Within about half an hour. I wonder if I could just put  
21 a schedule up so that you can see something that we put  
22 to our expert. It's 310-020-001. This gives you a sort  
23 of pictorial representation of what Claire was actually  
24 being administered. When you see it in that way, does  
25 it strike you as rather a lot?

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1 so on and so forth, you might want to just check when  
2 was she given all these medications, so I can try and  
3 see if you can correlate any of that to what's being  
4 described to you as her presentation over the period.  
5 So would it not have been prudent to have actually  
6 looked?

7 A. I think in an ideal world, yes, but I didn't, and  
8 I don't think I would do it routinely.

9 Q. Okay. So then you prescribe the acyclovir and the  
10 cefotaxime. Does that correspond to your view as to  
11 what's happening virally with her to address that?

12 A. That's correct.

13 Q. You also, do you not, suggest she has sodium valproate,  
14 which is another anticonvulsant? Why do you do that?

15 A. I think if we showed the original form from this morning  
16 of the management of status, you can see that there's  
17 a series of drugs that you go through.

18 Q. Yes.

19 A. So if a child doesn't respond to the first two or three  
20 drugs, you move to the next drug. Valproate was a drug  
21 that was unlikely to cause major sedation, and she'd had  
22 it before, she'd responded to it and had tolerated it  
23 well. So if I was going to re-start Claire on treatment  
24 the following day, it would have been valproate that  
25 I would have worked with, so it seemed reasonable to

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1 A. In the context of managing non-convulsive status, no.

2 Q. Well, let me add the amounts which aren't there. We'll  
3 leave aside the 5 milligrams of rectal diazepam. Let's  
4 take the 635, which will be the phenytoin, the  
5 12 milligrams of midazolam, followed by the infusion  
6 started at 4.30, and then she's going to have sodium  
7 valproate at 5.15. So by the time you have finished  
8 your consultation, you're expecting that she will be put  
9 on that sodium valproate, 400 milligrams. For a child  
10 who hasn't shown any improvement so far, if you had  
11 known those figures -- and I appreciate what you say,  
12 that you didn't see that she'd been given 635 as opposed  
13 to what you wanted her to have, which was 432, nor did  
14 you see that she'd been given the 12 as opposed to the  
15 3.6 you wanted her to have. But if you had known all  
16 that, what is your view as to what actually she was  
17 being administered and the likely effect of that?

18 A. I wouldn't have had significant concerns about the  
19 phenytoin dose. But in relation to the midazolam,  
20 I think I would have stopped the infusion and observed  
21 for a period of time.

22 Q. I'm not meaning so much each individual one because  
23 these things have a cumulative effect and, to some  
24 extent, sometimes the medications react with each other.

25 A. That's correct.

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1 Q. So if she is now accumulating in her system this amount  
2 of anticonvulsant, if you had known that, what would be  
3 your view?  
4 A. I don't think that the combination of medications is  
5 actually a major issue. There are some children with  
6 epilepsy who go home on three or four drugs in  
7 combination, and certainly in the context of  
8 status epilepticus, this sequence of drugs would not be  
9 unusual and sometimes you go to a fifth and sixth drug.  
10 Q. Would it surprise you to know that the inquiry's  
11 experts, Dr Aronson and, to some extent,  
12 Professor Neville, thought it was possible that the  
13 seizure that she had at 15.25 was as a result of the  
14 phenytoin and/or a combination of the phenytoin and the  
15 midazolam?  
16 A. I think that's most unlikely. Phenytoin can exacerbate  
17 absence seizures, but it's most unlikely for it to  
18 exacerbate non-convulsive status. The same is true of  
19 midazolam. It's most unlikely that midazolam would  
20 trigger a seizure. I think if it was given at 3.25,  
21 then I would have expected Claire's mother to have  
22 witnessed that and to have noticed it.  
23 Q. Well, depending on whether there is a literal accuracy  
24 about when it was administered, if it was administered  
25 a minute or two before 3.25, then that's the point

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1 A. I don't think that's likely.  
2 Q. And if we go on in this theme while I do that, the  
3 respiratory arrest may also be related to her  
4 medication.  
5 A. I don't think that --  
6 Q. By the respiratory arrest, I mean the one she suffered  
7 in the early hours of Wednesday morning.  
8 A. I don't believe that's likely either because if there  
9 was an issue with respiration, you would expect it to  
10 occur within an hour of giving midazolam, the bolus, and  
11 Claire was on oxygen saturation monitoring through all  
12 that period and clearly didn't have any problems.  
13 Q. And then I had been asking you about the view that you  
14 formed and to some extent that goes into communications  
15 between clinicians and I've asked you about whether  
16 you'd have wanted to speak to Dr Steen and whether you  
17 would have wanted to speak to Dr Sands and so on, but  
18 can I ask you about another clinician who we have not  
19 been able to identify? Dr Steen was actually going off  
20 duty at 5 o'clock and there would have been an on-call  
21 paediatric consultant. Would you have wanted to speak  
22 to that person?  
23 A. I think if I was going to speak to anybody after 5, it  
24 would have been to the intensive care team.  
25 Q. It is possible though, isn't it, that it is the

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1 that's being made: that might be the seizure that she  
2 witnessed.  
3 A. But she would have noticed that.  
4 Q. She did notice. She saw the 3.25 seizure.  
5 A. She would have noticed the administration of the  
6 medication. We give midazolam now to almost every child  
7 that we see with epilepsy and I cannot recall a single  
8 event where midazolam has provoked a seizure.  
9 Q. Are you aware of the fact that paradoxical seizures is  
10 something that has been identified both with phenytoin  
11 and midazolam?  
12 A. Yes, as I said I think phenytoin is well-known to  
13 provoke absence seizures, but it's rare and it's  
14 extremely rare for midazolam to do that. So I don't  
15 honestly think that's a likely scenario.  
16 Q. It's a statement of the obvious. Although it's rare,  
17 presumably there has to be some child in which it  
18 happens, otherwise there's no observed effect of it.  
19 A. You're talking about probabilities here. It's most  
20 unlikely that that played any part.  
21 Q. And the experts think that there is a possibility that  
22 the 9.30 episode -- I think it's described as "screaming  
23 and drawing up of arms" -- may also be in response to  
24 the medication that she had received. You don't think  
25 so?

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1 consultant paediatrician who's on call that might be the  
2 first contact point for the registrar who's on duty that  
3 evening or, for that matter, the SHO if the registrar  
4 can't be identified?  
5 A. My understanding was that the first contact would be  
6 with the general paediatrician who's responsible for the  
7 child so that they would try and contact Dr Steen first.  
8 Q. Even when they're off duty?  
9 A. That's my understanding.  
10 Q. Where did you have that understanding from?  
11 A. From my time working in the Royal: if they couldn't get  
12 hold of the paediatrician, then they would speak to the  
13 person who's on call.  
14 Q. And so it's the other way around: you would expect that  
15 the person whose child it was would be contacted first.  
16 If it's not possible to reach that person, then they'd  
17 have contacted the on-call paediatrician?  
18 A. Yes.  
19 Q. Did you know who the on-call paediatrician was?  
20 A. No.  
21 Q. What exactly did you convey to the parents? We've heard  
22 what you might have wanted to say to Dr Steen and  
23 Dr Sands and what you think you said to the nurses and  
24 the junior team. What did you say to the parents?  
25 A. I spoke to Claire's --

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1 Q. I beg your pardon. It would only have been Claire's  
2 mother.  
3 A. I would have conveyed my understanding that Claire had  
4 had a viral infection, that this had triggered her to  
5 have non-convulsive seizure activity and that this was  
6 accounting for her presentation, that we had tried  
7 a number of medications and we were just about to try  
8 another medication to control that, and that I thought  
9 the other possibility was that she may have an -- the  
10 viral infection may have caused irritation to her brain  
11 directly and I was starting treatment to cover that  
12 possibility too.  
13 Q. Do you think you conveyed to them that Claire was  
14 seriously ill? That even though you had a treatment  
15 plan for her, she nonetheless was seriously ill?  
16 A. I can't recall how I conveyed the seriousness of her  
17 condition, but I --  
18 Q. Would you --  
19 A. -- would have spelt out what I've just done --  
20 Q. Would you have thought it relevant to convey to her that  
21 her daughter was seriously ill?  
22 A. Certainly if I thought that Claire was going to get  
23 worse, absolutely. But my expectation, as I've said,  
24 was that Claire was going to respond to treatment and  
25 that she could make a full recovery from this.

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1 not what you thought?  
2 A. I think it's unlikely I would have said she was  
3 seriously ill.  
4 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: In terms of a mother being able to  
5 understand how ill her child is so she can decide  
6 whether she should make arrangements to stay through the  
7 evening with her child, how did you help Mrs Roberts  
8 understand that because she may not have gleaned it from  
9 the medical information that you had given her?  
10 A. I have difficulty recalling exactly what I said. I'm  
11 basing what I'm telling you on what I've written in my  
12 note.  
13 Q. Does that mean that you don't have an independent  
14 recollection of this conversation?  
15 A. No, I don't, no.  
16 Q. That explains matters. If, for example, Mrs Roberts had  
17 asked you the question, "Should I stay in the evening?",  
18 subject to the fact that you don't want to dictate  
19 anybody's arrangements, but what would your guidance  
20 have been about that?  
21 A. I find that very hard to speculate on.  
22 THE CHAIRMAN: Let's not speculate. Mr Fortune?  
23 MR FORTUNE: Sir, given the message that Dr Steen may  
24 possibly have got -- and you'll bear in mind Dr Webb's  
25 answers a few moments ago -- could what Dr Webb have

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1 Q. I'm just trying to find out whether you believe you  
2 conveyed to Claire's mother that her daughter was  
3 seriously ill. Because at 5 o'clock, that is the sort  
4 of time when family members might start to think,  
5 "Should we be making arrangements for the evening?", or,  
6 "What is the position?". That's why I'm asking you that  
7 particular question. Can you help as to whether you  
8 conveyed to her mother that she was seriously ill?  
9 A. I conveyed to her mother what I thought was the likely  
10 diagnosis and our current plan for treatment.  
11 Q. Yes, but to a non-medical person she may not be able to  
12 interpret that as telling her whether her child is  
13 seriously ill or not. It's possible, is it not, to --  
14 THE CHAIRMAN: Did you think she was seriously ill? We've  
15 discussed this in a number of different ways. I think  
16 you thought she was ill, but that you thought she was  
17 going to improve.  
18 A. That's correct.  
19 THE CHAIRMAN: Had you thought she was seriously ill, then  
20 you'd definitely have spoken to the paediatric intensive  
21 care unit?  
22 A. Yes, and I would have spelt it out to her mother, but  
23 I thought she was going to improve.  
24 THE CHAIRMAN: Right. So you definitely didn't tell  
25 Mrs Roberts that Claire was seriously ill because that's

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1 said to Mrs Roberts have been any different? Could the  
2 message have been any different, Dr Webb?  
3 A. I don't understand that question.  
4 THE CHAIRMAN: If Dr Steen had got a message, whoever it  
5 came from, which was in essence that there was no need  
6 for her to return to Allen Ward, I think either in  
7 respect of Claire or in respect of anybody else --  
8 there's no reason to suspect that this conversation was  
9 limited to Claire if it took place.  
10 MR FORTUNE: Well, if it was specific to Claire --  
11 THE CHAIRMAN: Let's say, even if it was specific to Claire,  
12 if Dr Steen got the message that it wasn't necessary for  
13 her to return to Allen Ward, then you would not have  
14 been impressing on Mrs Roberts that Claire was seriously  
15 unwell.  
16 A. I think that's correct.  
17 THE CHAIRMAN: She was unwell. I think what you're trying  
18 to piece together is what you think that you would have  
19 said --  
20 A. Yes.  
21 THE CHAIRMAN: -- rather than having any recollection of  
22 what you did say to her.  
23 A. That's correct.  
24 THE CHAIRMAN: You would have been saying that she was  
25 unwell, unwell to the extent that you were now trying

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1 another medication, but however you conveyed it,  
2 it would still be with the expectation on your part that  
3 she would improve?  
4 A. That's correct, and I think my understanding from the  
5 transcripts is that Claire's mother understood that  
6 I thought this was a return of her epilepsy and  
7 essentially that's what I was saying to her.  
8 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Well then, let's just see what else you  
9 put in train then because you're looking to not only get  
10 some understanding of where Claire is now, but also  
11 where she's likely to be, what the likely progression of  
12 her condition is so that you can have a plan for her  
13 treatment and management; isn't that right?  
14 A. Yes.  
15 Q. And in fact, in your note, leaving aside what you say  
16 about the cefotaxime and the meningococcal meningitis, and  
17 what you say about the sodium valproate, if we bring up  
18 090-022-055, that's the second item:  
19 "Check viral cultures. Query enterovirus. Stool,  
20 urine, blood and ..."  
21 A. "Throat swab."  
22 Q. What were the bloods you wanted to have done?  
23 A. That would be a blood culture.  
24 Q. I know that you didn't think it was necessary earlier,  
25 but did you at any stage think now maybe a full blood

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1 of the general paediatric care she was going to have her  
2 U&E done that evening.  
3 Q. But you're asking for some bloods to be tested. Why on  
4 earth not simply ask for a full blood count or at least  
5 for the serum sodium levels?  
6 A. Because I had left that to the general paediatric team.  
7 Q. I had mentioned to you before the textbook  
8 Forfar & Arneil that you would have been familiar with.  
9 A. Mm.  
10 Q. And it's the fourth edition, 1992, which would have been  
11 the relevant one at that stage. If we go to  
12 311-019-007. There you see the start of "Acute  
13 encephalopathies" and the aetiology and if you see in  
14 there:  
15 "Encephalopathy may also result from the effects of  
16 extracranial infection by inappropriate ADH,  
17 inflammatory oedema and status epilepticus."  
18 So there is an interrelationship between those two;  
19 isn't that right?  
20 A. That's correct.  
21 Q. And then if one looks at the management of the coma that  
22 can result, 311-019-009. And at this stage, at  
23 5 o'clock, she has a low Glasgow Coma Scale; isn't that  
24 right? So you see the management and then over the  
25 page, which is -- well, there's a whole series of things

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1 count -- or is that what you call a full blood count?  
2 A. Sorry, no, it's a blood sample for a viral culture.  
3 Q. Did you think a full blood count might be in order?  
4 A. I don't think it was going to help us.  
5 Q. Did you think that serum sodium levels might be helpful?  
6 A. It would have been, but I, as I said earlier, had an  
7 expectation that that was going to be requested anyway.  
8 Q. Yes, well, this is now 5 o'clock. You're nine hours  
9 from when you thought the last sample had been taken.  
10 A. Mm.  
11 Q. You've already got higher up or somewhere on your  
12 differential, encephalitis, which brings with it, does  
13 it not, a risk of SIADH? And if that's the case, then  
14 the management of electrolyte levels is an important  
15 factor, is it not?  
16 A. I still think, even eight hours after the level, that  
17 I would be surprised if it was going to explain her  
18 present condition.  
19 Q. But it's not just a matter of whether you thought  
20 it would explain; it's what was routine practice. If  
21 you thought that there was a possibility of  
22 encephalitis, was that not routine practice to test for  
23 these things?  
24 A. It does depend on how high up your differential you have  
25 encephalitis, and as I said, my expectation was as part

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1 to be done at table 14.20. If we go over the page to  
2 311-019-010, there's table 14.21. This is part of coma  
3 management. In fact, if you see the ones with the  
4 asterisk are for "all coma regardless of cause".  
5 Then after you've got through the "EEG continuous",  
6 which is not indicated for all coma regardless of cause,  
7 just past halfway down, you see:  
8 "Urea and electrolytes (twice daily)."  
9 So far as you were concerned, they were done at  
10 8 o'clock in the morning, you're now at 5 o'clock,  
11 you're already asking for some bloods. Why don't you  
12 ask for that?  
13 A. Because my expectation was that it was requested by the  
14 paediatric team.  
15 Q. Did you think, if you'd got encephalitis as part of your  
16 differential diagnoses, that Claire was at risk of  
17 SIADH?  
18 A. I thought that risk was small, actually, because she  
19 hadn't mounted a fever and, while I was considering  
20 meningococcal meningitis, I felt it was still down the  
21 differential.  
22 Q. But you had meningococcal meningitis?  
23 A. It was in my differential, yes.  
24 Q. Then let's look at Nelson, 311-018-012. At the top,  
25 this is a section dealing with infections of the central

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1 nervous system, viral meningoencephalitis. And if we go  
2 to "treatment", a third of the way down:  
3 "It is crucial to anticipate and be prepared for  
4 convulsions, cerebral oedema ..."  
5 And in that list:  
6 "Disturbed fluid and electrolyte balance."  
7 Although they go on to talk about severe  
8 encephalitis, and although you might not have thought  
9 she had severe encephalitis at that point, nonetheless  
10 what I'm putting to you is it's indicated that these are  
11 things that you have to be looking at the possibility of  
12 her developing. And if you should be looking at the  
13 possibility of her developing them, should you not be  
14 signalling that to the junior paediatric staff and  
15 indicating the tests that might be carried out to  
16 determine whether that stage is being reached? And if  
17 you see a little bit further down:  
18 "Inappropriate secretion of antidiuretic hormone is  
19 quite common in acute CNS disorders so constant  
20 evaluation is required for its early detection."  
21 A. What it doesn't say is how common it is in individual  
22 conditions. As I said, if this was bacterial  
23 meningitis, then there would no question. If this was  
24 traumatic brain injury, there'd be no question. In my  
25 experience, in the context of a viral encephalitis,

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1 (A short break)  
2 (4.03 pm)  
3 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: There is one point I ought to bring to  
4 your attention. I was putting to Dr Webb the fact that  
5 he hadn't included in his note any reference to  
6 status epilepticus. The nurses actually seem to have  
7 done so in their note at 090-040-141. I will just pull  
8 that up quickly in fairness.  
9 It's not entirely clear when all these things are  
10 being done, but there's a reference to the stat dose of  
11 phenytoin at 2.45. Then:  
12 "Seen by Dr Webb. Still status epilepticus. Stat  
13 IV Hypnovel at 3.25."  
14 There is definitely a reference there. It's not  
15 entirely clear whether that relates to what Dr Webb  
16 thought at 5 o'clock, but certainly there is a reference  
17 to "still in status".  
18 I don't want to ask you very much about Claire's  
19 care overnight because, to some extent, you've said that  
20 the course for the paediatric team is actually through  
21 the consultant paediatricians, one way or the other.  
22 But you did say that you expected Claire to improve.  
23 That was your expectation.  
24 A. That's correct.  
25 Q. If she didn't improve but either deteriorated or stayed

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1 there is actually quite a low risk and, as I said, my  
2 expectation was that it was going to be done anyway.  
3 Q. Yes. I suppose finally I'm simply asking you why you  
4 did not keep Claire's options open more broadly. Some  
5 of these things would not have been difficult to do, to  
6 have added on to that blood test that you were seeking.  
7 A serum sodium level is not a difficult thing to do.  
8 MR SEPHTON: Can I just interrupt there for a minute? How  
9 many times does this witness have to say he thought the  
10 paediatric team were going to deal with the blood test  
11 before the point is allowed to rest? With great  
12 respect, it's difficult to see how this line of  
13 questioning is taking the inquiry any further.  
14 THE CHAIRMAN: I think the differential diagnosis was open.  
15 He has given the answers that he has on a number of  
16 occasions about the blood tests, so let's move on.  
17 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: We then move on to Claire's care  
18 overnight.  
19 What are the things that you now know happened, if  
20 any, that you would have expected to have been alerted  
21 to?  
22 THE CHAIRMAN: The stenographer's been going since  
23 2 o'clock, so let's take a ten-minute break and then  
24 we'll resume. Thank you.  
25 (3.50 pm)

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1 the same, which wasn't what you thought would happen  
2 given what you had prescribed to be administered, did  
3 you expect to be contacted about that?  
4 A. I think if she deteriorated, I certainly would have  
5 expected to have been contacted and, if she had further  
6 convulsive seizures, I would have expected to be  
7 contacted.  
8 Q. If she remained much as she had been with these  
9 occasional teeth-tightening episodes, that sort of  
10 thing, but no discernable improvement, would you be  
11 expected to be contacted with that?  
12 A. Probably not.  
13 Q. Can I ask you why?  
14 A. Well, I think if she had remained stable, then  
15 I wouldn't be critical of anybody who didn't contact me  
16 in that situation.  
17 Q. But in the same way as you had reviewed and changed her  
18 anticonvulsant therapy over the afternoon when you  
19 didn't see the kind of improvement that you had expected  
20 to, I think Dr Steen has somewhat later on, when she's  
21 talking about the medication after Claire suffers her  
22 collapse, that the kind of medication that you were  
23 prescribing to be administering was something she wasn't  
24 entirely familiar with and that was really within your  
25 expertise. So if she were to think that, nobody else is

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1 really in a position, are they, to be making decisions  
2 as to whether there should be any adjustments to her  
3 medication to see if things might be improved by that  
4 change? So if she wasn't responding, are you still  
5 staying you wouldn't expect to be contacted, to be  
6 alerted to the fact that she wasn't responding in a way  
7 that you had expected?  
8 A. You're asking me to think back to what I would have  
9 expected at the time. It's very difficult.  
10 Q. It's not easy, I accept that.  
11 A. I certainly would have expected to have been informed of  
12 a deterioration and new developments. I find it  
13 difficult to discern whether I would have expected them  
14 to contact me in the context of her remaining the same.  
15 Q. Did you have an alternative plan for if your  
16 expectations weren't met and if so, what was it?  
17 A. I didn't have a plan to introduce any further medication  
18 overnight.  
19 Q. No.  
20 A. My plan essentially was to continue to monitor Claire  
21 with the nursing observations and her oxygen saturation  
22 monitoring.  
23 Q. I'm putting it to you in a slightly different way. If  
24 she didn't follow the path that you anticipated she  
25 would -- and, in fact, from that point of view that

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1 Would that be the sort of thing?  
2 A. I think that's difficult because it sounds like it was  
3 a very brief event. But the event -- I think there was  
4 an event at 9 o'clock.  
5 Q. You're absolutely right. There's one at 9 o'clock which  
6 is the episode of "screaming and drawing up of arms"; is  
7 that something that you might want to be contacted  
8 about?  
9 A. What was more concerning about that is that she  
10 developed a tachycardia during it, she developed a fast  
11 heartbeat, and I think there were some other changes  
12 too, which would be concerning.  
13 Q. Is that the sort of thing that you feel might have  
14 prompted communication to you?  
15 A. Yes, I think so, yes.  
16 Q. Or rather, would you have wanted to have known about it?  
17 A. I would have liked to have known, yes.  
18 Q. What would that have indicated to you about her  
19 condition?  
20 A. That she was still having seizure activity, which would  
21 have been a concern for me. I think I would have  
22 certainly wanted to speak to the medical people involved  
23 to see what her current status was.  
24 Q. I understand. I think you said in answer, I believe it  
25 was, to a question from the chairman that if you had

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1 would mean that she hadn't ever since about 2 o'clock  
2 in the afternoon -- if she didn't, what was your  
3 alternative plan for how you would treat her if you were  
4 alerted to it?  
5 A. The following morning I would have -- the plan would  
6 have been to undertake a CT scan and to arrange an EEG.  
7 Q. So you had no particular plan for the evening if she  
8 didn't improve as you thought she ought, or, sorry, as  
9 you expected her to?  
10 A. I had a plan for the evening, but I had no intervention  
11 planned.  
12 MR FORTUNE: Once again, where do we find that in the notes?  
13 It's all very well, Dr Webb --  
14 THE CHAIRMAN: Excuse me. Don't direct your question to  
15 Dr Webb. Intervene through me, please.  
16 MR FORTUNE: I'm sorry, sir.  
17 THE CHAIRMAN: And don't do that again.  
18 Dr Webb has indicated he didn't have an intervention  
19 planned, but he has indicated what he envisaged  
20 overnight and, if there was a deterioration or a new  
21 development or seizures, he would have expected to be  
22 contacted.  
23 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: And just so that we understand what  
24 might trigger that kind of contact, for example there's  
25 a further "teeth clenching and groaning" at 19.15.

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1 thought about talking to anybody in particular other  
2 than the staff who were around you, the general  
3 paediatric staff, then it might be that you would have  
4 thought of speaking to the paediatricians in PICU.  
5 A. The anaesthetists, yes.  
6 Q. Sorry. I beg your pardon?  
7 A. The paediatric anaesthetists.  
8 Q. Why did you even think about that at 5 o'clock if your  
9 expectation at that time was that she would improve?  
10 A. I think what I said was, in retrospect, I should have  
11 done that, I should have considered suggesting to  
12 Dr Sands that we make contact with the intensive care  
13 team to review her.  
14 Q. This may be a difficult question. Does that mean  
15 perhaps, in retrospect, you shouldn't have had such  
16 a confident view that she was likely to improve and  
17 entertained more the possibility that she might not be?  
18 A. Perhaps that, but also what sort of surveillance she was  
19 going to have during the evening.  
20 THE CHAIRMAN: It's self-evident, isn't it, in retrospect,  
21 your confidence or expectation that she would improve,  
22 unfortunately, was not borne out?  
23 A. That's correct.  
24 THE CHAIRMAN: So this is the point that you made about some  
25 of the inquiry experts and you think that it's not --

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1 they're not quite looking through the eyes that you  
2 would have been looking at Claire through on the Tuesday  
3 from lunchtime onwards. Is this the same point you're  
4 making with hindsight, you should have contacted the  
5 intensive care team?  
6 A. Yes. I think that's a fair point.  
7 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Just one last question about that.  
8 When the nursing expert for the inquiry, Ms Ramsay,  
9 was giving her evidence, she was saying at 5 o'clock  
10 there was enough, really, to have -- not looking with  
11 hindsight, but on the evidence that there was at  
12 5 o'clock -- started that conversation with PICU and at  
13 least alerted them to the possibility that they might  
14 have a child come through in the evening and just seen  
15 what the position was. Leaving aside the hindsight  
16 point, do you accept that?  
17 A. I can only make a comment in hindsight. I think, at the  
18 time, I didn't think that. As I say, in hindsight --  
19 THE CHAIRMAN: It's almost impossible for Dr Webb to answer  
20 that because if his position, which I accept, is that if  
21 he had realised how seriously ill Claire was --  
22 A. I would have sent her to ICU.  
23 THE CHAIRMAN: He would have sent her to ICU and he  
24 certainly would not have gone home at whatever point it  
25 was, 5.30 or 6 or whenever you did that evening.

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1 reconstruction?  
2 A. Very little of it.  
3 THE CHAIRMAN: Okay.  
4 A. But I believe I would have discussed the issue of the  
5 viral infection and would have mentioned the term  
6 "enterovirus" and that that might have been a likely  
7 candidate. And then in the context of her low sodium,  
8 I wrote my note at 4.40.  
9 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Yes. Sorry, that was one point I should  
10 have asked you. Leaving aside whether you would have  
11 wanted to be contact at 9 o'clock because of the episode  
12 of screaming and her other vital statistics at that  
13 time, would you have wanted to be contacted when it was  
14 shown that her serum sodium levels were at 121?  
15 A. Yes.  
16 Q. So so far as you're aware, there are certain things  
17 which relate to what you've just been explaining to the  
18 chairman over how you considered her case on the  
19 Tuesday, that you relate to Dr Steen. Although you  
20 can't remember it specifically, you think those are the  
21 sorts of things that you would have raised with her.  
22 A. That's correct.  
23 Q. Do you at that stage form a view as to what's happened?  
24 Because this is not what you expected to happen.  
25 A. My assessment of the terminal event was that Claire's

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1 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: I understand that, Mr Chairman. I was  
2 seeking, perhaps not very well, to put it in a slightly  
3 different way.  
4 Sometimes, at the time, one thinks one's got the  
5 right end of the diagnosis and all I was simply asking  
6 him is: if he looked at the information and the evidence  
7 that he had, did that not at least suggest that he could  
8 have contemplated that, but I understand that you've  
9 answered it for the chairman, so I don't press the  
10 point.  
11 THE CHAIRMAN: Let's move on.  
12 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: As far as you're concerned, the next  
13 information you have about Claire is after her arrest?  
14 A. That's correct.  
15 Q. And you are contacted and you go down to the hospital?  
16 A. That's correct.  
17 Q. Can you just help us with, when you get there, Dr Steen  
18 is already there; is that right?  
19 A. That's correct.  
20 Q. Do you and she discuss Claire's condition and the  
21 treatment that she received over the previous day?  
22 A. Yes, we certainly would have discussed Claire's  
23 condition.  
24 THE CHAIRMAN: Let's just check, before you start this: how  
25 much of this do you actually remember as opposed to

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1 low sodium was likely to have caused cerebral oedema and  
2 that that was most likely to have been on the basis of  
3 SIADH.  
4 Q. And do you have a view as to how that could have  
5 occurred? Because clearly, that wasn't something on  
6 your register, otherwise you would have done something  
7 about it previously. So do you have an idea of how that  
8 could possibly have happened?  
9 A. I would have struggled with that, but I think it's  
10 possible that it was related to a viral infection and/or  
11 the non-convulsive status.  
12 Q. So in fact she's falling into one of those rare  
13 categories that you didn't really contemplate because it  
14 was a rarity, if I can put it that way?  
15 A. That's correct.  
16 Q. Do you and Dr Steen get a sort of consensus as to what  
17 your combined experience and consideration of the  
18 evidence, if I can put it that way, indicates about  
19 what's led to Claire's collapse so that you can then  
20 speak to her parents when they arrive?  
21 A. Yes, I think we did come to a conclusion that this whole  
22 episode was triggered by a viral infection and it led to  
23 a series of events. I would have conveyed my feelings  
24 that non-convulsive status played a part in the initial  
25 presentation, but at some point clearly cerebral oedema

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1 took over.  
2 Q. And when you do come and you write your note at 4.40, is  
3 part of what you do having a look at the medical notes  
4 and records to see if they can shed any light on what  
5 happened, which was the opposite of what you thought  
6 should have happened?  
7 A. Um ... I can't recall how much reading of the notes  
8 I did from 5 o'clock onwards.  
9 Q. Would you have wanted to look at her medical notes and  
10 records as part of your understanding of how this had  
11 happened?  
12 A. I may have read them, I just can't recall.  
13 Q. I understand that you can't remember that. I am  
14 actually asking whether you would have wanted to do  
15 that.  
16 A. I may have got -- Dr Steen would have been there ahead  
17 of me and she may have filled me in on what was in the  
18 notes. Most of it was her own note.  
19 Q. Did you explain to her about the drug therapy that you  
20 had suggested for Claire and that had been administered  
21 to her?  
22 A. Again, I can't recall that, but I think I would have.  
23 Q. Did you decide between the two of you which one was  
24 actually going to speak to Claire's parents or, if it  
25 wasn't going to be one, which aspects of her care you

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1 hyponatraemia."  
2 Do you think that expression was actually ever used  
3 in discussion with the parents?  
4 A. No, I don't think that term was used.  
5 Q. If you were trying to convey the sense of that, what is  
6 the, if you like, the more user-friendly expression or  
7 description for that?  
8 A. Brain swelling with low sodium.  
9 Q. Do you think low sodium was mentioned?  
10 A. I can't recall, but it may have been. I think it's most  
11 likely that it was.  
12 Q. The parents had a meeting with the two of you before the  
13 results from the CT scan had been received, and then  
14 a meeting afterwards to advise them as to what had  
15 happened and also to explain about brainstem death and  
16 so forth. The parents, I think, recall that you were  
17 there at both, certainly at one. Do you remember that  
18 you were there at both?  
19 A. I think I was.  
20 Q. In terms of what might have been explained to the  
21 parents, Dr MacFaul was asked about that in his  
22 evidence. But before I go to that, can I ask: were you  
23 aware of the fact that Dr Stewart, who recorded the  
24 events of 11.30 in the evening of Wednesday, had thought  
25 that a cause of the hyponatraemia might be fluid

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1 were going to take the lead on, if I can put it that  
2 way?  
3 A. I don't think we had a discussion over that. I think it  
4 was quite clear that Dr Steen took the lead.  
5 Q. I know that she did. I'm asking if you discussed it or  
6 whether you would have thought that that was something  
7 you might have done?  
8 A. I don't think we discussed it, no.  
9 Q. Do you know why she did take the lead?  
10 A. I would have thought it's because she felt that she was  
11 the lead consultant and this was her patient.  
12 Q. Yes, but in terms of explaining the treatment that was  
13 administered to Claire and why Claire suffered her  
14 collapse, that's all effectively within your domain?  
15 A. As I said, we didn't discuss it.  
16 THE CHAIRMAN: Was Dr Steen much more experienced as  
17 a consultant than you were?  
18 A. I don't know that for certain, but Dr Steen took control  
19 of the situation and dealt with it.  
20 THE CHAIRMAN: Okay.  
21 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: In your witness statement, 138/1 at  
22 page 51, you say:  
23 "I cannot recall the details of what we said about  
24 hyponatraemia and brain oedema, but I believe I would  
25 have indicated that the brain swelling was due to

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1 overload?  
2 A. I don't think I was.  
3 Q. At that time you weren't aware of that?  
4 A. No, I don't think I was.  
5 Q. Then if I pull up the explanation that Dr MacFaul gave  
6 in his evidence of 14 November of this year, it starts  
7 at page 124 and if we can go to 125. If you see,  
8 I start the questioning about it at line 8.  
9 Dr Stewart's [sic] first line that there's a fluid  
10 management issue, effectively, and that that brings with  
11 it the possibility that her fluid management was  
12 inadequate and that's what I'm putting to Dr MacFaul,  
13 and he says, "Absolutely".  
14 Then I ask him at line 15 and going on:  
15 "In all the circumstances what should Dr Steen  
16 and/or [you] have been discussing with the parents?"  
17 Then if you look at page 125, he starts off at line  
18 7 saying it's very difficult, so he will just deal with  
19 it in the way that he would have if he were in that  
20 situation. He says:  
21 "I think I would have explained that Claire had  
22 suffered brain swelling and that that had caused her to  
23 stop breathing and had damaged her brain irretrievably,  
24 that the brain had swollen from an underlying disease of  
25 the brain and the complications of that, which are

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1 a reduced sodium level, and that the reduced sodium  
2 level was due to the production of a higher amount of  
3 hormone, which reacts to acute brain illness, but also  
4 to volume overload, fluid overload, from retention of  
5 carry ... and I suppose one would have to say, possibly,  
6 in part from the intravenous infusion."

7 And then if we can bring up the next page of 126.

8 The chairman said:

9 "Question: I suppose one would have to say --

10 "Answer: That's difficult. One is always hesitant  
11 to lay blame on oneself, I think, and on the regime. It  
12 would have to be stated because if you're explaining the  
13 hyponatraemia and you've properly conceived its  
14 mechanism, then you are considering the two main causes.  
15 One is fluid overload and the other is inappropriate  
16 ADH. There's only one way that the fluid overload could  
17 have occurred and that is by the fluid that had been  
18 administered."

19 Would you say that's a fair summary of how one might  
20 have explained events to Claire's parents?

21 A. I think when you use the term "fluid overload", it  
22 implies that you're using inappropriate volume of fluid.

23 Q. That's exactly what Dr Stewart had thought had happened.

24 In his note --

25 THE CHAIRMAN: I think we've seen that. Do you have

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1 putting something, 090-038-135 is the fluid balance  
2 sheet. What the registrar actually wanted was for her  
3 to be restricted to 41 ml an hour. In fact, if one  
4 looks at that amount you can see that by the infusion of  
5 phenytoin, for example, that she got more than that.  
6 The point that I was putting to you is that you  
7 recognised she did when you provided your statement for  
8 the coroner at 090-053-170.

9 If you look at the review of fluid balance  
10 administration -- so you've calculated the volumes that  
11 she received and you say the volume was greater than  
12 64 ml and so on. But in any event, however it is  
13 calculated, she was getting more than the 41 ml an hour  
14 that the registrar had wanted her fluids restricted to.  
15 Presumably it was overlooked, the fact that actually she  
16 was, on top of that, going to get all this other fluid  
17 with the anticonvulsants in?

18 A. I think that's true, and I think I certainly didn't pick  
19 that up on the evening, in the last four or five hours,  
20 that there was an excess.

21 Q. No. I understand that. So what I was putting to you  
22 is that the SHO -- and it was his actual query to his  
23 registrar when the serum sodium level came back. He had  
24 hyponatraemia and he queried fluid overload and  
25 low-sodium fluids. That was one line of his query. The

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1 a reservation about whether there was an excessive  
2 volume?

3 A. I think before you make that conclusion, it's reasonable  
4 to review the volumes that were given, and I think if we  
5 had done that, we would have seen that the volumes were  
6 as we would have expected to give [sic]. So they  
7 weren't outside the normal volumes for a child of that  
8 age. So there wasn't an overload in that sense.

9 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Except for when she was noticed to have  
10 121, of a serum sodium level, and the registrar  
11 prescribed that her fluids were restricted. I think you  
12 yourself have already noted in fluid calculations when  
13 you did your statement for the coroner that actually her  
14 fluids weren't restricted at that time. The reason they  
15 weren't restricted is because the anticonvulsants that  
16 she was also being prescribed were also being given to  
17 her in saline fluid. So her total fluid was not  
18 restricted.

19 A. And that would have been more difficult to discern from  
20 looking at the fluid sheet at the time.

21 Q. No, the fluid balance sheet shows that.

22 A. Well, I think the total was not outside what you'd  
23 expect, but I understand what you're saying. The  
24 restriction didn't occur as it should have.

25 Q. Yes. Well, just quickly, so that it's not me just

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1 other line of his query was SIADH. And his impression  
2 was that there was a need to increase the sodium content  
3 in the fluids to address what he thought to be  
4 dilutional hyponatraemia, effectively. And the upshot  
5 of that was that his registrar guided him by saying,  
6 well, you restrict the fluids to two-thirds of their  
7 present value, and that turned out to be 41 ml per hour.

8 A. When he was writing his note, I don't think there was  
9 fluid overload at that point.

10 THE CHAIRMAN: So you're distinguishing that unlike, say,  
11 Adam's case, the low reading of 121, there's a question  
12 about whether that was as a result of fluid overload;  
13 is that your point?

14 A. Yes.

15 THE CHAIRMAN: But the fluid regime was due to be reduced  
16 after 11.30.

17 A. That's right. I think from 11.30 there was an issue  
18 about exactly how much fluid should or should not have  
19 been given, but prior to that, I think Claire received  
20 the amount of fluid that we would have expected to give  
21 her, if you like.

22 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Yes. So on your view that you would  
23 say, well, whatever was causing that 121 serum sodium  
24 level, you don't think that was fluid overload at that  
25 stage because you think she was getting roughly what she

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1 should --  
2 A. -- appropriate fluid, exactly.  
3 Q. But then she did get more than she should have got --  
4 A. In the last three or four hours, yes.  
5 Q. In your view, did she develop a fluid overload as  
6 a result of that? Or could she have?  
7 A. In the last three or four hours?  
8 Q. Yes.  
9 A. I think the volumes are very small and it's not clear to  
10 me whether there was a retrievable situation at that  
11 time.  
12 Q. Is that something that happened, that she became  
13 overloaded?  
14 A. I think she wasn't restricted the way it was intended,  
15 certainly --  
16 THE CHAIRMAN: So she got some extra fluid?  
17 A. Some extra fluid, yes.  
18 THE CHAIRMAN: So the question is how significant that was  
19 and how significant the overload was and what effect  
20 that had on her condition; is that right?  
21 A. That's correct, and that's very difficult to discern,  
22 I have to say.  
23 MR SEPHTON: I wonder, sir, if I can throw into the mix the  
24 fact that the drugs were served with normal saline  
25 rather than Solution No. 18. I don't know if that has

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1 Dr Steen did discuss before the meeting as opposed to  
2 now, reconstructing.  
3 THE CHAIRMAN: I understand.  
4 You have said, doctor, that you don't have a clear  
5 recollection of everything that happened when you came  
6 back into the hospital. Can you help on that question  
7 that Mr Fortune has raised?  
8 A. I can't be certain, but I think it's quite likely that  
9 I would have looked at the fluid chart and just got the  
10 bottom line on it.  
11 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: And can one interpret that answer to  
12 mean that that certainly would have been what you would  
13 have wanted to do?  
14 A. Yes, and I raised the issue of hyponatraemia, so I would  
15 have looked at it.  
16 Q. Thank you. And just so that we finish it off for  
17 Mr Fortune, if you'd looked at it, because that's what  
18 you would have wanted to do, and you believed you were  
19 having a discussion with Dr Steen ahead of having to  
20 give some sort of explanation to the parents as to what  
21 happened, is that the sort of things you'd have wanted  
22 to discuss with her?  
23 A. As I say, I didn't take from my observation that there  
24 was a fluid overload.  
25 Q. No, whatever you took from the evidence, is that what

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1 a relevance.  
2 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: I think I did mention that actually,  
3 that it was normal saline.  
4 So in your view, therefore, is Dr MacFaul incorrect  
5 to say that one should have been considering that there  
6 was any error or deficiency, if I can put it that way,  
7 in her fluid management?  
8 A. I think, at the time, that's a bit harsh, yes.  
9 Q. At the time?  
10 A. Yes. I think there's been a growing realisation since  
11 about the importance of restricting fluids, but at the  
12 time I think that's a harsh comment.  
13 Q. The parents then go on, when they are describing their  
14 recollection of that meeting, to say that they had asked  
15 if everything possible had been done for Claire and if  
16 anything else could have been done. And Dr Steen  
17 informed them that everything possible had been done for  
18 Claire and nothing more could have been done. We can  
19 pull that up at the 14 November transcript, page 127.  
20 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Fortune?  
21 MR FORTUNE: Sir, can we ask Dr Webb if he has a clear  
22 recollection that he and Dr Steen actually looked at the  
23 fluid balance sheets and did some mathematics before  
24 they saw Mr and Mrs Roberts? It's very difficult to  
25 discern from some of the answers what exactly he and

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1 you'd have wanted to discuss with her?  
2 A. I'm not sure I understand that, I'm sorry.  
3 Q. When you characterised your own view as to what happened  
4 in your note, you have it as -- this is at 090-022-057:  
5 "SIADH, hyponatraemia, hypoosmolality, cerebral  
6 oedema and coning, following prolonged epileptic  
7 seizures."  
8 A. Mm-hm.  
9 Q. So you definitely have hyponatraemia in there, but as  
10 a result or a product of the SIADH and presumably you  
11 got that view from having looked at your notes. What  
12 I'm asking you is: is that what you would have wanted to  
13 discuss with Dr Steen?  
14 A. I think I did discuss with Dr Steen and we would have  
15 discussed it, as I said, the viral trigger for all this  
16 and how much that would have potentially played a part  
17 itself in causing oedema.  
18 Q. Thank you.  
19 Where I was taking you to, which is Dr MacFaul's  
20 view of that statement, "everything possible had been  
21 done". His view is that that's not correct. In fact,  
22 he refers to it -- you can see it at lines 13 and 14 --  
23 as evading the issue because actually her management was  
24 not up to the standard of the time in his view and the  
25 standard of the time he says is:

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1 "Fluid restriction and adjustment of the sodium  
2 content of the intravenous fluid and that should have  
3 happened, in my view, from, at the latest, around  
4 mid-afternoon."  
5 So in that sense, this was misleading.  
6 A. I actually don't agree with that. I think it's clear  
7 from the article in 2001 by Fenella Kirkham that there  
8 wasn't a consensus on fluid restriction in this sort of  
9 situation.  
10 Q. Sorry?  
11 A. I said I don't agree with this comment because it's  
12 clear from the article in 2001 by Dr Fenella Kirkham  
13 that there wasn't a consensus on the role of fluid  
14 restriction in this situation.  
15 Q. That's a matter that's received some attention as to  
16 exactly what Dr Kirkham was explaining in her article,  
17 the context of that, and whether that was a statement of  
18 general applicability. You will see from the  
19 transcripts as to the experts' different views about  
20 that.  
21 A. Yes. I think if you have diagnosed SIADH, then there's  
22 no issue: you fluid restrict. If you haven't, then  
23 I don't believe that there was a consensus on applying  
24 fluid restriction in that context.  
25 Q. So all this will come down to is whether SIADH should,

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1 something that the Roberts say was explained to them.  
2 Should it have been?  
3 A. Well, I'm not certain that I agree with that actually  
4 because I think if you look at the transcripts, both  
5 parents seem to have some recognition of the fact that  
6 this was potentially a recurrence of Claire's epilepsy.  
7 Q. I won't pull it up, but the reference to everything that  
8 had been done is reflecting what happened the day  
9 before. Was it a correct statement to say that  
10 everything that could have been done had been done?  
11 I can imagine it's one of the things that you do want to  
12 say to parents.  
13 A. Yes.  
14 Q. Do you think that's an accurate statement?  
15 A. Um ... I can see why Dr Steen would make that  
16 statement.  
17 THE CHAIRMAN: It depends how you interpret it, doesn't it?  
18 A. Yes.  
19 THE CHAIRMAN: If you interpret it as meaning that  
20 everything had been done that could have been done since  
21 Claire arrived in the hospital on Monday evening, that's  
22 a very, very broad statement.  
23 A. Yes.  
24 THE CHAIRMAN: Whereas if you say as if it's meant to  
25 say everything that has been done in the last hour or

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1 in the circumstances, have been diagnosed, and I think  
2 your view is, if it had been diagnosed, then there  
3 should have been fluid restriction; if there hadn't  
4 been, then that's a matter of fluid management.  
5 A. Yes.  
6 Q. Earlier at the top, Dr MacFaul's answer is that:  
7 "There was no reference in the discussion [that is  
8 the discussion as Claire's parents recalled it] to the  
9 epilepsy being the cause of the brain illness in Claire,  
10 which was what was being handled as the primary  
11 explanation at the time, and the alternative  
12 explanation, which had not received much attention, but  
13 had received some, was meningoencephalitis."  
14 So I think the point that Dr MacFaul is making, and  
15 maybe you can comment on it, is that in the explanation  
16 that the Roberts say they had, they didn't get the  
17 impression that the real cause of her brain illness was  
18 the epilepsy or a recurrence of her earlier epilepsy,  
19 which might have triggered various sorts of things or  
20 pre-disposed her to the non-convulsive  
21 status epilepticus, and yet that was throughout,  
22 certainly the status epilepticus element of it,  
23 something that was being treated for some considerable  
24 period of time and remained your view, anyway, as to  
25 a primary differential diagnosis. But that's not

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1 two since she collapsed --  
2 A. Since she collapsed.  
3 THE CHAIRMAN: -- and was brought into intensive care.  
4 A. That's right.  
5 THE CHAIRMAN: But the problem, even if you take the  
6 narrower, shorter time period after the collapse at  
7 about 11 or 11.30, because of various issues about  
8 staffing and so on, she was seen by a house officer, she  
9 wasn't then seen by the registrar, who unfortunately  
10 seems to have been very busy elsewhere, and it'd be hard  
11 to say, even on a narrow view, that everything possible  
12 had been done. So you'd have to narrow it down again,  
13 wouldn't you, doctor, to say: since she was brought into  
14 intensive care, everything possible had been done?  
15 A. I think that's fair comment.  
16 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: And I think you would agree, would you  
17 not, that by the time she's brought into intensive care  
18 she's beyond recovery?  
19 A. Yes.  
20 Q. If we move on to another part of the discussion, which  
21 will be the brain only post-mortem. Did you discuss  
22 that before it was raised with Claire's parents? Did  
23 you discuss that with Dr Steen?  
24 A. I don't think we had any discussion about the  
25 post-mortem.

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1 Q. Would that have been an appropriate thing for you to  
2 have discussed before it was raised with Claire's  
3 parents?  
4 A. Perhaps.  
5 Q. When she was giving her evidence, Dr Steen said -- and  
6 the transcript reference for it is 17 October 2012,  
7 page 180. I think it starts at line 10. I'm asking her  
8 the question:  
9 "In terms of this issue, to confine any post-mortem  
10 examination to Claire's brain only, who would you have  
11 considered to be the lead clinician on that?"  
12 She says:  
13 "This is looking back and I think the ultimate  
14 decision I would put to Dr Webb, which is maybe unfair  
15 because I'm putting it to him, but this was a child with  
16 an acute neurological condition. We had considered the  
17 need -- and I believe he was there with me considering  
18 that need -- for a post-mortem of some decision [sic].  
19 So it was important that whatever information we got  
20 from the post-mortem was going to give us the most  
21 relevant answers."  
22 Maybe not the clearest statement, but she certainly  
23 seems to be suggesting that you were the lead in that  
24 decision because the problems with Claire, if I can put  
25 it that way, were largely neurological.

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1 that she would have had a full post-mortem?  
2 A. I wouldn't have seen any indication to limit it to the  
3 brain and, given that she presented with vomiting and  
4 symptoms of a viral infection, it might have been  
5 helpful to have a full post-mortem.  
6 Q. Yes. Well, when that point was being put to others,  
7 their view was: that might be so, but the problem ended  
8 up being a problem in the brain, and that's the only bit  
9 you really need to look at.  
10 A. And if there's any reservation about having post-mortem,  
11 it'd be very reasonable to limit a post-mortem to the  
12 brain.  
13 Q. So that I understand what you're saying, if the parents  
14 had been concerned about it, then given that it wasn't  
15 going to be a coroner's case at this stage, that might  
16 have been a reasonable thing to do. But if the parents  
17 weren't concerned about that limitation,  
18 am I understanding you to say that you couldn't see any  
19 reason why you wouldn't go ahead and have a full  
20 post-mortem?  
21 A. That's correct.  
22 Q. And quite apart from --  
23 THE CHAIRMAN: It's a bit contradictory, isn't it? Because  
24 if you think that you need a full post-mortem, but the  
25 parents resist it, many parents might naturally resist

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1 A. And I'm quite clear that we did not discuss it.  
2 Q. You didn't discuss it?  
3 A. No, because I would have remembered if that was the  
4 decision.  
5 THE CHAIRMAN: Do you agree with it as a decision or can you  
6 remember at the time --  
7 A. I can understand how it might have arisen because  
8 sometimes parents wouldn't want a full post-mortem --  
9 THE CHAIRMAN: Just to make it clear, doctor, that does not  
10 appear to have been the Roberts' --  
11 A. That's correct.  
12 THE CHAIRMAN: It's not as if the Roberts were steering you  
13 and Dr Steen away from a full post-mortem.  
14 A. Yes. I think my preference would have been for a full  
15 post-mortem, so I'm pretty confident we didn't discuss  
16 it.  
17 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: In fairness to you, you do say that in  
18 your witness statement at 138/1, page 91:  
19 "I cannot recall my view at the time of Claire's  
20 death, but I believe I would have expected her  
21 post-mortem to have been a full post-mortem pending the  
22 parents' consent. I don't believe I was involved in the  
23 discussion about the extent of post-mortem in relation  
24 to Claire."  
25 Can you help us with why you would have expected

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1 that because of what it involves for their child. But  
2 if you think that you need a full post-mortem, then you  
3 should try to work with the parents to get their  
4 agreement to it.  
5 A. And that's what you usually do.  
6 THE CHAIRMAN: Right. Then if there's resistance, which may  
7 be entirely understandable, then you might reduce it to  
8 a brain-only post-mortem, but would you do that if you  
9 actually thought that a full post-mortem was required?  
10 A. I certainly wouldn't.  
11 THE CHAIRMAN: In that event, since you don't have their  
12 consent to a full post-mortem, does that make it  
13 a coroner's case?  
14 A. No.  
15 THE CHAIRMAN: Then how do you get round the fact, if it's  
16 not a coroner's case, the fact that the parents resist  
17 consent to a full post-mortem, or can you?  
18 A. If it's a coroner's case, the parents have no say.  
19 THE CHAIRMAN: If it's not a coroner's case and the parents  
20 resist a full post-mortem, then all you can do is the  
21 limited post-mortem?  
22 A. Yes.  
23 THE CHAIRMAN: And that's because the lead comes from the  
24 parents?  
25 A. And that's sometimes the situation, yes.

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1 THE CHAIRMAN: In this case, the lead came from the doctor  
2 or doctors.  
3 A. Yes.  
4 THE CHAIRMAN: Okay.  
5 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Is that why, Dr Webb, in the 1991 report  
6 of the joint working party on autopsy and audit -- and  
7 they provide guidance in this way ... We can look at it  
8 because I think it's directly relevant to what you've  
9 just said, 236-007-068. Maybe we can pull that up  
10 a little bit. It talks about "great care" at  
11 paragraph 2.2. Because this is now assuming a situation  
12 where you have to ask for permission for it and there's  
13 a fine line you walk in how you deal with the families.  
14 It says:  
15 "Great care should be taken in obtaining permission  
16 for an autopsy. The responsibility lies with the  
17 consultant in charge ..."  
18 And it goes on whether about it should be delegated  
19 or not. The relevant bit is:  
20 "Those responsible for approaching the relatives  
21 should be trained in a sympathetic and informed  
22 approach. Such training should be regarded as part of  
23 the proper duty ..."  
24 It goes on:  
25 "The person obtaining permission should explain to

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1 Is that a decision that you expected that you might  
2 be involved in?  
3 A. I don't recall the conversation specifically about  
4 referral to the coroner. We certainly discussed  
5 Claire's case and it's conceivable that Dr Steen felt  
6 that in that context we had discussed it, but I just  
7 don't recall that conversation specifically about  
8 the coroner.  
9 Q. I mean it in a slightly different way to that.  
10 I understand that much of this you don't have an  
11 independent recollection of, but what I'm asking you  
12 is: given that you had treated Claire and set up her  
13 drug therapy and seen her a few times and had certain  
14 expectations as to what would happen in relation to her  
15 path of recovery, as you thought it would be, then would  
16 you have expected to be part of a discussion as to  
17 whether her death should be referred to the coroner?  
18 A. Well, if I had felt that it was necessary to refer it to  
19 the coroner, I certainly would have said that. So  
20 that's a slightly different --  
21 Q. It is. The two of you are there and discussing matters,  
22 and I'm just asking whether you would have expected,  
23 granted you may not remember directly, but expected to  
24 have been part of the decision whether or not to refer  
25 to the coroner.

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1 the next of kin the benefits of the autopsy examination  
2 in providing information for them, for the medical staff  
3 and in the provision of tissue for homografts, for  
4 teaching and for research."  
5 So although their instinct might be that they don't  
6 really want that to happen to their child, if you were  
7 of the view that there is likely to be some value for  
8 them also as well as for teaching purposes, then it's  
9 the skill of the clinician to explain that so that the  
10 parents can appreciate the benefit to be gained from it.  
11 Ultimately, of course, if they refuse, then there's  
12 nothing you can do, but that's the process, is it, that  
13 you were describing to the chairman?  
14 A. I think that's a good rationale for the suggestion that  
15 post-mortems should be complete.  
16 Q. And then can I ask you about the referral to  
17 the coroner, which is sort of the counterpoint to that?  
18 If you are going to refer to the coroner, then the  
19 consent isn't really an issue --  
20 A. That's correct.  
21 Q. -- because it's not something that the parents can  
22 prevent. In your witness statement at 138/1, page 53,  
23 it says:  
24 "I was not involved in this decision and do not know  
25 why Claire's case was not referred to the coroner."

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1 A. Yes.  
2 Q. Thank you. When did you know that the decision had been  
3 made not to refer Claire's death to the coroner?  
4 A. I can't recall that.  
5 Q. Did you know that that day?  
6 A. I can't recall.  
7 Q. Do you have any thought about whether it would have been  
8 appropriate to have referred Claire's death to  
9 the coroner?  
10 A. As I said, I think at the time if I felt it was  
11 appropriate to, I would have said that. I would have  
12 felt, I think, that her death was a natural death and  
13 that it had been triggered by a viral infection, and  
14 that we had an explanation, if you like, certainly for  
15 the terminal event.  
16 THE CHAIRMAN: In essence, do I take it from that that you  
17 agree from the knowledge at the time that it was  
18 appropriate not to refer Claire's death to the coroner?  
19 A. Yes, and as I said, if I had felt it was, I would have  
20 said so.  
21 THE CHAIRMAN: Okay. And you have seen in retrospect that  
22 there's some criticism from the experts, a number of  
23 whom say Claire's death should have been referred to  
24 the coroner. That's not a universal view, but it's  
25 a majority view from the experts. What do you make of

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1 their suggestions that it was wrong not to refer  
2 Claire's death to the coroner?  
3 A. I think you can take that view, looking back. The issue  
4 I think they raised was that it was an unexpected  
5 death -- the ...  
6 THE CHAIRMAN: Which is undoubtedly right.  
7 A. That's correct. That aspect of the referral requirement  
8 seems to differ in different jurisdictions. In Dublin,  
9 my training had been that if the patient died within  
10 24 hours of coming into hospital. My understanding in  
11 the north is that it's any unexpected death. So I may  
12 not have been aware of that at the time, but certainly  
13 that was the situation that it would have been  
14 reasonable to, at least, have discussed it with  
15 the coroner.  
16 MR FORTUNE: Sir, could we please establish whether, even if  
17 it was Dr Webb's preference that there should be  
18 a post-mortem, he was present when Dr Steen actually  
19 discussed with Mr and Mrs Roberts the concept of  
20 post-mortem and, in particular, a limited post-mortem,  
21 limited to the brain? And if so, what was his actual  
22 reaction when he heard Dr Steen say that?  
23 A. I don't believe I was part of that conversation.  
24 THE CHAIRMAN: I think the suggestion is that you were  
25 probably there during the conversation, but is that

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1 THE CHAIRMAN: Right.  
2 A. But I don't think it has any impact on the subsequent  
3 discussions about post-mortem.  
4 THE CHAIRMAN: No, I think it's the other way around.  
5 I think the suggestion is that if the parents are  
6 already being talked to about consenting to organ  
7 donation, then the decision about post-mortem in  
8 reference to the coroner has already been taken.  
9 A. I think it says "they initially appeared to be giving  
10 consent", so there may have been some mention of that as  
11 an option. But clearly, that wasn't what happened and  
12 subsequently there was a discussion about post-mortem.  
13 THE CHAIRMAN: Okay.  
14 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Just to perhaps assist Mr Fortune: so  
15 far as you're aware, how many of these conversations  
16 were there? I think you've agreed that there was one  
17 before the CT scan and there was one after the CT scan,  
18 explaining the results of that CT scan. Presumably also  
19 talking about what the brainstem death tests would  
20 involve. And then there would have been a discussion,  
21 I assume, after the results of the brainstem death tests  
22 are received.  
23 A. The initial ...  
24 Q. Certainly the initial --  
25 MR McCREA: Sir, my instructions are that the limited

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1 probably right?  
2 A. I don't think so. I was there for the first two  
3 conversations, but I don't believe I was there for the  
4 post-mortem conversation.  
5 MR FORTUNE: Sir, I'm leading up to the passage on  
6 090-022-060, which is the entry in Dr McKaigue's  
7 writing, seven lines down.  
8 THE CHAIRMAN: "Initially appeared to be ..."  
9 MR FORTUNE: "Dr Webb and Dr Steen have discussed Claire's  
10 clinical condition with her parents. They initially  
11 appear to be giving consent for organ donation, but  
12 Dr Webb will speak again to both parents at 10 o'clock."  
13 So as we would understand it, if this was  
14 a coroner's case, it would be for the coroner to decide  
15 whether or not any organs could be donated, bearing in  
16 mind the need for a post-mortem. In the event that  
17 there was a possibility of organ donation, does that  
18 mean that the decision to hold a limited post-mortem had  
19 already been taken and, if so, how was the discussion  
20 about organ donation going to proceed at 10 o'clock?  
21 THE CHAIRMAN: Okay. Do you understand the point, doctor,  
22 that if you're talking to the parents about organ  
23 donation, the idea of going to the coroner has already  
24 been ruled out?  
25 A. I think that's correct.

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1 post-mortem was only discussed between the parents and  
2 Dr Steen and, secondly, in relation to the organ  
3 donation, that was very shortly after Claire was  
4 admitted to PICU.  
5 THE CHAIRMAN: Okay.  
6 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Thank you.  
7 THE CHAIRMAN: Sorry, shortly after the Roberts had arrived  
8 after Claire had been transferred some little time  
9 earlier?  
10 MR McCREA: Yes.  
11 THE CHAIRMAN: Okay, thank you.  
12 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: So does that sound like the main meeting  
13 was in terms of where she was when you both arrived  
14 at the hospital and the parents arrived and what can be  
15 seen on the CT scan and the implications of that?  
16 A. Yes. I think the main meeting was the second one,  
17 that's correct.  
18 Q. To the extent you remember them at all, that's the one  
19 you remember?  
20 A. Yes.  
21 Q. Then if we come to the brainstem death tests. You'll  
22 remember on Friday, Dr Webb, I said that that's a part  
23 in which we will deal with Adam's brainstem death test  
24 as well as Claire's. They raise not dissimilar issues.  
25 If we go to Adam, then your statement is at 107/2,

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1 page 4. It's a long time ago, sorry, to familiarise  
2 yourself with it. Your statement is:  
3 "I am fairly sure that no one informed me that the  
4 sodium level was so low because, if I'd been aware of  
5 the low sodium, I would have considered hyponatraemia to  
6 be the most likely cause of the fluid shift."  
7 I think it's at the end of (a). Do you see that?  
8 A. Mm-hm.  
9 Q. And this relates to the point where, when you write your  
10 note at 058-035-140 -- let's just have that.  
11 If we bring that alongside. You can see that in that  
12 note you've got "fluid shifts" and "osmotic  
13 disequilibrium syndrome". And the earlier notes  
14 indicate that you were being brought in to give an  
15 opinion, a neurological opinion, which is at WS107/2.  
16 So you had been brought in to give an opinion,  
17 a neurological opinion. That has been identified as  
18 what they wanted. You did that and came to the  
19 conclusion of osmotic disequilibrium syndrome. And what  
20 you're saying in your subsequent witness statement for  
21 the inquiry is that the reason you had that, and I think  
22 you said it to some extent on Friday, is because nobody  
23 had alerted you to the fact or you did not know that  
24 Adam had suffered from low sodium levels, and that's why  
25 you reached that view. Had you thought that he had been

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1 there might be a laboratory result for the 119, which is  
2 where it was at about 1 pm, 1.30, after the operation.  
3 A. Was that the first sodium?  
4 Q. No, the first low sodium result was through the blood  
5 gas analyser, and that was a result that they received  
6 there and then at 9.30 or thereabouts during the course  
7 of the operation. At the end of the operation, they had  
8 a further test done, and that produced a very low result  
9 of 119, and there's a laboratory report for that.  
10 That's why I'm asking you whether, if somebody was  
11 telling you, "We think there's a low result, but it  
12 might be a rogue result", if you're going to do  
13 a neurological opinion and that sodium might be an issue  
14 in that, whether you wouldn't go and look for yourself.  
15 In fact, I think that result is 058-040-186.  
16 There we are. 119. Granted, there's no time given  
17 as to when the sample was taken, but that is a very low  
18 result indeed, isn't it?  
19 A. That's correct.  
20 Q. And I think your evidence had been: if you'd known there  
21 was a result like that, then that might have affected  
22 your thinking.  
23 A. And what I'm saying is that it's likely that I was told  
24 that there was a low sodium. I may well have seen it  
25 in the chart, I don't know, but there is a note to the

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1 hyponatraemic, then you would have not gone to try and  
2 see what syndrome he could possibly have been suffering  
3 from.  
4 Before you formed that view, because you were asked  
5 to provide a neurological opinion, did you look at  
6 Adam's notes?  
7 A. I would have looked at ... I can't actually recall, to  
8 be honest ...  
9 Q. I'm sure you can't. Sorry. Let me put it a different  
10 way: would you have wanted to look at his notes?  
11 A. I'm aware there's a sodium result in the notes and  
12 I think the important note on that is that there's  
13 a comment about "query dilutional". So I think it's  
14 very likely that I was told: look, there's an issue  
15 here, but we think it's actually a false result.  
16 Because I wouldn't otherwise have gone to look for any  
17 other explanation.  
18 Q. If you'd received the information that there's a query  
19 here, but we think it's a false result, would you not  
20 have actually wanted to go and have a look at the serum  
21 sodium levels to the extent that there were any results  
22 for him?  
23 A. Well, as I said, there was a note on the chart to that  
24 effect with the actual result.  
25 Q. No, I believe there's a laboratory result. I think

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1 effect that it was "query dilutional". So clearly, the  
2 medical team looking after Adam were uncertain about the  
3 significance of that result. That was certainly how it  
4 was portrayed to me.  
5 Q. Yes. All I'm asking you, Dr Webb -- and it's a question  
6 that I have asked others in relation to the medical  
7 notes and records -- the medical notes and records are  
8 there and they are very often imperfect, but they are  
9 there. When you are brought in to provide  
10 a neurological opinion, then what are the notes that you  
11 think you should be looking at so that you can, so far  
12 as you can, accurately assess what the child's condition  
13 is and give that neurological opinion?  
14 A. Most of the information is provided by the team who are  
15 looking after the child at the time because they're most  
16 familiar with the child, so most of my information would  
17 be discussing it with the nurse who was looking after  
18 him. I wouldn't actually go looking to find the form  
19 that the sodium result was written on or typed on.  
20 Q. Is it fair to say then that the medical notes and  
21 records are not your primary source of information, but  
22 it's actually those who are treating the child?  
23 A. It's a mixture of the two. I can't recall, but Adam  
24 would have had a large number of charts. This was  
25 a procedure that had just been done that morning and ...

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1 I think that the information that would have been  
2 written in the chart since the operation is likely to  
3 have been limited. I may well have reviewed it and  
4 I certainly may well have seen the sodium result, but my  
5 understanding from the team was this was not considered  
6 to be a real result, as it were.  
7 Q. Are you able to identify who the team was?  
8 A. No. There was an ICU nurse and I believe a member of  
9 the anaesthetic team, but I can't recall exactly.  
10 Q. The person I think who had wanted you to be contacted is  
11 Dr Savage, who was Adam's nephrologist.  
12 A. That's correct.  
13 Q. And Dr O'Connor might actually be the person who tried  
14 to reach you because I think you weren't in the hospital  
15 at the time.  
16 A. No.  
17 Q. But both Dr Savage and Dr O'Connor had no difficulty  
18 whatsoever from coming to the conclusion on a review of  
19 Adam's medical notes and records that he had received an  
20 awful lot of low-sodium fluid. They didn't have any  
21 difficulty, so far as I can recall their evidence, in  
22 reaching that conclusion.  
23 A. When did they make that conclusion?  
24 Q. More or less there and then.  
25 A. I don't know why I was told then that there was any

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1 are looking after the child at the time. It perhaps  
2 reflects how busy you are at the time, whether you have  
3 time to sit down and read through the chart, and  
4 sometimes it can be quite fruitless reading through the  
5 chart because it's quite difficult to read it. In an  
6 ideal world, you would take time to do that, but it is  
7 not always possible.  
8 MR FORTUNE: Can we try and pin down who it was that Dr Webb  
9 spoke to because, of course, you know -- and, perhaps,  
10 Dr Webb may now recall -- there is a marked difference  
11 of opinion between Professor Savage and Dr O'Connor on  
12 one hand, and Dr Taylor on the other. And if it was  
13 Dr Taylor to whom Dr Webb spoke, then that might be the  
14 opinion given, but Professor Savage and Dr O'Connor were  
15 together and unequivocal in what had brought about  
16 Adam's death.  
17 A. If it had been Dr Savage or Dr Taylor, I would have  
18 known. I would have recalled that because I know the  
19 two individuals. I think it's most likely to have been  
20 Dr O'Connor because I didn't know Dr O'Connor. I can't  
21 be certain of that. I'm deducing that.  
22 THE CHAIRMAN: It shows the difficulty of trying to get the  
23 witness to do damage to his memory by over-recalling it  
24 because, on the evidence in this inquiry to date, it's  
25 rather unlikely that Dr O'Connor would have called that

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1 doubt about the cause of the cerebral oedema.  
2 Q. I don't know who you were speaking to.  
3 THE CHAIRMAN: It depends who told you.  
4 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: But the larger point that I had put to  
5 you is that whether the medical notes and records turn  
6 out not to be the primary source of information when  
7 you are reviewing matters for forming a view as to what  
8 is the problem or the difficulty with a child, and the  
9 reason I put it to you in that way is because when I was  
10 asking you about Claire, for example, you relied very  
11 much -- and I'm not for one minute being critical about  
12 it, I'm simply making the observation -- on what people  
13 were telling you about Claire. For example, you weren't  
14 even confident that you'd gone back to the beginning of  
15 Dr Sands' ward round note, but you were relying on what  
16 he had told you in the morning and what junior staff  
17 were telling you when you arrived on the ward at  
18 2 o'clock. And I'm trying to see whether there is  
19 a practice, if that's not too established an expression,  
20 for not really relying too much or considering in any  
21 great depth the medical notes and records, but taking  
22 your information more from those who have been directly  
23 involved in the treatment of the child.  
24 A. I wouldn't read too much into two cases, but in general  
25 I would get most of the information from the team that

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1 a rogue result.  
2 MR FORTUNE: Certainly, and if you look at the record, sir,  
3 Professor Savage was about that evening at the time and  
4 just after the first set of tests had been carried out.  
5 THE CHAIRMAN: Let's move on.  
6 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: I wasn't going to pursue that particular  
7 point, Mr Chairman. I was going to ask it in this way  
8 because I am still trying to find out, apart from  
9 speaking to whichever clinician that you spoke to, if  
10 there is any kind of issue at all about fluids, and you  
11 know that this child underwent surgery, do you not  
12 at the very least look at his fluid balance chart?  
13 A. If I'm being told by the nephrology team that there's an  
14 unexplained cerebral oedema, my expectation is that the  
15 fluid management, which is the principal issue in renal  
16 care, would be something that they would be very  
17 familiar with. I've just returned from a clinic in Derry  
18 -- I'd been there all day and I've just returned late in  
19 the evening ...  
20 THE CHAIRMAN: We have to push on. Dr Webb's been giving  
21 evidence since 9.30 this morning. It's been a very,  
22 very long day for him. We need to try and finish his  
23 evidence today, so let's move on.  
24 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: I accept that, Mr Chairman, but in  
25 fairness to the Strain family, can I simply identify, if

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1 he had looked at the medical notes and records, what was  
2 there for him to see? Dr O'Connor's note is 058-035-135  
3 on to 137. She refers to Adam as being "puffy", there's  
4 mannitol, which you would appreciate the significance  
5 of, being prescribed. She says:

6 "There's a high fluid input abnormal cerebral venous  
7 drainage and probably will need to restrict further  
8 fluids."

9 It is she who identifies the need for a neurological  
10 opinion, so she is doing it in that context. If you'd  
11 seen that, would you have appreciated there's a fluid  
12 issue?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Thank you. Then Dr McKinstry(?), and this is the one  
15 you really. There's a marginal note in 058-035-138, and  
16 he queries dilutional. Then there's a note in the  
17 records at 058-035-140, which talks about "repeating the  
18 U&Es tonight" and "the sodium is still low". Then at  
19 058-035-142, "electrolyte/fluid problem". And then  
20 you have the lab result that I put to you.

21 At the time when you are going to write your report,  
22 I think there is the record from PICU as to what Adam's  
23 sodium results were, and that record is to be found at  
24 057-009-011 as well as 057-020-031. It gives his serum  
25 sodium levels as 124, 120, 122, 121 and 125. And

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1 short a period of time and for that to produce cerebral  
2 oedema?

3 A. I'm sure that's possible, but I think in the context of  
4 someone who's had surgery, it's more likely there's  
5 an SIADH picture.

6 Q. If we go to the brainstem death test form, that for Adam  
7 is to be found at 058-004-009. The part that I want to  
8 you think about is 1(f):

9 "Could the patient's condition be due to  
10 a metabolic/endocrine disorder?"

11 The first test is at 7.35 on the 27th, and the  
12 second is at 9.10 on the 28th. For the first one,  
13 I think it is Dr Rosalie Campbell who signs with you.  
14 In the second one, it's Dr O'Connor who signs with you.

15 I had mentioned it before, but I don't know if you'd  
16 had an opportunity to look at Dr Simon Haynes'  
17 transcript of evidence in relation to this part of  
18 Adam's case. It's to be found on 3 May of this year,  
19 and it starts at page 106 and then goes on. I'm not  
20 going to ask for it all to be pulled up because he has  
21 quite an extensive discussion about it. It goes on to  
22 112. He is referring the inquiry to a code of practice  
23 for the diagnosis of brainstem death, and that's to be  
24 found at 306-035-001. It's dated March 1998 and his  
25 view is that what is recorded there is no different to

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1 they're all low, aren't they?

2 A. That's correct.

3 Q. Were you, at the time, aware of the connection between  
4 dilutional hyponatraemia -- this is November 1995 -- and  
5 cerebral oedema?

6 A. Yes, I was familiar with that concept.

7 Q. Right. So you would have been aware that those serum  
8 sodium levels, if they had been produced by a fluid  
9 overload in the way that Professor Savage and  
10 Dr O'Connor thought, that he had received too much  
11 low-sodium fluid over too short a period, that that  
12 could have produced those low serum sodium levels and  
13 that hyponatraemic condition could have resulted in his  
14 fatal cerebral oedema?

15 A. I think we discussed this on Friday and my view on  
16 it was that you have to have something else, so SIADH  
17 would have to be part of the picture to account for the  
18 cerebral oedema. Just giving low-solute fluids on their  
19 own, if the child has normal renal function, the child  
20 should be able to deal with it.

21 Q. Yes, I don't think it's the issue about giving them on  
22 their own, it's giving them within the short time frame  
23 that you give them, so effectively it overwhelms the  
24 person's responses. Do you appreciate that it's  
25 possible to give too much low-sodium fluid over too

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1 what was in practice in 1995.

2 He referred particularly to the flow chart at  
3 page 17, which is 0021. That's the series of events  
4 which you then have to be able to answer "yes" to --  
5 well, that you have to produce an answer to. In the  
6 code itself, one finds -- if one goes to 0011 of the  
7 code, this is the "Endocrine, metabolic and circulatory  
8 abnormalities":

9 "Abnormalities such as diabetes insipidus, hypo or  
10 hypernatraemia, hypothermia and disturbance of cardiac  
11 rhythm or blood pressure may occur in patients following  
12 anoxic, haemorrhagic or traumatic cerebral injury.  
13 These abnormalities may be consequences of brainstem  
14 failure and must be differentiated from abnormalities of  
15 endocrinological, biochemical or autonomic function  
16 contributing to failure of brainstem function."

17 So the distinction is whether the hyponatraemia has  
18 contributed to the failure of the brainstem function or  
19 whether it is a product of the brainstem failure;  
20 is that how you would interpret that?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. And in Adam's case, was his hyponatraemia not of the  
23 sort that was contributing to the failure of his  
24 brainstem function?

25 A. I think the purpose of that question is to prompt

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1 physicians to consider the possibility that there's  
2 a reversible cause of the child's picture. The  
3 important word in the sentence actually is "condition".  
4 The condition of the child is not just the child's  
5 neurological status on examination, it is the -- it  
6 includes the CT picture of the brain, which in both Adam  
7 and Claire's case showed that there was brain  
8 herniation. That's not a reversible situation and on no  
9 count is it due to hyponatraemia of its own. So  
10 you have three options in how you answer this question.  
11 You either say "yes", which essentially is telling an  
12 untruth because you don't believe it could happen. You  
13 leave it blank, which leaves you open to the suggestion  
14 that you haven't considered it, or you answer it "no",  
15 this is not a reversible situation due to hyponatraemia.  
16 Q. Can I take you to the view that Dr Haynes expressed?  
17 It's 3 May 2012, the page number is 111. If you look  
18 at the transcripts of the meeting of the experts in  
19 Newcastle, you will see that this is not a lone view,  
20 but we'll come to that in a minute. So if one goes down  
21 to line 19:  
22 "So we see 134 perioperatively, 119 when he came  
23 back to the intensive care unit -- and the last two were  
24 122 and 125."  
25 That's from that sheet that I was reading out to

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1 "Question: I think that you said you were all  
2 agreed, and did you mean by that all the experts in  
3 Newcastle?  
4 "Answer: Yes."  
5 And Professor Kirkham down at the bottom says she  
6 would have wanted the saline to be normal and she goes  
7 on over the page to talk about that and she also refers  
8 to how you deal with blown pupils at that stage.  
9 Then over the page, there's a reference to  
10 Professor Gross. Professor Gross gave views on what  
11 they would do in Germany and the efforts they would make  
12 at that stage. Then Dr Coulthard --  
13 THE CHAIRMAN: Could you go back one page please to 113?  
14 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Yes. There's Professor Gross. There's  
15 Dr Coulthard at line 16 expressing doubt about the  
16 situation. He says:  
17 "I would have questioned the decision to formally  
18 carry out brainstem death tests when there is still  
19 a very low sodium concentration."  
20 I think probably there's one more reference at  
21 page 111, at line 14, to:  
22 "... carrying out an EEG of 12 and then perhaps  
23 another the following day."  
24 And then, if we go to 114, I ask him explain why  
25 it's in the protocol that it is important to exclude

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1 you.  
2 A. So the 125 figure is the time of the brainstem testing?  
3 Q. Yes. So he's still hyponatraemic either at or shortly  
4 before the time -- this is the time of the second set of  
5 brainstem death tests. I have to look back and see from  
6 that sheet where he was at the time you did the first  
7 set. But by the second set Adam, according to  
8 Dr Haynes, is still hyponatraemic. And I put to him the  
9 normal range being 135 to 145, and he says, yes, that's  
10 right.  
11 If we can pull up 112, the next sheet:  
12 "I feel I'm obliged to point out that I have some  
13 discomfort that, although I cannot believe for one  
14 second that he wasn't actually brainstem dead at the  
15 point when both sets of tests were done, more strenuous  
16 efforts to return his serum sodium over the intervening  
17 hours to a more normal value hadn't been made. I am  
18 also a little concerned because the general principle of  
19 care of a patient in a coma is that, until he or she is  
20 declared brainstem dead, that patient should be treated  
21 as if they have a recoverable condition."  
22 I just now have the figures. The first brainstem  
23 death test was taken when the serum sodium level was 124  
24 and the second when it was 125.  
25 And then the question is:

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1 these electrolyte imbalances. And he goes on to say at  
2 line 7:  
3 "Brainstem death is a diagnosis made when a patient  
4 is comatose and is on a ventilator. It is important to  
5 exclude any reversible [and this is your point] causes  
6 of that coma. The first premise is to be that there has  
7 to be an underlying demonstrated diagnosis, which in  
8 Adam's case there most certainly was. There has to be  
9 the knowledge [and the wording is no stronger than that]  
10 that there has to be a certainty that there is no  
11 residual effect of any neuromuscular or sedative drug or  
12 other intoxicating agents."  
13 In Adam's case, none were present. That's not the  
14 issue the experts feel for Claire:  
15 "Then there has to be the exclusion of metabolic and  
16 biochemical causes of coma."  
17 And:  
18 "That exclusion has to be made before the doctors  
19 making the test can go on and do the test."  
20 Then if we go over the page to 115 at line 12 he  
21 says:  
22 "Question: If we look at (f), 'Could the patient's  
23 condition be due to a metabolic/endocrine disorder?';  
24 is that what you're talking about?  
25 "Answer: Yes, that is what I'm talking about. It's

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1 an issue which I have thought long and hard about, and  
2 even the fact that raising it will be distressing in  
3 some circles to talk about, but I feel that we cannot  
4 get away from the fact that more strenuous efforts were  
5 not made to normalise the concentration of sodium in  
6 Adam's blood following his admission to the intensive  
7 care unit up to the point in time when brainstem death  
8 testing occurred."

9 He's at great pains to say that he does not think  
10 that, had they done that and waited, that the upshot of  
11 waiting would be to find out that Adam had some  
12 reversible condition. That's not what he's saying.  
13 What he's saying is, as I understand it, is that the  
14 brainstem death protocol is a very important protocol  
15 indeed and it is very important to adhere to it. And  
16 all those experts at that stage were apparently in  
17 agreement with that and were concerned that more time  
18 had not elapsed so that you could at least see whether  
19 you could get Adam's serum sodium levels to within  
20 normal range. Can I ask you to respond to that?

21 A. Well, what I would like to ask the experts is whether  
22 they are really suggesting that brain herniation is  
23 reversible. Because that's what they're implying.  
24 I don't accept that a sodium of 125 could explain Adam's  
25 picture. You can spend a very long time trying to

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1 which is where we are with Adam, are to be interpreted  
2 so as to allow those forms to be properly completed.  
3 I'm not saying you alone, but you have a view as to what  
4 that means, and that view seems to be different from the  
5 experts in Adam's case and, for that matter, some of the  
6 experts who have been asked about it in Claire's. So --

7 A. And part of the reason for that difference might be that  
8 they're considering the brainstem death form, but not  
9 considering actually the child's condition, the whole  
10 picture, which includes the CT scan.

11 Q. Yes. And the question I was going to ask you is: is  
12 there any training, is there any discussion within the  
13 Children's Hospital as to the correct way to interpret  
14 and complete the brainstem death test form?

15 A. I don't know the answer to that.

16 Q. Did you receive any --

17 A. Yes, I certainly would have received training as I went  
18 through my neurology training. This is a situation that  
19 you meet all the time.

20 Q. When you say you received training, that is training as  
21 part of your professional training, not training as to  
22 what the Children's Hospital in Belfast expected of you?

23 A. No, no.

24 Q. Then if we look at the autopsy request form, which one  
25 finds at 012/2, at page 26. Would you have been

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1 correct serum sodiums in this sort of situation and all  
2 you're doing is prolonging the agony for the family.

3 Q. So you don't think --

4 THE CHAIRMAN: It really depends how you interpret question  
5 1(f).

6 A. I think it's the question. I think it's the way it's  
7 worded. To me, it refers to the child's condition and  
8 if you have herniated your brain, that's not reversible.  
9 So the serum sodium, you can spend time trying to  
10 correct it, but it's not going to fix the situation.  
11 And the same is true for the drug scenario. If you've  
12 got medications that are sedating, that does not cause  
13 brain herniation, and waiting for them to leave the  
14 system entirely is not going to fix that.

15 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Was that something that was discussed at  
16 all in the Children's Hospital at the time as to how  
17 doctors should approach this? Clearly, you have taken  
18 a certain view as to how that --

19 A. I'm not suggesting my view is unique to me. I think we  
20 discussed it absolutely all the time in this context.

21 THE CHAIRMAN: I think Ms Anyadike-Danes meant "you plural"  
22 have taken a certain view.

23 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: The point that I was putting to you  
24 is that you have taken a certain view as to how 1(c),  
25 which is what we will come to for Claire, and 1(f),

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1 consulted about this autopsy request form?

2 A. No.

3 Q. Would you have expressed a view as to whether Adam's was  
4 a case that should go to the coroner?

5 A. No.

6 Q. Can you see under the clinical diagnosis, it has:  
7 "Brainstem death due to osmotic disequilibrium  
8 syndrome."

9 You've told the inquiry that that's a view that you  
10 held when you came back to the hospital and you had your  
11 discussion with whichever clinicians it was at that  
12 time, but you had not had an opportunity to see that  
13 there was actually low serum sodium, and therefore had  
14 an opportunity to consider what you subsequently  
15 considered, which is the role of hyponatraemia.

16 A. That's correct.

17 Q. Is that right? Do you think that it would have been  
18 appropriate? Do you ever recall seeing the underlying  
19 documentation that would have indicated to you that Adam  
20 developed hyponatraemia?

21 A. No. I would have been told by Dr Savage, I think.

22 Q. Told by Dr Savage? Did you ever think that -- I don't  
23 know whether one does these sorts of things, but whether  
24 it was appropriate to go and add some sort of postscript  
25 to your note, because all these notes will ultimately

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1 find their way to the coroner, that that view that you  
2 expressed was a view without having seen the  
3 documentation and that you now have a different view?  
4 A. No, I didn't, and I think probably because my  
5 expectation was that the team clearly knew what the  
6 issue was by the time of the second post-mortem, so it  
7 wasn't as if it was something that wasn't known about at  
8 that point.  
9 Q. But it's --  
10 A. In a sense, hyponatraemia is an osmotic disequilibrium,  
11 it's a form of that. That covers the whole osmotic  
12 cerebral oedema, if you like.  
13 Q. What exactly does it mean?  
14 A. Well, in the osmotic disequilibrium syndrome, it was due  
15 to urea, urea rather than sodium, but the consequences  
16 are similar.  
17 Q. But in retrospect, that's not what you thought Adam  
18 developed.  
19 A. No. When I wrote the note it was ...  
20 Q. Yes, but nonetheless that clinical diagnosis has found  
21 its way on the autopsy request form. That's why I'm  
22 wondering whether it occurred to you -- and it may have  
23 been that you learned about that very much after the  
24 event -- that you should perhaps go and add  
25 a postscript. That's all.

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1 further involvement.  
2 A. I wasn't involved subsequently, no.  
3 Q. Would you have thought it appropriate if you were?  
4 Having been asked to provide a neurological opinion,  
5 it would be clear that people wanted that and you've  
6 done it. Do you think it would have been appropriate if  
7 you had been included in any consideration of Adam's  
8 case?  
9 A. It might have been.  
10 Q. Sorry?  
11 A. It might have been.  
12 Q. Yes. Then in terms of what actually happened, you  
13 received a memo from Dr Murnaghan on 6 December,  
14 I think, 1995. The reference for that is 059-071-164.  
15 You can see there it says:  
16 "The coroner has spoken to me recently on several  
17 occasions about this unfortunate clinical outcome and  
18 has now written requesting that I obtain for him as soon  
19 as possible statements from the clinicians involved."  
20 Then he asks for some other matters in addition. If  
21 you see the circulation, it's Dr Savage, Dr Taylor,  
22 Mr Brown and Dr Gaston. And then you are on the  
23 right-hand side, "Dr Webb: action". What did you  
24 understand that was for?  
25 A. I'm not certain that I received this letter, but I ...

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1 A. It didn't.  
2 Q. No. Then can I ask you about your statement? You made  
3 a witness statement for Claire's part of the inquiry,  
4 138/1, page 93, which is:  
5 "[You] had no knowledge of the inquest findings  
6 in the case of Adam Strain."  
7 And I think you then go on at the next page to say:  
8 "I became aware of the Adam Strain case being  
9 associated with IV hypotonic fluids during my visit to  
10 Belfast for Claire Roberts' inquest."  
11 So what actually did you know of what was happening  
12 following Adam's death?  
13 A. Very little.  
14 Q. Well, you were still there in the hospital because you  
15 didn't actually leave until shortly after Claire's  
16 death. What would you have expected you should have  
17 been involved in in relation to Adam's death?  
18 A. I don't think I had any expectation after I did  
19 the brainstem testing.  
20 Q. So that's it? You certify that the child is brainstem  
21 dead and --  
22 A. I think that's what Professor Savage asked me to do.  
23 Q. I think he asked you for a neurological opinion. But in  
24 any event, you formulate that opinion, you certify that  
25 he is brainstem dead, and then you don't have any

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1 Dr Murnaghan certainly asked me to write a report for  
2 the inquest.  
3 Q. I think you might have received it and I think that from  
4 059-061-147 because you write back to him.  
5 A. Yes, but I actually think he asked me in person to  
6 prepare a report. I'm not certain that I received  
7 a letter is what I'm saying. I think he asked me in  
8 person to do this.  
9 Q. In any event, you produce it. And you say how you were  
10 contacted to see the child and where you were. And  
11 then:  
12 "He was noted perioperatively to have fixed and  
13 dilated pupils ... complete unexpected finding."  
14 And then you say:  
15 "I examined Adam at this time and noted he was on no  
16 muscle relaxants or sedation. His vital signs were  
17 stable. He was not hypothermic. He was fully  
18 ventilated with no respiratory effort."  
19 Then you talk about his neurological examination:  
20 "I noted he had severe, extensive bilateral fundal  
21 haemorrhages."  
22 And you reviewed his CT scan and then you say that  
23 you repeated Adam's brainstem assessment:  
24 "My impression was that he had suffered severe acute  
25 cerebral oedema, which was likely to have occurred on

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1 the basis of osmotic disequilibrium, causing a sudden  
2 fluid shift."

3 So when you wrote that in the note, you were writing  
4 that towards the end of November, and here you are being  
5 asked for a statement. Did you not think that you might  
6 just go and look at the notes and records before you  
7 responded?

8 A. I may have done, but what I'm doing here is giving my  
9 summary of my assessment at the time.

10 Q. But if you looked at the notes and records, that might  
11 be the place to say: that's what I thought at the time,  
12 but that was because I hadn't been alive to his low  
13 sodium results. I've looked at the notes and records  
14 and I now realise that's not strictly correct."

15 That might have been helpful.

16 A. I think what I was asked to do was give my resume of  
17 what my impression was at the time.

18 Q. Okay. Then I think there is a meeting that is being  
19 organised. Given that when I was asking you about your  
20 involvement, you seemed to give the impression that you  
21 didn't expect to be very much involved at all. If one  
22 looks at the starting place of that, it's 059-042-093.  
23 There we are. It's a little bit difficult to see, but  
24 right down at the bottom there are two courses of action  
25 being noted on this letter that Dr Murnaghan receives

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1 Q. So why do these things go out? Is that common, that the  
2 letters being circulated by Dr Murnaghan, or memos,  
3 rather, go out and people just don't receive them?

4 A. It's certainly possible, but I --

5 Q. If so, that would be the second one.

6 A. Well ...

7 THE CHAIRMAN: It rather looks as if this letter was sent to  
8 you. The question is then, "Did you go to the  
9 meeting?", and your recollection is that you did not go  
10 to any such meeting.

11 A. No.

12 THE CHAIRMAN: Do you remember being involved in any  
13 consultation in the run-up to the inquest into Adam's  
14 death?

15 A. No, I provided a report for the coroner, but I didn't  
16 have any meetings related to it. I didn't attend the  
17 inquest.

18 THE CHAIRMAN: Right. So it's not just that you didn't give  
19 evidence, you didn't attend the inquest?

20 A. No.

21 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: If we go to two last parts, one is  
22 059-039-082. That's a memo dated 25 April 1996. This  
23 is actually attaching the post-mortem report. It says:  
24 "The attached arrived in the post yesterday.

25 I would be grateful if you would read it carefully and

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1 from the coroner. One is the copy of that report, which  
2 is Professor Berry's report, which is to go out to those  
3 undernoted under (i). Then at (ii):

4 "RM arrange meeting with all those to be called as  
5 witnesses. Drs Taylor, Savage, Keane, Brown, and David  
6 Webb."

7 Do you know why you would have been included in  
8 a list like that?

9 A. I suspect because my name was on the chart.

10 Q. Okay. Then 059-043-098. This is a memo from  
11 Dr Murnaghan and it's confirming a meeting has been  
12 arranged for Wednesday 17 April 1996 and there is a list  
13 of those to whom it is being circulated, and you are  
14 there as the fourth named person.

15 A. I wasn't at that meeting.

16 Q. You weren't at that meeting?

17 A. No.

18 Q. Is that because you remember that?

19 A. I would remember it if I'd been at it.

20 Q. Why would you remember that?

21 A. Because I think I would. I ... I'm pretty confident  
22 I wasn't at that meeting.

23 Q. Well, why didn't you go? Sorry, why weren't you there?

24 A. I'm not certain that I actually received a request to  
25 attend it.

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1 respond to me on its contents, particularly if anything  
2 therein raises with you a concern which may lead to  
3 a development at the inquest for which we would need to  
4 be prepared in advance."

5 Your name is down there. It doesn't appear that  
6 that is a tick that is associated with your name and we  
7 don't know who applied those ticks. In any event, did  
8 you get this memo?

9 A. I have no recollection of getting this memo.

10 Q. Well, if you consider yourself only sort of peripherally  
11 involved, and hardly that really, you effectively  
12 provided the opinion that enabled the brainstem death  
13 test to be performed and you've provided that statement  
14 that says that, can you explain why it is that  
15 Dr Murnaghan, who is a director of medical  
16 administration -- I think he also held the title in  
17 litigation as well -- would be including you on his  
18 circulation list?

19 MR SEPHTON: I'm sorry to interrupt again. I think we're  
20 all getting tired perhaps, but how on earth can this  
21 witness know what Dr Murnaghan was thinking?

22 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. Did you speak to Dr Murnaghan about  
23 receiving these various letters?

24 A. I am very certain he did speak to me and he asked me to  
25 provide a letter for the coroner. But I don't recall

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1 any other contact with him in relation to it.  
2 THE CHAIRMAN: Okay.  
3 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Well, then if we go again to  
4 060-022-041, your name is ticked on that:  
5 "The preliminary correspondence attached has been  
6 received from solicitors acting on behalf of [Adam and  
7 his family]."  
8 So this is their indication that litigation is to  
9 ensue:  
10 "You have kindly provided me with sufficient  
11 information to ensure that a witness statement could be  
12 prepared for and provided to the coroner."  
13 Well, you have done that:  
14 "However, you will appreciate that more detailed  
15 information will now be required by me as case manager  
16 for the Trust in order that proper instructions may be  
17 given to our legal advisers."  
18 Then he asks for strengths and weaknesses, if any,  
19 in the care provided for Adam and tells you how to make  
20 arrangements to have access to the case notes if you  
21 need that. There's a series of you there, and your name  
22 is there as "Dr Webb" and your name is ticked. Did you  
23 get this one?  
24 A. I don't recall getting this either.  
25 THE CHAIRMAN: Were you involved in any? There was

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1 Were you aware of there being any differences of  
2 view amongst the clinicians --  
3 A. No.  
4 Q. -- as to why and how Adam had died?  
5 A. No.  
6 Q. Can you explain why Dr Murnaghan should have sent you  
7 this?  
8 A. I don't know. Again, I don't recall getting this  
9 either. I'm beginning to wonder about my memory now,  
10 but I don't remember getting this letter. Again,  
11 I think I would have remembered.  
12 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.  
13 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Thank you.  
14 Then we have covered much of the ground in relation  
15 to Claire's own brainstem death test. The point that  
16 I wanted to raise with you is -- it starts in your entry  
17 in her medical notes and records at 090-022-058.  
18 Can you see the third line up from your signature?  
19 A. Yes.  
20 Q. "Under no sedating/paralysing medication."  
21 That is dated 6 am. Is that correct, that at 6 am  
22 she was under no sedating or paralysing medication?  
23 A. She wasn't receiving midazolam at that time.  
24 Q. No, she wasn't receiving it, but was she under any? In  
25 other words, was there any sedating or paralysing

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1 litigation brought by Adam's mother against the Trust.  
2 Were you involved in any discussions or meetings about  
3 that?  
4 A. No. No. And I think I would remember if I had got this  
5 letter.  
6 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Then the final one is 060-010-015. This  
7 is a memo from Dr Webb, and this is to you directly, and  
8 he sends it to a number, those typically indicated on  
9 his circulation list, they each get a separate one.  
10 This is one to you, dated 9 May:  
11 "I'm sure you will be pleased to be informed that  
12 this claim has been successfully concluded by a payment  
13 of the sum ..."  
14 In the second paragraph:  
15 "From a liability position, the case could not be  
16 defended particularly in the light of the information  
17 provided by one of the independent experts retained by  
18 the coroner at the inquest. Additionally, it would have  
19 been unwise for the Trust to engage in litigation in  
20 a public forum and, given the tragic circumstances of  
21 the death, it would not have been helpful for an  
22 opportunity to be provided to lawyers to explore any  
23 differences of opinion which might exist between various  
24 professional witnesses who would have been called to  
25 give evidence."

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1 medication likely to be in her system?  
2 A. I think given that her midazolam was stopped at  
3 3 o'clock, it's most unlikely that there would have been  
4 any in her system at that time.  
5 Q. What about phenytoin?  
6 A. Phenytoin is not a very sedating medication. It rarely  
7 causes sedation, certainly within the normal therapeutic  
8 range.  
9 Q. Are you aware of the fact that both Dr Aronson, who's  
10 the inquiry's expert pharmacologist, and also Dr MacFaul  
11 take a different view from you about that? If we go to  
12 the 8 November transcript, page 288 I think it is, it  
13 starts at line 17, after I've put to him some of the  
14 very areas that I had read to you from Dr Haynes'  
15 evidence in relation to Adam. He expressed the view  
16 that he understood, he agreed with what Dr Haynes was  
17 saying and thought it was perfectly appropriate. And  
18 then the question that he recites rhetorically, and the  
19 question was:  
20 "Question: Could the drugs present in Claire's body  
21 have fallen under that rubric as you just read it?  
22 "Answer: I think they could."  
23 Now, just so that we're clear on the rubric,  
24 Dr Haynes gets it from the protocol at 306-035-008.  
25 Then you see:

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1 "There should be no evidence that this state [that's  
2 the deeply unconscious state] is due to depressant  
3 drugs. The benzodiazepines are markedly cumulative and  
4 persistent in their actions and are commonly used as  
5 anticonvulsants or to assist with synchronisation with  
6 mechanical ventilators. It is therefore essential that  
7 the drug history should be reviewed carefully and any  
8 possibility of intoxication being the cause of or  
9 contributing to the patient's comatose state should  
10 preclude a diagnosis of brainstem death. It is  
11 important to recognise that, in some patients, hypoxia  
12 may have followed the ingestion of a drug, but in this  
13 situation the criteria for brainstem death will not be  
14 applicable until such a time as the drug effects have  
15 been excluded as a continuing cause of the  
16 unresponsiveness."

17 Pausing there, did you go back and review the drugs  
18 that Claire was under and when she had been administered  
19 them so that you could make that entry that she was  
20 under no sedating or paralysing medication?

21 A. I can't recall whether I went back to the chart, but  
22 I would have certainly discussed that with the nursing  
23 team who were there.

24 Q. Sorry, just so that I'm clear, where were you when you  
25 made that entry in Claire's notes? Were you in --

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1 How did you know that?

2 A. Well, I would have asked that.

3 Q. Did you know that not only had she had that phenytoin  
4 bolus, but she'd also had more phenytoin at 23.30?

5 A. Yes, I would have --

6 Q. How would you have known that?

7 A. Because that's what I prescribed.

8 Q. I'm not sure you did prescribe that. What you  
9 prescribed was that they should take the phenytoin  
10 levels and then they should administer the phenytoin if  
11 those levels were within the acceptable range. How did  
12 you know what the levels were when they took them and  
13 when they therefore administered the phenytoin?

14 A. How did I know the levels?

15 Q. Yes.

16 A. I think the result was available at that stage.

17 Q. No, but I'm asking you how you knew. At that stage  
18 you're in PICU, you have the nurses there in PICU and,  
19 unless you are looking at Claire's notes, how do you  
20 know that when, firstly, they checked her levels --  
21 because actually they seem to have checked her levels  
22 slightly later than you envisaged that they would have  
23 --so how do you know when they did that, what the levels  
24 were and, therefore, that they would or had not  
25 administered further phenytoin?

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1 A. In the intensive care --

2 Q. You were in intensive care?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. So then the nurses that you are discussing with are  
5 those the nurses who are in intensive care?

6 A. Correct.

7 Q. So they wouldn't have been the nurses who would  
8 necessarily have known when she was being administered  
9 any of the medication that you had recommended?

10 A. Correct. They should have had a handover, but they  
11 wouldn't have --

12 Q. Given the circumstances in which Claire was transferred  
13 to PICU, they might not have had that kind of handover,  
14 if I can put it that way. So that's why I'm asking you,  
15 when you now come to make this entry, which you do at  
16 6 o'clock, so presumably you can then proceed to  
17 commence the first of the brainstem death tests, do you  
18 check what actually was administered and when it was  
19 administered so that you can make that statement?

20 A. Well, I would have known that diazepam was given the  
21 previous evening -- afternoon, rather. I would have  
22 known that the phenytoin was given the previous evening.  
23 I would have known the midazolam was stopped and the  
24 valproate had been given the previous evening.

25 Q. Sorry, you'd have known that the midazolam was stopped?

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1 A. I think it's likely that I would have looked at the drug  
2 chart, but I can't recall doing that. And what I'm  
3 saying is that if she'd had a dose of phenytoin, it  
4 would have been one further dose the previous evening.

5 Q. If you had looked at the drug chart, though, you would  
6 have seen that she had received more than you had wanted  
7 her to receive.

8 A. In the bolus?

9 Q. In the bolus for phenytoin, and if you'd looked at the  
10 drug chart for midazolam, you would have seen that she  
11 received more than you wanted her to receive for  
12 midazolam.

13 A. In the bolus?

14 Q. Yes.

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Did you?

17 A. I don't know. I can't recall whether I looked at the  
18 chart or not, but I certainly would have discussed the  
19 medications with the nurses who were looking after her  
20 at the time, and my ... I'm fairly certain that her  
21 midazolam had been stopped, that she had one further  
22 dose of phenytoin, she had one dose of diazepam the  
23 previous afternoon and she'd had one dose of valproate.

24 Q. And she had had midazolam up until at least 3 o'clock.

25 A. 3 o'clock, yes.

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1 Q. So the only point I'm really trying to put to you  
2 is: you fairly say you can't remember whether you did  
3 look at the drug chart, so let's leave that out of it  
4 because you can't remember and that's probably fair  
5 enough, but is it something you should have looked at in  
6 order to make a statement like in that in her notes?  
7 A. Yes. I think that's fair criticism.  
8 Q. Thank you. And just because this will turn on -- I know  
9 that this a governance issue, so while it is there, let  
10 me just quickly ask it. If you had looked at it, which  
11 you think is probably a fair enough thing to say, and  
12 you had noticed that there were overdoses, in other  
13 words, she was given more than you had wanted her to  
14 receive, is that something that -- maybe not then  
15 because that's a critical point, you're trying to deal  
16 with an emergency situation, if I can put it that way  
17 but is it something that you think should have been  
18 taken up later on and addressed how those errors could  
19 have happened?  
20 A. Yes.  
21 Q. Thank you. And if that was going to happen, where was  
22 the forum for that?  
23 A. I would have expected that there would have been an  
24 audit meeting, a mortality and morbidity meeting that  
25 would have discussed Claire's case.

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1 been a period of delay when you allowed the levels to go  
2 lower and Aronson said that where he would have wanted  
3 to have them was below 10.  
4 So both of them -- I'm not going to go through it  
5 all in detail, but you get the sense of the criticism  
6 they are making that, in those circumstances, you  
7 shouldn't have embarked upon the first brainstem death  
8 test.  
9 A. And it comes back to the wording of the sentence, and  
10 I think that the child's condition is the important word  
11 in the sentence. And really, under no circumstances,  
12 could I accept that the medications that she'd received  
13 could account for the condition with brain herniation.  
14 That was not a reversible condition.  
15 Q. I understand. At a slightly different point, Dr MacFaul  
16 says at page 133 -- leaving aside whether you could have  
17 completed accurately the brainstem death test in that  
18 way -- his view is that you couldn't, with confidence,  
19 say at that time that she had no sedating or paralyzing  
20 medication. He says that at line 19.  
21 So the brainstem death test might be a slightly  
22 different issue from what you write on her charts.  
23 Do you accept that you couldn't with confidence say  
24 that?  
25 A. Yes, I think that's fair.

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1 Q. And is that something you think you should have been  
2 invited to?  
3 A. Yes.  
4 THE CHAIRMAN: Would you also agree that if the overdoses  
5 had been picked up at that point, that would have led  
6 inevitably to Claire's case being referred to  
7 the coroner?  
8 A. I think that's right, yes.  
9 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Thank you.  
10 If I just ask you this quickly because I know that  
11 time is marching on and you have been there answering  
12 questions for a very long time. Dr MacFaul also is of  
13 the view and I think he says that on 14 November,  
14 page 130, line 12. He picks it up because I put to him  
15 the background to it, if I can put it that way. He  
16 picks it up at line 20 and he agrees that it's not an  
17 accurate statement, it's not correct. He says:  
18 "It was not correct that she was under no sedating  
19 medication. The fact is that she was still having some  
20 effect of the sedating medication because the phenytoin  
21 was likely to be at a significant level, exactly what --  
22 but it has a long half-life ..."  
23 You will know that it was 19.2, I think it was, at  
24 about the 3 o'clock in the morning, but nonetheless both  
25 he and Dr Aronson formed the view that there should have

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1 Q. Thank you. If I can go to the request for autopsy form,  
2 to be found at 090-054-183, you're included in there.  
3 At the top as the consultant it's "Dr Webb/Dr Steen".  
4 I should ask you first: had you seen this form before?  
5 A. Not at the time, no.  
6 Q. Would you have considered that appropriate to have  
7 "Dr Webb/Dr Steen" there as the consultant?  
8 A. I suppose I was a little bit surprised that my name was  
9 first, but I could understand that Dr Steen would  
10 include me on the forms, certainly.  
11 Q. Then in terms of the history of the present illness,  
12 that has been gone through in some detail, so I'm not  
13 going to ask you about that, but I will ask you about  
14 the clinical diagnosis:  
15 "Cerebral oedema, secondary to status epilepticus,  
16 query underlying encephalitis."  
17 That's not quite how you put it in your note. If  
18 you had been shown that form with a view to discussing  
19 it or helping Dr Steen complete it to send off to the  
20 pathologist, would you have framed that slightly  
21 differently?  
22 A. I think I would.  
23 Q. And would you have wanted to see it reflect what you had  
24 actually written in your note at 4.40, I think it is?  
25 A. I think I would have included SIADH in the description.

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1 Q. That's the point I was going to put to you. You'd have  
2 wanted to see the SIADH in there. And if you see how  
3 Dr Steen has framed it there, "cerebral oedema secondary  
4 to status epilepticus", at the time Claire actually  
5 died, did you consider that that was the secondary cause  
6 of her death?  
7 A. The secondary?  
8 Q. It says, "cerebral oedema, secondary to  
9 status epilepticus". It's just the way in which the --  
10 A. I don't think that's how I would have formulated it.  
11 Q. Do you think it's correct?  
12 A. Um ... I don't know the answer to that.  
13 Q. Sorry?  
14 A. I don't know the answer to that.  
15 Q. Well, in your description you've got:  
16 "SIADH, hyponatraemia, hypoosmolality, cerebral  
17 oedema and coning ..."  
18 You don't actually have status epilepticus in there  
19 at all:  
20 "... following prolonged epileptic seizures."  
21 But you don't have that as the secondary cause of  
22 the cerebral oedema and therefore her death.  
23 A. That's correct, and I think my note really reflects what  
24 I thought was the terminal event.  
25 Q. Yes.

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1 A. I can't recall that, but I think I would have.  
2 Q. Would you have thought that midazolam should have been  
3 included in the drugs that she has listed there? She's  
4 got diazepam, phenytoin, valproate, acyclovir and  
5 cefotaxime. Would you have expected to see midazolam  
6 included in there?  
7 A. I don't see any reason why it would be left out, yes.  
8 Q. The last area I have to ask you about is about the  
9 explanation to the parents and after the autopsy and, in  
10 particular, in the 2004/2006 part. Subject to anything  
11 from anybody else, that's the last area I would like to  
12 address with you. Are you content that we finalise  
13 that?  
14 A. Yes.  
15 Q. Thank you. In fact, given what you have already said  
16 about what you spoke to the parents about at the time  
17 with Dr Steen, perhaps we can simply confine it to the  
18 2004 period. Dr Rooney informed or Mr Roberts that  
19 Dr Rooney informed him -- this is in 2004 -- that  
20 Dr Steen, you, Dr Hicks and Dr Sands were to carry out  
21 the review. That is the review in relation to his  
22 daughter's case. At that stage you were no longer with  
23 the Trust, you were in the south. Did you have any  
24 indication at all that you would be part of any review?  
25 A. No.

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1 A. But I accept that I certainly would have considered  
2 encephalitis as a possibility and status would have been  
3 in there as a possible trigger for SIADH.  
4 Q. So if it had been discussed with you at all -- and I'm  
5 not saying it was -- but if it was, would you have  
6 preferred to see your formulation of the steps by which  
7 Claire came to have her fatal cerebral oedema as  
8 you have written them in your account in the notes?  
9 A. I think it would be reasonable to include the SIADH,  
10 certainly.  
11 Q. And to include the hyponatraemia?  
12 A. Well, they go together.  
13 Q. Yes. Dr Steen says that she would have discussed the  
14 drug therapy with you as it was beyond her familiarity  
15 in the treatment of children.  
16 THE CHAIRMAN: No, I think she said, if she had spoken to  
17 Dr Webb during Tuesday, she would have wanted to discuss  
18 the drug treatment with him because it was far beyond  
19 her knowledge or experience.  
20 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Yes, so I was going to ask: given that  
21 you didn't have an opportunity to do that with her on  
22 Tuesday, did you at any stage when she was formulating  
23 her thoughts for the Roberts or reaching a view as to  
24 the autopsy, discuss your anticonvulsant therapy with  
25 her?

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1 Q. Did anybody contact you about the case shortly after it  
2 came to light, which is --  
3 A. I was contacted in relation to the inquest, but not --  
4 Q. No, the parents contacted the trust shortly after the  
5 UTV programme, which is in October 2004, and then they  
6 actually had a meeting in December 2004. Were you told  
7 anything at the tail end of 2004 in relation to Claire's  
8 case?  
9 A. No.  
10 Q. Then you prepared a deposition for the coroner  
11 in relation to Claire's inquest.  
12 A. That's correct.  
13 Q. Was that because Mr Walby asked you to do that?  
14 A. Yes.  
15 Q. You seem to have had the notes and records for it,  
16 we can see that at 139-098-002. This is the start of  
17 it, it's very detailed, I think you'd accept. Is it  
18 done -- and it would appear, because you go through in  
19 some detail the events. It's done with the benefit of  
20 having seen Claire's notes, isn't it?  
21 A. I must have had a photocopy of the notes, yes.  
22 Q. In fact, I think you refer to having a photocopy of the  
23 notes. You go through and you talk about the 132, which  
24 you interpret at that stage as being a record from  
25 midnight. You deal with the phenytoin and midazolam.

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1 We see that at 139-098-008. But when you deal with the  
2 midazolam and phenytoin, which you can see in your  
3 notation, if you're looking at the notes you haven't  
4 picked up any error there.  
5 A. That's correct.  
6 Q. And then Dr Stewart's note is at 139-098-010. There you  
7 see Dr Stewart's note, the sodium is 121. You have that  
8 reasonably -- quite faithfully reported as the  
9 hyponatraemia fluid overload, but you're not drawing any  
10 conclusions about that, you're simply describing that  
11 that's there?  
12 A. That's correct.  
13 Q. Is it fair to say this may have been the first time you  
14 saw the entirety of Claire's notes from her admission?  
15 Sorry, not saw them, scrutinised them.  
16 A. Yes, I think that's fair.  
17 Q. And then there's the loose bowel motion, that's dealt  
18 with, which at some points has been perhaps  
19 miscommunicated. 139-098-018. Then that Claire had  
20 a witnessed seizure on the day prior to admission and  
21 was having subtle, non-convulsive seizure activity.  
22 That's at 139-098-019. That's up at the top there.  
23 So that's the compass of what you are looking at,  
24 but I wonder if you could help us with this. It's at  
25 139-098-021. Do you see right down at the bottom? This

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1 Q. The statement then goes out with Mr Walby's amendments.  
2 That's how it goes to the coroner. Why did you allow  
3 that to happen?  
4 A. Um ... Well, I guess I was influenced by his comments  
5 that it wasn't clear that it was a mistake.  
6 Q. Yes, but was he in a position to judge that at that  
7 stage?  
8 A. I don't know.  
9 Q. But you'd formed a view about it.  
10 A. I had formed a view that I should have made contact with  
11 the PICU staff.  
12 Q. Yes. So why didn't you insist on your view, which is  
13 what you thought was the position, and in fact is a view  
14 that you've repeated here? Why didn't you allow that  
15 view to go to the coroner?  
16 A. Because, as I said, I think I was convinced by his  
17 argument that it perhaps wasn't clear that it was  
18 a mistake.  
19 Q. Well, if you look at the top of this letter, although  
20 Mr Walby is the associate medical director, it is being  
21 sent from the litigation management office. Do you  
22 think that might have been influencing things?  
23 A. Possibly.  
24 Q. Well, then, if I ask you to look at this, which is the  
25 good medical --

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1 is something that you have given evidence today about  
2 in relation to PICU. You say there:  
3 "I made the mistake of not seeking an intensive care  
4 placement for Claire before I left the hospital on the  
5 evening of October 22nd."  
6 This is a statement that you provide to Mr Walby,  
7 who asked you for it, and you sign it. He then makes  
8 amendments to it. One of them is to strike out your  
9 acknowledgment of what you believed to be a mistake and  
10 to substitute:  
11 "Although I did not seek an intensive care  
12 placement."  
13 Can I ask you, when Mr Walby asked you to provide  
14 the statement for the coroner and you did that and you  
15 signed it, did you expect that he would make any  
16 amendments to it?  
17 A. No, I didn't think that he would, actually.  
18 Q. He writes a letter to you about it, actually. You can  
19 see that at 139-096-001 where he explains what he's  
20 done. He says:  
21 "I have changed the sentence beginning 'I made the  
22 mistake' as I think it's not clear that it was a mistake  
23 and I would allow others to judge that if they wished."  
24 But you thought, your judgment was that it was?  
25 A. Yes, I think that's correct.

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1 THE CHAIRMAN: Sorry, the point is here, Mr Walby doesn't  
2 say that you're wrong, that it isn't a mistake; he says:  
3 "I think it's not clear that it was a mistake."  
4 A. Yes. I think that's a fair comment for him to make.  
5 THE CHAIRMAN: But it's your statement. If Mr Walby wants  
6 to give evidence to the coroner, presumably he can, but  
7 do you accept that he should be dictating what goes into  
8 your statement?  
9 A. No, but I think he made the point to me and I accepted  
10 it.  
11 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Can I just refer to you this: this is  
12 the General Medical Council that deals with these  
13 matters, and the one that was relevant at the time was  
14 the Good Medical Practice of 2001. That was withdrawn  
15 in November 2006, but it was the one that was relevant  
16 for that period. If one looks at 314-014-014, this is  
17 complaints. Firstly, are you aware of this practice?  
18 A. The GMC?  
19 Q. Yes.  
20 A. Yes.  
21 Q. And that when you sign those sorts of statements,  
22 irrespective of who your employer is, you have your  
23 obligations as a doctor?  
24 A. Yes.  
25 Q. Then if we look at 314-014-014 under "complaints and

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1 formal enquiries", if you look at 30:  
2 "You must cooperate fully with any formal inquiry  
3 into the treatment of a patient. You must give to those  
4 who are entitled to ask for it any relevant information  
5 in connection with an investigation into your own or own  
6 healthcare professional's conduct, performance or  
7 health."

8 Then at 32:

9 "Similarly, you musts is the coroner by responding  
10 to enquiries and by offering all relevant information to  
11 an inquest or inquiry into a patient's death."

12 If you thought, irrespective of what Mr Walby that,  
13 that you might have made a mistake and that it would  
14 have been better to have contacted PICU at that stage,  
15 is that not something that you in furtherance of your  
16 duties and obligations should have retained in your  
17 statement?

18 A. As I said, I think the case was made to me that I may be  
19 incorrect and I listened to Mr Walby.

20 Q. But should anybody be making a case to you? You've  
21 drawn up your statement, which is an extremely detailed  
22 statement and you have signed it. Presumably you took  
23 some time to do it and it was a careful statement. That  
24 was your best view as to what you thought was  
25 appropriate to go to the coroner. Should you have

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1 inquest suggests in his statement that he made  
2 a mistake, he's given a very clear steer to withdraw any  
3 suggestion that he made a mistake. Do you understand  
4 why that worries me?

5 A. I do, yes.

6 THE CHAIRMAN: Okay, thank you.

7 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: I have just been asked to put one final  
8 point to you.

9 MR QUINN: This is vexing the parents and they've asked me  
10 to include this point specifically in the opening of the  
11 case on Thursday. The parents want to know if he made  
12 a mistake or not.

13 THE CHAIRMAN: Well, is it -- when you wrote that -- could  
14 we bring up the original of that on screen again? Not  
15 the original, the handwritten --

16 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: 139-098-021.

17 THE CHAIRMAN: What you seem to be saying in that final  
18 paragraph, doctor, is that you have made a mistake by  
19 not seeking an ICU placement for Claire, but you're not  
20 sure whether she would have met the criteria for  
21 admission. Right? Can I take it that when you drafted  
22 that statement and sent it to Belfast that that was  
23 a view that you took, that you had made a mistake?

24 A. I think that's correct. I ...

25 THE CHAIRMAN: Whether it's a mistake which had consequences

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1 allowed anybody to have interfered with that?

2 A. I wasn't making a statement of fact, it was an opinion.

3 Q. Yes.

4 A. And, as I said, I think Mr Walby's convinced me that my  
5 opinion maybe wasn't correct.

6 THE CHAIRMAN: When you say he convinced you, did he do  
7 anything other than write that letter? Did you speak on  
8 the phone about it?

9 A. No, I don't think we did.

10 THE CHAIRMAN: It seems a bit strange that you used the term  
11 that he convinced you when all he did was write back.

12 He didn't say that your view was wrong, he simply said  
13 it was a view that others might not agree with. That's  
14 not convincing you that you had not made a mistake.

15 That's saying, "Well, you say you made a mistake, not  
16 everybody would agree with you". It's rather short of  
17 trying to convince you, isn't it? I'll tell you how it  
18 reads to me, doctor, and I'm very worried about this  
19 because this comes after this inquiry is established and  
20 after this inquiry is established there is evidence in  
21 this letter that a senior figure in the Royal Trust, as  
22 it then was, is influencing the information which is  
23 being put before a coroner for the conduct of an inquest  
24 into a child who may have died from reasons connected to  
25 hyponatraemia. And when a doctor who's involved in that

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1 is another matter.

2 A. Yes.

3 THE CHAIRMAN: But your view was that you had made  
4 a mistake?

5 A. I certainly was of the view that I had made a mistake by  
6 not contacting the ICU. The question of admission  
7 I wasn't certain about perhaps because I followed up by  
8 a statement that it wasn't entirely clear whether  
9 admission would have been justified.

10 THE CHAIRMAN: I understand. There's a qualification. In  
11 your original draft there was a qualification of it.

12 But the point is that as you drafted the statement and  
13 presumably as Ms Anyadike-Danes just asked you, thinking  
14 carefully about the contents of the statement, you were  
15 conceding that you had made a mistake?

16 A. That's correct.

17 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

18 MR QUINN: Does it then follow that his evidence given under  
19 oath today is wrong? Because today he said he expected  
20 improvement. So the two can't sit together. He said  
21 today that he expected improvement, therefore --

22 THE CHAIRMAN: I'm not sure they're contradictory. I'm not  
23 sure that making contact with ICU wasn't necessarily  
24 a fallback. I don't think they're necessarily  
25 contradictory.

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1 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Two last questions. Not that last point  
2 that was put but in relation to the statement itself.  
3 You'd provided the statement, finalised and signed, and  
4 what happens is that Mr Walby amends it and then sent,  
5 presumably, it back to you with that cover letter,  
6 saying that that's what he has done. Do you then retype  
7 it and re-sign it and send it out with his corrections?  
8 A. Yes, I think so, yes.  
9 Q. Thank you. This is the final point I wanted to ask you  
10 about. It's an e-mail and it's from Professor Ian Young  
11 to Michael McBride. It's at 139-153-001. If we pull  
12 that up:  
13 "We met with Heather Steen this afternoon, reached  
14 a measure of agreement about the role of hyponatraemia.  
15 She wants to be present. I will deal with the fluid  
16 issues. Hopefully this will work. Heather has definite  
17 views about the significance of the fluid management,  
18 which are not quite the same as mine. Nichola will  
19 offer the parents an opportunity to meet with me  
20 separately if they wish to. Heather thinks it's  
21 important that someone should speak to Dr Webb in Dublin  
22 so that he is informed about what is happening. Do you  
23 want to do this or will I contact him?"  
24 The date of that is 6 December. Can you help with  
25 how you were contacted?

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1 recollection on my feet is he also dealt with that in  
2 his second statement, that he -- the witness statements  
3 which he adopted in the beginning of his evidence on  
4 Friday all made perfectly clear that he was considering  
5 that he thought that he had made a mistake.  
6 THE CHAIRMAN: Can you remind me? When this long first  
7 statement was provided, who was providing him with legal  
8 advice? Had he gone to Tughans at that stage or was he  
9 with DLS?  
10 MR McALINDEN: He was with the DLS.  
11 THE CHAIRMAN: Right.  
12 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: I'm asked to ask you -- I think you  
13 might have answered it yesterday, but I'm asked to ask  
14 you: did you attend a grand round or know about a grand  
15 round in relation to Claire?  
16 A. No.  
17 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Thank you.  
18 THE CHAIRMAN: Okay. It has been a very long day, doctor.  
19 Thank you very much. That concludes your evidence.  
20 Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for your patience  
21 today. We've got the return of Professor Neville  
22 tomorrow morning. He'll be coming here in person.  
23 I know it will not get a huge welcome, but we'll start  
24 again at 9.30 to get through Professor Neville. We have  
25 Professor Scott-Jupp by video link. The video link will

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1 A. I think I received an e-mail from the trust, but I can't  
2 be certain.  
3 Q. Do you have it?  
4 A. Possibly.  
5 THE CHAIRMAN: If you have, when you finish today, over the  
6 next few days, doctor, could you try to trace it to us  
7 and if you can, please send it to us?  
8 A. Yes.  
9 THE CHAIRMAN: And any related exchanges.  
10 A. Sure.  
11 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: If you can't recall this, please say,  
12 but is it simply asking you to furnish a statement or is  
13 it seeking some other or different involvement?  
14 A. I can't recall.  
15 Q. You can't recall. Well, if you could find the e-mail,  
16 that would be very helpful.  
17 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Mr Chairman, I don't have any further  
18 questions.  
19 MR SEPHTON: In view of the question my learned friend has  
20 just put, if the doctor's attention could be drawn to  
21 witness statement 138/1, page 74.  
22 THE CHAIRMAN: Which paragraph?  
23 MR SEPHTON: It's the very first sentence on that page.  
24 It's the one where he's conceding in his first statement  
25 that he believed he made a mistake. Then my

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1 not be available before 2.30, but we'll take him after  
2 that and we'll continue to get through the evidence.  
3 Thank you very much.  
4 (6.30 pm)  
5 (The hearing adjourned until 9.30 am the following day)  
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I N D E X

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2 DR DAVID WEBB (continued) .....1  
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4 Questions from MS ANYADIKE-DANES .....1  
    (continued)  
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