

Monday, 12 November 2012

1

2 (9.00 am)

3

(Delay in proceedings)

4 (9.18 am)

5

DR ROBERT SCOTT-JUPP (called)

6

Questions from MS ANYADIKE-DANES

7

THE CHAIRMAN: Good morning. I understand that not

8

everybody is here yet, but we have to get started.

9

Dr Scott-Jupp is available to us until 4 o'clock today.

10

After today, I understand that he is not available again

11

until early December, so I would very much like to get

12

through his evidence as completely as we can today.

13

Ms Anyadike-Danes?

14

MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Thank you. Dr Scott-Jupp.

15

Good morning, doctor.

16

A. Good morning.

17

Q. Do you have a copy of your CV there?

18

A. Yes.

19

Q. Before we turn to that, you have provided three reports

20

for the inquiry. Just for reference, 234-002, 234-003

21

and 234-004, the first of which was 20 May 2011, then

22

12 June 2012 and then 7 September 2012.

23

I'm going to ask you if you adopt them, but

24

I understand there might be an issue in relation to the

25

second one to do with phenytoin.

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Absent that, do you adopt those reports?

3 A. Yes, I do.

4 Q. Perhaps then we can look at the second report. It
5 arises at 234-003-002, which is your description of the
6 phenytoin. I think the upshot of it is about
7 three-quarters of the way down in that first substantive
8 paragraph. You say:

9 "I conclude therefore that the 110 ml recorded at
10 23.00 was indeed the loading dose."

11 It's just a little bit further down than that
12 pointer, about five lines up from the bottom.

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Just so that we put it in its context, the direction
15 in relation to the stat dose of phenytoin is to be found
16 at 090-022-054. And you can see there that
17 the suggestion is for "IV phenytoin 18 milligrams per
18 kilogram, stat" and is to be followed by an amount
19 12-hourly.

20 Dr Aronson's evidence says that "stat" means,
21 effectively, forthwith; would you accept that?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. And then Dr Stevenson's calculation for the loading dose
24 is to be found immediately under that, which was an
25 incorrect calculation, but in any event there it is at

1 632.

2 Then one sees the prescription for it, 090-026-075.
3 You can see the phenytoin, the second line on the
4 "once-only prescriptions", "635, 2.45 pm, IV". The time
5 of administration is given at "2.45". It's signed by
6 Dr Stevenson and his initials appear there as having
7 given it.

8 If we look at the nursing notes, 090-040-141, and
9 flip those around, you can see after "8 pm":

10 "Stat dose IV phenytoin at 2.45."

11 Do you see that there? And then finally, there is
12 a clinical note from Dr Webb when he examines Claire at
13 17.00, and one sees that at 090-022-055. Under "17.00":

14 "Claire has had a loading dose of phenytoin."

15 In the light of that, would you like to reconsider
16 your conclusion that the amount that was given at
17 2300 hours was in fact the first dose and the loading
18 dose?

19 A. Yes. That was clearly an error on my part, for which
20 I apologise. I was asked to look at it from the context
21 of the fluid balance chart. There was no entry on the
22 fluid balance chart indicating an infusion at the time
23 when the loading dose was apparently given according to
24 the medical notes, and the prescription chart, so that's
25 why I overlooked it. Clearly, because a phenytoin blood

1 level had been taken at, I think, about 9.30 pm, and it
2 was already 23, then there must have been a loading dose
3 given prior to that. So that was an error, for which
4 I apologise.

5 Q. No, no, you mean because of the levels of her phenytoin,
6 it was clear she must have had some phenytoin before
7 then.

8 A. Exactly. So even if all these records were incorrect,
9 then she clearly had had phenytoin; there's objective
10 evidence.

11 Q. And if we go to the fluid balance sheet, I think your
12 point is -- we see it at 090-038-135. And there you
13 see -- it's a bit obliterated, but that phenytoin is
14 alongside 23.00. So although the 110 of phenytoin is
15 identified there and earlier infusions -- the acyclovir,
16 for example, the midazolam -- they're all noted there on
17 that fluid balance chart, but your point is that they
18 didn't note having infused the phenytoin.

19 A. That's correct. The omission wasn't that they didn't
20 give the phenytoin; the omission was that it wasn't
21 recorded on the fluid balance charts, although it was
22 recorded on the prescription chart.

23 Q. And would you have expected it to have been there?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Thank you.

1 THE CHAIRMAN: On that, doctor, how does that affect then
2 the conclusion at the end of that paragraph?

3 A. I'm sorry, at the end of which paragraph?

4 THE CHAIRMAN: In your report at 234-003-002, you've
5 corrected the, five lines up:

6 "I conclude therefore that the 110 ml was indeed the
7 loading dose."

8 And then you go on. That leads into a conclusion
9 which you make about the total quantity of fluids which
10 Claire was receiving.

11 A. Well, I was asked to comment on the total quantity of
12 fluids given between 11 o'clock and 2 am for the
13 purposes of this part of my report, so that still stands
14 because it appears that she was given that 110 ml,
15 I think, later in the evening, irrespective of whether
16 she was the given a loading dose earlier.

17 THE CHAIRMAN: So the conclusion stands?

18 A. The conclusion stands. The conclusion about the
19 quantity of fluid still stands.

20 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

21 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: And can we just deal with another point,
22 staying with that second report. You say:

23 "On 23 October 1996, after Claire's acute
24 deterioration, the low sodium result was known and
25 it would have been appropriate to request this and the

1 request was made by Dr Stewart."

2 I'm trying to see if I can help you with where we
3 see that.

4 MR FORTUNE: 003.

5 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Yes, thank you.

6 So that date of 23 October, that would appear to be
7 a typographical error because, in fact, Dr Stewart's
8 note is 22 October. That's when he notes the low sodium
9 result. You can see that at 090-022-056. Right at the
10 top there.

11 A. Yes. It was just before midnight. That is an error.
12 It should have been the 22nd. I'm sorry about that.

13 Q. Thank you.

14 So then if we go to your curriculum vitae. The
15 reference for that is 311-038-001 and you have a copy of
16 it there. You confirm that your current position
17 is that you're a consultant paediatrician at the
18 Salisbury District Hospital and you've been a consultant
19 since 1992. If one looks over, you were also a fellow
20 of the Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health in
21 1995. So then that means that, at the time of these
22 events, 1996, you were both a consultant and a fellow of
23 that Royal College.

24 A. Yes, although I should add that at that time all
25 consultant paediatricians were automatically fellows of

1 the Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health.

2 Q. If one looks at your college activities, you say that
3 you were a National Council member for the Royal College
4 since 2008. And this is to be found at 002. Then,
5 in the second bullet down, you talk about service
6 development and you say that:

7 "Having pioneered novel working practices, which
8 have enable sustainable and safe 24-hour paediatric
9 cover in [your] own unit."

10 Can you explain what that is?

11 A. Yes. There is a problem nationally providing acute
12 paediatric services in light of the fact that doctors
13 hours' of work have been reduced by the European working
14 time directive and there is a need to have 24-hour
15 skilled resident cover for both neonate and general
16 paediatrics. This produced a lot of difficulty in small
17 units such as the one I work in, in sustaining that,
18 given that there are limited numbers of people
19 available, and we just developed a method of combining
20 both trainee, experienced trainee doctors and
21 consultants sharing the out-of-hours work to provide
22 that cover. I have to say, I don't think it's
23 particularly relevant to the Royal Belfast Hospital for
24 Sick Children, which has a much larger tertiary teaching
25 hospital and rather different issues.

1 Q. Can I ask you just to slow down a little bit so the
2 stenographer can keep up?

3 What are the differences that you see between your
4 hospital and the teaching hospital here in
5 Northern Ireland?

6 A. Teaching hospitals have more trainees, they have more
7 paediatricians in training, and therefore have more
8 people available to man the rotas. They still have
9 problems. Even now, it's particularly acute. But the
10 problems are slightly different to what one encounters
11 in a small, isolated district general hospital such as
12 where I work.

13 THE CHAIRMAN: When you say it's a small unit that you work
14 in, doctor, we've heard evidence that in the mid-1990s
15 the Royal might have had 114 or 120 children staying
16 overnight and an accident and emergency unit. For
17 comparison purposes, what might have been the number of
18 children that you were looking at in the 1990s?

19 A. Our ward was at that time only up to, I think, about 20,
20 22 beds on a single children's ward. So it was much
21 smaller, although we did cover the my neonatal unit as
22 well, which wasn't the case with the Belfast hospital.

23 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

24 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Did you have access to a neurology
25 department in your hospital?

1 A. Yes, but it was not on site; it was -- and still is --
2 at our local regional tertiary centre in Southampton.

3 Q. And how far away was that to get to if you required some
4 expertise?

5 A. 25 miles.

6 Q. And if you needed a neurological opinion, how would that
7 be arranged?

8 A. If I needed a neurological opinion, then as now, I, as
9 a consultant, would have contacted the switchboard at
10 Southampton General Hospital and asked them to contact
11 the on-call consultant paediatric neurologist.

12 Q. And could they come or was it be something discuss over
13 the phone?

14 A. No, it would be a discussion over the phone and
15 a decision whether to transfer the child or not.

16 Q. I see. So it wouldn't be a matter of the neurologist
17 coming to you, it would be a matter of do you send the
18 child to the neurologist?

19 A. That is correct. For less urgent cases, the neurologist
20 could see them in outpatients, but for urgent cases it
21 would be a case of transferring the child there.

22 Q. And what about the access to EEG, for example, in 1996,
23 how would that be organised for a child in your
24 hospital?

25 A. For a child in my hospital, we didn't have

1 a five-day-a-week EEG service and certainly not any kind
2 of emergency service. The technicians came over to do
3 lists of outpatient sessions of children requiring EEGs
4 and, in order to get an urgent EEG done, it would have
5 meant specifically asking the EEG technicians to stop
6 their routine work that had already been planned for
7 that day in order to come to the ward to do an urgent
8 test.

9 Q. And did that happen?

10 A. Occasionally, but it was quite a rare event.

11 MR FORTUNE: Before my learned friend moves on, can we find
12 out whether there was, on site at Salisbury, an EEG
13 machine to which the technicians came or did they have
14 to bring their equipment with them, or alternatively did
15 you have to consider sending the patient to Southampton
16 in an emergency?

17 A. No, there was a machine on site that was used for
18 outpatients, which was, as I remember, transportable on
19 a trolley and could be taken to the ward if required.

20 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: In 1996?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. What about a CT scan; did you have one of those at the
23 hospital?

24 A. A CT scan had been available for some time before that.

25 THE CHAIRMAN: On the EEG service, you had the machine

1 constantly available, but not the staff to use it?

2 A. That's correct, yes.

3 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Can I ask you about an expression that
4 I think Dr Steen used? We don't need to pull it up, but
5 the reference is the transcript of 15 October, page 7,
6 line 5. It's "consultant-led service"; what does that
7 connote to you?

8 A. There has been quite a lot of discussion in recent years
9 amongst paediatricians, and also in other specialties,
10 about the distinction between a consultant-led service
11 and a consultant-delivered service. I think the general
12 understanding is a consultant-led service is the more
13 traditional role, whereby the consultant leads a team,
14 but does not necessarily see every patient and does not
15 get actively involved in a hands-on way with every
16 patient.

17 A consultant-delivered service is taken to mean
18 where a consultant is available in the hospital and
19 often, in some situations, resident at night in order to
20 be much more immediately available. It implies that
21 there are fewer or less experienced trainee doctors
22 around when one has a consultant-delivered service
23 because the consultant then acts in a way in a more --
24 as one might put it -- junior level or more hands-on
25 level than in a more traditional consultant-led service.

1 Q. And what was the service that was provided in 1996
2 provided from your hospital?

3 A. In my hospital, it was still, I think, what one would
4 call a consultant-led service in theory, although in
5 practice it turned out being very much
6 a consultant-delivered service. The way consultants
7 worked, certainly in paediatrics, has changed a lot
8 in the last 20, 15 years.

9 Q. Why do you say:

10 "In theory, it was a consultant led service, but in
11 practice it turned out to be more of
12 a consultant-delivered service"?

13 A. Because the resident doctors that we had in place, who
14 were supposed to be competent to manage patients without
15 more senior resident cover, in fact very often weren't
16 very experienced, so in practice the consultant --
17 although, in theory, not employed to be resident in the
18 hospital -- would frequently have to come in and stay in
19 on a voluntary basis -- effectively, not contracted to
20 do that -- in order to support the inexperienced junior
21 doctor.

22 Q. Was that a judgment you would make day-to-day as to what
23 you thought the cover was, who you thought your patients
24 were and what you thought might be appropriate and safe
25 in all the circumstances?

1 A. Exactly. It would depend on how many ill patients there
2 were, what problems were expected and, importantly, on
3 the experience and competence of the resident junior
4 doctor.

5 Q. Did that depend not just on the experience of the
6 registrar, but the other supporting junior doctors?

7 A. It would be primarily the registrar, although I have to
8 say in my own unit, on some instances, there was no
9 registrar at all, it was only an SHO, but I don't think
10 that would have happened in Belfast. No, it would be
11 primarily the most senior resident paediatric doctor
12 would be the defining factor.

13 Q. And if you're talking about coming in and staying over,
14 during the night, if I can put it that way, how many
15 beds was your registrar going to be responsible for?

16 A. Well, I work in a small unit, which is not comparable to
17 Belfast, so only about 20 inpatient beds plus a neonatal
18 unit.

19 Q. Without getting reference, I think it's accepted that
20 the registrar on the night of the 22nd, and probably,
21 for that matter, for the night of the 21st, was
22 providing cover to at least about 115 beds --

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. -- with some support from junior SHOs. Is that the sort
25 of thing, if you were to transport that back into your

1 circumstances, would have had you evaluating whether the
2 children that you had in the wards on those nights might
3 lead you to think you should be more in touch at least,
4 given that level of cover?

5 A. I would guess the situation you're referring to was the
6 case most nights at the Royal Belfast Hospital for Sick
7 Children and so the consultants would have expected that
8 situation, and that would be what was the norm. So
9 it would be difficult for them to decide on how busy it
10 had to be in order for them to decide to stay in
11 whatever, as opposed to coming in specifically to see
12 a particular patient.

13 Q. What's your attitude to that level of cover?

14 A. I think it's completely inadequate. Having only one
15 registrar available at night for that number of
16 inpatients, by today's standards, is completely
17 inadequate.

18 Q. If we forget about today's standards and think about
19 1996 standards.

20 A. Yes, even by 1996 standards, I think other Children's
21 Hospitals, as I remember at the time, would have had two
22 registrars or a registrar and a senior registrar
23 simultaneously available at night.

24 MR FORTUNE: Can we just assist Dr Scott-Jupp because there
25 was no question at the Royal of a consultant staying

1 in the hospital overnight. It's always been --

2 THE CHAIRMAN: I think Dr Scott-Jupp understands that.

3 That's why he's saying the level of cover overnight was

4 completely inadequate.

5 MR FORTUNE: Whilst I'm on my feet, sir, on this related

6 point, Dr Scott-Jupp has told us he's a full-time

7 consultant. In his own hospital at that time, how many

8 consultant colleagues did he have in his department and,

9 secondly, were any of them partially based in the

10 community by terms or by the terms of their contract?

11 A. Yes. In 1996, there were four of us, so I had three

12 colleagues, two of whom were partially based in the

13 community.

14 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Thank you. Who provided cover when they

15 were partially based in the community in your hospital

16 in 1996?

17 A. We covered each other in that -- yes, I think in 1996 we

18 had already started a system of duty consultant on

19 a daily basis. So for example, on a particular day of

20 the week -- for example, Thursday was always my day and

21 I would never be out of the hospital, even if there was

22 a community clinic or something. It would never be

23 scheduled for my day on the ward and similarly with my

24 colleagues.

25 Q. When you said you covered each other, was that

1 explicitly so, so you knew who was going to provide
2 cover for any given consultant who was conducting a
3 clinic in the community?

4 A. Yes, because it was specifically by day of the week. So
5 if for any reason I was not available on what was my
6 cover day, I would specifically ask a colleague to cover
7 me for that duration.

8 Q. Thank you. If I might move on and ask you about a file
9 that relates to other children that were on the ward,
10 their medical notes and records, which we call file 150.
11 It won't come up on the screen, but we have it in hard
12 copy for you to look at. (Handed).

13 A. Thank you.

14 Q. You came and looked at a number of these records. In
15 fact, I think all of them, really, are Dr Steen's
16 patients, who were on Allen Ward, Musgrave Ward and
17 Barbour Ward on 22 October, and also doctors Webb, Reid
18 and Hill. You looked at them on 4 and 5 October of this
19 year and looked at the notes with a view to assisting
20 which of these notes should be retained for the purposes
21 of trying to understand what might or might not have
22 been occupying Dr Steen's time in the morning when she
23 was otherwise scheduled to be on the ward carrying out
24 a ward round.

25 Then I think you, later on, provided guidance on the

1 telephone in relation to three sets of notes.

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. And that was on 8 October. Those notes were read out to
4 you and you provided guidance in a similar way; is that
5 correct?

6 A. Yes. That's correct.

7 Q. One of the things that you were able to gain some
8 appreciation of was the seriousness of Claire's
9 condition, just from the notes, by comparison to the
10 other children in the notes, at least from the records
11 of the clinicians and nurses; is that correct?

12 A. That's correct, yes.

13 Q. The evidence that we've heard is that at least so far as
14 Allen Ward is concerned, the clinicians and nurses
15 ultimately formed the view that Claire was the sickest
16 child on the ward. If you've looked at those notes of
17 the other children, are you able to express a view as to
18 how she compared with any of their recorded conditions,
19 if I can put it that way?

20 A. Yes, there were some other children on the ward with
21 serious conditions, no doubt about that. But in terms
22 of the acuteness of the condition, the other children
23 involved -- one or two of them had quite serious but
24 more chronic conditions that required a long hospital
25 admission, but weren't necessarily as ill on the day.

1 So on the day, I would agree with what others have
2 said that she was probably the sickest child on the
3 ward, yes.

4 Q. And if she was, is she a child, if she was available to
5 be seeing children at all, that you would have expected
6 her to be trying to see?

7 A. Dr Steen, you mean?

8 Q. Yes.

9 A. Yes, I would.

10 THE CHAIRMAN: Doctor, one of the issues which has emerged
11 over the last few weeks of evidence is a concern
12 expressed specifically by Mr Roberts about whether a lot
13 of this evidence about how seriously ill Claire was is
14 with the benefit of hindsight. Would it have been or
15 should it have been apparent, say, to Dr O'Hare
16 admitting Claire on Monday night just how seriously ill
17 she was, or would that be too soon?

18 A. I think that would have been too soon. A lot of
19 children who come in at night, who appear to be unwell,
20 recover very rapidly. That is one of the particular
21 features of paediatrics, children bounce back, they get
22 better very quickly. So to overtreat and
23 overinvestigate a child in a very short-term basis when
24 the vast majority of children in that situation are
25 likely to be much better in the morning is justified.

In error: should
read - 'is not
justified'

1 THE CHAIRMAN: Okay. Then at what point on Tuesday the 22nd
2 should it have been apparent or over what period on
3 Tuesday would it have been increasingly apparent just
4 how seriously ill Claire was?

5 A. At the ward round.

6 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

7 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Thank you. I wonder if I can take you
8 to S8. If you look in that bundle that you've just been
9 handed, they're all tabbed, and if you go to S8 just
10 quickly so that you look at 150-008-002. This won't
11 come up, but you can look at it and see. That's the
12 admission; do you see that?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And then I wonder if I could take you to 005 in that
15 series. You can see there, just alongside where it has
16 "HSS"; do you see that?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. That's Dr Steen's initials. There is an addition there
19 in relation to the medication. Dr Steen has said that
20 she did that and I also think she has indicated that she
21 would have done that in the morning. This child was
22 admitted at 11.05 the previous day. And it is her view
23 that that puts her, because this is where that child
24 was, in bay 7 where Claire was. If that's the case, are
25 you able to tell from that how serious that child's

1 condition was and the extent to which her condition
2 might or could have monopolised Dr Steen's time?

3 A. Yes. Can you just give me a minute to look at the
4 admission note to remind myself of this child's
5 condition?

6 Q. Of course.

7 A. The admission note on the previous day, on the 21st,
8 suggests that this child had asthma. From the admitting
9 doctor's impression, it wasn't a particularly severe
10 exacerbation of asthma in that this child was given
11 standard asthma treatment with nebulisers and oral
12 steroids, and there was no further entry made later on
13 the 21st suggesting that no other doctor was asked to
14 see this child and, therefore, presumably the child
15 improved.

16 The fact that on the 22nd -- first of all, at the
17 ward round, Dr Sands changed the treatment regime to PRN
18 nebulisers, that is to say instead of giving them
19 regularly, to give them as necessary, and later to
20 inhalers. What this suggests to me is that the child
21 was improving, that the severity was becoming less and
22 treatment was being stepped down. So on that evidence,
23 this child was not that unwell.

24 Q. And the question I had put to you is: is there anything
25 about this -- it probably follows -- which would have

1 monopolised Dr Steen in a way that might have prevented
2 her from dealing with Claire --

3 A. No.

4 Q. -- if she was in bay 7 --

5 MR FORTUNE: Sir, can I interrupt at this stage? Because my
6 recollection is that Dr Steen was not saying that this
7 boy was in the same room as Claire. If I'm wrong,
8 I'll be corrected.

9 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Sorry, I beg your pardon. That might be
10 the earlier one. I beg your pardon. In any event, the
11 question remains the same, which is that if she was able
12 to see this child, what would you have expected her to
13 want to do in relation to Claire?

14 A. I'm sorry, can you repeat the question?

15 Q. If she was able to see this child and/or at least be
16 present to modify his treatment regime, what are your
17 expectations of what she should have been doing in
18 relation to Claire if she was about? That's the point.

19 A. I find that difficult to answer. If for whatever reason
20 Dr Steen had chosen to see this child -- and it's
21 possible, although I don't know whether she reported
22 this -- and she already knew the child from previous
23 encounter, she may have known the parents and therefore
24 wanted to speak to this family simply because she knew
25 them as she may have been passing through the ward. It

1 wouldn't have been unreasonable for her to do that.

2 If her attention was not drawn to Claire, it is
3 possible that she could have seen this much less ill
4 child, dealt with them, made some fairly minor decisions
5 about treatment, without being made aware of the much
6 illier child even within the same bay.

7 Q. Then if she was on the ward at all and had appreciated
8 that she, for whatever reason, had not been able to
9 attend the ward round, having got herself to the ward,
10 should she have been asking, "While I'm here, is there
11 anything I need to know about any of the new
12 admissions?"

13 A. I would have thought that was a reasonable expectation,
14 yes.

15 Q. Then let's go to, I think, the child who might have been
16 in the same bay, and that's S7. If you flip back to the
17 previous tab, the admission sheet is 150-007-002. This
18 child is admitted at 13.33 on the 22nd. And if you go
19 to 003, this is a note taken by Dr Stevenson. Under
20 5 pm, he lists the problems. Then the last of his
21 writing, just above the redaction, says:

22 "Seen by Dr Steen. Admit for further assessment and
23 management".

24 And then we can go to the nursing note, which is at
25 007 in this series. You see at 2 pm:

1 "Mum phoned Dr Steen this morning concerning reflux.
2 Brought down to Allen Ward at 1.30 for admission."

3 In fact, that's it. So Dr Steen's evidence is that
4 if she was in Cupar Street in the afternoon -- which
5 it's believed she was -- she would have left the
6 hospital in and around the time that this child is being
7 recorded as actually being admitted on to the ward.

8 As I understand it -- and I hope Mr Fortune will
9 correct me if I'm wrong -- earlier than that, she had
10 seen the child, not on the ward, to admit the child and
11 then the child had duly been admitted and was on the
12 ward in bay 7, which is the same bay as Claire.

13 MR FORTUNE: Dr Scott-Jupp ought to know that in respect of
14 this patient, Dr Steen knew mother and patient.

15 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Yes.

16 A. Okay.

17 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: I think Dr Scott-Jupp might have
18 appreciated that from the mother phoning Dr Steen
19 directly as is recorded in the nursing note.

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. So the point is similar, which is: if Dr Steen is
22 actually in the vicinity, if I can put it that way, of
23 the ward and has appreciated that she's not been able to
24 take the ward round, then should she have been making
25 contact with the ward to find out about new admissions,

1 find out about the state of the children, before she
2 goes off to do her clinic in Cupar Street?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. She should?

5 A. I believe it would have been good practice for her to
6 have spoken to either the registrar or one of the SHOs
7 or the senior nurse to ask about any other patients of
8 concern on the ward at the time.

9 Q. Dr Steen, in fairness to her, has no independent
10 recollection at all of this period. So she's dependent
11 upon the notes and records that emanate from that
12 period. One of the things that she thinks is that she
13 was around and about the ward, she was available.
14 That's one of the things that she says. That's why I've
15 asked you about, if she was available, what her conduct
16 should then have been. There was another suggestion,
17 nobody knows that, but perhaps there was a child of
18 sufficiently serious condition that would have quite
19 properly taken up her time, and that's what she was
20 dealing with.

21 You have looked at the notes of all this children.
22 In the course of that, did you see any evidence of her
23 being -- apart from what I have just taken you to
24 there -- contacted in relation to a child whose
25 condition would have been monopolising her time or

1 taking up a significant part of her time?

2 A. Not on the evidence of the notes we've seen.

3 Q. Thank you. I think you indicated that you might
4 actually have seen the evidence of quite a sick child --
5 if you give me a moment. Maybe I'll come back to that
6 because I'm trying to deal with a child whose condition
7 might identify it. Perhaps I'll come back to that.

8 There is evidence, though, that a Dr Nan Hill was
9 available. It's S1, the one where she is involved. One
10 sees that if you go to tab S1 and, just to orientate
11 you, 002 is the admission sheet, and then you can see
12 21 October when she comes in. Her discharge sheet is at
13 011. There is a reference there to "See the review
14 arrangement as per Dr Hill". I think your view was,
15 when you looked at this, that the way that discharge
16 sheet is written might suggest that this could actually
17 have been a Dr Hill patient who happened to come in at
18 a time when Dr Steen was on call and, therefore, the
19 child would be written up as one under her care; is that
20 right?

21 A. Yes, that's correct.

22 Q. Then the actual reference to Dr Hill, one sees that at
23 005. There is the ward round on the 22nd taken by
24 Dr Sands. Towards the bottom, signed off by
25 Dr Stevenson, you see "Ward round, Dr Hill". And then

1 if you go to 009, which is the nurse's note, you see
2 under 12 midday, "Seen by Dr Hill. To commence physio".

3 And so on. So Dr Hill is another paediatric
4 consultant who actually came in at midday to see this
5 child. If Dr Steen was of the view that she might not
6 have been available for whatever reason, maybe she was
7 dealing with administrative matters -- there's some
8 suggestion that she might have been involved in a King's
9 Fund survey or something of that sort -- but if she were
10 to know that in advance, do you think it would have been
11 appropriate or it could have been possible even for her
12 to have asked for Dr Hill to have provided some cover
13 for her to her registrar?

14 A. Yes. If she knew that she was on call for the ward,
15 that there was a post take round to be done -- that's to
16 say a ward round seeing acutely ill patients who had
17 come in the night before -- and she knew she wasn't
18 going to be available for whatever reason, however good
19 that reason was, it would have been good practice to
20 informally ask one of her colleagues if they could be
21 available to the registrar to sort out problems if she
22 was not going to be available at that time.

23 Q. Apart from whether it could have been done, in your
24 experience in 1996, is that something that got done or
25 would people have been a little bit precious about their

1 patients?

2 A. I think it would have been -- yes, it would have
3 happened frequently. There may have been a reluctance
4 of another consultant to get involved with a colleague's
5 patient where decisions had to be made that could wait,
6 they weren't necessarily very urgent decisions, because
7 people didn't like to tread on each other's toes.
8 That's rather different to an urgent situation where
9 a decision needs to be made straightaway.

10 Q. Thank you. So that is something that could have been
11 done, had she appreciated she was going to be away for
12 any length of time that morning?

13 A. Yes, it could have been done.

14 Q. And apart from it could have been done, what's your view
15 as to whether it ought to have been done?

16 A. I think under the circumstances, and not just with
17 hindsight, I think it ought to have been done.

18 Q. Thank you. Then I'm going to try and see if we can move
19 reasonably chronologically through Claire's admission if
20 I can put it that way. If we start with her initial
21 assessment and the treatment by Dr O'Hare.

22 In fairness to her, in your report at 234-002-002,
23 you've commended her for clear and competently set out
24 admission notes. And you say that the important points
25 in the history are clear and a competent clinical

1 examination is recorded. But you have formed the view
2 that her initial investigation was somewhat limited and
3 that you would have expected more extensive biochemical
4 tests.

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Can you expand about that as to what you would have
7 expected and why?

8 A. Well, she was an unwell child. There was no clear
9 diagnosis. The extent to which one investigates a child
10 during the night would vary somewhat from one
11 practitioner to another. I have looked at Dr O'Hare's
12 justification for not doing some of these specific tests
13 and I actually agree with her reasons; they're all
14 entirely logical.

15 When you're starting from scratch and you don't know
16 what you're dealing with, the common practice is to do
17 a variety of tests even though they may be somewhat
18 unfocused, to do a broad range of tests which might give
19 you a clue as to what's going on. In her case, the only
20 blood tests I think that were done on admission were
21 a full blood count and urea and electrolytes and
22 a glucose, I think -- sorry, I can't remember if there
23 was a glucose or not -- which is less than I think most
24 practitioners would have done at that time -- even
25 out-of-hours tests -- for a child who was that unwell.

1 Q. So just that I understand you: even though you say you
2 have read her reasons and you think they are logical,
3 do you nonetheless feel that something more extensive
4 was required and should have been carried out?

5 A. Yes. I can go through the individual tests one by one
6 if you'd like me to. But I'm just giving a general
7 impression that even though one always doesn't always
8 think, at the time, of a long list of specific
9 diagnoses, one often sends off a batch of commonly done
10 and easily available tests to help formulate one's idea
11 as to what the problem is.

12 Q. In your view, even bearing in mind all that Dr O'Hare
13 has said, what do you think were the tests that should
14 nonetheless have been carried out?

15 A. Right. As I think I said in my reports -- it may be in
16 the second report actually, there may be a reference to
17 that -- as well as the urea and electrolytes, the liver
18 function tests -- she didn't have any clinical evidence
19 of liver failure, and I agree with that assertion by
20 Dr O'Hare. Nonetheless, you can have disturbed liver
21 function without any clinical evidence of liver disease,
22 such as jaundice, and that could be an early indication
23 of the nature of the problem.

24 There are a number of different biochemical
25 indicators that are included in the liver function test

1 which can be associated with quite a wide variety of
2 different conditions, not just specific liver failure.
3 Reye's syndrome is an example of one that I think has
4 already been mentioned --

5 Q. Yes.

6 A. -- which is rare, but early evidence of that could be
7 gained from an early abnormality of the liver function
8 test. So that's one example.

9 Q. If we pause there. I think, in fairness to Dr O'Hare,
10 in her evidence, which is on 18 October at page 138,
11 having gone through a series of things, at page 138 at
12 line 14, I think she did concede because she was
13 considering that Claire had a viral infection, which
14 could have been hepatitis A, it probably would have ben
15 reasonable to do the liver function test. So for
16 whatever reason that prompted it, I think she's come to
17 the view that perhaps that was a reasonable test to have
18 done.

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. And you would agree with that from what you have just
21 said?

22 A. Yes, in the event it wouldn't have made any difference,
23 but it would have been a reasonable test to have done.

24 Q. One doesn't know in the event. That's the whole point
25 at the time you're doing these.

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Then as you have progressed through, what else do you
3 think should have been done?

4 A. Calcium, it's rare, but either a high or a low calcium
5 level can lead to seizures, and there are many causes of
6 that, all of which are rare. Doing an ammonia, which is
7 not quite such a routine test, but is an important one,
8 is a good screening test for a broad range of rare
9 metabolic conditions, including Reye's syndrome, as it
10 happens. That is not something that is usually done as
11 the first line blood test, but can be done urgently out
12 of hours where one suspects there may be a metabolic
13 problem going on.

14 Q. And would you have thought it was reasonable to think
15 that there might have been a metabolic problem going on
16 at this stage?

17 A. Yes, I think it would.

18 Q. Okay. Anything else that you think they might have
19 reasonably done?

20 A. I didn't mention this in my report, but a blood gas,
21 that is to say an analysis of the level of
22 acidity/alkalinity of the blood -- a blood pH, in
23 effect -- can also be a useful screening test for
24 a metabolic problem.

25 MR FORTUNE: Sir, the relevant paragraph in Dr Scott-Jupp's

1 first report is 234-002-002 at (b).

2 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Yes, that's where we were before we went
3 into the transcript. Thank you.

4 Sorry, that was one you said you didn't mention, but
5 that might have been a reasonable thing to do --

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. -- in 1996?

8 A. The machines available to do this test on were less
9 commonplace in 1996, but it was still possible to do it,
10 yes.

11 Q. Anything else?

12 A. No.

13 Q. Can I then just ask you about the fact that --

14 A. Sorry, importantly, a glucose.

15 Q. I think they did do a glucose.

16 A. Yes. Sorry.

17 Q. But you have said that the blood tests that they did do
18 produced the blood count, the urea and the electrolytes.
19 We can have a look at 090-032-108. Dr Aronson and
20 Professor Neville have given some evidence as to whether
21 they should have done a differential on the white cell
22 count. Have you got a view as to whether that would
23 have been an appropriate thing to do?

24 A. It would have been an appropriate thing to do, but
25 I think my opinion may differ slightly from the other

1 expert witnesses in that I doubt it would have had any
2 influence on immediate management, having a differential
3 available at that time. I think the other experts have
4 explained to the inquiry what is meant by
5 a differential; do I need to repeat that?

6 THE CHAIRMAN: We've got that, thank you. You don't need
7 to.

8 A. As a practising paediatrician, I actually don't find the
9 differential all that useful. In theory, a viral
10 infection should cause an increase in the relative
11 number of lymphocytes and a bacterial infection should
12 cause an increase in the relative number of neutrophils.
13 In practice, that doesn't always happen. In the early
14 stages of a viral infection, you can often get an
15 increased neutrophil count and vice versa. So it can,
16 in the early stages, be relatively unhelpful unless it's
17 extreme.

18 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Would you necessarily know whether you
19 were in the early stages at this stage?

20 A. I think from the history Claire had only been unwell for
21 a day, so it was still in the early stages, yes.

22 Q. Would it have been something that could have been noted
23 to do later on?

24 A. Yes. It could have been. It would have been more
25 useful to repeat the blood tests and repeat the

1 differential on a new specimen rather than going back
2 and doing it on the one taken on admission.

3 THE CHAIRMAN: Sorry, doctor, just to interrupt for
4 a moment. One of the points made last week was that
5 this printout -- which you have on screen in front of
6 you at the moment -- is in an unexpected form because
7 the white cell count differential would, according to at
8 least one of last week's witnesses, be expected to
9 appear on that printout; is that your experience?

10 A. Yes, that is entirely a technical laboratory issue. It
11 depends on, firstly, whether they had a machine that
12 could automatically do the differential count available
13 out of hours and, secondly, whether there was
14 a technician who was available to interpret it.

15 THE CHAIRMAN: I think it was Professor Cartwright who said
16 that he would have expected that the differential would
17 automatically be printed on that and he was really very
18 taken aback that it didn't appear there. He made two
19 points. First of all, it should have been appeared
20 there because this wasn't a new machine, this system, as
21 he described it, had been in place for decades. Would
22 that be your experience?

23 A. Yes. Going back a long way, the differential counts
24 were done by hand, but I think by 1996 it was automated.
25 I don't know why it wasn't done.

1 THE CHAIRMAN: That's one point and the second point is that
2 when the differential didn't appear on the printout,
3 that that's something which might have been picked up
4 overnight, perhaps by Dr Volprecht, but which certainly
5 is something that should have been picked up at the ward
6 round on the Tuesday morning.

7 A. Well, as I say, it probably should have been picked up,
8 but I don't think it's that helpful personally. My
9 personal opinion is I don't think it's that helpful in
10 deciding the nature of the infection in Claire's case.

11 THE CHAIRMAN: Okay, thank you.

12 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: I think Dr O'Hare also thought that
13 a toxic screen would have been reasonable on 22 October
14 if Claire didn't improve. So the next day if you like.

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Would you have wanted to do that as part of the blood
17 work on the 21st?

18 A. Yes. I think as a general rule if a child comes in with
19 an altered conscious level with no obvious cause, it's
20 good practice to take specimens, blood and urine, early
21 on for possible later analysis for a toxic screen. The
22 reason being that if you don't take it early on, the
23 toxins, whatever they were, may have cleared out of the
24 body if you go back and try and repeat it later, and
25 you'll miss it. So even if the specimens are not

1 actually analysed, it's good practice to keep them, and
2 I think it would have been useful to have had those
3 specimens sitting in the lab even if they weren't
4 analysed. It may have been that later other evidence
5 came along that showed clearly poisoning was not the
6 problem and that it could not have happened, but as a
7 first-line investigation, it would have been useful.

8 Q. And that's because although you can't detect them any
9 longer, because they've dissipated through the system,
10 their effects may still be there --

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. -- and you would want to be able to identify what it was
13 that was causing those effects?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. The white cell count, as you see it there, is raised.
16 Professor Cartwright thought that was markedly raised,
17 enough for your attention to be drawn to it.

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Is there anything that you would have done about that?

20 A. No, it's very non-specific. All that tells you is that
21 there's something going on, that she's unwell. It
22 doesn't tell you what kind of illness it is. It
23 suggests, but does not prove, an infective cause. I
24 should also point out -- I'm not sure if this has been
25 mentioned before -- that seizures, convulsions, in

1 themselves can actually cause a rise in the white cell
2 count in the absence of any infection.

3 Q. And then could that have been a reason why perhaps
4 Dr O'Hare might have retained the differential diagnosis
5 of encephalitis, which she had thought about?

6 A. Do you mean the high white count on its own?

7 Q. Well, the evidence that she had before her, thinking
8 that maybe the high white cell count indicates perhaps
9 something viral, maybe something to do with seizures,
10 maybe the encephalitis is producing seizures. There's
11 a train of thought that might have gone on. What I'm
12 trying to ask you is whether it would have been better
13 practice for her to have retained a broader range of
14 differential diagnoses than to have simply stuck with
15 the viral illness, which ultimately was her decision.

16 A. Yes. As I said in my report, viral illness and
17 encephalitis, are not usually exclusive. Encephalitis
18 is a form of viral illness, though obviously a very
19 serious one. I think what you're asking was, should the
20 high white cell count have made her more suspicious that
21 this was a more serious viral illness rather than
22 a trivial one, and I don't think it does. You can get
23 a white count of 16 in a relatively minor viral illness.

24 Q. Thank you. Do you think that stool samples might have
25 been taken?

1 A. Yes. It would not have helped immediately because it
2 takes 24, 48 hours to get a result from a stool
3 microscopy and culture. To do viral tests on stool,
4 which I think was later mentioned by Dr Webb, takes much
5 longer.

6 Q. If it is going to have that sort of time lag for
7 a result, might that be a reason for starting it sooner
8 rather than later if you are thinking that there is
9 a viral cause?

10 A. Yes. Although obviously it depends on the child opening
11 their bowels. So a stool test can only be available if
12 that happens.

13 Q. Yes, assuming that that was available, would it have
14 been an appropriate thing to have done?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. A reasonable thing to have done?

17 A. Yes, it would.

18 Q. I think in fairness viral cultures were taken on
19 admission. Professor Neville has also formed the view
20 that Dr O'Hare performed a competent examination, but he
21 felt that her differential diagnosis and investigations
22 were not adequate. I'm going to ask you how you respond
23 to what he said.

24 Firstly, he thought that Dr O'Hare should have
25 discussed the patient with the consultant paediatrician;

1 is that your view?

2 A. I think that's a difficult question. In my initial
3 report, I thought it was justifiable for her not to
4 discuss on admission with a consultant paediatrician,
5 given that, although Claire clearly had a problem, it's
6 something that could have waited until the next morning.

7 I am still inclined to that view, but it would
8 depend a lot on Dr O'Hare's personal confidence and
9 experience with dealing with this sort of condition.

10 Q. Well, if we stay with the fact that she had thought it
11 might be encephalitis and then, on reflection at some
12 point, presumably struck that out and stayed with viral
13 illness, do you think she might have prescribed any
14 treatment for a viral illness at that stage?

15 A. If she was strongly suspecting that it was a viral
16 encephalitis, it would have been appropriate to start
17 acyclovir, which is an antiviral medication.

18 Q. Would there have been any downside to doing that if
19 subsequently you formed the view that maybe it wasn't
20 that?

21 A. No, and frequently acyclovir --

22 THE CHAIRMAN: Sorry, doctor, she would only do that if it
23 was a strong suspicion?

24 A. Yes.

25 THE CHAIRMAN: And if her view is that it probably isn't,

1 would she do it anyway?

2 A. Sorry, can you repeat the question?

3 THE CHAIRMAN: She had "encephalitis" and then struck it
4 out. That does not seem to indicate a strong suspicion.

5 A. I agree.

6 THE CHAIRMAN: Your answer was:

7 "If she was strongly suspecting that it was a viral
8 encephalitis, it would have been appropriate to start
9 acyclovir."

10 If it wasn't a strong suspicion, then it's not
11 appropriate to start it.

12 A. Yes, I agree.

13 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Is there anything else that you think
14 she might have prescribed in relation to her diagnosis
15 or presumptive diagnosis that it was a viral illness?

16 A. No, most viral illnesses do not require treatment.

17 Q. Could she have flagged it up for something to consider
18 later on?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Should she have?

21 A. She should. This leads on to the whole issue of
22 handover, which I think has been discussed previously.
23 But if there was any substantial handover of Claire to
24 the daytime Allen Ward team, mentioning encephalitis, if
25 only to dismiss it, if only to say that, "Actually,

1 I don't think it is encephalitis", would have been
2 appropriate, yes.

3 Q. Are the things you've dismissed also important to help
4 others in the formulating of the differential diagnoses
5 and the reason why you have dismissed them?

6 A. Sorry, can you repeat the question?

7 Q. There are positive differential diagnoses and there are
8 also things that you have considered but, for one reason
9 or another, have dismissed. Are those important to
10 communicate as well to those coming after you to have
11 the care of the child to tell them, "I've thought of
12 that and I dismissed it because of whatever reason"?
13 Is that an important piece of information?

14 A. Yes, it is, but it comes back to the time available and
15 the adequacy of the handover. By today's standards,
16 handover is now much more rigorous, is much more
17 detailed. And also, importantly, has a teaching
18 element, which perhaps isn't very relevant here. So
19 when you're discussing a patient and you talk about all
20 the things that it could be but it isn't, everybody
21 listening to that handover learns and thinks, "Gosh,
22 next time one of these this comes along, I have to think
23 of that, even though it didn't apply in this particular
24 patient".

25 Where handover is very rushed and brief, as it

1 appears to be in this case, there may not have been time
2 to go into all the different unlikely possibilities.

3 Q. Was encephalitis an unlikely possibility as far as
4 you are concerned?

5 A. Um ... No, I don't think it was an unlikely
6 possibility.

7 THE CHAIRMAN: We're into curious language, aren't we,
8 between unlikely possibilities and likely possibilities.

9 A. Yes.

10 THE CHAIRMAN: But we're not into probabilities?

11 I interpreted your report as being mildly critical of
12 Dr O'Hare, but no more than that; would that be a fair
13 interpretation?

14 A. That is true. Encephalitis is a difficult diagnosis.
15 Many children who come in with a viral illness behave
16 abnormally for a short time and then rapidly improve by
17 the next morning, and that slightly abnormal
18 behaviour -- sleepiness, drowsiness, not being
19 themselves -- is a transient thing and that's
20 particularly associated with a gastrointestinal illness
21 and can often happen. Most bounce back and are fine the
22 next morning. They would not be generally described as
23 encephalitis, although it may be in some of these
24 children there is some causal link between the virus
25 that's causing the gastrointestinal illness and their

1 behaviour.

2 THE CHAIRMAN: The other point that I think is probably
3 relevant for me to note about Dr O'Hare is that, while
4 you are mildly critical of her, there was nothing which
5 was done overnight on the Monday/Tuesday, which could
6 not have been improved upon or tested better or in more
7 detail on the Tuesday morning, either before or after
8 the ward round?

9 A. I don't think there was anything that should have been
10 done before the ward round, given that it seems her
11 condition had improved slightly, although quite what
12 that means I'm not sure. But I think it would have been
13 the right thing to wait for the team doing the ward
14 round to take a more detailed second look and go over it
15 again. I think that's reasonable.

16 THE CHAIRMAN: Okay.

17 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Thank you.

18 MR FORTUNE: Sir, before my learned friend continues we seem
19 to have jumped quickly from the examination on admission
20 to the ward to the ward round itself. In between we've
21 had no reference so far to the question of the lumbar
22 puncture, nor particularly to the reassess after fluids,
23 which of course is the opportunity later in the evening
24 to revisit any of the earlier diagnoses.

25 THE CHAIRMAN: I don't think Ms Anyadike-Danes was going to

1 let me jump ahead. I was only jumping ahead in order to
2 get an overall picture to the extent that there's any
3 criticism of Dr O'Hare, but I presume we're going to
4 back to what happened during the rest of Monday night
5 and Tuesday morning.

6 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: We are. Before we do that, I was going
7 through actually the list that Professor Neville had
8 provided to see how you responded to that. "Discussing
9 with a consultant paediatrician" was one in his list.
10 The other is that he was of the view that
11 hyponatraemia/cerebral oedema is something that should
12 have been considered as part of the differential
13 diagnosis and tested for because Claire had been
14 vomiting and she had a reduced consciousness. I think
15 his view is it wasn't just a matter that she was a bit
16 sleepy. If one looks at that part of the examination by
17 Dr O'Hare, it's very careful where she tests all her
18 reflexes. So she did seem to have a neurological
19 presentation, if I can put it that way. And I think his
20 view is that in the light of all of that, hyponatraemia
21 and cerebral oedema should have been considered;
22 do you have a view?

23 A. I think on admission that would have been a difficult
24 conclusion to come to. Those things are rare.
25 Certainly, even before the original low serum sodium of

1 132 came back, it would have been even more difficult.
2 Her neurological symptoms and signs could have been
3 accounted for by things other than cerebral oedema,
4 which is rare. If cerebral oedema had been considered,
5 it would have been obligatory to do an urgent CT scan.
6 No doubt about that. So if it had been considered,
7 I would have expected Dr O'Hare to have certainly
8 discussed with a consultant and ordered an urgent
9 CT scan, but I don't think that would have been as high
10 up the list of diagnostic possibilities as
11 Professor Neville suggested.

12 Q. Well, in the field of the rare, some of the ones that
13 you have suggested that Dr O'Hare might have tested
14 for -- in fact, should have tested for -- were all rare.
15 Reye's syndrome was there.

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. The calcium abnormality would be rare, and those are the
18 two that come to the top of my mind, but there may have
19 been two or three others that you indicated were also
20 rare, but you would have done them.

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. And you would have done them because you maintain
23 a possibility that that could be what's happening, and
24 you want to exclude it.

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Should you have retained the possibility that another
2 rare, but neurological, cause was at work here?

3 A. Yes. And I can answer that quite easily. There is no
4 blood test for cerebral oedema. Simple easy to do,
5 quick and accessible blood tests can rule out all the
6 other things. To rule out cerebral oedema, you would
7 have to do a CT scan. A CT scan is a much greater
8 undertaking. From the point of view of the resident
9 doctor, it would have required discussion with
10 consultants, it would have required transferring the
11 child to the neighbouring institution and it would
12 have -- not without a significant risk, I should add.

13 So in those days, getting a CT scan was a much
14 bigger issue than it is at the moment. And that's the
15 only way it could have been ruled out.

16 Q. Can I just ask you a little bit about that? You say
17 "not without significant risk". Why would there have
18 been a risk of taking Claire for a CT scan?

19 A. Whenever a child is transported in an ambulance, even
20 for a very short distance, firstly, it takes a member of
21 staff out. And, secondly, things can happen in
22 ambulances and on trolleys in corridors. So any
23 transfer of any patient anywhere carries a small but
24 significant risk.

25 THE CHAIRMAN: Does that mean you need to have identified

1 that as a more likely possibility in order to justify
2 going through that process with Claire?

3 A. Yes. I think one's level of suspicion of something
4 diagnosable by a CT scan would have to be fairly high
5 to, in those days -- and it is very different now, but
6 in 1996, in order to justify an out-of-hours CT scan.

7 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Might it have been a factor that if she
8 has got something like that, if we don't know about it
9 and therefore can't deal with it, that could be
10 deteriorating over the night and we've got a reasonably
11 slim staff on over the night? Might that have been
12 a factor of: let's deal with it now and see what she
13 might have?

14 A. As opposed to doing it in the morning, you mean?

15 Q. Yes.

16 A. Well, it would have been much easier to arrange it
17 in the morning.

18 Q. Sorry, it's not the ease of it; it's the fact that if
19 you don't do it now, but you leave it maybe until
20 something happens later on -- midnight or whatever
21 it is -- and you realise that that's the territory that
22 we're in, it might have been an awful lot harder to have
23 organised at that time in the evening. Meanwhile, the
24 condition is developing all the while. So if there's
25 a possibility of that, would it not be something you'd

1 want to think about eliminating earlier on before you
2 face a long night not knowing if the condition is
3 deteriorating?

4 A. Yes. I agree. By today's standards, that's probably
5 what would have been done. However, I should also point
6 out the very early stages of cerebral oedema can be
7 impossible or difficult to detect on a CT scan.
8 Particularly with the technical quality that was
9 available at that time, which is not as good as now. So
10 there is an argument that doing it too early, you might
11 be falsely reassured and lulled into a false sense of
12 security whereas in fact it was too early to be seen on
13 the CT scan.

14 Q. If we come up to midnight or thereabouts, when it's
15 appreciated that -- it's not entirely clear when the
16 blood tests were taken that produced that result, but
17 let's say it's about 9.30-ish or thereabouts. That
18 would have put her serum sodium level at 132 at that
19 time in the evening. Is there any response or any
20 difference in any of the answers that you've given as to
21 the tests that might have been carried out?

22 A. No.

23 THE CHAIRMAN: I think rather than rely on this document,
24 let's go to the clinical record because I'm not sure
25 when that printout actually came back to the ward.

1 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: 090-022-052. Sorry, Mr Chairman, it was
2 there on its default.

3 THE CHAIRMAN: I understand. But the point, doctor, is that
4 the handwritten note, you'll see on the lower half of
5 this page, is, I think we're assuming, a note that was
6 phoned up to the ward with the results, which were on
7 the printout you were looking at a moment ago, but it is
8 maybe a bit unlikely the printout was available around
9 midnight.

10 A. Yes.

11 THE CHAIRMAN: So on the basis of these results then, the
12 question really is: what action might or should have
13 been taken when they came through?

14 A. Yes. The sodium level of 132, as has been discussed by
15 others, although below the normal range, is not at
16 a level where I think anybody would expect it to cause
17 significant symptoms. It's not even at a level where
18 it's diagnostic of inappropriate ADH secretion. Whether
19 you call it hyponatraemia or not is a bit of a semantic
20 point, but the ... So to answer your question, in
21 itself a low sodium of 132 at that time, I don't think
22 should have prompted any further investigations at that
23 time.

24 MR FORTUNE: What does Dr Scott-Jupp mean by "at that time";
25 midnight or 1996?

1 A. Both.

2 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Can we just look above it? We can see
3 Dr O'Hare's really trying to work through what she
4 thinks is going on. She's got a query about seizure
5 activity, so although she's got rid of the encephalitis,
6 she has a query about seizure activity because she's
7 suggesting that maybe IV diazepam, which is her query
8 for that, and then she says all that should be
9 reassessed after fluids. And then this note at
10 12 midnight is her reassessment.

11 So if we go back to what you were saying before and
12 to the advisability of a CT scan, she does have on her
13 radar that what is going on here is seizure activity and
14 not just perhaps a viral illness, a tummy bug, which is
15 one thing the parents thought their daughter had. This
16 is a little more and it's sufficient more for her to
17 query whether IV diazepam should be administered at some
18 point. Does any of that affect what you'd said about
19 the reasonableness or appropriateness of conducting
20 a CT scan earlier?

21 A. It's not necessary to do a CT scan to make a diagnosis,
22 or it doesn't help at all in the diagnosis of
23 non-convulsive status.

24 Q. I'm not sure she's got that point yet.

25 A. No, but, no, I don't think doing a CT scan would

1 influence the decision as to whether to give IV diazepam
2 or not.

3 Q. Sorry, no, it was to do with the fact that she had
4 considered seizure activity, seizure activity as
5 something that can result from cerebral oedema. I was
6 taking you back to the point that Professor Neville had,
7 that that should have been part of their differential
8 diagnoses. And at that time, when we were looking at
9 the other documents, it perhaps wasn't so clear that she
10 had retained a possibility of seizure activity, but her
11 own note makes it clear that she did, and that's why I'm
12 asking you now, now that you see that and realise that
13 that's what she was thinking at 8 o'clock when she was
14 examining Claire, does that change what you had said
15 about the reasonableness or appropriateness of having
16 carried out a CT scan to see if that could assist with
17 a thought as to what might be triggering that?

18 A. Most children who come into hospital with seizure
19 activity do not require a CT scan or certainly didn't in
20 1996, perhaps less so now. So the fact of noting
21 seizure activity is not of itself a reason to request
22 a CT scan. A deteriorating neurological condition in
23 other ways may be, but not seizure activity of itself.

24 Q. She formed the view, when she reassessed at midnight --
25 firstly I assume you're going to agree that that was

1 a prudent note for her to make to herself that, having
2 started her on the IV fluids, she should be reassessed.

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. So she does reassess her and she finds her slightly more
5 responsive. You said you weren't entirely sure what
6 that meant.

7 A. It's not very precise but it's the sort of note that one
8 makes frequently and I may have done this myself many
9 times. It is an subjective impression that she is
10 responding a little bit more to stimulation.

11 Q. And she did the first examination, so she's comparing
12 her previous view of the child with how she presents to
13 her now.

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Then she says:

16 "No meningism. Observe and reassess in the
17 morning."

18 Before we get to the "observe and reassess in the
19 morning", despite the fact that she has noted an absence
20 of meningism, would you have thought a lumbar puncture
21 appropriate?

22 A. No. I would have thought a lumbar puncture was not
23 advisable at that time.

24 Q. Why is that?

25 A. Because where there is some uncertainty about the

1 possibility of there being an intracranial lesion, then
2 a CT scan would be advisable before doing a lumbar
3 puncture.

4 Q. So you wouldn't do a lumbar puncture because there might
5 be the very sort of activity going on that a CT scan
6 would show up, but you wouldn't do a CT scan?

7 A. Yes, I see where your argument's going. A lumbar
8 puncture is done primarily to diagnose meningitis. The
9 primary presenting symptoms of meningitis are fever,
10 which Claire did not have, neck stiffness or meningism,
11 the same thing, which she did not have. In some cases,
12 a rash, and also in some cases evidence of septicaemia,
13 which she didn't have either. So there was very little
14 to clinically indicate the need to do an urgent lumbar
15 puncture. A lumbar puncture is something that can be
16 deferred if there is doubt about either its safety or
17 its necessity out of hours.

18 Q. What might a lumbar puncture have disclosed that would
19 have been helpful to know, if I can put it that way,
20 apart from confirming a meningism?

21 THE CHAIRMAN: Sorry, I don't think anybody advocates
22 a lumbar puncture should have been conducted at around
23 midnight on Claire. Is there?

24 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: No.

25 MR FORTUNE: Professor Cartwright was very hesitant about

1 a lumbar puncture because of the dangers of performing
2 the puncture and the dangers of nicking a blood vessel.

3 THE CHAIRMAN: I don't think we need to explore the lumbar
4 puncture. None of the experts who are giving evidence
5 have suggested that it would have been appropriate to
6 conduct a lumbar puncture on Claire overnight on the
7 Monday/Tuesday.

8 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: I beg your pardon, Mr Chairman.

9 I wasn't necessarily meaning overnight. Now that
10 we were on the lumbar puncture point, I was going to ask
11 him what he thought that might have disclosed because
12 that is something that happens later on, on 22 October.
13 It's something that Dr Webb wonders, or has a query
14 over, whether he would have done that. We can move on
15 to deal with that later on in its proper order. Then
16 she says, "Observe and reassess". What would you
17 understand that to mean, what should be reassessed?

18 A. Well, I think everything would be reassessed: her
19 conscious level; her seizure activity; her state of
20 hydration; evidence of developing infection, that is to
21 say fever, rash; symptoms of an associated viral
22 infection; vomiting she already had, but that would need
23 to be reassessed; diarrhoea; development of respiratory
24 symptoms; everything.

25 Q. Finally, so we're clear on where the various experts

1 stand, Professor Neville's view is that a CT scan on the
2 evening of the 21st should have been an urgent
3 requirement on the basis of a child having unexplained
4 reduced consciousness to exclude or confirm a number of
5 causes of raised intracranial pressure. I take it that
6 you don't accept that?

7 A. I don't accept that it needed to be done immediately
8 after admission on the evidence we have here.

9 Q. Or at any stage on the 21st?

10 A. No. I think it should have been considered the next
11 day.

12 Q. Thank you. What about the result of 132, do you think
13 that should have been repeated?

14 A. Yes.

15 THE CHAIRMAN: When?

16 A. Well, this is perhaps one of the major questions of this
17 entire inquiry. I think I said in my original report it
18 should have been done some time during the day of the
19 22nd, and I think other experts have been more specific
20 on that.

21 It would have been normal practice, I think, in the
22 way that the ward routine happens, and I think it would
23 have been acceptable for it to have been repeated
24 probably late morning after the ward round, after
25 decisions had been made on what investigations were

1 required on Claire.

2 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: I think in fairness to Dr Webb, his
3 evidence was -- and one sees that at witness statement
4 138/1 at page 22 in answer to 15(c):

5 "It was routine for blood samples to be taken in the
6 early morning."

7 That was his evidence.

8 A. Sorry, whose evidence is this?

9 Q. This is Dr Webb.

10 A. Yes, it may have been. It doesn't mean that it wasn't
11 also routine to take them after ward rounds.

12 Q. Yes, that's exactly the point I was going to come to.

13 If that were the practice that the routine blood tests
14 are done in the early morning and so, for example,
15 they're available for the ward round, do you think it
16 would have been necessary for Dr O'Hare, or Dr Volprecht
17 for that matter, to have indicated that repeat blood
18 tests should be done?

19 A. No, I think it would have been reasonable to wait until
20 the child had been seen on the ward round. Can I just
21 mention the reasons for that?

22 Q. Yes.

23 A. Blood tests done in the early morning are likely to be
24 done by the most junior member of the team, by the SHO,
25 with little experience. SHOs know that when their

1 seniors see a patient on the ward round, they always
2 think of another test to do, which the junior doctor
3 wouldn't have thought of, and so I think a lot of SHOs
4 would have been in the habit of delaying a blood test
5 until a senior doctor had seen them so they didn't have
6 to go back and do it again. Obviously, that saves them
7 work, but more importantly, saves the child having to
8 undergo two separate venipunctures, two separate
9 needles. So it would have been justifiable for the
10 on-call SHO to defer the blood tests until after the
11 ward round had been done in case some other tests that
12 could have been taken at the same time were added to the
13 list of what needed to be done.

14 Q. No, I didn't mean the on-call registrar or SHO
15 deferring, I meant if the practice in the Children's
16 Hospital was that -- as Dr Webb has said -- samples are
17 taken in the early morning in any event, if that's what
18 was going to happen so there would be an early morning
19 set of blood tests, would that have meant there was no
20 need for either Dr O'Hare or Dr Volprecht to
21 specifically request or prescribe repeat tests being
22 done? That's the question I was putting.

23 A. No, I think Dr O'Hare or Dr Volprecht would have had to
24 specify it needed doing. It wouldn't have just happened
25 automatically.

1 Q. Irrespective of if they were routine?

2 A. Yes. I don't think any blood tests in acutely admitted
3 children are routine. They're all requested for
4 a specific purpose at a specific time.

5 Q. Okay. The blood test that she had, which produced the
6 serum sodium level of 132, Dr O'Hare has said would have
7 been taken from blood before she had really had any or
8 very much of her IV fluids.

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. In other words, that dilute solution of Solution No. 18
11 would not have had an opportunity to have made much
12 impression on her serum sodium level.

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. So would that be another reason for wanting to get an
15 early morning test or a morning test so that you can
16 compare that, effectively what she came in with, and
17 then we'll see how she is after we've had her all night,
18 as it were, on low-sodium fluids?

19 A. Yes. I think the need to repeat it was irrespective of
20 what fluid she was getting. I think it would have
21 needed repeating had she been getting a different fluid
22 regime or no intravenous fluids at all.

23 Q. Was it all the more because she had been getting
24 low-sodium fluids? So if her own concentration was low
25 and she had received low-sodium fluids over the night

1 and into the morning, did that make it not all the more
2 important to test what her serum sodium levels were?

3 A. Not really, because we're back to the whole question
4 that's repeatedly come up in this inquiry, which
5 is: were any of the doctors aware that low-sodium fluids
6 could actually exacerbate hyponatraemia, and given that
7 it seems that most of them weren't at the time, then
8 there wouldn't have been any reason for them to do that
9 blood test on account of her having been on
10 Solution No. 18 any more than they would have done
11 anyway.

12 Q. Obviously, that's going to be an issue, the extent to
13 which the doctors knew that, but at least one doctor is
14 recorded as knowing that, which is perhaps the most
15 junior SHO of them all, which is Dr Stewart. He knew
16 that because, at 11.30 on the 22nd, he not only queried
17 whether that low serum sodium result was the result of
18 hyponatraemia, but whether it was the result of
19 hyponatraemia caused by fluid overload from low-sodium
20 fluids. So he was able to make that connection. But
21 anyway, it'll be --

22 THE CHAIRMAN: Sorry, this is becoming a discussion rather
23 than questioning. We have to get through
24 Dr Scott-Jupp's questioning.

25 I think, doctor, the point is this: it has been

1 suggested to me that there were at least three
2 opportunities to do a further blood test. One was,
3 query, should it have been done after this first result
4 came through? You're a bit sceptical about that.
5 Secondly, it might have been done before the ward round.
6 But as an absolute minimum, it should have been done
7 after the ward round.

8 A. Yes.

9 THE CHAIRMAN: And the second blood test should not have
10 waited until much later on Tuesday when it eventually
11 took place.

12 A. Yes.

13 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

14 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: If we just deal with the fluid
15 management part of it, which is where we've got into,
16 you say that the rate was appropriate and the type of
17 fluid was fairly standard for 1996.

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. And you didn't see it necessary, even with her
20 neurological presentation, to engage in any kind of
21 fluid restriction; would I be right in summarising you
22 in that way?

23 A. Yes. I know some of the other expert witnesses have
24 suggested that she should have been restricted fluids
25 right from admission. I have to say, I don't agree with

1 that. Fluid restriction is really only done when
2 a patient is known to have cerebral oedema or an acute
3 neurological condition such as meningitis or
4 encephalitis. It is, I think, a relatively less
5 important part of their management than the other
6 aspects of management of those conditions. In other
7 words, it's good practice, but it probably doesn't make
8 a huge difference.

9 If Dr O'Hare had been suggesting fluid restriction
10 because of concerns about neurological illness, then she
11 certainly should have got a CT scan. So by the same
12 token that I don't think she should have got a CT scan,
13 I don't think she should have been restricting the
14 fluids.

15 Q. And just so that we have your response to it,
16 Professor Neville's view is that at midnight some
17 consideration -- the reference for that is
18 232-002-004 -- to a higher concentration being used as
19 a precautionary measure at midnight, although he does
20 concede, in fairness, that not everybody would have done
21 so, but he believes that some consideration should have
22 been given to that. And I take it from what you said
23 that you don't agree with that.

24 A. No, I don't.

25 Q. Then at what point do you think, before 11.30 on the

1 evening of the 22nd, that any consideration should have
2 been given to fluid restriction?

3 A. Well, as I've said, I think several things should have
4 been considered at the same time. And they all really
5 go together. So that would be getting an EEG, getting
6 a CT scan, and if that showed evidence of cerebral
7 oedema, restricting fluids at that point. Even then,
8 I don't think many people would have restricted fluids
9 for presumed cerebral oedema without getting a CT scan
10 to diagnose it.

11 Q. Just to complete the fluid management part, do you think
12 the nurses should have measured the urine output?

13 A. Yes, in an ideal world they should. However, the
14 practice is that on children's wards urine output is not
15 very well done because of practical reasons. In order
16 to get an accurate measurement of urine output, you have
17 to put a urinary catheter in. That's unpleasant and
18 invasive for the child. If a child is continent and
19 able to pass urine on to a bedpan or whatever, then you
20 can measure it directly in that way. If a child is
21 incontinent and the urine wets the bed, then that's
22 almost impossible to measure. You can weigh nappies and
23 I believe Claire was in nappies at the time.

24 Q. She was.

25 A. That, I think, with hindsight, is something that

1 probably should have been done.

2 Q. Well, leaving aside the hindsight, if you're in that
3 situation in 1996, is that something that you would have
4 wanted to have been done?

5 A. Yes, I think I would.

6 Q. Thank you.

7 Mr Chairman, I was going to go over and deal with
8 handovers, but I was getting an indication perhaps about
9 the stenographers.

10 THE CHAIRMAN: Okay. We'll break and we'll have to keep the
11 breaks tight today. We'll be back at 11 o'clock.

12 (10.50 am)

13 (A short break)

14 (11.03 am)

15 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Dr Scott-Jupp, my attention has been
16 drawn to a view that you reached in terms of the low
17 serum sodium level, and it's to be found in your second
18 report, 234-002-003.

19 It's prompted -- it's at (iii) -- by the question
20 about whether the blood results that came back in the
21 evening of the 21st were abnormal and should have
22 prompted reassessment, which is an area that you were
23 dealing with just before the break.

24 Just a bit further than halfway down in that
25 answering paragraph, you are dealing with what might

1 have led to that 132 result. You say:

2 "This can happen in a range of acute illnesses,
3 sometimes due to a mild degree of inappropriate ADH
4 secretion."

5 If you had thought that that's what was going on,
6 what else should have been done at the time?

7 A. In the vast majority of children where one sees what is
8 presumed to be a mild degree of inappropriate ADH
9 secretion, although it's quite difficult to prove it,
10 the assumption is made simply on the basis of the low
11 serum sodium, nothing else. In the vast majority, it
12 resolves spontaneously as the underlying condition that
13 caused it improves. So in most cases, the answer is
14 nothing.

15 Q. Although that's most cases, is there any precautionary
16 measure that one takes if one thinks about inappropriate
17 ADH secretion?

18 A. Fluid restriction, yes. But only to a fairly moderate
19 degree, and as I say, most cases -- these are children
20 who are well -- well, relatively well, not very well,
21 but not necessarily on IV fluids, and they naturally and
22 instinctively fluid restrict themselves. In other
23 words, a child who, for example, might have a mild
24 degree of ADH secretion due to pneumonia, may well be
25 able to drink spontaneously and they will often choose

1 not to. It directly affects the thirst mechanism so
2 they actually become less thirsty.

3 Q. But Claire couldn't restrict --

4 A. No, it's a different situation when a child is, for
5 whatever reason, unable to drink and is on IV fluids.

6 Q. That's why I think the issue is being raised. If you
7 had thought that, what would that have led to?

8 A. I think it would have been advisable to consider, after
9 that result, a moderate degree of fluid restriction, but
10 it wouldn't have been standard practice at the time. It
11 would not have been seen as negligent not to fluid
12 restrict just on the basis of a serum sodium result of
13 132.

14 Q. I'm really not dealing with issues of negligence, but
15 you, I think, said it would be advisable to do that.

16 A. Yes.

17 THE CHAIRMAN: Sorry, doctor:

18 "It would have been advisable to consider doing
19 that, not necessarily advisable to do that."

20 That's perhaps a slightly different thing isn't it?

21 A. Yes. Perhaps "advisable" is the wrong word. It would
22 have been accepted practice to restrict fluids with that
23 level.

24 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: So that would have been something that
25 should have happened at midnight then because that's

1 when the result comes through?

2 A. Yes. I think I have to say ideally it should have
3 happened, but I don't think that oversight was
4 particularly unusual or major in the scheme of things.

5 THE CHAIRMAN: That's not quite what you say in your report,
6 sure it isn't, because in that paragraph in your report
7 you're not critical of the fact that this didn't happen.

8 A. Well, this is on reflection, and I admit, on reflection,
9 having considered what other experts have said. And
10 it is quite difficult to think back to what one would
11 have done. I think, had I been presented with a child
12 with a sodium of 132 in 1996, who was on IV fluids for
13 whatever reason, would I have restricted fluids --
14 I actually don't know whether I would have done or not.

15 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Thank you. If we move --

16 MR FORTUNE: Sir, I rise because I'm concerned about "in
17 these circumstances". If you look at the sentence:

18 "In these circumstances, it would have been
19 appropriate not to have acted on a sodium level of 132."

20 THE CHAIRMAN: That's why I was asking the doctor if he's
21 not moving from that written report. And if
22 I understand what he's saying, he's now taking account
23 of what some of the other experts have said, but he
24 can't say whether in 1996 he would have acted on that
25 report himself.

1 MR FORTUNE: But which expert is Dr Scott-Jupp referring to
2 specifically when he's saying, "I'm now influenced by
3 the opinions of others"?

4 A. I think it was Professor Neville, who said -- I'm sorry,
5 I'm getting a little confused as to which expert reports
6 I've read, but I think it was Professor Neville who
7 suggested there should have been fluid restriction
8 there.

9 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Yes. Professor Neville is, if that
10 helps you, is the paediatric neurologist; is that the
11 expert that you're talking about?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Then if we move to handovers. The handover that I'm
14 specifically talking about is the handover that would
15 have taken place between the outgoing, if I can put it
16 that way, night staff and the incoming day team. And
17 that would have been round about 9 o'clock or
18 thereabouts.

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. What would you have expected of a handover between
21 Dr O'Hare on the one hand, as the registrar, and
22 Dr Volprecht as the SHO, and then, on the other,
23 Dr Sands and Dr Stevenson, who are their opposing --
24 they're colleagues of the same rank, if I can put it
25 that way. What would you have expected in that handover

1 at 9 o'clock or thereabouts?

2 A. In respect of Claire, do you mean, or generally?

3 Q. No, Claire.

4 A. I would have expected the outgoing team to have said she
5 has been admitted, given a very brief history, both of
6 her earlier possible epilepsy and learning difficulties
7 and also of the events the day before. But it would
8 have been quite brief. And also to have described the
9 working diagnosis, which Dr O'Hare felt was a viral
10 illness, and that bloods had been done on admission and
11 I think those results should have been pointed out, and
12 that she was continuing on IV fluids and being observed
13 on the ward.

14 Q. Dr O'Hare describes very briefly -- because I think, as
15 you've indicated, it's a brief handover -- what she
16 thinks she would have been trying to convey. It's the
17 transcript of 18 October, page 178. I think it starts
18 at line 18. There we have it from lines 18 to 21:

19 "I would have said: this is a child that I wasn't
20 100 per cent clear about her diagnosis and I would like
21 her reviewed on the ward round."

22 And I think, in fairness to her, she doesn't have
23 a very clear recollection of that. From what you said,
24 does that mean you would have anticipated however brief
25 it was, it would have a little more content than that?

1 A. Well, if that's all that was said, that is extremely
2 brief. It would and should have had more content than
3 that, I believe.

4 Q. Would you have expected necessarily for there to have
5 been a handover between Dr Volprecht and Dr Stevenson?

6 A. That's difficult to answer and would depend on the
7 custom and tradition in the hospital at that time. It
8 wouldn't necessarily be important for two separate
9 handovers to occur at both registrar and SHO level.
10 Only one needed to happen. Ideally, all four doctors
11 would be there at the same time. And that's what
12 happens now, very much. The practicalities may have
13 been that there was so much to hand over that it was
14 divided up and different patients were handed over to
15 different people at different times.

16 Q. In any event, whoever is doing it, the information that
17 you gave in answer to my earlier question is information
18 that you think ought to have been passed on.

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Can I ask you about whether you consider there's any
21 difference in handovers? There's obviously a handover
22 here in the morning when you have staff who are covering
23 a number of children's beds, now handing over to staff
24 who would be operating during the day, but there would
25 be more of them. And then at the other end, those who

1 have looked after her during the day handing over to
2 what may be a more skeletal cover. Do you have a view
3 as to which is the more important handover in terms of
4 the amount of information to convey?

5 A. They're both important. The morning handover, there
6 would have been no need for the night team to hand over
7 patients that the day team already knew about on their
8 ward if nothing had changed overnight. So the only
9 patients the night-time team would have needed to
10 mention is new patients and those patients whose
11 condition had changed during the night.

12 The evening handover, where the oncoming team
13 probably or often wouldn't have known any of the
14 patients on the ward because they may have been based on
15 a different ward, would have needed a little bit of
16 information about all the patients on the ward, even if
17 it was very brief, for those that weren't particularly
18 ill or weren't expected to change overnight.

19 Q. And might they have needed a better pointer as to the
20 things to bear in mind since there will be less of them
21 and they are covering a larger number of beds as opposed
22 to the daytime team who may have more opportunity to
23 have tests carried out and assess the results and so
24 forth?

25 A. Yes. I think that's true. There would have been more

1 need to hand over in the evening because there's
2 a greater number of patients to hand over to a smaller
3 number of doctors, yes.

4 Q. Thank you. Just on that point, recognising that
5 division, fairly basic division, between what's
6 available to be done during the day and what's possible
7 to be done during the evening, should the daytime team
8 be bearing that in mind and recognising that maybe
9 it would be advisable to have certain tests being done
10 now so that they're being done within working hours, if
11 I can put it that way, and that their results can be
12 available to the night-time team rather than expecting
13 the night team time team to institute those and perhaps
14 have more difficulty in getting the results back?

15 A. Yes, absolutely, even more than now in that between 5 pm
16 and 9 am the following morning, there were very few
17 staff running the hospital and an awful lot of patients.
18 So I guess it would, and should, have been the culture
19 that the daytime team did as much as they possibly could
20 to reduce the workload of the evening team coming on at
21 5.

22 Q. So not only for their own purposes in caring for the
23 child during the day, but also looking to the evening
24 and thinking that we've got a rather slimmer team and
25 it's out of hours anyway for getting results back, they

1 should be sort of taking a precautionary method as to
2 what work they could get done in terms of tests and so
3 forth?

4 A. Yes, and also there are some tests that are only
5 available during working hours anyway.

6 Q. Yes. I think you've conceded that the handover,
7 certainly the one in the morning, might have been done
8 rather informally. Would you have expected any of that
9 to have been recorded or noted?

10 A. Not in 1996. Certainly today, but not then.

11 Q. Thank you. Then if we go move to the contact with the
12 consultant. I think you've already answered the
13 question, which some had, as to the extent to which
14 Dr O'Hare and Dr Volprecht should have been in touch
15 with Dr Steen. I think your view is that they didn't
16 really need to do that; would that be fair enough?

17 A. If they felt competent to deal with this, yes.

18 Q. Well, is there anything that you have seen in the notes
19 and records that indicated to you that one or other of
20 them should have contacted Dr Steen?

21 A. Well, it would have been Dr O'Hare, but no.

22 Q. Then can I ask you whether, in your view, Dr Steen
23 should have seen Claire on admission, if it were
24 possible for her to do that?

25 A. No, not necessarily.

1 Q. Should she have seen Claire when she first arrived at
2 the Children's Hospital in the morning?

3 A. Either then or have discussed with the registrar doing
4 the ward round and asked him to report back to her,
5 having seen Claire on the ward round.

6 Q. If she, for any reason, knew that she wouldn't be
7 available during the ward round -- and in fact it was
8 unpredictable the extent to which she would be
9 unavailable to see her patients during that morning --
10 would it have been appropriate for her to try and get
11 some immediate feedback ahead of the ward round before
12 she went on to her other commitment?

13 A. It would have been appropriate, yes.

14 Q. Would you have done that?

15 A. Well, it depends on what information was available. If,
16 as is quite possible, neither Dr Sands nor Dr Stevenson
17 had actually seen Claire at the time when Dr Steen
18 passed through the ward, if she did, and they hadn't,
19 until they did the ward round, appreciated how unwell
20 she was, it's possible that it may not have been brought
21 to her attention before the ward round.

22 Q. Would it have been appropriate for her to have passed
23 through the ward just to see who did come in the
24 previous evening, if she thought she might not be
25 available during that morning or at least not available

1 easily that morning?

2 A. Yes, it would have been appropriate.

3 Q. Even before the ward round?

4 A. Even before the ward round, yes.

5 Q. Because Dr Steen can't remember this, if you're in that
6 position and you've done that and you hear that a child
7 has been admitted, nobody's entirely sure what the
8 problem is but she's having some sort of neurological
9 presentation, if I can put it that way, what would
10 you have wanted to do before you moved on to whatever
11 was your commitment?

12 A. Personally, I would have wanted to see the child,
13 probably speak to the parents, decide on a plan of
14 investigation and management and refer to a specialist.
15 Under the circumstances where, if the consultant had
16 a commitment elsewhere and there was a competent
17 registrar doing the ward round, some of those tasks
18 could have been delegated to the registrar, which is
19 what their job is and is also a useful learning
20 experience for the registrar to actually take that
21 responsibility. That's entirely reasonable.

22 Q. Well, if you would have wanted to do something of that
23 sort, if that means you're there just a bit before
24 9 o'clock, the parents didn't actually arrive on the
25 ward until, I think about 9.30 --

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. -- would that have meant that you would have had or
3 would have wanted to have some discussion with your
4 registrar on those sorts of issues before you then had
5 to go to whatever was your commitment?

6 A. Yes. And I think it would have been helpful to the
7 registrar to have some guidance of what you normally
8 would tend to do in these sorts of cases, even though
9 the child hadn't been fully assessed at that time.

10 Q. I know it's a hypothetical, but Dr Steen's view is --
11 and she takes some comfort from the two records that
12 I showed you earlier this morning -- she was about and
13 her view was that she was contactable and that could be
14 done through her mobile, bleeper, her secretary and so
15 forth. Assuming that she was, would you have expected
16 her to want to -- if she had known about Claire coming
17 in with that presentation -- keep in touch with the ward
18 to see what had happened as a result of the ward round,
19 even if Dr Sands hadn't independently contacted her?

20 A. Yes, I think it would have been reasonable for her to
21 either phone or visit the ward at a time she knew that
22 the ward round would have been completed in order to
23 catch up on what decisions had been made and what was
24 happening to the patients.

25 Q. And then her clinic is at Cupar Street, which I think is

1 about five to ten minutes away, something of that sort,
2 not any great distance. I think her evidence is she
3 would have been leaving there, because it starts just
4 a bit before 2, early lunchtime, the hospital for there.
5 If that's the case, if she hadn't already, for one or
6 other reason, been able to make contact with the ward,
7 would you have expected her to go to the ward just
8 before she left?

9 A. Yes, I would.

10 Q. And would you have expected her to do that even if she
11 hadn't known who had come in the previous evening and
12 what their presentation was?

13 A. Not necessarily if ... There would have been days when
14 there were relatively few admissions and none of them
15 had been particularly ill and their management was
16 entirely within the competence of the registrar. So if
17 she had received no inkling that Claire had been
18 admitted or the severity of her condition had been
19 understated to her, she might have been justified in not
20 going back, knowing that the registrar had been there
21 and had done the ward round and that he could contact
22 her if he was concerned.

23 Q. If for any reason she was alive to the fact that perhaps
24 she had been difficult to get hold of, so any efforts
25 maybe would not have been successful, so you can't

1 necessarily conclude anything about what's happening
2 in the ward by the fact that nobody has reached her.
3 Let's say that's the situation. Would it then have been
4 appropriate for her to have gone to the ward just before
5 she left for the clinic?

6 MR FORTUNE: Sir, we've gone into a lot of ifs, ifs, ifs,
7 ifs. How far is this speculation --

8 THE CHAIRMAN: Let me put it more simply: Dr Sands took the
9 ward round and was sufficiently concerned about Claire's
10 condition that he went off to look for Dr Webb. In
11 other words, to bring in a specialist.

12 A. Yes.

13 THE CHAIRMAN: It seems to me that he would have been
14 unlikely to do that directly unless he could not contact
15 Dr Steen. Is that the way it would appear to you?

16 A. I really don't know the answer to that question.
17 I don't know whether Dr Sands would have gone to Dr Webb
18 because he couldn't contact Dr Steen or because he felt
19 he had already taken a decision that this child needed
20 a neurological opinion and had rather, perhaps,
21 overceded his remit as a registrar in reaching that
22 conclusion.

23 THE CHAIRMAN: Let's suppose that he had formed a view that
24 whatever Dr Steen thought, a neurological opinion was
25 required, wouldn't you expect him to at least inform

1 Dr Steen of that decision as soon as possible?

2 A. Yes, I would.

3 THE CHAIRMAN: Because what that means is that there's

4 a child who's under Dr Steen's care, who the registrar

5 thinks is sufficiently unwell that a further specialist

6 opinion is required --

7 A. Yes.

8 THE CHAIRMAN: -- and Dr Steen should know about that from

9 Dr Sands.

10 A. Yes.

11 THE CHAIRMAN: Because it would prompt her, if she's

12 contactable and if she's available, to visit Claire

13 herself --

14 A. Yes.

15 THE CHAIRMAN: -- and for her to liaise with Dr Webb.

16 A. Yes.

17 THE CHAIRMAN: And the one thing that we know didn't happen

18 over the next 24 hours is that there was no liaison

19 between them.

20 A. Yes. I agree with all that.

21 MR GREEN: Taking that slightly further, it's Dr Sands'

22 evidence on the transcript for, I think, 19 October,

23 page 182. It's the official transcript. He said that

24 he thought obviously Dr Steen was the consultant under

25 whom Claire was admitted, that he had been to speak to

1 Dr Webb and so on. And then further down, line 19:

2 "Well, I may have talked to Dr Steen by that point."

3 But then he goes on to give his definite
4 recollection that he did speak to Dr Steen at some point
5 after he had spoken to Dr Webb, but can't time the
6 conversation with Dr Steen exactly.

7 So perhaps Dr Scott-Jupp might assist the inquiry if
8 he comments upon what he thinks about the thought
9 processes that Dr Steen should have been having once she
10 was alerted to the fact that a neurologist had been
11 brought on board.

12 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. If you're the consultant in this
13 setting, which I know is slightly different to your own
14 setting, and your registrar has brought in a neurologist
15 and then talks to you about having brought in the
16 neurologist, what do you expect the consultant
17 paediatrician to do?

18 A. I think that would vary from one hospital to another, so
19 it's difficult to be too definite about this. There has
20 not been an agreement at this stage to hand over
21 Claire's care to Dr Webb because it seems that at
22 this point he might not have even seen her. So the
23 general consultant, i.e. Dr Steen, if I had been in her
24 situation, I would have wanted to discuss with Dr Webb,
25 either before or after he had seen Claire, and I would

1 have wanted to remain involved.

2 Would I have felt the need to actually physically
3 see her if I knew Dr Webb was coming? Not necessarily.
4 If I knew that the ... If the registrar had adequately
5 briefed me on the position that I felt it was
6 appropriate for a neurologist to become involved,
7 I might have been reassured that it wasn't necessarily
8 essential to see Claire then. In my own personal
9 practice, I think I would have done, but speaking for
10 others, they may not have felt the same way.

11 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Would it not have assisted the
12 discussion that you think you would have wanted to have
13 with Dr Webb if you had actually seen the child?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. And if you realised that your opportunity,
16 realistically, for seeing the child was that morning, if
17 you were going to see the child before Dr Webb saw her,
18 because you had a clinic that afternoon, does that not
19 make it more likely or not that you might have tried to
20 see the child before you left?

21 A. Yes, certainly it would have been good practice to pass
22 through the ward before going off and doing a clinic in
23 the afternoon --

24 Q. Yes.

25 A. -- and see the child and had the relevant discussions,

1 yes.

2 Q. The point that I was going to put to you just before
3 Mr Green rose is that, at one point, Dr Sands'
4 recollection was that he thought, for whatever reason --
5 and he didn't know what the reason was -- his view was
6 that Dr Steen was not contactable by him during the
7 morning. If that's the case, and if Dr Steen presumably
8 would have appreciated that herself, the question that
9 I was asking you is: would it have been appropriate for
10 her to have passed through the ward before she went off
11 to her clinic in the afternoon?

12 A. Yes, it would.

13 Q. Thank you. Does it make any difference to your answer
14 that she may have known that her registrar was himself
15 going to be involved in a clinic in the afternoon? So
16 he was likely to be at a clinic and she was at a clinic.
17 Would that make any difference as to the significance of
18 her seeing the child first?

19 A. Yes. If she had known that the SHOs were going to have
20 effectively no registrar, I think that should have
21 prompted her to provide more advice and availability
22 during that lunch period.

23 Q. In fairness, I think Dr Sands' view is that he would
24 have told his SHOs how to reach him, so it's not quite
25 the point that he would be himself un-contactable; it's

1 all just a matter of degree and accessibility. So in
2 those circumstances, would you still have thought that
3 it was appropriate to see the child or maybe more
4 appropriate to see the child?

5 A. I think if Dr Steen had been aware of the seriousness,
6 it would have been appropriate to see the child whatever
7 the registrar was doing that afternoon. I don't
8 actually think that's a major factor in whether she
9 should or shouldn't have seen the child.

10 MR GREEN: If I can nail this point down and go to page 185
11 of the same transcript, please, sir.

12 THE CHAIRMAN: 19 October?

13 MR GREEN: Yes. Thank you. At line 19, when asked how he
14 would have described Claire's condition to Dr Steen when
15 he spoke to her at some point that day:

16 "I think I would have described it in much the way
17 you have done [that's to Ms Anyadike-Danes], starting
18 with how Claire had been admitted, what her presentation
19 was, and perhaps most importantly what I felt, because
20 I had just examined her on the ward round, and what my
21 specific concerns were."

22 And then over the page on to 186, at the top:

23 "Question: Is there a phrase beyond that which
24 might describe how seriously you regarded her?

25 "Answer: 'Neurologically very unwell' is a term

1 that I've used, I think, in witness statements, and
2 I think did describe how I felt about Claire, that her
3 problems appeared to me to be neurological and of
4 a serious nature."

5 And then a critical question from Ms Anyadike-Danes:

6 "Question: What was your expectation that Dr Steen
7 might do as an as a result of realising her patient was
8 in that condition so far as you saw it at that stage?

9 "Answer: I'm not sure. I'm not sure at the time
10 what I would have expected Dr Steen to do except to
11 perhaps keep in touch, preferably to talk to Dr Webb if
12 at all possible."

13 And I wonder if Dr Scott-Jupp could comment on the
14 proposition that perhaps the bare minimum that could
15 have been expected, once contact was made, is that
16 Dr Steen would have kept in touch and talked to Dr Webb
17 if at all possible.

18 MR FORTUNE: Before we go to that, my learned friend
19 Mr Quinn tried to nail this point by way of reassurance.
20 It's page 236. It's after a question from you, sir,
21 at the top, line 2:

22 "I think you have said you have difficulty
23 understanding how any such reassurance could have been
24 given."

25 Dr Sands says:

1 "I do, sir, unless Dr Steen -- and this is all
2 hypothetical -- believes that Dr Webb has taken
3 everything on board and is fully in control and is
4 content with the situation. That's the only way I could
5 construe that Dr Steen might feel somewhat reassured,
6 but not completely."

7 THE CHAIRMAN: The reassurance that's being referred to
8 there is Dr Steen's suggestion that her normal practice
9 would have been that she would call from Cupar Street
10 when it finished or that the ward would ring her as she
11 was finishing Cupar Street and she would ask what was
12 going on and she somehow got some reassurance that
13 Claire's condition was now okay or less serious.

14 MR FORTUNE: Or in safe hands.

15 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. And the question then is to Dr Sands.
16 He had suggested that he had difficulty understanding
17 how any such reassurance could have been given in light
18 of the fact that when Dr Webb came in at 2 o'clock, he
19 began to prescribe more treatments, but still on the
20 basis of an uncertain diagnosis. So I think where this
21 comes back to is the point that was being made to you by
22 Mr Green, from the back left, that Dr Sands' view, which
23 perhaps chimes with your own, is that you would not
24 necessarily have expected Dr Steen to come and see
25 Claire before she went to Cupar Street, but you would

1 have expected her to become involved and to keep herself
2 involved about what was happening; is that right?

3 A. Yes.

4 MR GREEN: Also, sir, it perhaps raises the rhetorical
5 question: how could Dr Steen have taken comfort from
6 what she was told by Dr Webb if it was as full as is
7 perhaps being suggested?

8 THE CHAIRMAN: Or from what she has been told by the ward?

9 MR GREEN: Exactly.

10 THE CHAIRMAN: Sorry, but I'm not sure that there's evidence
11 that Dr Steen spoke to Dr Webb.

12 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: No, there's no evidence [OVERSPEAKING].

13 THE CHAIRMAN: I thought you suggested a moment ago about
14 how she could have taken reassurance from what was said
15 to her by Dr Webb, but it's what was said -- the
16 question is if she did -- this is all hypothetical --
17 whether there was, in fact, any contact with the ward at
18 about 5 o'clock. And the question, which is really
19 unclear, is how could anybody in the ward have expressed
20 a view about Claire's condition, which would have given
21 Dr Steen the assurance that meant that she did not need
22 to come back to see Claire?

23 MR GREEN: Absolutely. But my point was a slightly
24 different one, namely that it still leaves the question
25 in the air, even if we park that hypothetical question

1 for the time being, what Dr Steen should have done

2 following the conversation with Dr Sands --

3 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

4 MR GREEN: -- about the referral to Dr Webb and about

5 Dr Sands' grave concerns about her neurological

6 presentation.

7 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Thank you very much, Mr Green. That's

8 exactly --

9 MS O'ROURKE: Sir, could I just add to that if Mr Green's

10 making that point because when he made the point a few

11 moments ago and referred to Dr Sands' witness statement,

12 he was referring to a passage that said:

13 "... if everything was under control because of the

14 involvement of Dr Webb."

15 I'm not aware that there's any evidence given that

16 anybody tells that to Dr Steen. In other words,

17 Dr Sands repeatedly says, "I don't remember the full

18 extent of the conversation, but I know I spoke to her".

19 So where is it being said that Dr Steen was given the

20 information that everything was under control with

21 Dr Webb when again, sir, as you pointed out, there has

22 been no conversation between Steen and Webb?

23 MR GREEN: Can I assist my learned friend? Page 182, the

24 transcript of 19 October, 2012.

25 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, okay.

1 As you'll observe, doctor, from the number of
2 interventions from the floor, there's some degree of
3 tension about this. What does not appear to be in
4 dispute is that there was no direct contact between
5 Dr Steen and Dr Webb. There does appear, on one
6 interpretation of the evidence, Dr Sands' evidence, to
7 have been one conversation between him and Dr Steen at
8 some point on the Tuesday. This was after he had, at
9 least, decided to bring in Dr Webb because of his
10 concerns about Claire's condition.

11 There is effectively no evidence that Claire's
12 condition improved substantially on Wednesday. In fact,
13 if anything, it was deteriorating. And in these
14 circumstances, do you agree that it's hard to understand
15 how, if there was a conversation with Dr Steen from
16 Cupar Street and she was given any accurate information,
17 how that could have reassured her about Claire's
18 condition. We have to assume the information was
19 accurate? She may have received inaccurate information,
20 I suppose, which could somehow have reassured her. But
21 if somebody gave her accurate information, surely she
22 could not have been reassured about Claire.

23 A. I agree, yes. The condition of Claire as described
24 would not have been reassuring. The only thing that she
25 might have found reassuring was that Dr Webb was already

1 involved.

2 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. It's Dr Steen's position that Dr Webb
3 did not take over Claire's case.

4 A. Yes.

5 THE CHAIRMAN: And if Dr Webb had not taken over Claire's
6 case, but was assisting with it, then do I have it right
7 in believing that Dr Steen should then have come to see
8 Claire?

9 A. I believe so, yes.

10 THE CHAIRMAN: When say "then", I mean at the latest when
11 she was leaving. Because she says on previous occasions
12 she has done back into the Children's Hospital after she
13 leaves her clinic to see a patient who's causing
14 concern. So if she received any level of accurate
15 information and, in any event, since she knew that
16 Dr Webb was contributing to Claire's care, but had not
17 taken it over, should she have come back in at that
18 point?

19 A. Yes, or as a minimum have spoken to Dr Webb directly by
20 phone.

21 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. Thank you.

22 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

23 Just one point in terms of clearing up a point that
24 has been bandied about in terms of whether Dr Sands did
25 tell Dr Steen that Dr Webb was involved. One sees it

1 from Dr Sands' witness statement, 137/1 at page 16.

2 It's 7(d):

3 "I recall that Dr Steen was informed on the
4 afternoon of 22 October that Dr Webb had been consulted
5 regarding Claire. This was by telephone as Dr Steen was
6 not in the hospital. I believe it was me who spoke to
7 Dr Steen."

8 I believe he may refer to it again at page 20.

9 THE CHAIRMAN: If you just pause there. If Dr Sands did
10 speak to Dr Steen in the afternoon, it'd be an
11 astonishing omission if he didn't mention to her that
12 Dr Webb was involved in assisting with Claire's care,
13 wouldn't it?

14 A. Yes, it would.

15 MS O'ROURKE: Sir, can I make clear my interjection, to
16 which Mr Green responded? I wasn't saying there wasn't
17 evidence that Dr Sands was saying there had been such
18 a conversation, I was saying we don't know the content
19 of it because Mr Green had referred to the fact of if
20 somebody had told Dr Steen that Dr Webb was now in full
21 control, which suggests Dr Webb's doing something more,
22 in other words taking on the patient rather than giving
23 some advice in respect of it, and therefore taking it
24 out of Dr Steen's hands. And I'm saying -- unless I've
25 missed it and others obviously know the evidence better

1 than me -- I'm not aware that Dr Sands has said any more
2 than, "Yes, I had a conversation with her and, yes,
3 I told her that Dr Webb was involved". In other words,
4 he's not recalling the detail of that conversation or
5 whether he said Dr Webb's taken over or what Dr Webb's
6 doing or the detail. So it's not an issue about whether
7 there was a conversation; it's about the detail of that
8 conversation and what impression that would have given
9 Dr Steen at that stage in time as to the degree of
10 involvement of Dr Webb.

11 THE CHAIRMAN: It's hard to see how Dr Sands could have said
12 to Dr Steen that Dr Webb had taken over Claire's care.

13 MS O'ROURKE: Indeed.

14 THE CHAIRMAN: If Claire's care is going to be taken over,
15 it has to be, effectively, with the agreement of
16 Dr Steen, doesn't it, because she is the named
17 consultant?

18 MS O'ROURKE: Sir, that's my point. It's simply because
19 Mr Green had referred to part of the transcript that
20 said:

21 "... and if there was reassurance that all was now
22 in control of Dr Webb."

23 And that might lead some people to believe, when you
24 talk about "in control", they've taken over the patient.
25 It's a different matter to say, "I'm giving advice as an

1 expert", and that's how I've read Dr Scott-Jupp's
2 reports and, indeed, understood his evidence to date,
3 that that's what he would accept is more normal. It's
4 not that the patient's taken over and Dr Steen's dropped
5 out.

6 MR GREEN: Perhaps the fullest account of the conversation
7 between Dr Steen and Dr Sands is at page 185 of the
8 transcript of 19 October. And follows on to page 186,
9 if they could be brought up together. I'm not going to
10 read tranches of it out, but you see there, sir, what
11 Dr Sands' recollection, supplemented by what he thinks,
12 reconstructing it, he would done, is about this
13 conversation with Dr Steen and what his expectations of
14 her would have been as a bare minimum.

15 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

16 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: We're going to leave this point soon,
17 but I'm still trying to make sure that we have your
18 clear evidence as to what you think Dr Steen ought to
19 have done about seeing Claire before she left for
20 Cupar Street. You've had a number of scenarios put to
21 you. Leaving aside whether she spoke to Dr Sands at
22 that point and he conveyed to her at that point that he
23 thought that Claire was neurologically very unwell,
24 I think you have suggested it would have been at least
25 prudent for her to have kept in touch with the ward and

1 seen what the position was before she left for
2 Cupar Street; would that be fair?

3 A. It would have been prudent, yes.

4 Q. Right. I wonder if we can pull up Dr Sands' witness
5 statement, 137/1 at page 15. If we can pull up page 16
6 next to it, please. The question really emanates from
7 7:

8 "However, I and the ward team felt that she was
9 really very unwell."

10 And:

11 "Identify all the member of the ward team and
12 specify their position."

13 And he goes on and says that. He says:

14 "My statement that I and the ward round team felt
15 that Claire was really very unwell reflects the ward
16 round discussion and the feeling that Claire was very
17 unwell from a neurological viewpoint."

18 He says that is what prompted his action to go to
19 Dr Webb. If you go to the top of page 16 at (c):

20 "Identify the members of the ward team who felt that
21 she [Claire] was really very unwell."

22 He said:

23 "I believe it was the combined feeling of the ward
24 round team that Claire was very unwell neurologically.
25 I recall that this included medical and nursing staff on

1 the ward round."

2 So the question that I'm putting to you is: if she
3 had contacted the ward, as you thought was prudent,
4 it would seem at least from Dr Sands' evidence that
5 anybody who spoke to her, whether it was a member of the
6 ward round team or the nurses, would have been telling
7 her that they all thought that Claire was neurologically
8 very unwell and they presumably would have known that
9 Dr Sands was off to try and get some assistance from
10 Dr Webb, the neurologist. So if that's what she had
11 learnt from a nurse or a doctor, whomsoever, in your
12 view should she have come and seen Claire before she
13 left for Cupar Street?

14 A. Yes. I think she should, but if she had been reassured
15 that Dr Webb was definitely going to see Claire and
16 there was going to be some consultant involvement at
17 that level, that might have made it less imperative for
18 her to see Claire straightaway.

19 THE CHAIRMAN: But she would want to know what the outcome
20 of Dr Webb's --

21 A. Yes.

22 THE CHAIRMAN: -- assistance was and that would influence
23 her in deciding whether she should then come back in
24 because she would want to speak to Dr Webb. She'd also
25 then presumably want to speak to Dr Sands, she'd want an

1 update from Cupar Street and then decide whether or not
2 to come in at 5 o'clock.

3 A. Yes.

4 THE CHAIRMAN: And if she's getting accurate information
5 from any of these conversations, then the only possible
6 course of action for her would have been to go and see
7 Claire.

8 A. Yes.

9 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Might she have wanted to know before she
10 left when it was anticipated that Dr Webb might be
11 seeing Claire and might she have wanted to talk to him
12 before she herself went off to Cupar Street?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. That would have been reasonable?

15 A. That would have been reasonable, yes.

16 Q. In her position, what would have been your conduct?

17 A. I would have wanted to see the patient and speak to
18 Dr Webb.

19 Q. Thank you. Because we've jumped a little bit on because
20 we were dealing with the contact with consultant.
21 If we deal with the ward round. From your point of
22 view, how significant was it or not that the consultant
23 paediatrician was not there to lead the ward round?

24 A. It was not unusual for ward rounds to be led by
25 registrars, and even today often ward rounds are led by

1 registrars. There's nothing remarkable about that.
2 This however was a post take round, by which I mean
3 a ward round done on a ward which had been receiving
4 acute admissions the night before. Most departments
5 arrange themselves so that the consultant who would be
6 on the night before would have been available during the
7 day to do the post take round, which is an important
8 ward round, obviously, because that's when you're
9 reviewing patients like Claire who have been admitted
10 very unwell the night before.

11 However, that doesn't oblige the consultant to
12 attend the ward round; it's just that the timetables are
13 usually arranged so it makes it easier for them to do
14 so.

15 Q. And this is a teaching hospital. I think Dr Steen's
16 evidence was that a ward round was one of those
17 opportunities where there was teaching with not just the
18 junior members of the medical team, but also students.

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. I don't know if your hospital is a teaching hospital.

21 A. No, but we do have students.

22 Q. So does that make it any more likely that, if it's
23 possible, a consultant should be leading the ward round?

24 A. Not really. Regarding teaching, there are two ways in
25 which that can be done. Either the students can just

1 tag along with the ward round, observe what's happening
2 and just pick up information by listening and absorbing,
3 or one member of the team can actually go off and
4 actively teach the students on the patients that they're
5 seeing, while another member of the team examines the
6 patient and speaks to the parents. And that's one way
7 that it is sometimes done.

8 Now, that could be either way round. It could be
9 consultant seeing the patient and the registrar teaching
10 the students or vice versa.

11 Q. In terms of Dr Sands' examination of Claire and the
12 differential diagnoses he formulated as a result of
13 that, the evidence was that although Claire had been
14 thought to have improved some time earlier in the
15 morning, at least by the time her parents came -- and
16 maybe slightly before that for the nursing staff --
17 there was a view that such improvement had dissipated
18 and she wasn't improving, and her parents definitely had
19 that view. And Dr Sands, when he saw her, his evidence
20 was that he could understand why the parents had the
21 view that they did have.

22 In those circumstances, have you any comment as to
23 how long you think he might have spent examining Claire
24 and discussing with her family?

25 A. Sorry, are you asking how long I think he should have

1 spent or how long he actually did spend?

2 Q. How long you think he should have.

3 A. On the ward round?

4 Q. Yes.

5 A. I would think maybe between 10 and 20 minutes would have
6 been a reasonable length of time.

7 Q. Thank you. Your first report, 234-002-004, was that
8 Dr Sands' diagnosis was not unreasonable at the time,
9 but that other differentials, including encephalitis and
10 encephalopathy should have been considered.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Dr Sands' evidence was that he did discuss encephalitis
13 during the ward round. If he had discussed that, would
14 you have expected the SHO to have recorded that?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. And if he had discussed it and formed a view that that
17 was a differential diagnosis along with his
18 status epilepticus, what do you think should have
19 followed from that in terms of tests and treatment?

20 A. From his consideration that the encephalitis --

21 Q. Yes, yes.

22 A. There are two separate issues. There's the
23 status epilepticus and the encephalitis, which are
24 related but they're not synonymous.

25 To deal with encephalitis first, the investigations

1 that I think should have been considered during the day
2 are a CT scan of the head, as we've already mentioned,
3 possibly doing more investigations for a potential viral
4 cause, which would including doing -- I won't list the
5 investigations, but looking for potential viral causes.
6 And possibly, but only after a CT scan, doing a lumbar
7 puncture.

8 Q. Can I just confine you for a moment to Dr Sands having
9 done the ward round and, in the course of the ward
10 round, according to him, formed the view that a
11 differential diagnosis is encephalitis.

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. I'm going to take them each in turn. He has
14 status epilepticus, encephalitis and encephalopathy. On
15 the encephalitis front, if he had formed that view, what
16 should have been prescribed in terms of further tests or
17 treatment to address that at that stage?

18 THE CHAIRMAN: The CT scan. That's what he said.

19 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: I think Dr Scott-Jupp said "at some time
20 during the day"; I'm trying to see what should have gone
21 in the note as prescribed.

22 A. That would depend on who had the authority -- sorry. Go
23 back a bit. A CT scan should certainly have been
24 considered. The practicalities of actually getting
25 a CT scan would depend on the local arrangements and on

1 who had the authority to order one. It may be that
2 Dr Sands did not have the authority to order a CT scan.

3 MR GREEN: Can I help on this? The reference is WS137/1 at
4 page 36, where Dr Sands' evidence, as adopted when he
5 gave his evidence on oath, was that the keys to the
6 CT scan were in effect in the hands of the consultant
7 neurologist.

8 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Yes, I understand.

9 MR GREEN: And the same, whilst I'm on my feet, for an EEG.

10 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

11 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: The question is: if that was something
12 that he was considering, should he have recorded it or
13 had it recorded by the SHO in the medical notes and
14 records?

15 A. Yes, ideally. I suspect what was going through
16 Dr Sands' head at the time, and he may have said this
17 somewhere, was that if he'd already come to the
18 conclusion that both a CT and an EEG were probably
19 necessary, he would have got them done quicker by going
20 straight to Dr Webb and bypassing Dr Sands [sic]. That
21 might have been his line of thought at that time.

22 Q. This is Dr Sands.

23 A. Sorry, bypassing Dr Steen, I beg your pardon. And if
24 he was aware that the procedure in the hospital at that
25 time was that Dr Steen was not in a position to

1 authorise either a CT scan or an EEG, he may have felt
2 that he could get Claire investigated more quickly by
3 going directly to Dr Webb.

4 Q. I accept that. This is just the question: should it
5 have been recorded in the medical notes and records?

6 A. It should have been. It may be that it was something
7 that he felt he would come back and do later and then
8 never did. There may be various reasons, but yes, it
9 should have been.

10 THE CHAIRMAN: Sorry, what should have been recorded in the
11 notes, the fact that he was going to ask Dr Webb?

12 A. That it had been considered that she should have had
13 a CT scan or an EEG and that --

14 THE CHAIRMAN: Would that not be a bit unclear? Would that
15 not be saying, "I think she might need a CT scan or an
16 EEG, therefore I'm going to see Dr Webb because he can
17 authorise it and it's up to him to decide whether
18 that is the appropriate course"?

19 A. Yes. He may have felt he was not of sufficient
20 experience and seniority to actually give an opinion on
21 whether she should have a CT or an EEG, and therefore he
22 would defer to somebody more senior before that would
23 have been recorded. But there wouldn't have been any
24 harm in recording it in the notes.

25 THE CHAIRMAN: He would not be recording a definite course

1 of action?

2 A. No. Because he wasn't able to take that action.

3 THE CHAIRMAN: He would be recording the fact that he was
4 going to ask somebody else, who could authorise it?

5 A. Yes.

6 MR FORTUNE: There is, of course, the alternative. If
7 Dr Scott-Jupp looked at 090-022-053 and saw under the
8 heading "Plan", "rectal diazepam" and then "Dr Webb",
9 how would he interpret that part of the plan, what would
10 he be expecting Dr Sands to be saying in that plan?

11 A. The immediate treatment for non-convulsive
12 status epilepticus is to give a rapidly acting
13 anticonvulsant medication such as diazepam. So having
14 considered that, to give rectal diazepam was an entirely
15 reasonable treatment.

16 MR FORTUNE: I'm more concerned with the second line, "Plan,
17 Dr Webb".

18 A. Yes.

19 MR FORTUNE: What would you interpret that to mean?

20 A. That she was sufficiently ill to require a paediatric
21 neurology opinion. Neurologically ill.

22 MR FORTUNE: And potentially a CT or EEG?

23 A. Yes.

24 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: So just to finish off I think what
25 Mr Fortune is getting at, but in the same way as

1 you have put or it was written, "Discuss with Dr Gaston
2 re previous history", he might have put, "See Dr Webb re
3 presentation, query CT scan, query EEG"?

4 A. Yes. I suspect Dr Sands felt that it didn't really need
5 to be stated, that it was obvious to him -- and would
6 have been to Dr Webb -- that that was a line of
7 investigation that would have been gone down. I suspect
8 the comment about "discuss with Dr Gaston", who was the
9 consultant who had seen Claire much earlier, was
10 a reminder to himself or his SHO to make a phone call,
11 which would have needed some sort of prompt in the notes
12 to remind people to do it.

13 Q. I suppose, in a way, some of this comes down to what is
14 the purpose of the medical notes of records --

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. -- in terms of flagging up to those who weren't present
17 when you were formulating your thoughts things that you
18 have either intended to pursue or discounted or so
19 forth. And that's why I think you're being pressed
20 a little bit as to whether some of these alternative
21 points or investigations along the way ought to be
22 recorded.

23 A. Yes. Well, medical notes are often very incomplete, and
24 this happens all the time and everywhere. There are
25 a lot of things that should go in that don't. And

1 I don't think these notes are particularly worse than
2 any other sets of notes that one could have found, then
3 or now.

4 Q. If we just keep that page up --

5 THE CHAIRMAN: And put up the page before, which is the
6 complete note. Could we have page 052 as well, please?

7 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Thank you very much, Mr Chairman.

8 Starting at the bottom on the left-hand side and
9 going up to where you were being taken to just now is
10 Dr Stevenson's complete note of the ward round that
11 Dr Sands undertook. In terms of what Dr O'Hare thought
12 would happen, that there would be a complete review,
13 I think she said, because she wasn't 100 per cent
14 certain what was wrong with the child, is there any
15 evidence that there has been here a complete review of
16 Claire's condition with a view to formulating
17 a differential diagnosis as to what was causing it?

18 A. It is quite a brief ward round note, but the note
19 doesn't usually, in a ward round, always reflect the
20 amount of time that was spent seeing the patient. It
21 depends on the time available and the conscientiousness,
22 if you like, of the person doing the writing.

23 Q. Do you see any evidence of her fluid regime having been
24 reviewed?

25 A. No. There's just a note that she is on IV fluids.

1 Q. Yes. Do you see any evidence of there having been
2 either a set of blood test results from that morning or
3 a direction that there should be blood tests taken?

4 A. No.

5 Q. Do you think that should have been there?

6 A. Yes, as I've already said.

7 Q. You might have said this before, and I apologise if
8 you've answered it, but in terms of the possibility of
9 there being some sort of underlying viral trigger to
10 some of her presentation, do you see any evidence as to
11 what's being done about that?

12 A. Well, as I've said, unless you have made a diagnosis of
13 encephalitis or a provisional diagnosis of encephalitis,
14 most viral infections do not require any treatment. So
15 I don't think that needs explicitly stating in the
16 notes. You'll find many children who are admitted to
17 a children's ward overnight, the diagnosis is "viral
18 illness, no action".

19 Q. There is a differential diagnosis of encephalitis.

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. So him having done that, what do you think should have
22 followed on from that?

23 A. I think they should have considered treating with
24 acyclovir and that may be one of the things that
25 Dr Sands intended to discuss with Dr Webb.

1 Q. I think when I asked you about acyclovir before, you
2 said that there wasn't a particular downside to having
3 instituted it. Is there any reason why he, as
4 a registrar, couldn't simply have prescribed that?

5 A. No, except that he may not have encountered this
6 particular situation before. It's unusual.

7 THE CHAIRMAN: This is really why you need a consultant,
8 isn't it? Because as it turns out, Claire wasn't one of
9 those patients who a registrar could easily take.
10 Claire was a more complicated case. Unfortunately,
11 Dr Steen wasn't there and things begin to go wrong.

12 A. Exactly.

13 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: I think Dr Sands' evidence was, not
14 in relation to encephalitis -- he is quite clear in his
15 evidence that encephalitis was discussed during the ward
16 round. Claire's parents don't ever remember him using
17 that expression, but leaving that aside, his evidence
18 was that he spoke to Dr Webb and, as a result of
19 speaking to Dr Webb, he formed the view that
20 encephalopathy should be added as a differential
21 diagnosis. So I think his evidence is that he came
22 back, therefore, and added to her notes, added the
23 encephalitis, which wasn't there, and added the
24 encephalopathy, which resulted from his discussion with
25 Dr Webb.

1 If he was doing that, so we're no longer in
2 a position pre him having a discussion with Dr Webb,
3 would it have been appropriate at that stage for him to
4 have prescribed acyclovir or something of that sort to
5 address the encephalitis?

6 A. It would have been appropriate, yes.

7 MR GREEN: Sir, in the interests of enabling Dr Scott-Jupp
8 to see very shortly what was being said by Dr Sands when
9 he gave his evidence, the transcript at page 118 for
10 19 October. At line 19:

11 "Question: And if you were going to put in train
12 the kind of test to help you or any consultant coming
13 after you who was going to deal with Claire's care as to
14 what might be causing the seizures, what sort of test do
15 you think, from 1996, you would have wanted to have
16 carried out?

17 "Answer: At the time, I think I would have
18 particularly wanted to get advice from a neurologist to
19 advise on that because I think I would have felt unable
20 to put down a comprehensive plan or -- maybe not unable
21 to, but it would have been better, more efficient, more
22 full to get that advice about those tests from
23 a consultant neurologist."

24 And then again on page 120 of the same transcript,
25 line 17, and there was a run-in to this, the various

1 records, as they stood at the point when Dr Sands went
2 to Dr Webb:

3 "Question: If those are all things that you could
4 have known about and therefore could have prescribed or
5 put in the plan for the SHOs to do, why didn't you?

6 "Answer: I think because my impression was that
7 I was going to speak to Dr Webb and that he, in fact,
8 would come -- I hoped soon -- and would give us a steer,
9 give us a direction to go down because it seemed to me
10 quite clear that this child, Claire, had a major
11 neurological problem that Dr Webb would be able to help
12 us with and he would guide us in terms of investigation
13 or lines of investigation, rather than me suggesting
14 a number of investigations."

15 Pausing there, while I'm on my feet, I will give the
16 reference. It's page 160 of the same transcript, where
17 Dr Sands relates a specific recollection. He doesn't
18 have a lot of direct recollection about the detail of
19 the conversation, but he specifically recalls discussing
20 a CT scan. And I wonder if Dr Scott-Jupp could be
21 asked: is it reasonable, when faced with this sort of
22 presentation, for a registrar of but four months'
23 experience to take his lead from an experienced
24 consultant neurologist?

25 THE CHAIRMAN: You mean take a lead generally in relation to

1 a CT scan, acyclovir, whatever?

2 MR GREEN: The lot, yes.

3 THE CHAIRMAN: Is that appropriate?

4 A. Absolutely appropriate, yes. If Dr Sands had been
5 confident that he could get advice quickly and
6 appropriately from Dr Webb, then it would have been
7 entirely justifiable for him to not initiate any
8 investigations or treatment himself. I think it's
9 a question of timing.

10 THE CHAIRMAN: Just to finish that, when you say it would
11 have been appropriate for Dr Sands to prescribe
12 acyclovir then, are you also saying it was equally
13 appropriate for him not to prescribe that but to wait
14 for what he expected to be a relatively short time and
15 Dr Webb would come to help and maybe give a more
16 comprehensive and more expert analysis?

17 A. Yes. If there was going to be a delay, though, and for
18 whatever reason Dr Webb couldn't come fairly soon, he
19 should have sought advice from someone else senior.

20 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: On the acyclovir?

21 A. On everything, but on that particular issue of immediate
22 management, yes.

23 MR GREEN: Just so that Dr Scott-Jupp understands the full
24 picture, it would appear that there was nobody else more
25 senior with this expertise in the vicinity at the time.

1 And also so he understands the timeline, we know that
2 Dr Sands had administered the rectal diazepam at 12.15
3 from the note, and that at 1 o'clock that afternoon the
4 central nervous system observations began and the
5 general observations were discontinued.

6 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

7 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Can I ask it in this way: as

8 I understand the position, Dr Sands had a discussion
9 with Dr Webb before Dr Webb actually arrived to examine
10 Claire, which is what happened at about 2 o'clock in the
11 afternoon. By that time, Dr Sands, it seems, had
12 already had to leave for his clinic, which may have
13 happened at about 1.30.

14 As a result of the discussion with Dr Webb, it
15 seems, the evidence seems to be that he was confirmed in
16 his view that rectal diazepam was appropriate and he
17 also was given the indication that encephalopathy is
18 something that should have been considered. So if he
19 has already got part of a treatment plan in terms of
20 Claire, which actually addresses the neurological side
21 of things, which is the rectal diazepam, would
22 a registrar in 1996 have appreciated that acyclovir is
23 medication that can be used for encephalitis?

24 A. I'm trying to recall when it first became available.

25 I think it became available in the 1980s, from my

1 memory. So it would have been around for a while. It
2 certainly had been used at that time for several years.
3 Whether it would have been within the expected
4 competence of a registrar of Dr Sands' grade, I would
5 find it difficult to be certain about. It's possible
6 that he was not aware that that was an appropriate
7 treatment for encephalitis.

8 Q. Well, maybe at some stage during the break we will check
9 the book that was -- the ready reckoner, if I can put it
10 that way, that was available to the clinicians. It's
11 called the paediatric prescriber. It's the third
12 edition, July 1994, that the Royal produced. They also
13 had some textbooks, but they may not have been readily
14 available -- that apparently was -- and they had the
15 BNF, of course. We'll check in there what it says about
16 the use of acyclovir.

17 In any event, if it turned out to be something
18 in that book and something that it would have been
19 appropriate for him to have been looking at the book,
20 is that something that would have been better to have
21 started sooner rather than later, if I can put it that
22 way?

23 A. Yes, but I rather doubt that a relatively junior
24 registrar, as Dr Sands was at the time, would have taken
25 that decision completely on his own. I think it's the

1 sort of decision that is normally taken at a slightly
2 more senior level. Even though we now know that it's
3 fairly harmless and one could almost say routine when
4 encephalitis is suspected, I think it was somewhat less
5 so in 1996.

6 Q. Is it something that he could have been discussing with
7 Dr Webb as to, "What do we do about the encephalitis
8 element of it? You have helped me with the rectal
9 diazepam, but is there anything I should be doing in
10 relation to the encephalitis?" Would that have been a
11 reasonable discussion to have had?

12 A. It would, and my own experience is that whenever an
13 unexplained acute neurological illness occurs in
14 a child, one of the first things that a paediatric
15 neurologist, when one speaks to them on the phone,
16 normally advises is: start acyclovir early on. Because
17 it may not be, it may be unnecessary in hindsight, but
18 it doesn't do any harm.

19 Q. Thank you. As for the status epilepticus, if we go
20 back, but before the encephalitis and encephalopathy was
21 added, what he actually thought, his impression, to be
22 fair to him, it wasn't so much a diagnosis as an
23 impression of what was happening, was non-fitting
24 status. Given that he is a junior registrar, as
25 Mr Green pointed out, was that an appropriate diagnosis

1 on the available indications for him to be reaching?

2 A. I'm slightly surprised that a relatively inexperienced
3 registrar came to that conclusion so readily because
4 it's a difficult diagnosis to make, clinically, and it's
5 not common at all. So I think that was surprising to
6 me.

7 Q. If he knew enough to believe that that was what is
8 happening, would he have been wanting to raise or should
9 he have been perhaps raising with Dr Webb, as the only
10 person who can help him there, as to whether there
11 should be an EEG done?

12 A. Yes. Can I just point out about the EEG? We have
13 talked a lot about it being diagnostic in non-convulsive
14 status epilepticus. It can also be helpful in the
15 diagnosis of encephalitis in the absence of
16 status epilepticus. A neurologist would know more about
17 this than me, but sometimes it can help. There are
18 certain abnormalities in EEG pattern which you can see
19 in encephalitis as well.

20 Q. So that EEG would have assisted with at least two, if I
21 can put it that way, of those differential diagnoses?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Thank you. If you had been about as the consultant
24 paediatrician and had had the opportunity to discuss
25 with Dr Webb, just so that we're clear, what exactly

1 would you have been discussing with Dr Webb?

2 A. At that time, I would have been -- well, had I been in
3 my own unit, I would have been discussing transfer to
4 the tertiary centre, but given that Claire was already
5 in a tertiary centre, that's obviously not relevant in
6 this case.

7 Q. If we just we pause there: if that had happened in your
8 hospital, you would have been discussing transferring
9 Claire to the tertiary centre?

10 A. Not necessarily acutely and immediately, but I would
11 have been discussing it as one of the options, yes.

12 Q. And why would that have been?

13 A. Well, okay, this comes back to -- going back a step --
14 the EEG question. As we were discussing earlier, EEG is
15 often not available in a small district general hospital
16 and one reason for urgent transfer or a reasonably
17 urgent transfer would be to get an EEG if there was no
18 technician available. It's obviously better if the
19 technician can do it there and then, but if there's no
20 technician available, transferring the child might be
21 the only way of getting it.

22 Q. But that's not the situation we're in here?

23 A. No.

24 Q. So given that you're in the Children's Hospital in
25 Northern Ireland, if I can put it that way, what would

1 you have been discussing with Dr Webb or wanted to
2 discuss with Dr Webb?

3 A. Well, what we've already mentioned. What investigations
4 need doing urgently, what urgent treatment needs doing.
5 So getting a CT scan, getting an EEG done, doing other
6 diagnostic investigations, including possibly further
7 blood tests for evidence of a viral infection, and
8 possibly, after the CT scan, doing a lumbar puncture.

9 Q. And why is that?

10 A. Because a lumbar puncture, its main purpose is to
11 diagnose meningitis, which wasn't the picture in Claire,
12 but it can also be helpful in diagnosing encephalitis.

13 Q. Thank you. I was going to move on to the EEG. The
14 evidence from Dr Webb is that there wasn't a possibility
15 in his view of an emergency EEG. You might be able to
16 get an urgent EEG, but in any event, given that the EEGs
17 were very often for outpatients -- not entirely, I think
18 his evidence was that you could also have patients on
19 the ward who required one and you would book one, if I
20 can put it that way. But ultimately, his evidence came
21 down to the fact that there would already be slots with
22 patients allocated to them. So it's really a question
23 of actually getting your patient a greater priority than
24 any of those.

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. So if that's the case and you are Claire's consultant
2 paediatrician discussing that with Dr Webb, how urgently
3 would you have wanted to have had an EEG done?

4 A. I would have wanted it done as soon as possible, even if
5 that meant delaying a routine case.

6 Q. Another routine case?

7 A. Yes. Or even, for that matter, a less urgent case on
8 the ward that was urgent but not as urgent as Claire.

9 THE CHAIRMAN: There is a distinction being drawn, which
10 I presume is difficult to define, between an emergency
11 EEG and an urgent EEG.

12 A. I don't think, in terms of EEG, there's such a thing as
13 an emergency EEG. It's not a service that provides an
14 emergency service, unlike radiology, laboratory medicine
15 and everything else because the vast majority -- the
16 vast majority -- of EEGs are done on an outpatient basis
17 on people who aren't acutely ill and the numbers that
18 are done urgently must form a tiny percentage of their
19 workload. So there is no service set up anywhere --
20 I think even in a big neurological hospital -- where
21 there is a 24-hour emergency call-out EEG service.

22 THE CHAIRMAN: Okay. If we understand emergency and urgent
23 to describe somehow the extent to which one is needed
24 immediately or as soon as possible, how urgent was it
25 after the ward round for Claire to get an EEG?

1 A. I think it was same-day urgent.

2 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

3 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Dr Webb comes to see Claire at about
4 2 o'clock in the afternoon. You see his note there,
5 although it's not noted in that way, but I think it's
6 now accepted that it was 2 o'clock. Just so that we
7 pull it up, 090-022-053.

8 Maybe if we can have the other page as well to get
9 the complete note in. In your view, should there have
10 been a member of the paediatric team present when
11 Dr Webb was examining Claire?

12 A. That's actually quite a difficult question to give
13 a direct answer to. General practice is, when
14 a tertiary specialist comes to see a child on a ward or
15 a specialist from another department, it's always
16 advisable that a junior member of the team accompanies
17 them. There are several reasons for that. Firstly,
18 they can provide information that might not be
19 immediately apparent to the visiting specialist. They
20 can introduce the specialist to the parents, so they
21 know who they are. They can then record and do the
22 scribing in the notes of what the specialist says, if
23 required, and they can go and check results, check what
24 investigations have been ordered, and finally carry out
25 the advice given in terms of requesting further

1 investigations, prescribing treatment and so on.

2 So it obviously makes it a much more efficient
3 process if a member of the staff can be with the
4 visiting specialist when they see a child. However, the
5 practicalities are that it isn't always possible. The
6 visiting specialist may come on to the ward at a time
7 when there is no junior doctor present or available,
8 they're tied up with other things, and that specialist,
9 rather than waiting for a junior doctor to become
10 available, may choose to see the patient directly
11 without being accompanied by a member of the team.

12 Q. But if it's possible, it's better?

13 A. It's better if they can. If there wasn't a doctor
14 available, they would almost always speak to a nurse.

15 Q. Yes. And apart from any other thing, I presume since
16 you're bringing the specialist in, it is because you're
17 not entirely sure of what's happening, so this is a way
18 of not only seeing what the specialist is recommending
19 in terms of a plan, but also understanding it --

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. -- so that one can understand the significance of
22 certain things that may happen thereafter; is that fair?

23 A. Exactly and whenever a specialist consultation is
24 sought, there's a big teaching element to it and quite
25 often a large crowd will gather and hear the words that

1 are being spoken if people are able to come. So it can
2 be made into a learning experience.

3 Q. Given what Dr Webb has recorded there as his
4 examination, and unfortunately not only does it appear
5 there may not have been any junior doctors to have
6 accompanied him, but it seems also the parents weren't
7 there. Both sets of grandparents were there, as
8 I understand it, but her parents weren't there. You see
9 the history that he takes. And then he examines Claire
10 himself. Then he gives a view:

11 "Impression: I don't have a clear picture."

12 This is perhaps because he doesn't know sufficient
13 of her history beforehand. And then he gives his
14 suggestions as to what should happen. There are three
15 strands of those: one is the anticonvulsant medication;
16 the other is hourly obs; and then the third is
17 "a CT scan tomorrow if she doesn't wake up".

18 Given that that's what Dr Webb thought was happening
19 and what his plan was, would you, as the consultant
20 paediatrician, have expected him to have contacted you
21 and discussed that with you?

22 A. I think there should have been discussion between the
23 two consultants. The question is whose responsibility
24 was it to contact who? And that could go either way.
25 Had I been the general paediatrician in charge of this

1 case, I think I would have wanted to speak to the
2 neurologist and I probably would have made efforts to
3 contact him. Some specialists would make an effort to
4 contact the supervising consultant having seen
5 a patient, others wouldn't; some would have thought it
6 adequate to speak to a member of the junior staff.

7 Q. That's the difficulty, the registrar isn't there, for
8 the reasons which have already been explained, and it
9 seems, for one reason for another -- it's not entirely
10 clear why -- that neither of the SHOs were there. So he
11 doesn't have a doctor.

12 THE CHAIRMAN: Wasn't it quite clear from Dr Stewart's
13 evidence last week because Dr Stewart said he remembered
14 being --

15 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: I think he said he remembered him being
16 about and he would have wanted to have been involved.

17 THE CHAIRMAN: He seemed to remember -- the recollection
18 might not be correct -- Dr Stevenson being with Dr Webb
19 and Dr Stewart being disappointed because he was looking
20 after somebody else and he had an interest in neurology
21 and he would have liked to have been part of that
22 discussion.

23 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Thank you very much. Perhaps I didn't
24 pick that up from the transcript.

25 If that's the case, that Dr Stevenson actually was

1 there, although Dr Stevenson can't remember --
2 Dr Stevenson has, like many, no independent recollection
3 of these events. He doesn't actually remember that. If
4 he was present and Dr Webb had discussed his view with
5 him and why he had reached that view, would it then have
6 been reasonable for Dr Webb to think he had discussed
7 things with the paediatric team and that he didn't need
8 to initiate the contact with Dr Steen?

9 A. Yes. I would have thought he would have wanted to
10 discuss it with somebody above SHO level. I would be
11 surprised if he didn't. We don't really know from
12 people's recollections whether he did or didn't.

13 I think that's fair to say.

14 THE CHAIRMAN: Dr Stevenson was a particularly inexperienced
15 SHO.

16 A. Yes. To make that plan of treatment would have required
17 some co-operation from the resident medical team and he
18 would have needed to have spoken to them. That
19 shouldn't have gone through a nurse.

20 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: So the upshot of it is, I think, that
21 even if Dr Stevenson had been present, given that he was
22 just an SHO and, as the chairman said, a particularly
23 junior SHO, it would still have been appropriate for
24 Dr Webb perhaps to have discussed that with Dr Steen?

25 A. Yes, it would have been appropriate.

1 THE CHAIRMAN: Just to go back for one moment to the
2 acyclovir and the query about whether Dr Sands might
3 have prescribed that at the end of the ward round, even
4 before Dr Webb became involved. What do you make of
5 that in light of the fact that it wasn't then
6 prescribed, sure it wasn't, by Dr Webb?

7 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Thank you, Mr Chairman. That's just
8 where I was coming to.

9 THE CHAIRMAN: What was being floated with you was the idea
10 of whether Dr Sands might be criticised for not
11 prescribing acyclovir at the end of the ward round as he
12 went off to get Dr Webb. And you were saying, well, he
13 might have left it to see what Dr Webb said. Do I take
14 it then that the fact that Dr Webb didn't prescribe it
15 at 2 o'clock means that it's pretty harsh to criticise
16 Dr Sands for not prescribing it earlier?

17 A. Yes, it would. Well, I'm not a neurologist, but I found
18 it slightly surprising that Dr Webb didn't suggest
19 acyclovir. I don't think I put that in my report; maybe
20 I should have done with hindsight.

21 THE CHAIRMAN: The general picture of what went wrong is
22 tolerably clear already and if individuals have to be
23 criticised, they will be criticised, but it's a question
24 of what the level of criticism is. In light of the
25 earlier discussion and what Dr Webb did, it might be

1 a bit harsh to say that Dr Sands was somehow at fault.

2 A. Yes, I think it would be harsh to say that Dr Sands was
3 at fault for not prescribing acyclovir for the reasons I
4 have said: he was relatively inexperienced, he was going
5 to get more senior help anyway, he had already decided
6 to do that, so I agree.

7 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: I think also your view was that you
8 thought it was appropriate for there to have been
9 a discussion between them about how you treat the
10 encephalitis or the viral element, if I can put it that
11 way, and I think it was in the context of that that you
12 thought the acyclovir could have been raised and, if it
13 had, then it could have been prescribed at that stage.

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. But to pick up the chairman's point, if you thought that
16 that was an appropriate thing to be doing just in that
17 conversation between Dr Sands and Dr Webb, would you
18 have considered it appropriate for Dr Webb to himself
19 have addressed the issue in his plan or suggestion, if I
20 can put it that way, for how the viral element of
21 what was thought to be her differential diagnoses was
22 going to be addressed?

23 A. Yes. It would have been appropriate. He said, "I don't
24 have a clear picture". The picture of acute
25 encephalopathy was probably postictal in nature. So

1 he was clearly, on that first consultation, of the
2 opinion that it wasn't encephalitis. That seems to be
3 the impression. He doesn't explicitly say that, but he
4 thought her problem was seizure activity, that her
5 abnormal neurological signs were related to that,
6 without an underlying encephalitic picture.

7 Q. So although it seems from Dr Sands' evidence that the
8 encephalopathy and the encephalitis may have been
9 discussed with Dr Webb at some point, at this stage,
10 you're interpreting his note to suggest that that had
11 been reduced, that thought, in favour of the seizure
12 activity?

13 A. It would seem so from what's written here.

14 Q. And are you able to see what further information could
15 have been available that could have reduced the
16 significance of encephalitis/encephalopathy?

17 A. No, I think the information was available on the ward
18 round. There was nothing new between then and when
19 Dr Webb came at 2, I think. There were no new results
20 and she -- all I can say is that she hadn't, over that
21 period of time, developed a fever or any other signs
22 that would be associated with an acute infection.

23 Q. So then if we deal with that suggestion of his that this
24 is most probably postictal in nature --

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Are you aware of a diagnosis like that, that her
2 presentation is postictal?

3 A. Well, postictal refers to the state anybody is in after
4 having a seizure, and her reduced conscious level -- one
5 of the commonest reasons for reduced conscious level in
6 a child is that they've had a seizure.

7 Q. Yes. Would you have expected that to have been the case
8 still at 2 o'clock?

9 A. It does seem a very long time, I admit. So usually
10 it's only a matter of an hour or two.

11 Q. I'm just going to pull up something that I pulled up
12 in relation to -- I think it was Professor Neville's
13 evidence. It's 097-001-001. This is a note.
14 Dr Dewi Evans, whose report you've seen, was
15 a consultant paediatrician retained by the PSNI, and
16 this is a note that's made of a telephone conversation,
17 so it's a little bit removed. But in any event, the
18 point you'll see that's coming is that Dr Dewi Evans
19 says that he has consulted with an intensivist
20 consultant paediatrician -- that's Dr Dawn Edwards --
21 and she has confirmed three things:

22 "Postictal abnormalities disappear by at least three
23 to four hours [presumably after the seizure]. That
24 problems remained at 9 in the morning."

25 So she was relating her potentially coming in with

1 a postictal condition, and if that was the case, if you
2 had problems at 9 in the morning then that was serious
3 and she would have been worried after an hour. So it's
4 a little bit removed but that's her view. I pulled it
5 up for you because you just expressed a view as to how
6 you would have been surprised that what was happening
7 was an actual postictal presentation at 2 o'clock in the
8 afternoon.

9 A. Yes, although there's a slight inconsistency. Because
10 if somebody is in status epilepticus, they don't have
11 a postictal phase, they're fitting continuously. So I'm
12 not entirely clear what Dr Webb meant by that, whether
13 her state was ongoing seizure activity or recovery from
14 earlier seizure activity.

15 Q. Does status epilepticus mean you fit all the time?

16 A. No.

17 Q. Or you fit periodically?

18 A. You fit periodically. He may have intended to mean that
19 it was difficult to distinguish when she was at reduced
20 conscious level because she was in a non-convulsive fit
21 or whether she was at reduced conscious level because
22 she had just finished having a non-convulsive fit.

23 Q. That's what I was just going to ask you. And if it was
24 of the non-fitting sort, you wouldn't see any of that at
25 all, so you wouldn't be able to determine whether there

1 was a fit going on or whether this was the aftermath of
2 a fit that had happened.

3 A. Exactly?

4 Q. And the only way to be sure about that is to have an EEG
5 to see whether you're having any fits at all.

6 A. Exactly.

7 Q. Thank you.

8 THE CHAIRMAN: We keep coming back to that, don't we?
9 Claire needed an EEG.

10 A. Yes.

11 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Can I ask you about the consultant
12 responsibility in relation to the IV fluids management.
13 If we can pull back up the early part of that page,
14 which is 053, so that we have the two. When I was
15 taking you through that, you said there was no reference
16 to -- I don't think you did say that. Maybe I didn't
17 ask you. There's no reference there to any review of
18 her fluid regime that you can tell.

19 A. From the ward round note, do you mean, or from
20 Dr Webb --

21 Q. From Dr Webb --

22 A. No.

23 Q. Part of that might be that Dr Webb was under the
24 impression that the 132 serum sodium level was one that
25 came from what he said was the routine bloods that were

1 taken for ward rounds as opposed to actually coming from
2 9, 9.30, the previous evening.

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. So he was under that view?

5 THE CHAIRMAN: Just pause there. Do you see how that
6 mistake was made?

7 A. Yes. I can understand the way these things happen, that
8 a mistake could quite easily be made.

9 THE CHAIRMAN: What, if you read the ward round notes?

10 A. Yes, if somebody reads the notes and -- can we go back
11 to that ward round note?

12 THE CHAIRMAN: It's top left.

13 A. That's the ward round note, but -- yes, it was written
14 on the ward round and Dr Webb clearly interpreted it as
15 having been done on or around about the time of the ward
16 round because there is no time attached to that note.

17 THE CHAIRMAN: So he must have been working on the
18 assumption that it was done on the Tuesday morning
19 before the ward round started.

20 A. Yes, before or --

21 THE CHAIRMAN: And the result was back in time for it to be
22 recorded in the ward round notes --

23 A. Yes.

24 THE CHAIRMAN: -- because it precedes any plan or any
25 diagnosis?

1 A. Yes, from where it's written, that's presumably what he
2 assumed.

3 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: The person who wrote that ward round
4 note is, of course, Dr Stevenson, who is the SHO that
5 it's thought was there with Dr Webb when he was carrying
6 out the examination. Was, at that time, Claire's serum
7 sodium level a significant thing, do you think, for
8 Dr Webb to have wanted to know about?

9 A. It was significant, but in the context of her other
10 signs and symptoms, it wasn't the most important.

11 Q. Why I'm asking you that is because the very person who
12 would have known whether the serum sodium level related
13 to a blood test that was taken that morning or to
14 a blood test result from the previous evening but was
15 simply being copied back into the notes was present with
16 him.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. So since we don't have access to Dr Webb at the moment,
19 and Dr Stevenson can't remember, what I'm putting to you
20 is: if Dr Webb is coming to examine this child and
21 trying to provide an opinion as to what's happening and
22 what ought to be done, is part of the picture her serum
23 sodium level?

24 A. It's part of the picture, but from Dr Webb's
25 perspective, probably a fairly minor part of the

1 picture.

2 Q. I haven't got to that point. If it's part of the
3 picture, is it therefore something that he should be
4 told accurately what it is?

5 A. Yes, which is, as I was saying earlier, one of the
6 reasons it's very useful to have a junior doctor
7 accompanying a specialist when they see --

8 Q. Therefore, back to the chairman's question to you: if
9 the very junior doctor who made that ward round note and
10 would have known when those results relate to is there,
11 can you see how he would have made that error?

12 A. Sorry, are you asking how Dr Webb could have made the
13 error if the doctor was there?

14 Q. Yes.

15 A. He still could have made the error if he hadn't asked.

16 THE CHAIRMAN: And he might not have asked because you say,
17 in his eyes, the serum sodium level would be relevant,
18 but not one of the primary issues he's looking at.

19 A. Not one of the primary things. He might just have
20 glanced at that note, made the assumption, not asked the
21 SHO and not asked any further about it.

22 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: I think he makes a note about the
23 biochemistry. Can we just highlight that? It's in the
24 line above "suggest". On the right-hand side, "I note
25 normal". There was a bit of debate as to whether it

1 said "no" or "normal". Ultimately, it has been
2 interpreted as normal.

3 A. Mm.

4 Q. Was that normal?

5 A. Well, there's a semantic argument to be had about the
6 precise meaning of the word "normal". I don't know if
7 you want me to go into that, you may have heard it from
8 others. The laboratory normal range, which with sodium
9 is, I think, 135 to 147 or something, is not the same as
10 what a clinician acknowledges as being the range outside
11 of which one starts to become concerned. And
12 frequently, with any laboratory result, but particularly
13 with sodium, we see results that are outside the
14 laboratory normal range. Perhaps I should just explain
15 what I understand by "normal range" because it's
16 important to realise that people vary, individuals vary,
17 and that a laboratory normal range is a statistical
18 description between certain statistical parameters as to
19 what, if you take, for example, a serum sodium from
20 a large number of people -- a certain percentage will be
21 within that normal range, but a small proportion of
22 perfectly healthy people might be outside those normal
23 ranges for all sorts of reasons.

24 So a laboratory result that is outside a normal
25 range is not diagnostic of a specific problem or

1 a condition.

2 Q. No, but does 132 still get described as "normal"?

3 A. I think that depends on what you mean by "normal".

4 Q. Right.

5 A. Sorry to be a bit evasive with that answer.

6 Q. That's okay.

7 A. The word "normal" is used in different contexts to mean
8 different things.

9 Q. There's no specific reference to reviewing her fluid
10 management in this note.

11 A. No.

12 Q. Is that something that you consider the neurologist
13 might have given some guidance about?

14 A. I think this comes largely to the crux of this case
15 whose responsibility was it to manage Claire's fluids?
16 It would have been entirely within the remit and
17 reasonable of the consultant neurologist to advise on
18 it. I think, as Claire was still under the general
19 paediatric team, the primary responsibility for doing
20 the tests and altering treatment on the basis of those
21 tests still rested with the general paediatric team,
22 Dr Steen's team.

23 Q. What guidance would you have expected him to have
24 provided as to carrying out further tests or being alive
25 to the significance or importance of her fluid

1 management?

2 A. To repeat the urea and electrolytes.

3 Q. And you would have expected that as part of his
4 suggestion, if I can put it that way?

5 A. Yes. As a suggestion, although he understandably made
6 the assumption that the general team would have been
7 doing that anyway.

8 THE CHAIRMAN: That criticism is more importantly directed
9 at the ward round, isn't it?

10 A. It is, but given that it wasn't done after the ward
11 round, then it is more the responsibility of the general
12 team, who knew that the 132 result had been quite a long
13 time previously, more the responsibility of them to
14 repeat it than it was the responsibility of Dr Webb to
15 advise them to repeat it.

16 THE CHAIRMAN: So his misunderstanding of when the reading
17 of 132 was obtained, if we assume it was
18 a misunderstanding, does that further reduce any
19 responsibility that he has for not advising on fluid
20 management?

21 A. Yes, to some extent.

22 MS O'ROURKE: Sir, can I just ask if while Dr Scott-Jupp is
23 dealing with this, particularly if the ward round
24 finished sometime around about 11.30 or 12.00, and
25 indeed possibly even slightly after, since the rectal

1 diazepam was given at 12.15, and although we've talked
2 about Dr Webb's note of whether it's 2 o'clock, the
3 evidence of the parents was that they came back at 2.10
4 and there was no Dr Webb to be seen and Dr Webb's
5 evidence is that he believed he was with Claire for 20
6 to 25 minutes. So it's a possibility -- and of course
7 Dr Webb has yet to be heard from -- that Dr Webb in fact
8 attended about 1.30, 1.40, and wrote his note up at
9 2 o'clock if he finished. So therefore, if he's dealing
10 with it within less than two hours from the conclusion
11 of the ward round, would you say the same thing in terms
12 of the repeating the urea and electrolytes or expecting
13 a further result to be available, bearing in mind it's
14 less than two hours since the end of the ward round?

15 A. I think it would have been helpful for him to remind the
16 general team of the ongoing importance of monitoring
17 urea and electrolytes, not necessarily be that specific
18 about precisely when the tests were done. Does that
19 answer your question?

20 MS O'ROURKE: Yes.

21 Can I follow that up? When you say he would have
22 reminded -- of course, and you'll be aware that what we
23 consider is the reasonable average, whether somebody
24 should have done something and fell below when they
25 didn't or whether that would have been a good thing to

1 do, in other words, not quite the counsel of perfection,
2 but it would have been a good thing to do. Are you
3 saying --

4 THE CHAIRMAN: Sorry, this isn't a medical negligence case.

5 MS O'ROURKE: No, sir, and I'm aware of that. I'm just
6 testing that when you say it would have been a good
7 idea -- let me just get your exact words to remind ...
8 "Yes, it would have been a good thing to do it, but it's
9 not necessarily a criticism if you don't".

10 A. Yes; I accept that.

11 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Counsell?

12 MR COUNSELL: I wonder if I could ask Dr Scott-Jupp to deal
13 with this? He has given evidence that he can understand
14 how it is that Dr Webb might have assumed that that
15 reading was the morning's reading rather than the
16 night's before. The evidence, I think, from Dr Sands,
17 and insofar as he was able to deal with the practice,
18 Dr Stevenson, was that it would not have been normal
19 practice for a repeat blood test to have been done
20 before the ward round on the morning and to have had the
21 results within a time frame so that they would appear on
22 the ward round note.

23 If you go to the transcript for 19 October at
24 page 99, if that could be brought up. That is the
25 transcript of Dr Sands' evidence. He's asked at line 13

1 by Ms Anyadike-Danes:

2 "I think the evidence that he gave [he being
3 Dr Stevenson, I think] is that it would have been
4 unusual to have had blood tests taken that morning and
5 have got the result back, and therefore that been
6 a result from the morning. And by 'morning', I don't
7 mean the early hours ... He said that would be
8 unusual."

9 And Dr Sands' evidence, I think, is that it would be
10 unusual if that blood had been taken at 8 or 9 o'clock.
11 I don't know whether Dr Scott-Jupp has factored that
12 into his opinion when he indicated he could understand
13 how Dr Webb could make that mistake.

14 THE CHAIRMAN: In other words, doctor, just to go back on
15 this point again, if it wasn't a normal practice for
16 blood tests to be taken before the ward round, would
17 that make it more difficult to understand how Dr Webb
18 understood that that was a result from the morning?

19 A. Not really. It depends on the practice at the time, on
20 the turnaround time that the laboratory was able to
21 achieve at that time in the morning, how results were
22 communicated to the ward. It's very much a local,
23 organisational issue. But say, for example, that it was
24 common practice for the SHOs to go round and do blood
25 tests at, say, 7 or 8 am, they could get the specimens

1 to the lab before 9, the lab could process them and
2 maybe phone the result through the ward between, say, 9
3 and 9.30. They would have been on a little slip of
4 paper for them to be presented to the ward round team
5 and written in at the time they saw the patient on the
6 ward round. That seems to be entirely feasible.

7 THE CHAIRMAN: But if that's not local practice?

8 Professor Neville was perhaps on the same track as you,
9 saying that the first missed opportunity to repeat the
10 blood tests was overnight on Monday night/Tuesday. The
11 second was by doing a blood test before the ward round
12 on the Tuesday. But let's suppose this evidence is
13 correct, this suggestion is correct, that it was not
14 usual on this ward or in the Children's Hospital to do
15 blood tests before the ward round and let's suppose that
16 Dr Webb knew that that was not the normal course, then
17 he should not have assumed that a reading of 132 was
18 from that morning.

19 A. Yes, but I don't know whether Dr Webb would have known
20 in that level of detail what the normal practice was on
21 that ward at that time.

22 THE CHAIRMAN: Okay.

23 A. He may have done, I don't know.

24 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: In terms of Dr Webb looking at the
25 medical notes and records when he came to examine

1 Claire, would you have thought it appropriate that he
2 did look at the notes and records that were made since
3 her admission?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Then if we look at --

6 THE CHAIRMAN: Sorry, so the short point is that if he'd
7 done that, he would have seen that the 132 came from around
8 midnight or some time after midnight?

9 A. I see what you mean. He may have looked no further back
10 at the notes made at the ward round. It's possible he
11 didn't go any further back than that.

12 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Sorry, if he had done that, so he had
13 captured the beginning of the ward round, he would have
14 seen 090-022-052. There we are. That's the ward round.
15 So if he had looked at the ward round note, which
16 you have just indicated he might well have done,
17 immediately above the ward round note is the concluding
18 part of Dr O'Hare in combination with Dr Volprecht's
19 note.

20 THE CHAIRMAN: You have to be careful with that, don't you?

21 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: I said "in combination".

22 THE CHAIRMAN: Dr O'Hare is timed at midnight; Dr Volprecht
23 isn't timed.

24 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Sorry, I don't think I meant to say what
25 time; I said he would have seen the concluding part. As

1 I understand Dr O'Hare's note -- that serum sodium
2 result, I think she said that was hers. She didn't
3 write all the others. In any event, whenever it came
4 in, he would have seen those results.

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. So if he's looking to get the whole of the ward round
7 note, he would have seen those results and would have
8 seen that in terms of the serum sodium result, that's
9 the same, the white cell count is virtually the same,
10 the glucose is the same. I think others that have been
11 asked that question have come to the view that the
12 likelihood of getting a set of results like that from
13 two different blood tests taken hours apart, exactly the
14 same, is perhaps quite low.

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. So if you had seen those, would the view not have been
17 that the two sets are the same thing?

18 A. Yes, I'm sure they were the same thing, but firstly he
19 may not have looked that far back at the result under
20 12 midnight and, secondly, it is possible that that
21 result -- he might have interpreted that result as
22 having been written in at some point between midnight
23 and the start of the ward round.

24 THE CHAIRMAN: I suppose the other factor is he might have
25 been under terrible pressure himself --

1 A. Yes.

2 THE CHAIRMAN: -- because one presumes he had his own ward
3 to look after and he has been called into another ward.
4 So when we all sit down and pore over these notes and
5 records, we can see how they self-evidently come from
6 the night before. But I presume you sometimes miss
7 these details --

8 A. Yes, you miss these details and as I said, to him, it
9 wouldn't have been a particularly important detail at
10 that time.

11 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

12 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Before we went into that, I think where
13 you had concluded was you wouldn't have expected him to
14 get into the minutiae of exactly when they should have
15 been taking further serum sodium tests, but you would
16 have expected him to have provided some opinion and
17 guidance on fluid management generally and the
18 significance of it in terms of her presentation?

19 A. Yes, but the general paediatric team should have been
20 able to manage the fluids without necessarily getting
21 advice from a paediatric neurologist because it's not
22 really a neurologist's remit to do that.

23 Q. No, but I think Professor Neville's position was
24 that ...

25 THE CHAIRMAN: He said that Dr Webb couldn't quite slide

1 away from some degree of responsibility for this.

2 A. Just to give a slightly more general overview, this case
3 is particularly unusual in that the symptoms and the
4 presentation were primarily almost exclusively
5 neurological, but as it turned out further down the
6 line, one of the primary causes was, in fact,
7 biochemical. This doesn't often happen. So whereas if
8 you have a neurological case, the neurologist is likely
9 to cover all aspects of it -- investigation, management
10 and so on -- but where a case is, as you might say, on
11 the cusp between neurology and general paediatrics,
12 it is more difficult to be specific as to whose role
13 it is to monitor which different aspects of the care.

14 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: When you say "biochemical", do you mean
15 some sort of a electrolyte imbalance?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. But isn't that something that a neurologist perhaps
18 ought to bear in mind, particularly as he would be aware
19 -- or he may be aware, he may not have known exactly --
20 that he's the only consultant who's seen that child.
21 Should he not be thinking in the round, if I can put it
22 that way, about not just the possibility of seizures,
23 but maybe there's something else going on other than the
24 viral element that's producing those seizures?

25 A. Yes, he should. But whose task it is to actually manage

1 it in terms of taking the tests and prescribing the
2 fluids is the issue.

3 Q. That's my fault. I was trying to make a distinction
4 between the advice and guidance that could or should
5 have been given by Dr Webb and the actual implementation
6 of that in terms of getting the test results and so
7 forth. I was trying to make that distinction and keep
8 the advice and guidance perhaps to something you might
9 have expected Dr Webb to have provided.

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And does your "yes" mean, "Yes, I would have expected
12 him to have provided that".

13 A. I would have expected him to provide broad advice and
14 guidance, yes.

15 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Mr Chairman, I'm just about to get into
16 the neurological observations. I don't know if that's
17 a good moment.

18 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, it has been a long morning. We'll start
19 again at 2 o'clock, doctor. Thank you.

20 (1.00 pm)

21 (The Short Adjournment)

22 (2.00 pm)

23 THE CHAIRMAN: We're sitting until 4 o'clock at the latest.
24 Dr Scott-Jupp has to leave by then. We'll be sitting
25 without a break until we finish this afternoon.

1 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Thank you.

2 Dr Scott-Jupp, I have been asked to try and have you
3 deal with the issue of the EEG. I know that you've been
4 over it a number of times, but some people are a little
5 concerned nonetheless -- not concerned, but wish to be
6 clear on it in relation to what you said in your second
7 report.

8 You deal with it in your second report at
9 234-002-004. I think in the light of the evidence that
10 you were giving just before the luncheon break about
11 what you consider to be the need for an EEG, I think
12 people just want to be absolutely clear about what
13 you're saying in paragraph (iv) and then in that
14 asterisked paragraph. You say:

15 "In his 2012 witness statement, Dr Webb states that
16 there was no urgent EEG service available at the RBHSC
17 at the time. My criticism of the failure to obtain an
18 EEG to confirm the clinical diagnosis of non-convulsive
19 status may therefore be unjustified."

20 In the light of the views that you have been
21 expressing today about what the EEG would have done and
22 what you consider to be its significance, can you help
23 us as to whether it remains your view that it's not an
24 appropriate criticism to say that the EEG should not
25 have been obtained to confirm the clinical diagnosis of

1 non-convulsive status?

2 A. I think the inquiry has heard since Dr Webb's witness
3 statement that there was in fact a possibility of an EEG
4 being available, in spite of what Dr Webb says; is that
5 correct?

6 Q. I think we need to be clear about that. I don't think
7 there has been any dispute that there was an EEG
8 service.

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. And in fact, I think in file 150 you saw that child W1
11 actually had an EEG in the morning, which was a booked
12 EEG, in the morning of 22 October. The information that
13 we've received from the DLS was that there were
14 outpatients or other patients booked for EEGs, if not
15 in that morning, but certainly in that afternoon. So
16 there was a service.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. That's not quite the issue. The issue has become one
19 of, in the light of the fact that the EEG slots, if
20 I can put it that way, were already allocated to
21 patients, it's what should have been done in those
22 circumstances. And I think your evidence, as you were
23 giving it this morning at least, was that it was
24 a matter of priorities, and I think the chairman had
25 asked you whether Claire might constitute a priority or

1 at least was sufficiently serious, and I think you gave
2 your evidence on that.

3 So it's in the light of all of that that people
4 are -- well, there are some who are not clear whether
5 you consider that there is still some criticism to be
6 made of an EEG for Claire not having taken place some
7 time on 22 October.

8 A. To answer your question, yes, I think there is
9 a criticism to be made for an EEG not having been asked
10 for on 22 October. To just explain, my original report,
11 when I wrote it, I had no information at all about the
12 availability of an EEG service. I then read Dr Webb's
13 witness statement, where he says there was not an urgent
14 EEG service available, but there was no information on
15 whether there was any EEG service available. We now
16 have information that there was a routine EEG service
17 available. My view is that the routine EEG service
18 should have been diverted to do an urgent EEG in
19 Claire's case, yes.

20 Q. Thank you. And then there is one other point of
21 clarification, which I think should be made in relation
22 to some comments that I made. That relates to the
23 recording of the serum sodium and other results under
24 the midnight entry, if I can put it that way, in
25 Claire's notes and records.

1 The point is that Dr O'Hare doesn't believe that she
2 made the entry of "132". Where one sees that is an
3 attachment to her witness statement; it's 135/1,
4 page 24. You just see there that she said her statement
5 was prepared under the mistaken belief that she made the
6 entry in those records, which listed the sodium result
7 of 132. She has now realised that, in fact, that note
8 was made by another doctor, and so that's her evidence,
9 that it wasn't her that inserted that. Dr Volprecht's
10 evidence was that she wrote down the biochemical
11 results, but her evidence is that she also did not write
12 down the serum sodium result, although I think she
13 acknowledges she might have put the arrow.

14 So that's where it is. It's just because these are
15 matters of obvious importance to the doctors concerned.
16 It's appropriate to be correct about it. That's their
17 actual evidence.

18 If I go back to the EEG, something else I was asked
19 to raise with you. You have said it was important to
20 have an EEG and I think you've now confirmed that there
21 is some criticism to be made of an EEG not having taken
22 place on the 22nd. There are a number of times, if I
23 can put it that way, or periods when an EEG might have
24 happened. And I think your views on whether you
25 consider it would have been appropriate would be

1 helpful. I'm first going to give them to you so you can
2 think about them, and if you can tell us when they are.

3 The first is before the rectal diazepam, and the
4 time for that was 12.15. The second is some time before
5 Dr Webb saw Claire and we know he saw her in or about
6 2 pm. Then before the phenytoin was administered, and
7 that's recorded as having been administered at 14.45.
8 Another is before the midazolam was administered, and
9 that's recorded as having been administered at 15.25.
10 Then finally, there's before the sodium valproate, the
11 Epilim, and that's been recorded as having been
12 administered at 17.15. So those are what some people
13 consider might be the times when you'd be ...

14 If you could help us with when you think an EEG
15 ought to have been administered or at least carried out.
16 When?

17 A. Okay. I'll deal with the extremes, the earliest and the
18 late first. Dr Sands would not have had the authority
19 to order an EEG without discussing it with a more senior
20 doctor, almost certainly Dr Webb, first. So the
21 earliest case in which it could have been done would
22 have been, I suppose, after 2 o'clock, when Dr Webb saw
23 the patient, unless Dr Webb was so convinced by
24 Dr Sands' description that he felt he could order it
25 before he had even seen Claire, following a discussion,

1 but I think that's unlikely.

2 At the other end of the day, EEG, as we have already
3 said is not an emergency service; as we have already
4 said, it is very much a nine-to-five service, so there
5 wouldn't have been anyone available to do it after
6 5 o'clock. So we're really narrowing it down to
7 a fairly short period in the mid to late afternoon.

8 THE CHAIRMAN: At any point, realistically, after Dr Webb
9 had seen Claire and before the service closed? So
10 roughly between --

11 A. Yes.

12 THE CHAIRMAN: -- 1.30 to 2 o'clock at one end and 5 o'clock
13 at the other end?

14 A. Yes.

15 THE CHAIRMAN: But in light of Claire's condition, she
16 should have been given priority and should have been
17 given an EEG?

18 A. Yes. The practicalities are that the EEG technicians
19 would have had to finish the recording they were doing
20 at that time, they would have had to contact or somehow
21 communicate with the unfortunate person who was being
22 displaced. They then would then have had to transport
23 their equipment down to the ward -- I have no idea how
24 far it is, but it would have taken time. And then
25 setting it -- this is not a quick investigation. It

1 would have taken them quite some considerable time to
2 set it up. There's a lot of technical stuff to be done.
3 So it could have taken them, I don't know, 15 minutes,
4 half an hour to set up, and then maybe another 15
5 minutes, half an hour to do the reading, so it's not
6 a quick test.

7 THE CHAIRMAN: And when you do the test, do you get the
8 reading straightaway?

9 A. No. EEGs are difficult to interpret. They are -- they
10 require someone with specialist training and they can be
11 quite subtle. The technicians themselves do not
12 interpret the EEGs, they simply do them. In some
13 services, they are interpreted by specific
14 neurophysiologists, whose job is just to do that. In
15 other services -- as I think was happening at the Royal
16 at the time -- they are interpreted by the consultant
17 neurologist, if they're trained to read them. However,
18 in the particular case of non-convulsive
19 status epilepticus, the EEG is so abnormal that I think
20 even a relatively untrained doctor such as myself
21 probably would have recognised it as being abnormal.

22 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: So that time frame is on the basis that
23 whatever Dr Sands had communicated to Dr Webb was not
24 sufficient for him to think that an EEG was appropriate?
25 Just that we're clear about that.

1 THE CHAIRMAN: That's because Dr Scott-Jupp thinks it's
2 unrealistic that Dr Sands could have gone to Dr Webb
3 with such a dramatic report, really, on Claire's
4 condition that Dr Webb would have displaced somebody in
5 the queue without seeing Claire himself.

6 A. It's quite a big ask, if I might put it that way, to ask
7 the EEG technicians to abandon their carefully planned
8 day of activities, to considerably inconvenience
9 a patient who had come up for an outpatient EEG, and
10 then to move themselves down to the ward to do it. It
11 is not something that is done very often.

12 THE CHAIRMAN: So if we deal in realities, that's why you're
13 putting it at some point between 2 o'clock and 5
14 o'clock?

15 A. Yes.

16 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Is it a fair assumption to make given
17 that they had spoken some time before 12, and that's how
18 the diazepam is being given at 12.15, but Dr Webb
19 doesn't actually come to see the child at 2, so if the
20 description from Dr Sands had been so compelling that he
21 had thought that she was in that kind of category, would
22 you have expected him perhaps to have tried to see her
23 maybe a little earlier than that if he thought that she
24 was of the condition that warranted somebody being
25 displaced from the list?

1 A. That depends entirely on what Dr Webb's other
2 commitments were at the time. I don't think I can
3 answer that.

4 Q. Okay. Just for completeness, because some have noted
5 it, one of Dr Webb's own patients had a booked EEG at
6 midday, I think it was, on that day. 10.45? In any
7 event, that would have been far too early.

8 THE CHAIRMAN: [Inaudible: no microphone.]

9 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: I'm simply getting Dr Scott-Jupp to
10 confirm that so that people appreciate that that would
11 not have been realistic.

12 THE CHAIRMAN: That's even before the ward round. That
13 can't make sense.

14 A. I think from what I remember, looking at those notes, it
15 was a booked inpatient EEG as opposed to an urgent EEG.

16 Q. Yes.

17 A. It's not quite the same thing.

18 Q. Yes, it was. It was a booked one, which they had
19 originally thought might happen on the Monday, didn't
20 happen on the Monday, so it had gone in to happen on the
21 Tuesday, and the nursing note records that it happened
22 at 10.45.

23 If I move to the neurological observations. Can
24 I pull up 310-011-001? That's a chart made to try and
25 record all the Glasgow Coma Scale information along with

1 those red lines, which indicate when the nursing shift
2 changed. The red numbers are numbers that come from an
3 assessment that Dr Webb made when he was examining
4 Claire.

5 If we pull alongside of that 090-039-137. That's
6 where the information comes from. But the CNS
7 observation chart obviously has a lot more information
8 on it. I'd like to ask you about what can be
9 interpreted about Claire's condition from that chart
10 and, in case it makes it any easier, the schedule
11 showing the Glasgow Coma Scales?

12 A. Well, the first observation is done at 1 pm, so we don't
13 know what it was before then.

14 Q. Yes.

15 A. But a Glasgow Coma Scale score of 9 is significantly low
16 and worrying, even if there wasn't a demonstrable acute
17 deterioration down to 9. If that's your starting point,
18 I think that is significantly low.

19 Q. And then you see how it progresses through the time. By
20 the time we get to 9 pm, it never rises, according to
21 this, above 6; that's correct?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Then if you look at the intracranial pressure, what is
24 the significance in the fact of the changes in her pupil
25 size?

1 A. That's very difficult. The reason for doing these kinds
2 of CNS observations is most often in the context of
3 a head injury, and that is the reason why these charts
4 are used most often in the children's ward. In a head
5 injury, where there has been trauma to the head, what
6 you're most looking for is evidence of a haemorrhage,
7 that is a bleed on one side of the brain which then can
8 cause an inequality of pupil size. So the reason these
9 charts are designed this way with a right and a left
10 like that is to see whether there's any developing
11 inequality. One pupil becoming more dilated than the
12 other is a very worrying sign in that context.

13 This is a bit different because there wasn't a head
14 injury and there was no suggestion that it was
15 a one-sided problem. In that context, that part of the
16 neurological observations is probably less important
17 than it would have been in a head-injury child.
18 Nowhere, I think, is it recorded that the pupils were
19 unequal. I think I am right in saying that.

20 Q. It appears to be "E" all the way as to equality.

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Is there any significance at all to the fact that they
23 seem to be recorded as "small" as many times as they are
24 "medium". In fact, is "medium" normal?

25 A. Yes, it depends on the light conditions when it's being

1 done and -- let me think ... No, the only ... This
2 probably is rather unsatisfactory, but there appear to
3 have been more smalls during daylight hours and more
4 mediums during night-time hours, but that depends on the
5 light levels in the ward and so on and lots of other
6 things, so that doesn't help very much. No, I'm afraid
7 I don't really know what the significance of that is.
8 The issue of whether the anticonvulsant drugs that she
9 had received may have caused her pupils to constrict in
10 size does arise, but as far as I'm aware the types of
11 drugs that Claire was given don't normally cause that
12 reaction in the pupils.

13 Q. I see there's one occasion, at 10 pm, when they're
14 recorded as being "large". If we're outside of your
15 area of expertise, please say. Is this something that
16 we should refer to the neurologist?

17 A. Yes, I think you should. Whether he will be able to
18 throw any light on it I don't know, but yes, I think you
19 should.

20 Q. I think round about the 10 where the -- a bit later on,
21 it's difficult to see the times at the top. There's one
22 instance where their reaction is recorded as "sluggish".
23 That would be the reaction time, would it, so far as you
24 interpret that?

25 A. Yes, the pupils were said to be sluggish, yes.

1 Q. If we go to see the temperature, the record of which is
2 on the right-hand side, you can see it there under the
3 peaks just hitting 38; do you see that, two peaks
4 hitting 38?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Can you think of anything that would be affecting her
7 temperature in that way?

8 A. Well, many things. All the things we talked about this
9 morning, about this being a viral illness, any of the
10 possible viral or infective causes put her temperature.
11 However, quite separate to that and much less rarely,
12 temperature instability -- either a high or low
13 temperature -- can be a sign of impending problems with
14 the brainstem, the part of the brain at the base of the
15 stem that we all have that controls our temperature. If
16 that is starting to be adversely affected, then it can
17 cause either a very high or a low temperature in the
18 absence of infection. There's no way that anybody could
19 have diagnosed that at that time.

20 Q. When you say "adversely affected", do you mean for
21 example by the brain swelling?

22 A. Yes, one of the consequences of cerebral oedema and,
23 later, coning, was that it can cause very rapid
24 fluctuations in temperature.

25 Q. Yes. As you have the information there, who -- and it

1 spans from 1 o'clock until 2 o'clock in the morning --
2 who do you think should have had the overall
3 responsibility for taking all this information in and
4 seeing where it was all going in terms of the
5 differential diagnoses for Claire and her treatment
6 plan?

7 A. The on-call paediatric team. Or do you want a specific
8 individual?

9 Q. Well, as it goes into --

10 THE CHAIRMAN: That changes as the hours go on. That team
11 changes.

12 A. Yes. I thought you meant during the night-time hours.

13 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: No, it spans 1 o'clock, as you pointed
14 out in the afternoon, through to 2 o'clock in the
15 morning.

16 A. During the day, up until 5 o'clock, the ward team, the
17 same team who had seen her in the ward round that
18 morning. And in the evening, the on-call team after 5.

19 THE CHAIRMAN: Looking at this from your specialty, it's the
20 Glasgow Coma Scale that you would be focusing on, is it?

21 A. Yes.

22 THE CHAIRMAN: And the fact that even at the starting point
23 of 9, which was never reached again, that's
24 significantly low and worrying?

25 A. Yes. It's significantly low. If you look at the actual

1 individual scores given at 1 pm, "eye-opening to verbal
2 command only", "no verbal response", and, "obeys
3 commands", which actually seems, looking at it now,
4 seems a little inconsistent: there is no verbal
5 response, but obeys commands. That's what was recorded.
6 However -- and this is a big "however" -- one of the
7 problems with the Glasgow Coma Scale, as applied to
8 children, is that one has to base it on the knowledge of
9 what that child's normal functional level is. And for
10 some children, it may be that they never have a verbal
11 response, they are unable to speak.

12 THE CHAIRMAN: But that's why you engage with the parents
13 at the bedside, isn't it?

14 A. Exactly. And this is where knowing -- and what should
15 be fairly routine practice ... In a child, particularly
16 in a child known to have learning difficulties or
17 a long-term neurological handicap, one has to always ask
18 the parents what their normal functional level is and
19 judge it. So taking a Glasgow Coma Scale in isolation
20 can be quite unhelpful.

21 THE CHAIRMAN: Right.

22 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: It wouldn't be being taken in isolation,
23 though, would it? It would be taken in with all the
24 other information --

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. -- including the record of attacks, the medications
2 given and this central nervous system observation chart,
3 and the history that the parents have given as to what
4 her normal presentation is?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. All of that would be part -- that's why I was asking
7 you: who is pulling that together with the degree of
8 knowledge of the potential implications of that for an
9 underlying neurological condition?

10 A. Well, I think that is the crux of this case, really. As
11 I've said, the general paediatric team -- that is
12 Dr Sands and Dr Stevenson, Dr Stewart -- were primarily
13 responsible during the day. Then they would have handed
14 over to the on-call team. What you're asking is: to
15 what extent should Dr Webb have been involved in that as
16 a neurologist as opposed to the general paediatric team;
17 is that the thrust of the question?

18 Q. It is --

19 THE CHAIRMAN: Not "as opposed to the general paediatric
20 team", "in conjunction with the paediatric team",
21 surely?

22 A. Yes, absolutely, yes.

23 THE CHAIRMAN: Right. To what extent should he have been
24 involved as the neurologist who was contributing to
25 Claire's care, as someone who at least saw her twice in

1 the afternoon, if not three times, and working in
2 conjunction with the general paediatric team?

3 A. To what extent? Um ... He should have given advice
4 about specific neurological investigations, as I've
5 already said -- EEG, CT scan -- about possible
6 diagnoses, and management of those neurological
7 conditions.

8 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: So does that mean he's helping the
9 paediatric team to put all this together, if I can put
10 it that way?

11 A. Yes. You could put it that way.

12 Q. Because the evidence seems to be that the registrar
13 isn't there for much, if not all of the afternoon. He
14 appears to be there at 5.15 because he is recorded as
15 having administered certain medication. So he's there
16 then, but if he's at the clinic, then it may be that
17 he's not there for most of the afternoon.

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. It's known that the consultant isn't there at all in the
20 afternoon because she's in a clinic off the site. So
21 you have two very junior SHOs and, if Dr Webb is aware
22 of that, he's the only person with consultant expertise
23 to assist in understanding what is happening with
24 Claire, to determine further tests, to formulate
25 differential diagnoses and to recommend further

1 treatment at a consultant level. It's him and,
2 presumably, he would appreciate that.

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. That's why I've asked you what his role becomes when
5 he's in that situation.

6 A. Well, I think that is part of the problem, that it is
7 rather poorly defined. I don't think you can answer
8 that question in black and white terms as to exactly
9 what the consulting [sic] neurologist's role is and what
10 the general paediatric team's role is. There would be
11 some patients where the neurologist would perhaps make
12 the running primarily and others where the general
13 paediatricians would manage when the neurologist had
14 just given a one-off opinion. I think that part of the
15 problem with this case is that was not clear.

16 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Yes. Professor --

17 MR GREEN: Sir, if I understand this evidence correctly, if
18 we could possibly pull up 234-002-007. The bottom
19 answer on that page, page 7 of Dr Scott-Jupp's first
20 report:

21 "Dr Webb should have communicated his concerns to
22 a senior on-call general colleague, either a consultant
23 or experienced general registrar, or alternatively made
24 it quite clear that the neurology team were taking over
25 her care fully. He should then have ensured that all of

1 the neurology team on call that evening were aware of
2 the details of the case."

3 It would help me just in crystallising where we
4 stand with this evidence in my own mind so that I'm
5 better placed to assist the inquiry when I make written
6 submissions down the line, whether first of all I'm
7 correct in understanding Dr Scott-Jupp's position to be
8 that Dr Webb should either have communicated his
9 concerns to another appropriately senior person in the
10 general paediatric team or have taken over the care
11 along with the neurology team. First, whether that's
12 a correct understanding and, second, whether
13 Dr Scott-Jupp sticks by that.

14 A. Can I answer that, Mr Chairman?

15 THE CHAIRMAN: Of course.

16 A. At the time I wrote my first report, I did not know
17 whether there was a separate 24-hour paediatric
18 neurology rota at the Royal. I've since found out that
19 there wasn't; there was simply two consultants with no,
20 at that time, no junior staff, and therefore in practice
21 in terms of junior staff responsibility, it wouldn't
22 have made any difference because the on-call team who
23 were on call for the paediatric neurology patients after
24 hours were also on call for all the general patients.
25 So it would have been the same people at junior doctor

1 level.

2 I would now, with that knowledge, have phrased that
3 differently.

4 THE CHAIRMAN: Then could you say what would be the effect
5 of the rephrasing? Because as that stands, that
6 paragraph is somewhat critical of Dr Webb.

7 A. Yes.

8 THE CHAIRMAN: Right. So in light of what you now know, are
9 you more or less critical of Dr Webb and in what way?

10 A. I think, as I said earlier, he should have discussed his
11 concerns with Dr Steen or with an experienced general
12 registrar, and it's a matter of debate whether that
13 would include Dr Sands or not, but anyway. And I would
14 have deleted the bit that says, "Alternatively, made it
15 clear that neurology team -- Dr Webb and his own
16 juniors", because the neurology team was just him as far
17 as I can see. And then, "ensured that neurology team on
18 call that evening were aware of the details of the
19 case". That was just Dr Webb, so there wasn't any other
20 team. So I would have deleted all part.

21 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

22 MR GREEN: I promise to sit down after my next point: it
23 would really help if we could flush out whether
24 Dr Scott-Jupp would really characterise a four-month in
25 registrar as an experienced general registrar.

1 A. No.

2 THE CHAIRMAN: But if he's the best registrar who's
3 available --

4 A. Yes.

5 THE CHAIRMAN: -- then that's all that can be done.

6 A. If that's --

7 THE CHAIRMAN: We can go round in circles a lot, but it
8 emphasises all the more, surely, the need for Dr Webb
9 and Dr Steen to make contact with each other?

10 A. Exactly, yes.

11 THE CHAIRMAN: Maybe more particularly, if Dr Steen isn't
12 aware of what's going on, for Dr Webb to definitively
13 make contact with her to alert her to the problems?

14 A. Yes. As I said earlier, it's a debatable point which of
15 those two consultants should make the effort to contact
16 the other, but there should have been some communication
17 between the two of them.

18 THE CHAIRMAN: But if you have two consultants and one,
19 namely Dr Webb, does know what's going wrong and the
20 other, Dr Steen, doesn't know what's going wrong, then
21 in that scenario surely the onus falls on Dr Webb to
22 make contact with Dr Steen?

23 A. Yes.

24 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

25 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: If we go back to the Glasgow Coma Scale

1 chart that we had put up, which is the 310-011-001.
2 Professor Neville's view was that any drop in the
3 Glasgow Coma Scale should have prompted contact with the
4 registrar by an SHO, or the consultant if, for some
5 reason, the registrar is not available.

6 Assuming that Dr Sands is at his clinic and he's at
7 his clinic sometime between 1 and 2, and he's there
8 until 5, there is a fall in the Glasgow Coma Scale. In
9 fact, it steadily falls point by point until 4 and 5 are
10 the same, which is the 6 and the 7, depending on how you
11 classify it.

12 At any point then would you agree with
13 Professor Neville and think that any of the SHOs who
14 were there and able to see that this is what was being
15 recorded should have either tried to get hold of
16 Dr Sands at his clinic or, if they couldn't reach him,
17 should have tried to get hold of Dr Steen?

18 A. Yes, although I have to express a reservation in that
19 the Glasgow Coma Scale is not as objective as it appears
20 to be and the real change in her condition between 1 pm
21 and, let's say, 3 pm, when it appears to drop from 9 to
22 7, may not have been all that great because of
23 inter-observer variation in the Glasgow Coma Scale
24 score, which is not as robust as it appears to be.

25 Q. I understand that, and I think to some extent

1 Professor Young has produced a report that addresses
2 that. He will give evidence in due course, I'm sure, on
3 that. But leaving that point by point approach, if one
4 started at 1 o'clock, as the chairman took you to, she
5 never gets back to 9 again. You already said that 9 was
6 quite low in your view. She's on a downward trajectory,
7 if I can put it that way, and what I'm really trying to
8 ask you is whether you accept what Professor Neville
9 says and are of the view that at some point in time on
10 that downward trajectory one or other of those SHOs
11 should either have tried to get hold of Dr Sands and
12 said what they are seeing here or, if they couldn't
13 reach him, should have tried to get hold of Dr Steen?

14 A. Yes, I think it's fair to say that.

15 THE CHAIRMAN: Accepting that the score which one gives
16 every hour in the scale is not absolute, if it is
17 already significantly low and worrying, as you described
18 it, when it's 9, at best the same interpretation applies
19 throughout the afternoon and, on most views, it
20 deteriorates a little.

21 A. Yes.

22 THE CHAIRMAN: So you go from significantly low and worrying
23 to something worse than that.

24 A. Yes.

25 THE CHAIRMAN: And that's why contact needs to be made with

1 them between the consultants.

2 A. Yes. I suspect that had the Glasgow Coma Scale been
3 done a couple of hours earlier, just after the ward
4 round, it probably wouldn't have been much higher. So
5 the SHOs on the ward might have said, "We have put
6 a number to it now, but in fact she isn't any different
7 to how she was a few hours ago", and therefore they
8 didn't really see that as a deterioration.

9 THE CHAIRMAN: Of course, that might very well be correct,
10 but if in the meantime she has started to receive drugs
11 prescribed by Dr Sands and by Dr Webb and has not
12 responded positively, has not improved, then even if her
13 condition hasn't deteriorated, the fact that she isn't
14 improving adds to the worry, doesn't it?

15 A. Yes, it does, and it is that lack of improvement that is
16 one of the most worrying aspects of this case.

17 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, it's the lack of improvement after
18 treatment.

19 A. After treatment, yes.

20 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Yes. And if one was looking at the
21 record of attacks -- I hadn't brought that in as a third
22 piece of information. We had had this and the CNS
23 chart, but if you added in the record of attacks, which
24 is another document for them to consider what the
25 results were, 090-042-144. There we are. As the

1 chairman says, if you're trying to correlate all this
2 information, which is back to my original question about
3 who should have been trying to do that, you see that at
4 3.25, there's a seizure. That's the first recorded for
5 her. So if she was having non-fitting
6 status epilepticus, that looks like something different,
7 if I can put it that way, at 3.25.

8 Then at 4.30, she's got another episode that's being
9 recorded, and that's why I was asking you: who was there
10 with the seniority and expertise to be able to interpret
11 all of this in terms of what should be happening with
12 Claire and I think you were saying that really Dr Webb
13 ought to have been helping the junior staff, but also it
14 provided an added reason for him contacting Dr Steen and
15 speaking consultant to consultant.

16 A. Yes, I would agree with that.

17 Q. Can I then ask you, which sort of moves on a little bit
18 from this -- I am going to deal with Dr Webb's specific
19 interventions in his examinations, but for now that
20 we're speaking in general terms about what this
21 information may indicate, a possible admission to
22 paediatric intensive care, PICU. She wasn't actually
23 admitted to PICU until sometime around 3 o'clock in the
24 morning of Wednesday and Professor Neville felt she
25 should have been admitted very much earlier. I think

1 his view was if the cerebral oedema had been identified,
2 then elective ventilation is something that could have
3 been used to reduce what would have been a raised
4 intracranial pressure, as he saw it, and the only place
5 where that properly could have been done was in PICU.
6 He thought that that might be something that couldn't be
7 considered early on 22 October. I'm not sure we have
8 got an exact time for when he thought that.

9 From your point of view, when do you think they
10 should have at least been seriously considering
11 transferring Claire to paediatric intensive care?

12 A. I actually think in the early afternoon, possibly after
13 Dr Webb's initial examination because it was clear that
14 her conscious level was abnormal, it wasn't responding.
15 She needed probably closer observation in terms of
16 nursing observations than is easy to do on a general
17 ward. So had cerebral oedema been strongly suspected or
18 diagnosed, then that would have been an absolute reason
19 to admit to intensive care. But even before that, even
20 without that awareness, I think she should have done.

21 Of course, this depends very much on local policy
22 at the time, which has changed since then, and it would
23 depend on availability of beds on the intensive care
24 unit and we have no information on that.

25 Q. I think your view is that the threshold for admission to

1 paediatric intensive care is rather lower now --

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. -- than it would have been in 1996?

4 A. Yes. Paediatric intensive care was a relatively new
5 specialty, in fact very new in the mid 1990s, and there
6 was still an uncertainty about how one decided who to
7 admit. Before paediatric intensive care units came
8 along, the choice was either the children's ward or an
9 adult intensive care unit, which might have been even
10 more inappropriate, and certainly before PICUs became
11 available, much sicker children were nursed on general
12 paediatric wards than they are now.

13 In 1996, it was in a state of transition and
14 probably before that, children would only have been
15 transferred to a paediatric intensive care unit if they
16 definitely required intubation and ventilation. After
17 that, I think children with worrying neurological signs
18 requiring close observation would have been transferred.
19 This was sort of in that transition period.

20 Q. You have dealt with that in your second report at
21 234-002-009, with a degree of hindsight really, and it
22 carries on over the next page. You say:

23 "By today's standards [and that's the point you were
24 making], she would certainly have been admitted with a
25 Glasgow Coma Scale score as low as 6."

1 But you say those standards didn't apply in 1996.
2 Then you refer to high dependency units, which are sort
3 of halfway houses these days, and then you go on to say:
4 "In 1996, the need for artificial ventilation
5 probably would have been a prerequisite for admission to
6 PICU. However, it would have been appropriate to
7 discuss her earlier with a PICU consultant who could
8 then have assessed her on the general ward and possibly
9 given some advice about management while being
10 pre-warned about a possible later admission."
11 A. Yes. And this is something we do frequently now and
12 I think could and should have happened at that time.
13 There are some children that one is a bit concerned
14 might be heading the way of intensive care, but haven't
15 quite got there yet, and it's extremely helpful both to
16 the ward staff and to the PICU staff to know about that
17 possibility in advance so that the PICU staff have
18 already learnt the background, they could come back and
19 review the child later. I think in some hospitals they
20 even have what's called a critical care outreach team.
21 It's more of an adult phenomenon, but I believe it
22 sometimes can happen in children's hospitals where there
23 is a senior doctor and nurse who go out and look at
24 children that might be potential intensive care
25 candidates before they get to that stage.

1 Q. Yes, but in 1996, I think your evidence is that that
2 would have been something, following Dr Webb's
3 examination at 2 o'clock or thereabouts, whenever it was
4 that he concluded that, that could have been being
5 discussed?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Are you able to express a view as to when you think it
8 would have been best for it to have happened?

9 A. Yes. I don't think necessarily she would have, by 1996
10 standards, required admission to intensive care at that
11 time. The problem is it was a very gradual
12 deterioration and so at what point it should have been
13 considered is a little uncertain. But I guess with the
14 series of overt seizures as opposed to non-fitting
15 status, that could have been a prompt. The falling
16 Glasgow Coma Scale, given its limited validity, would
17 also have been a prompt. But it's difficult to put
18 a specific time on that.

19 Q. Yes, I suppose, as the chairman says, that all things
20 point to the EEG and the CT scans. If those tests are
21 being carried out and they identified a cerebral oedema,
22 then, from your point of view, would that have been more
23 than a prompt, would that have actually warranted her
24 transfer?

25 A. The EEG wouldn't have helped, but the CT scan would have

1 done, yes.

2 Q. The EEG will have told you about the level of seizure
3 activity.

4 A. Yes, it would, but an abnormal EEG and status would not
5 of itself require an admission to intensive care; the
6 cerebral oedema most certainly would.

7 Q. So if the CT scan had been carried out, as you think one
8 ought to have been carried out, if that had happened and
9 indicated cerebral oedema, that in itself, so far as
10 you're concerned, would have indicated that she ought to
11 have been transferred to paediatric intensive care?

12 A. Yes, undoubtedly.

13 THE CHAIRMAN: Doctor, is it wrong to look at what happened
14 to Claire and think that her condition just drifted on
15 that day and nobody really seized control of the
16 situation and acted decisively?

17 A. I think that's a fair comment, yes.

18 THE CHAIRMAN: There were any number of opportunities for
19 somebody to do that.

20 A. Yes.

21 THE CHAIRMAN: And it might be a bit invidious to identify
22 one individual rather than another should have done it,
23 but it certainly should have been done?

24 A. Yes, I agree. As I said, it was a gradual
25 deterioration, so there was no one point. But if, say

1 for example, a general consultant had been back to
2 review her in the early evening, between 5 and 7, that
3 might have been the point at which a reassessment was
4 made, more investigations were asked for and possible
5 consideration given to intensive care.

6 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: If we then go and look at the actual
7 examinations that took place and go to 090-022-053 and
8 pull it up with 054. Professor Neville's view -- and
9 I put it to you for your comment -- was that he thought
10 that Dr Webb had performed a competent examination on
11 that afternoon, but he made some criticisms. I'm not
12 going to pull it up, but the reference for it is
13 232-002-008 and on to 009. Essentially, they were that
14 he felt that Dr Webb had failed to include the
15 possibility of a rising intracranial pressure to explain
16 Claire's reduced conscious level and her motor signs;
17 would you accept that?

18 A. Yes. It's not really my place to comment on the
19 comments made by one paediatric neurologist on another
20 paediatric neurologist, but I don't see any reason to
21 disagree with that.

22 Q. Let me put it this way: if you had come back to the ward
23 at some point, is that something that you might have
24 thought or would you have simply got a neurologist in?

25 A. I might have thought it, but if a neurologist had seen

1 the child and reassured me that that wasn't the case,
2 I would have accepted that reassurance.

3 Q. Yes.

4 THE CHAIRMAN: Would that then have led you on to a longer
5 conversation: if that's not what is wrong with Claire,
6 then what is wrong with Claire?

7 A. Yes, it may well have done.

8 THE CHAIRMAN: And what are we doing to find out what's
9 wrong with Claire, what tests are we carrying out and
10 what should we be doing, because we just can't let this
11 drift on?

12 A. Yes. I think I might have asked the consultant
13 paediatric neurologist why a CT scan now was not a good
14 idea and turned it round that way.

15 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Because in a way, you as a consultant
16 can maybe push things with Dr Webb to get an explanation
17 from him in a way that I think you've accepted --
18 Dr Sands was not a particularly experienced -- or
19 experienced at all -- registrar, he was quite junior.
20 That might have been difficult for him to have not
21 exactly challenged him, but asked him for an explanation
22 of why he was doing certain things and not doing other
23 things --

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. -- whereas you may not have had that reticence as

1 a consultant?

2 A. Exactly, yes.

3 Q. And the other point he mentioned was that Dr Webb had
4 failed to require an urgent sodium level as part of his
5 assessment. You've, I think, already dealt with that in
6 terms of what he may or may not have thought was the
7 case.

8 Then Professor Neville thinks that Dr Webb should
9 have been aware that there is a possibility of
10 inappropriate secretion of ADH and acute brain illness
11 and that Claire's sodium levels or conscious level and
12 fluid balance should be monitored and he should have
13 directed that that ought to be done. I think in your
14 report you already thought as early as 21 October, the
15 previous evening, that SIADH might be something that was
16 happening alongside a number of other things. But now
17 at 2 o'clock in the afternoon, would you accept
18 Professor Neville's view that that should have been in
19 Dr Webb's mind?

20 A. Yes. Again, I feel cautious about commenting on one
21 specialist paediatric neurologist's comment made about
22 another. But I wouldn't have been surprised if it had
23 been mentioned in that context.

24 Q. Let me put it in a fairer way to you then: given that
25 you had thought that that was a possibility on

1 21 October, the previous evening, if you had the
2 opportunity to discuss Claire's condition and
3 presentation with Dr Webb on the afternoon of the 22nd,
4 is that something you might have been raising with him?

5 A. Um ... I might have considered that it was ... If
6 I was the general paediatric consultant possibly,
7 I might have considered that it was first my
8 responsibility to ensure that the serum sodium was
9 checked before I raised it as an issue. Because if, as
10 in most cases, it would have returned to normal, then it
11 ceases to be an issue.

12 Q. Yes.

13 A. And in the vast majority of cases, of a child coming in
14 with a sodium of 132, repeated 12 hours later, it's
15 completely within the normal range. Therefore, why
16 raise it if you haven't checked it? So the critical
17 things is the blood should have been checked first.

18 Q. So in other words, if you were having that discussion
19 with him, you might at the very least suggested: have we
20 got recent serum sodium tests?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. You would want to know therefore whether this was
23 something worth discussing further?

24 A. Yes, because if you can discount that, which in most
25 cases you could, then why mention it?

1 Q. Yes. Then if we go into the CT scan, that's something
2 that, just in answer to the chairman just then, you
3 thought that if you'd had the opportunity to discuss
4 with Dr Webb, you might have been raising with him
5 a CT scan?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Can you express a view as to whether you think that
8 should have happened before the administration of any
9 further anticonvulsant medication other than the rectal
10 diazepam? She would have had the rectal diazepam at
11 12.15. At this stage, she wouldn't have had the
12 phenytoin. That was one of the things that Dr Webb
13 actually prescribed. If you'd had an opportunity to
14 express your views about it, would you have wanted the
15 CT scan before the phenytoin?

16 A. If anticonvulsants had been decided to be given, they
17 should have been given whether or not a decision to have
18 a CT scan was made. The CT scan could have revealed an
19 unexpected problem which might have then taken you down
20 a different track of treatment, but to some extent, the
21 timing of the CT scan as against the giving of the
22 anticonvulsants is not critical.

23 Q. Might the CT scan have revealed cerebral oedema?

24 A. It might have done.

25 Q. And if it had revealed cerebral oedema, then that might

1 have provided an explanation for why she had the
2 presentation that she did.

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. And you would then have been treating the cerebral
5 oedema as opposed to treating the non-fitting or the
6 seizures?

7 A. Yes, certainly. If a CT scan had revealed cerebral
8 oedema, then that would have taken priority. That
9 requires very urgent treatment, more so than the
10 anticonvulsants. However, the two can co-exist. If
11 encephalitis is causing brain swelling, cerebral oedema,
12 whether or not there's hyponatraemia present, then that
13 can be associated with fits. So treating fits is
14 an important part of the treatment of cerebral oedema.

15 Q. Maybe I can put it this way: given that the cerebral
16 oedema could have provided the explanation for the
17 seizures, is that not all the more reason to get on and
18 have such a test done so at least you know what you're
19 dealing with?

20 A. Yes, I would agree with that.

21 Q. Thank you. Then if we go to what happens at 5 o'clock.
22 The note for that can be seen if we pull up -- I think
23 it's only on one page you need to pull up, which is
24 090-022-055. That's a complete note of that
25 examination. Before then, so before Dr Webb comes, or

1 rather when he comes, would you have expected him to
2 look at Claire's medical notes and records at that
3 stage?

4 A. Sorry, what time are you talking about?

5 Q. 17.00 hours, 5 pm.

6 A. Yes, there wasn't much written since he was last there,
7 but yes.

8 Q. Sorry?

9 A. Do you mean the little bit that was in between Dr Webb's
10 previous consultation?

11 Q. No, his consultation previously was at 2 o'clock and the
12 end part of it can be seen where he signs off "Dr Webb"
13 on the left-hand side.

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Then you've got an entry by Dr Stevenson when he is
16 calculating the phenytoin that Dr Webb has suggested.
17 And then over the page, you see he is calculating the
18 midazolam in relation to a suggestion from Dr Webb.
19 Then Dr Webb comes at 17.00. It is not clear, as the
20 chairman had indicated, whether Dr Webb actually saw
21 Claire in between the 2 o'clock and the 5 o'clock. But
22 in any event, the 5 o'clock is his next note, if I can
23 put it that way.

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. And what I was asking you is: would you expected him to

1 look at Claire's charts, if I can put it that way, as
2 part and parcel of his examination of her at 1700 hours?

3 A. Yes. Do you mean the nurse's observation charts?

4 THE CHAIRMAN: And this record.

5 A. And this record? Yes. There wasn't very much to look
6 at in that record. It's just the calculation of the
7 dose.

8 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Well, there's the CNS chart to look at.

9 A. Yes, there's the neurological observations chart. Yes,
10 I would have expected him to look at that or at least to
11 ask the nurse who had been doing them if there had been
12 any change.

13 Q. In addition to that, there's the record of attacks.

14 A. And the record of attacks, similarly.

15 Q. Would you expect him to look at what had been actually
16 prescribed or administered, sorry, by way of medication?

17 A. On the drug chart, you mean?

18 Q. Yes.

19 A. No. I would have expected him to trust in the fact that
20 it had been done competently. I don't think it's the
21 consultant's job to check all the fine detail of the
22 prescription chart.

23 THE CHAIRMAN: Without checking the fine detail, doctor, if
24 you look at the top of page 55 on the right-hand side,
25 Dr Webb has indicated that he wasn't sure about the

1 amount of midazolam which should be prescribed --

2 A. Yes.

3 THE CHAIRMAN: -- so he had to check it --

4 A. Yes.

5 THE CHAIRMAN: -- and then ring it down, as now appears to

6 be his position, and there was to be 0.15, which turned

7 into 0.5.

8 A. Yes.

9 THE CHAIRMAN: If you look at the records at all, does that

10 not jump out at you, particularly if you have been

11 cautious and had to check what the prescription was just

12 a couple of hours before?

13 A. Well, I think to be fair, as a consultant you can't

14 check every single calculation made or potential error

15 made by junior staff. You have to have some sort of

16 confidence that they're going to do it correctly, unless

17 there's a very specific reason to, unless there has been

18 an abnormal response and you suspect an error has been

19 made.

20 THE CHAIRMAN: Okay.

21 A. But I don't think it's fair to expect the consultant to

22 check all that.

23 MR COUNSELL: I wonder if Dr Scott-Jupp could be referred to

24 the first line of Dr Webb's entry at 5 o'clock where he

25 specifically refers to the bolus dose.

1 THE CHAIRMAN: Claire's had a loading dose of phenytoin and
2 a bolus of midazolam.

3 A. Yes.

4 THE CHAIRMAN: So I think Mr Counsell's point is that in
5 order to make that entry, he must have checked back over
6 what Claire had received during the previous couple of
7 hours.

8 A. He may have checked she received it; he wouldn't have
9 necessarily have checked the dose calculation was
10 correct.

11 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: What I was going to ask you is: when
12 that prescription was given to the junior doctor, it was
13 given to the junior doctor over the telephone.

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. That's Dr Webb's evidence. I think it seems to be
16 common case that this was medication, midazolam that is,
17 which the junior doctors, and for that matter the
18 nursing staff, weren't familiar with. So the point is,
19 if you are doing that, if you are giving something that
20 you know they wouldn't necessarily recognise whether
21 they'd written it down and got the order of magnitude
22 wrong, if I can put it that way, and you've communicated
23 it over the telephone, would it be appropriate to check
24 that things were in order when you had the opportunity
25 to do that?

1 A. Well, yes, it would be appropriate, but as I say, you're
2 starting from the supposition that junior doctors get
3 things wrong all the time and I don't think most
4 consultants do start from that position. We assume
5 competence.

6 THE CHAIRMAN: Doctor, I understand that, and for instance,
7 I can understand in light of what you're saying that if
8 you look at the bottom of the previous page that he
9 might not have noticed the multiplication mistake when
10 18 by 24 turned into 632.

11 A. Yes.

12 THE CHAIRMAN: Okay. And at the top of the next page, the
13 right-hand page, I can understand you saying that you
14 wouldn't expect him to follow down the calculation on
15 the right-hand side, which ends up at 69 milligrams over
16 24 hours because that is, in a sense, checking
17 somebody's homework.

18 A. Mm, yes. The actual dose itself, you mean? Yes.

19 THE CHAIRMAN: Is that not more likely to strike you?

20 A. Yes.

21 THE CHAIRMAN: I think we have to assume that it didn't
22 strike Dr Webb because, if it had struck him that Claire
23 had got more than triple the prescribed dose of
24 midazolam, we would expect that he would have noted that
25 on his examination at 5 o'clock.

1 A. Yes, I think he would, and presumably he didn't observe
2 that.

3 THE CHAIRMAN: Which is why there's no reference to it.

4 A. Mm.

5 THE CHAIRMAN: Sorry, that's, not just with the benefit of
6 hindsight, an easier mistake to check.

7 A. Yes.

8 THE CHAIRMAN: Because as Ms Anyadike-Danes said, she said
9 a moment ago that junior doctors were not familiar with
10 it, the nurses weren't familiar with it, but in fact
11 Dr Webb wasn't that familiar with it, which is why he
12 had to go and check the dose.

13 A. Midazolam was a new drug then, I remember it coming in,
14 and people weren't familiar with it. I accept that,
15 yes.

16 THE CHAIRMAN: Okay.

17 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Thank you. When Dr Webb had written his
18 note after his examination at round about 2 o'clock,
19 he'd said he didn't really have a clear picture, and
20 prior to that Dr Sands had said that he wanted to get
21 a history from Dr Gaston. In fact, that information is
22 faxed through too late, obviously, for Dr Webb's
23 2 o'clock examination, but in time for this. It comes
24 at 15.15, 3.15, and one sees it at 090-013-015. Sorry,
25 perhaps the most significant one to pull up is

1 090-013-017, with me just making a note that this is
2 a letter written by Dr Gaston, who's the consultant
3 community paediatrician, to Claire's GP, and it's
4 a letter dated 2 August that results from a clinic visit
5 on 1 August.

6 These are the subsequent notes. They're all phone
7 calls recorded, and you see there's a phone call
8 in September:

9 "Well. More focused on Ritalin."

10 And the plan in relation to Ritalin. There's
11 another phone call later on. This is September now, the
12 20th:

13 "Doing well on Ritalin."

14 Then you see there's a phone call on 2 October:

15 "Dry mouth 30 minutes after Ritalin. Hold meds."

16 Then the other piece of information that was sent
17 through related to an earlier letter from Dr Gaston to
18 the GP, dated 30 May, which referred to attentional
19 difficulties.

20 So this is the information. It's not entirely clear
21 whether there was any other communication, but this is
22 the only one that we have seen recorded. So this would
23 have come through and assuming that this was on the
24 notes that Dr Webb would have had access to, is this
25 something that should have been considered as part and

1 parcel of his examination of Claire at 5 o'clock and, if
2 it is, what should he have made of it all in your view?

3 A. I don't think this letter helps at all actually. I can
4 understand why he asked for more information from
5 Dr Gaston. I suspect his reasons for asking for that is
6 what the actual physical examination findings were last
7 time Claire had been examined as an outpatient. In
8 other words, what her baseline neurological status was
9 when she was well. It doesn't give any information
10 about that at all.

11 The other aspects of Claire's abilities could be
12 gained from the parents, by whether she was able to
13 talk, whether she was able to walk, care for herself and
14 so on. Things like the level of muscle tone in her
15 limbs, the reflexes and that sort of thing, could only
16 be gained from the doctor examining her, not from
17 speaking to the family, so I suspect that was the sort
18 of information he was looking for.

19 Q. There was a thought that Claire's earlier, as they
20 considered them to be, epileptic seizures -- at least,
21 on admission, they were querying whether they were
22 epileptic seizures -- that she had had when she was
23 a baby, there was some thought that maybe what is being
24 seen here is somehow some of that presentation coming
25 back. She was examined in the Children's Hospital when

1 she was a few months old, up to about 8 months old,
2 I think she was, and she came under the care of
3 Dr Hicks, who was an experienced consultant paediatric
4 neurologist, and they were unable at that time, as it
5 seems, to resolve the cause of Claire's presentation.
6 But leaving that aside, if it had been known, and
7 I presume it is known from her medical notes and
8 records, that she'd been in when she was a baby with the
9 suspected epilepsy, would it have been appropriate as
10 they're trying to find out what is happening and why for
11 anybody to have tried to contact Dr Hicks to see if she
12 could shed any light on anything?

13 A. I don't think in this circumstance it would have helped
14 that much. The important information could be got from
15 the parents directly as to how long ago she had had
16 fits, what treatment she'd had and when she'd come off.
17 If she had been given a very specific and unusual
18 diagnosis of what was causing the fits, for example some
19 congenital brain abnormality that had been diagnosed
20 at the time, the parents undoubtedly would have known
21 and would have given that information to the admitting
22 doctors. I think there's relatively little information
23 that would have been gained from the previous
24 consultations that wouldn't have been known to the
25 parents.

1 THE CHAIRMAN: And Dr Hicks' involvement had ceased about
2 eight years earlier, so the parents can give a much more
3 complete, up-to-date picture.

4 A. Exactly, yes. The very fact that she had had fits --
5 whether or not you call it epilepsy -- when she was
6 younger, doesn't really affect greatly the management in
7 this case because it wasn't active, it was a long time
8 ago, and the same issues would arise whether or not she
9 had had that history.

10 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: I just want to ask you about that.

11 Would it have made any difference at all to how you
12 would have treated her if you were the consultant
13 paediatrician there to know that she did have this
14 history or would you simply have treated her on the
15 basis of how she presented as she came in on the 21st?

16 A. It might have made you slightly more likely to consider
17 seizures as part of the diagnosis, but not really
18 because a child who's never had a seizure before can
19 present for the first time in this way and it doesn't
20 really prove anything, that history from some years
21 before.

22 Q. Then if we go back to the medical notes and records,
23 090-022-055, at this stage now Dr Webb has the benefit
24 of quite a bit more information than he had when he saw
25 her at 2 o'clock, although no further tests; would that

1 be fair?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. So he has more observational information, if I can put

4 it that way, but nothing in the terms of actual testing.

5 There's still no serum sodium tests, there's obviously

6 no CT, no EEG, he's just got more observations.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And what he does know, though, is he knows the

9 medication because he's prescribed it. So he knows that

10 Claire's already had rectal diazepam and she's also had

11 phenytoin and, for that matter, she's had midazolam.

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. What would you have been wanting to discuss with him if

14 you'd been Dr Steen and had remained concerned about her

15 and had come back from Cupar Street? So you are there

16 at 5 o'clock in the afternoon. What would you be

17 wanting to discuss with him as the way forward?

18 A. Well, as we've already said, getting more information

19 about the reasons for her depressed conscious level,

20 getting some explanation of whether or not she is

21 actually having seizures and the reasons why.

22 Q. For example, if you see above, before he saw her at 5,

23 she's already been prescribed the midazolam after the

24 phenytoin.

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Would you have wanted to know why that had happened,
2 given that there is no more information in terms of
3 actually what's happening in her brain?

4 A. It's fairly obvious that you wouldn't give those
5 medications unless you thought that the child was having
6 seizures.

7 Q. I appreciate that, but would you have wanted to know
8 from Dr Webb why he thought it was appropriate to give
9 midazolam after both the rectal diazepam and the
10 phenytoin haven't made an appreciable -- there might
11 have been some fluctuation in improvement -- difference
12 to her condition?

13 A. Yes, I think I would have discussed and questioned
14 whether seizures or non-convulsive status was in fact
15 the right diagnosis.

16 Q. And then if one sees through his notes, one of the
17 things that he wants to do at item 3 is to administer
18 more anticonvulsants, which is the sodium valproate.

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Do you see that on 3? What would have been your
21 response to that?

22 A. Well, the same. I would have asked whether the lack of
23 response to three anticonvulsants should have led to
24 questioning whether that actually was the problem,
25 particularly in the absence of any EEG evidence.

1 Q. And if you see the first two: (i) is the cefotaxime and
2 the acyclovir; and then (ii) is to check the viral
3 cultures and stool and urine and bloods and so forth.
4 In relation to (i), would you have been surprised that
5 that was the first time that that was being done at
6 5 o'clock?

7 A. Well, I think Dr Webb, in his previous consultation at
8 2 o'clock said, gave the impression that he didn't think
9 it was an encephalitic illness. Then he has presumably
10 changed his view due to the lack of response and decided
11 to be more cautious and cover that eventuality with
12 those drugs. So I'm not surprised that he chose to give
13 it then.

14 Q. And then the check the viral cultures?

15 A. Yes, the viral cultures are somewhat academic because
16 that wouldn't change your immediate management at all;
17 that might give you a diagnosis several days down the
18 line.

19 Q. Would you have wanted to discuss with him generally the
20 actual medication? I mean, the inquiry has had the
21 benefit of expert views on it and what its likely
22 effects are and so forth. But from your position as
23 a consultant paediatrician would you have wanted to
24 understand more about why he had devised the drug regime
25 he had?

1 A. I think I would for my own education, yes. I think
2 I would have been curious as to why that particular
3 sequence of drugs had been decided upon.

4 Q. And if we just go back to something that the chairman
5 had asked you and others earlier. If you had phoned
6 through from Cupar Street and were being told actually
7 what had happened -- so these were the medications which
8 would have taken you up to the midazolam and the Glasgow
9 Coma Scale, if you had asked about it -- you would have
10 known that she was on hourly obs, I assume. If you'd
11 had that kind of information, could you have gained the
12 comfort that would have prevented you from coming to see
13 her simply by knowing that Dr Webb was there or seeing
14 her?

15 A. I certainly would have gained comfort from the knowledge
16 that a consultant was there, given that the registrar
17 was fairly junior, yes. My own personal practice would
18 have been to either speak to Dr Webb on the phone there
19 and then or to visit the ward and speak to him
20 face-to-face, I think.

21 Q. Would you have wanted to come and see Claire for
22 yourself and perhaps speak to her parents?

23 A. Personally, I think I would, yes.

24 THE CHAIRMAN: But to a degree, that would depend on
25 a conversation which you would like to have with

1 Dr Webb?

2 A. Yes.

3 THE CHAIRMAN: It might be that you get sufficient
4 reassurance from that not to come and see Claire, but
5 actually looking at the records for that day, it's a bit
6 hard to see how you would have got that reassurance.

7 A. One might get the reassurance that there was nothing
8 more that I, in Dr Steen's role, could have done that
9 Dr Webb wasn't doing already. I think what I would have
10 asked if I had spoken to Dr Webb is, "Have you spoken to
11 the parents?", because sometimes in this situation, the
12 division of roles is that the specialist might be the
13 one who does the treatment and makes the plan, whereas
14 the generalist might be the one who speaks to the
15 parents. It quite often happens, for example, when
16 a child is admitted critically ill to an intensive care
17 unit where the intensivists get on and do the hands-on
18 stuff and the generalist's role is to speak to the
19 parents and counsel them.

20 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: If you'd been able to have the
21 conversation with Dr Webb at all -- which may have been
22 the case here, we don't know -- if you hadn't been, but
23 you'd been given the kind of information that was
24 recorded about Claire, if I can put it that way, would
25 you have wanted to come to see her at 5 o'clock or

1 whenever your clinic finished?

2 A. Yes, personally, I would.

3 Q. There is one drug that we haven't heard of in
4 particular, which is the Hepsal. 090-026-075. We can
5 see it at the bottom there, the regular prescriptions --

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. -- at E.

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And that's being prescribed to be given at those
10 particular times and it's signed off by Dr Stevenson.
11 Is that something to do with the fact that she was
12 receiving so much by IV?

13 A. Yes. I can answer that quite easily. That is simply
14 a flush. It's simply a solution of heparin, which
15 prevents blood clotting, with a small amount of saline.
16 You can see it's a tiny quantity, it's only 5 milligrams
17 --actually, that should probably be 5 millilitres --
18 which is used very routinely to flush the line and
19 prevent clots forming in the line. That is to say, the
20 intravenous cannula.

21 Q. When you say it should have been 5 millilitres and not
22 5 milligrams?

23 A. It's usually ... I'm sorry, I can't remember the ...
24 It's actually not terribly important, but usually it's
25 written up as millilitres. Hepsal has a small

1 concentration of heparin in a small amount of saline.

2 Q. If we then go on to one element in relation to the
3 seizures. If we pull the record of attacks back up,
4 090-042-144. I think the evidence in your second report
5 was that the further seizure at 9 o'clock, in spite of
6 having received a considerable amount of anticonvulsant
7 medication, should have prompted reassessment, including
8 electrolyte testing. And that was done because there
9 was going to be a test to check for her phenytoin
10 levels. So they were going to take the bloods at either
11 at 9 o'clock or at 9.30 and they did indeed take the
12 bloods at that time. It seems it was these bloods which
13 produced the result of 121, which you see recorded at
14 11.30 in the notes. Then you say:

15 "And a repeat neurological examination ..."

16 That's at your reference 234-002-008.

17 What would that have involved so far as you're
18 concerned?

19 A. Do you mean the neurological examination?

20 Q. Yes.

21 A. It would have involved assessing the conscious level in
22 rather the same way one does when doing a Glasgow Coma
23 Scale. Assessing her level of response to voice, to
24 being spoken to, her level of response to physical
25 stimulation, her level of response to pain, if there's

1 no response to the first two. It would have involved
2 checking her vital signs, pulse, blood pressure,
3 temperature, all that sort of thing. It would have
4 involved furthermore looking at her eyes to look at the
5 pupils in more detail than is done just in the standard
6 CNS observations, looking at the eye movements.
7 It would have involved, if possible, examining the backs
8 of the eyes, examining the retina with an ophthalmoscope
9 to look at the fundi, which is a rather important part
10 of the examination, to see if there was evidence of
11 papilloedema, which can indicate raised intracranial
12 pressure. It would have involved looking at the muscle
13 tone and the posture in her arms and legs to look for
14 evidence of abnormality there and it would have involved
15 doing tendon reflexes in the arms and legs to see
16 whether there was any asymmetry or any exaggeration of
17 the tendon reflexes. All those things give information
18 about neurological status.

19 Q. In the record of attacks --

20 THE CHAIRMAN: Sorry, before you go on, you're on question
21 7(a); is that right?

22 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Yes.

23 THE CHAIRMAN: Am I right that the reference to Dr Stewart
24 in that question is wrong? It should be Dr Hughes,
25 shouldn't it?

1 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: It should be Dr Hughes, exactly, sir.

2 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

3 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: In the record of attacks, that episode
4 of screaming and drawing up of arms which is recorded at
5 9 pm -- well, let's pull it up alongside of this,
6 090-042-144.

7 There's her pulse rate, her pupils are large but
8 reacting to light, and a doctor is informed. So
9 a doctor's told about this. In terms of the
10 neurological assessment or neurological examination,
11 which you think should have been carried out in response
12 to this, how soon after it do you think that should have
13 happened?

14 A. As soon as possible. It's difficult to do
15 a neurological examination actually during a seizure for
16 fairly obvious reasons. But as soon as the child has
17 settled down, that's a good time to do a neurological
18 reassessment.

19 Q. And so far as you're concerned, how important was it
20 that that happen?

21 A. It depends a bit how recently a neurological assessment
22 had been done. It looks as if probably it hadn't been
23 done since Dr Webb saw her at 2 o'clock that afternoon;
24 am I right? From what's recorded in the notes, she had
25 been seen, but she hadn't actually had a neurological

1 examination done. So certainly by that time, which is
2 some 7 or 8 hours later ...

3 Q. Sorry, it's not actually clear if he didn't do that.
4 I'll stand to be corrected if he said something else in
5 a witness statement. At 090-022-055, if we pull it
6 alongside, he says --

7 THE CHAIRMAN: It depends how you interpret the 5 o'clock
8 note, does it?

9 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Yes, thank you very much, Mr Chairman.

10 THE CHAIRMAN: Do you interpret the 5 o'clock note as being
11 a fresh neurological examination?

12 A. I doubt it. I think ... What does he say ... "She
13 continues to be largely unresponsive. She responds ..."
14 Can you help me with reading it?

15 Q. Perhaps we could enlarge that part.

16 A. "... by flexing her left arm to deep supraorbital pain
17 and does her facial grimace, but no vocalisation."
18 So that's a partial neurological examination, which
19 I think, under the circumstances, was acceptable.

20 THE CHAIRMAN: But you're saying that the attack which is
21 noted at about 9 o'clock should have led to a full
22 reassessment in light of the fact that this came after
23 she had received quite a lot of drugs?

24 A. Yes, and she was having overt seizures, which she wasn't
25 at 5 o'clock.

1 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Who do you think should have been
2 carrying out that kind of examination in those
3 circumstances?
4 A. At 9 o'clock?
5 Q. Yes.
6 A. I think it should have been the on-call paediatric
7 registrar.
8 Q. If for any reason the on-call paediatric registrar can't
9 because she's caught up with any number of things that
10 she might have been, given the thinness of the cover, if
11 I can put it that way, what do you think should have
12 happened then?
13 A. The SHO should have done as best he could and reported
14 his finding to the registrar and, if his findings were
15 of concern or if the history given of recent events had
16 been of concern, the registrar should probably have
17 either phoned the on-call consultant herself or asked
18 the SHO to do so.
19 Q. Are there circumstances in which the SHO might have
20 contacted the consultant directly?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Could these be one of them?
23 A. Yes, although nearly always the SHO would have discussed
24 it with the registrar first.
25 Q. Yes. But the position I'm suggesting is that for some

1 reason the registrar can't come and do it herself or
2 maybe can't even be reached given what she was doing.
3 If that's the case, so there's not a registrar
4 available, if I can put it that way, to the SHO at that
5 time, and I think your evidence is that that ought to
6 have been done as soon as possible.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Would that provide a justification for contacting the
9 consultant?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And leaving aside justification, would it have been an
12 appropriate thing for the SHO to have done that?

13 A. Yes. It isn't the conventional hierarchy, but I think
14 all consultant paediatricians would accept that there
15 are circumstances where the conventional hierarchy has
16 to be bypassed and a more junior member of staff -- and
17 it could be a nurse as well as a doctor -- goes straight
18 to the top under unusual circumstances.

19 Q. Which top would they be going to, Dr Webb or Dr Steen?

20 A. Well, that's the point. That, I think, is the crux of
21 this case. Under normal circumstances, I would have
22 said Dr Steen as she remained the consultant in charge
23 of the case, and I think she explained in her witness
24 statement that even though she wasn't on call that
25 night, she made it known that she still expected to be

1 called about her patients.

2 Q. She did, and indeed she was --

3 A. Yes. Later, yes.

4 Q. -- when there was the respiratory collapse.

5 A. Under the circumstances, if the on-call doctor had known

6 that Dr Steen had not seen the patients, but knew that

7 Dr Webb had relatively recently, and also knew that

8 Dr Webb was on call and therefore likely to be

9 available, it would have been quite understandable for

10 that doctor to have gone straight to Dr Webb.

11 THE CHAIRMAN: There's two things. First of all, Dr Hughes,

12 who is this doctor we're talking about, she effectively

13 conceded last week -- it rather looks as if she didn't

14 appreciate the seriousness of Claire's condition.

15 A. Yes.

16 THE CHAIRMAN: And was reasonably clear about that, so

17 that's an acknowledgment on her part that, despite what

18 now seems to be obvious, she did not pick that up at the

19 time. But on another note, if she did jump the

20 hierarchy and go to a consultant, would she not have

21 been more likely to go to, in a sense, her own

22 consultant, namely Dr Steen than she would have been to

23 go to Dr Webb?

24 A. Yes, I think she probably would have been more likely.

25 It would have depended a little on what Dr Hughes

1 perceived to be the accepted practice in the hospital at
2 that time.

3 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, thank you.

4 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: I wonder if I can move now to
5 discussions with the family. I think in your report.
6 At 234-003-007, which we can pull up, you have said
7 that:

8 "... the parents ought to be told of any changes in
9 diagnosis, the possible reasons for any deterioration,
10 the management plan, any significant neurological
11 deterioration."

12 Is that fair? Is that your view that that's what
13 they should have been told about?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. What would you have expected them to have been told
16 about the involvement of Dr Webb and the consultant who
17 was going to be responsible or who was responsible for
18 Claire's treatment?

19 A. I would think with any child where a general
20 paediatrician is involving a specialist colleague for an
21 opinion, the parents should normally be told because
22 that is a significant step. It may also be that the
23 parents end up meeting this doctor, either then or at
24 some later date, and they need to know who they are and
25 what the reasons for their involvement are.

1 Q. Given that it was Dr Sands' wish to at least consult
2 with Dr Webb and possibly have Dr Webb involved if that
3 was appropriate, and that was something that came out of
4 his ward round and the parents were there at the ward
5 round, how do you think that should have been
6 communicated and the significance of doing it at that
7 stage?

8 A. I think Dr Sands should have told the parents he was
9 going to ask for a neurological opinion, yes.

10 Q. I meant the significance of doing it. What should they
11 have been led to understand as to what that meant about
12 the seriousness of their child's condition?

13 A. If I can sort of paraphrase what I might have said
14 in that situation. I would have said to the parents,
15 "It looks like it's more than just a virus, as we
16 thought it was when she came in last night. It looks
17 like she might have a neurological problem, that is to
18 say a problem involving the brain. We don't know yet
19 whether it's serious or not. I'm not entirely certain
20 what's causing it, so I'm going to seek some help from a
21 colleague who specialises in these areas and I will
22 contact him straightaway and hopefully he will see your
23 child as soon as possible".

24 Q. Thank you. That leads on to a related question, which
25 is: what do you think they should have been told about

1 the likely cause of her problems, what they were
2 treating her for and how they were proposing to go about
3 that?

4 A. It's quite difficult to explain uncertainty to
5 parents -- or to patients, not just parents. I think,
6 as doctors, we are, as a breed, perhaps guilty of
7 pretending there is more certainty when there isn't. We
8 don't like to appear to be hesitant and uncertain when
9 talking to people, so we are a little bit inclined to
10 imply that the diagnosis is more certain than it
11 actually is, to try and keep things simple.

12 In this case, as in many others, we may have
13 entertained all sorts of possible likely differential
14 diagnoses, but to list all of them, some of which are
15 extremely rare and extremely unlikely to be the cause,
16 I don't think is helpful and it would not be normal
17 practice. You just mention one or two of the most
18 likely that you think is there and the reasons for it
19 and what you're going to do to manage it.

20 THE CHAIRMAN: Professor Neville had about five.

21 A. Yes.

22 THE CHAIRMAN: You really wouldn't give five to parents,
23 would you?

24 A. In this situation, I would not go through all these
25 things, particularly if you start talking about brain

1 tumours when that's incredibly unlikely. That would
2 cause huge and unjustified anxiety.

3 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: If we take it at either during or at the
4 conclusion of the ward round, what stage do you think
5 the parents ought to have been told, leaving aside the
6 question of going to go and see Dr Webb, but in other
7 respects?

8 A. Well, if I'd been Dr Sands, I think I probably would
9 have admitted that I was only a trainee doctor and
10 therefore would have needed some consultant back-up and
11 confirmation, and I probably would have not said that
12 much if I knew that there was going to be a consultant
13 speaking to the family fairly soon. But I would have
14 said, "I'm concerned it might be more than just a viral
15 infection, there may be some problem with the brain",
16 and I think I probably would have left it fairly vague
17 at that point. I doubt I would have used the word
18 "encephalitis".

19 Q. Okay. So enough for them to understand that there's
20 a bit of investigation that has to go on, there's
21 a consultant that has to be brought on in a specialist
22 field because you're a trainee and it's not your area,
23 but you going to go and set about doing that?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. In your view, at the upshot of it all, would you have

1 wanted to communicate that their daughter was actually
2 quite ill, but you were going to put in place a plan to
3 address it?

4 A. Yes, I think I would.

5 Q. Would you have said anything about the thought that you
6 had that she had some sort of fitting, even if that
7 might not be apparent to them?

8 A. It depends how certain I was.

9 THE CHAIRMAN: It's a difficult question when you thought
10 fitting was a rather unlikely identified problem.

11 A. Yes. If Dr Sands was not confident of his diagnosis
12 that this was non-convulsive status which, as we've
13 said, is a rare diagnosis, then I probably wouldn't have
14 said anything to the parents until I had at least
15 discussed it with a senior colleague.

16 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: I think they were left with an
17 impression that there was some sort of internal fitting
18 going on.

19 A. Yes. I don't know. It might have been appropriate to
20 mention that, particularly if a decision at that stage
21 had been made to give rectal diazepam, although I think
22 that was a bit later, wasn't it?

23 Q. The rectal diazepam was a query and I think he then got
24 confirmation from Dr Webb that that was appropriate.
25 That happened therefore at about 12.15. Would you have

1 told them anything after the initial contact with
2 Dr Webb when you had, from him, confirmed your view of
3 encephalitis -- I'm not saying that you necessarily
4 would have used these terms -- added encephalopathy and
5 we're going to administer rectal diazepam? What, if
6 anything, would you have told them at that stage when
7 you came back from your conversation with Dr Webb?

8 A. This is before Dr Webb has actually seen the patient?

9 Q. Yes, exactly.

10 A. If I knew Dr Webb was coming fairly soon, I think my
11 conversation would have been fairly limited. It would
12 have been necessary to explain the reasons for giving
13 rectal diazepam, and therefore a mention would need to
14 have been made of fitting activity of some sort.

15 Q. So if you hadn't already mentioned it before because
16 that's what you thought it was, you might be mentioning
17 it now, otherwise they'll wonder why she's being
18 administered it?

19 A. Exactly. One would have to explain the reasons for
20 administering it.

21 Q. Then Dr Sands -- it's not clear entirely when he would
22 have left the ward, but it may have been some time
23 between 1, 1.30, something of that sort to go and get
24 ready for the clinic in the afternoon. At that stage,
25 Dr Webb had not come, although I think it's fair to say

1 to Dr Sands that he had rather hoped that he would and,
2 in fact, thought that he might by the time he left. But
3 it hasn't happened. You know that you're going off and
4 you're perhaps not going to be there for the entire
5 afternoon. Is there a conversation you have with the
6 parents if they're there about that?

7 A. Yes. I think so. If they're there, it would be good
8 practice to speak to them.

9 THE CHAIRMAN: The grandparents were there at that time.

10 A. The grandparents is a much more difficult -- this often
11 comes up, actually. If the grandparents are sitting
12 with the child and giving the parents a break, how much
13 one should say to the grandparents. That's actually
14 quite difficult. One doesn't want to appear to be
15 evasive, but one doesn't know how much the parents would
16 want the grandparents to know.

17 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: Of course.

18 A. And there may be good reasons why the grandparents
19 shouldn't be given all the information.

20 Q. I see that. Given that, what do you feel it is
21 important that he does to communicate his views and
22 what's happening to the SHOs and the nursing staff?

23 A. Dr Sands, you mean?

24 Q. Yes.

25 A. Well, one would expect that he would have been in

1 communication with the SHOs and the nursing staff all
2 the time. That's what a registrar should do and he
3 should have made his concerns known to them.

4 Q. So if he felt that Claire was neurologically very
5 unwell, is that something that the junior doctors and
6 the nurses should understand?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And that if they hadn't for some reason -- perhaps
9 because of the lack of experience in it -- formed that
10 view of their own, it's something that he should been
11 communicating with them?

12 A. Yes. It is possible for less experienced staff to
13 underestimate how unwell a child is or, for that matter,
14 overestimate how unwell a child is and more experienced
15 doctors should rectify that.

16 Q. And although he might have been rather guarded in what
17 he said to the parents because, to some extent, he's
18 still waiting to see what Dr Webb will say when he
19 comes, what is the information you think he should have
20 been explaining to the junior doctors and the nursing
21 staff, who may be the people who are left to discuss
22 things with the parents when they come back and when
23 he's away at clinic?

24 A. Well, if he thought she was in non-convulsive status, he
25 should have made that clear, that this is an uncommon

1 condition, that most of them may not have seen before,
2 and that anticonvulsants are an important part of the
3 treatment and that the effect of anticonvulsants may
4 actually make the child become more awake and alert
5 rather than becoming sedated because that's the whole
6 reason for giving them.

7 Q. If that's sort of coming out of the ward round and
8 taking you up, in term of Dr Sands anyway, to when he
9 goes off to the clinic, and then Dr Webb comes at 2 pm
10 and the parents are not there at that stage, but the
11 grandparents are there. Given that the parents aren't
12 there and he records that in his note, that they're not
13 there, and given what you just said about not sure how
14 much you necessarily convey to the grandparents, what do
15 you think he should have been explaining to the
16 grandparents?

17 A. Well, as I say, with grandparents it's particularly
18 difficult. I would personally give a very limited
19 explanation to the grandparents, but would have
20 established from them when the parents were likely to be
21 arriving back in the hospital and I would have told the
22 grandparents that I'll tell the parents everything about
23 it when they get here and just give a very brief
24 bulletin, if you like, about her current status.

25 Q. Yes. It was in that context that I was going to ask you

1 because he, of course, has his own patients that he is
2 dealing with and I presume he's not an entire master of
3 his time, so he wouldn't necessarily know when he'd be
4 able to come back to have that kind of discussion with
5 the parents. If that's the case and he's loath to
6 embark on that kind of detail with the grandparents, is
7 there anything that he might be saying or you would
8 think was appropriate that he would say to the nursing
9 staff and to the junior staff for when the parents come
10 back?

11 A. What I would have done is ask the nursing staff to phone
12 me as soon as the parents came back so I could speak to
13 them.

14 Q. And by "speak to them", do you mean you would have
15 spoken to them on the phone or would you have wanted to
16 actually go there and see them face-to-face?

17 A. If at all possible see them face-to-face, but second
18 best would be speaking on the phone.

19 Q. Thank you. If you were doing that, what would have been
20 an appropriate amount of information to have told them
21 some time after 2, but before 5, if I can put it that
22 way?

23 A. To have told the parents?

24 Q. Yes.

25 A. More than I think I would have expected Dr Sands to have

1 said in the morning. There was evidence of
2 a neurological illness, that I think the ... Dr Webb
3 felt that there was ongoing seizure activity and that we
4 didn't entire know the cause for it, that some
5 investigations were going to be done to see if we could
6 find out what was causing it, but it was likely to be
7 due to a virus of some sort, and that we would continue
8 with giving treatment, anticonvulsant treatment, to try
9 and bring it under control.

10 Q. And then if we come to 5 o'clock, the parents are there,
11 at least the mother is there at 5 o'clock. What would
12 you have been expecting Dr Webb to have told the mother
13 at that stage?

14 A. Well, actually, more or less the same, except that by
15 this time he was considering starting specific treatment
16 for infective causes, antibiotics and acyclovir.

17 Q. Yes.

18 A. So that probably should have been mentioned as well.

19 Q. At that time, she's had more anticonvulsants and he's
20 about to suggest she start on her fourth round.
21 I appreciate that you don't think that that was
22 a pattern of medication that you would have subscribed
23 to, but leaving that aside, that is what Dr Webb is
24 doing, and in those circumstances what do you think
25 should have been conveyed to the mother?

1 A. That she was responding poorly to treatment and that
2 we were concerned.

3 Q. That's what I was coming to. How much should he have
4 communicated to the mother about his concerns about
5 Claire?

6 A. It's very difficult to quantify that. Can I just go off
7 on a slight tangent talking about communicating to
8 parents generally in any situation? One has to
9 establish what level they're at, where they're coming
10 from. For example, if a child comes in with
11 a relatively minor problem, they seem to be extremely
12 anxious, then one would emphasise to them that there's
13 nothing to worry about, the child is going to be
14 absolutely fine. This happens very frequently. If on
15 the other hand the child really is quite ill and the
16 parents seem to be somewhat unbothered and blase about
17 it, you might use different language in exactly the same
18 situation to what you would with a parent who was
19 appropriately worried.

20 So one assesses their level of anxiety and concern
21 and tries to bring them to what one considers to be
22 appropriate for that situation, either bringing them up
23 or bringing them down, if you see what I mean.

24 Q. Yes. How seriously ill, if you were doing it, would
25 you have conveyed that Claire was at that stage?

1 A. If they were not already significantly worried, I would
2 have used terms that conveyed that she was significantly
3 ill. If they were so concerned at the time that they
4 thought things were actually worse than they were, then
5 I would have perhaps made slightly more reassuring
6 noises.

7 Q. And if we go then to 9 or 9.30, the parents left at
8 about that time, some time between 9.15 and 9.30, in any
9 event after she'd had that episode of screaming at
10 9 o'clock. The mother's evidence is that they left,
11 really not understanding that Claire was seriously ill.

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. She went to the nursing station, said that Claire was
14 settled, seemed to be sleeping and that they were off,
15 and very much in that frame of mind, if I can put it
16 that way. What do you think was an appropriate
17 conversation to have had with the parents before they
18 were proposing to leave?

19 A. Well, one never wants to put pressure on parents and
20 tell them, "You absolutely have to stay", because
21 parents have their own very good reason sometimes for
22 wanting to leave even when they don't want to. But
23 I would have attempted to give the impression that
24 Claire wasn't really any better, the situation wasn't
25 improving, she was still quite ill. I might have

1 mentioned, in order to give an illustration of how
2 serious it was, that an admission to intensive care
3 during the night was a possibility. My own practice is
4 actually to mention that fairly early on, even if it may
5 not happen, just to give a sort of measure to the
6 parents of how unwell they are.

7 Q. In a way, what you're trying to convey, without
8 necessarily being prescriptive about it, that if they
9 have a choice, then staying may be an appropriate thing?

10 A. Yes. That is probably the hint I would have dropped
11 without necessarily demanding it.

12 Q. Thank you. I'd referred earlier to a book or a text
13 called the paediatric prescriber, which was put together
14 for the Royal Belfast Hospital for Sick Children.
15 There's a bit in it about parents and, as it happens,
16 status epilepticus. One finds that at 311-023-010.
17 That last bullet -- you can see the flow of it, dealing
18 with status and dealing with the seizures and the
19 medication you might be using and so on. That final
20 bullet is:

21 "Once seizure controlled, institute maintenance
22 therapy."

23 And this is the point I'm bringing you to:

24 "Keep parents informed and supported."

25 It's a very, very brief entry, I appreciate that,

1 but if any of the junior doctors were looking at this
2 because she did have or was thought to be experiencing
3 seizures -- are you of the view that in all the
4 circumstances, with the information that you had, that
5 the parents were being kept informed and supported?

6 A. I don't think they were sufficiently informed of the
7 seriousness of Claire's condition, no. I think putting
8 that in the formulary is just so obvious, it's so
9 self-evident that it's almost surprising that somebody
10 perceived the need to put that in, but clearly there is
11 a need to put it in.

12 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Roberts' concern, as he expressed it in
13 the witness box, I think a week and a half ago, was that
14 he's not sure that the seriousness of Claire's condition
15 was actually appreciated and he wonders why -- that's
16 part of the reason why he and his wife and his sons were
17 allowed to leave.

18 A. I don't know, I can't comment on to what extent it was
19 the doctors not appreciating the seriousness of her
20 condition or them failing to communicate it to the
21 family. Either way, it clearly didn't go well, and
22 I don't know which of those is the major contribution.

23 THE CHAIRMAN: It's now fairly clear to me from the evidence
24 that Dr Hughes did not appreciate it.

25 A. Yes.

1 THE CHAIRMAN: She might have come along a little bit after
2 they left and got the check done and the phenytoin level
3 and the blood test, which later came back at 121.
4 If she didn't know it, then that, to a degree, might be
5 a failing on her part, but it might also reflect back on
6 what she was told if there was any handover at
7 5 o'clock?

8 A. Yes, that's true. How unwell Claire was quite possibly
9 was not communicated adequately at the 5 o'clock
10 handover.

11 THE CHAIRMAN: And if it wasn't being adequately
12 communicated between doctors, it might also very well be
13 that the nurses weren't aware of it either?

14 A. Yes, possibly.

15 THE CHAIRMAN: Which all fits into the unhappy picture of
16 Claire slipping away and nobody grasping or identifying
17 the problem and stepping in decisively to treat her.

18 A. Yes, I would agree with that.

19 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: If we go to 5 o'clock, as the chairman
20 had you, Dr Hughes comes on duty at 5 o'clock. Dr Sands
21 has come back at that point because, as I understand it,
22 he administered the sodium valproate or signs as having
23 done that, so he is there. When I was asking you
24 earlier today about the significance of the handovers,
25 you said that the handover from the day team, if I can

1 put it that way, to the night team was perhaps more
2 significant because the night team was a more skeletal
3 service.

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Leaving aside Dr Webb discussing with the parents, what
6 should the day team have been discussing as part of the
7 handover with the incoming night team?

8 A. They should have been discussing that Claire was still
9 on ascending levels of anticonvulsants, that the
10 diagnosis still was not entirely clear, that -- well,
11 they obviously didn't appreciate it, but they should
12 have mentioned that her electrolytes had not been
13 checked recently and that she was on IV fluids and not
14 eating or drinking anything. I think I've already said
15 they should have mentioned that Dr Webb had already seen
16 and examined her and made a plan for treatment.

17 I think they should also have established between
18 them, the registrars and the SHOs, what the consultant
19 line of responsibility was. Now, I can't say it's
20 really their fault that that remained unclear, but it is
21 the sort of thing that should be and often is discussed
22 at handover. In other words, who do we phone during the
23 night if we have a problem.

24 Q. Let's stay with that point and I'll come back to
25 something else you said. For various reasons, Dr Steen

1 did not come at 5 o'clock, she also does not appear to
2 have phoned in to have been able to have a conversation
3 with Dr Webb at 5 o'clock. How should the consultants
4 amongst themselves have resolved the issue as to who is
5 going to be the person primarily responsible should
6 things develop over the evening, if I can put it that
7 way?

8 A. Well, they should have spoken to each other. It would
9 have been, I think, with a simple conversation, quite
10 easy to agree between them, but that clearly didn't
11 happen.

12 Q. And if they hadn't spoken to each other, as you thought
13 would have been helpful, through the afternoon, was
14 there not at least an important thing to resolve at
15 5 o'clock between each other as to who people should
16 have been contacting?

17 A. Yes, I think there was. Even if they hadn't spoken to
18 each other, one or other could have communicated to one
19 member of the on-call team, whether it be SHO or
20 registrar, saying, "I'm the one to call if you have
21 problems", but it appears that didn't happen.

22 Q. Yes. Then if we go back to 5 o'clock and the handover
23 between the teams, if I can put it that way. Dr Sands
24 is back, he regarded her as neurologically very unwell
25 at the ward round in the morning. He would have known

1 that there were no new blood tests taken when he was
2 carrying out the ward round. If he's looking at her
3 notes at all, which he may not have been if he was
4 literally coming in to do something and then depart, but
5 if he was looking at them at all, he would have known
6 that there weren't any new serum sodium tests done
7 during the day. She's had quite a bit of
8 anticonvulsant, four different types, or just about to
9 have her fourth different type, if I can put it that
10 way, without any significant improvement in her
11 condition. What should he have conveyed to his incoming
12 number, which is Dr Bartholome, if Dr Bartholome was
13 there to hear it?

14 A. Well, really, what I've just said, that she remained
15 unwell, she had a neurological illness for which there
16 was no definitive cause, that she was on ascending
17 levels of anticonvulsant medication, and she hadn't
18 improved.

19 Q. Can I just ask you, "remained unwell", is that a medical
20 term of art or does anyone know what that actually
21 means?

22 A. These words are bandied around all the time and they
23 mean different things to different people. I appreciate
24 that's difficult. "The sick child", "the unwell child"
25 has such a broad range of meaning. But I think when one

1 paediatrician is speaking to another, I think we have an
2 understanding of what we mean by that, which would be
3 very difficult to what a layperson might say.

4 Q. What does that mean, "remained unwell"?

5 A. It means more unwell than the other children on the
6 ward, I suppose would be one way of describing it
7 relatively. But it means a child who might require
8 intensive care and who might have a serious potentially
9 fatal or permanently handicapping condition.

10 Q. So "remained unwell" is actually quite a serious thing
11 to say about a child?

12 A. In that context, yes. If you were to speak to a GP,
13 you'd probably get a very different answer.

14 Q. So that's what Dr Sands might have been communicating to
15 Dr Bartholome if she was there. Would it have been
16 appropriate to express his view, which I believe was
17 that she was the sickest child on the ward?

18 A. Yes. I think that's a useful thing to hand over because
19 it's all about prioritisation. When you're handing over
20 a whole ward full of patients, the people coming on need
21 to know which are the ones to worry about most, to
22 devote their priorities to.

23 THE CHAIRMAN: And doctor, even though handovers were less
24 structured and more informal in 1996, if there was ever
25 a case to be handed over or ever a patient to be handed

1 over from one shift on another, it was Claire, wasn't
2 it?

3 A. Yes, and there may have been others equally, but yes.

4 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, okay. I think we'll have to stop now,
5 doctor, to let you away.

6 The doctor's agreed to make himself available on
7 Tuesday 4 December at 2 pm by video link, and we're
8 going to be sitting that week anyway. Thank you very
9 much indeed for today. If you want to leave now, you
10 can be taken to your taxi and I hope you're on time.

11 (The witness withdrew)

12 Ladies and gentlemen, I just want to say that
13 tomorrow we'll have Dr MacFaul, who is likely to be all
14 day and possibly into Wednesday. That will be the only
15 other witness this week. I think it's likely we'll go
16 into Wednesday with Dr MacFaul, but after he finishes,
17 whether it's tomorrow evening or Wednesday, there are no
18 other witnesses who we can take this week.

19 Between tonight and tomorrow, we'll try to finalise
20 a way forward for the rest of November and
21 into December. I told you last week, we're not sitting
22 next week. I think there's an issue that Mr Fortune
23 raised about when we start in the week of Monday the
24 26th, but we're working on that. We will be sitting
25 that week, it's just a question of which days that week.

1 It might be that we'll start later in the week than the
2 Monday but sit through on the Friday, but we'll let you
3 know that tomorrow. Anything more this evening?

4 MS ANYADIKE-DANES: No. Just briefly to ask, in terms of
5 the evidence that has been heard so far, just to ease
6 things along when Dr Scott-Jupp next appears, if there's
7 anything that anybody wants me to pick up, please let me
8 know, e-mail me or let me know, and then I can try and
9 get it all together so it happens more smoothly than
10 just taking things in an ad hoc way.

11 THE CHAIRMAN: I should say generally that it seems to me to
12 be essential that we finish Claire's case before
13 Christmas. I don't want this dragging on. Mr and
14 Mrs Roberts are listening to this, it must be
15 exceptionally difficult, and we want to bring an end to
16 Claire's case by Christmas and then we'll resume after
17 Christmas with the next case. There are still bits and
18 pieces about the Kirkham issue, there are still bits and
19 pieces about the availability of Dr Carson and Mr McKee;
20 I take those as important enough, but secondary to
21 getting through the other 95 per cent of the evidence in
22 Claire's case. Thank you.

23 (4.00 pm)

24 (The hearing adjourned until 10.00 am the following day)

25

I N D E X

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3 DR ROBERT SCOTT-JUPP (called)1
4 Questions from MS ANYADIKE-DANES1
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